Opinion
C.A. No. 07C-11-021 JTV.
Submitted: March 29, 2011.
Decided: June 29, 2011.
Upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.
Denied.
William D. Fletcher, Esquire and Noel E. Primos, Esquire of Schmittinger and Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Plaintiffs.
Dominick Scioli, pro se.
ORDER
The jury found Defendant liable for tortious interference with contract and defamation, and awarded $650,000 in damages. The jury instructions did not direct the jury to provide separate damage awards for the two causes of action, so it is impossible to discern how much the jury intended to award for either claim. Defendant filed post-trial motions seeking judgment as a matter of law, remittitur, or a new trial.
The Court granted Defendant's motion for a new trial after finding that Defendant had been unfairly prejudiced by the failure to instruct the jury regarding a fiduciary's privilege to take action regarding the contracts of his beneficiary for the beneficiary's benefit. The Court determined that the facts of the case overwhelmingly indicate that the privilege should apply, and thus the verdict on the intentional interference with contract claim was against the great weight of the evidence.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 770 (1979).
The Court held that a new trial should be held on the issue of damages for defamation because the failure to allocate damages in the verdict makes it impossible to determine how much of the award was intended to compensate Plaintiffs for their defamation claim-as opposed to the clearly insufficient intentional interference with contract claim. The Court also granted a new trial on the tortious interference with contract claim in order to avoid manifest injustice. Plaintiffs have filed a motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
Rachael Pennington ("Pennington") and Kendra Todd ("Todd") (jointly "Plaintiffs"), worked together as a sales team at Synergy Direct Mortgage, Inc. (Synergy) from mid 2005 until November 2006. Plaintiffs were classified as independent contractors rather than employees. Dominick Scioli ("Defendant"), Synergy's chief executive officer, terminated Plaintiffs after an incident on November 22, 2006. The termination and its aftermath led to an action for defamation and intentional interference with contractual relations. The undisputed facts are as follows.On November 22, 2006, Eric Glass, Synergy's chief operating officer, remotely monitored Pennington's use of her company computer. Glass testified that he was alarmed to discover that Pennington was violating company policy regarding data confidentiality by e-mailing "a substantial amount of files" to multiple email accounts. He testified that several of the email addresses appeared to belong to Pennington and Todd, but one email address appeared to belong to another mortgage company. Glass immediately informed Defendant of Pennington's activity. Two other Synergy officers, Mario Glover and Siobhen Merritt, were called into Defendant's office and informed of the incident. The Synergy officers conferred for between an hour to an hour and a half, and then Defendant called Pennington into his office. According to Glass, Defendant immediately asked Pennington why she had been "stealing from [him]." Glass testified that Pennington sat in shocked silence and offered no reply. Defendant terminated Pennington and, subsequently, Todd because he believed he had caught them in the act of stealing confidential company information.
Defendant mailed letters to clients who had worked with Plaintiffs. The letters state that he had fired Plaintiffs "for cause" for violating confidentiality, that a "cease and desist order had been issued," and legal action against Plaintiffs was "pending." The letters were not factually accurate. In fact, no cease and desist order had been issued and there was no pending legal action against Plaintiffs. It was also alleged that Defendant made oral statements to clients along the same lines as the letters.
Standard of Review
A Rule 59(e) motion for reargument will only be granted if it is shown that the Court overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have controlling effect, or that it has misapprehended the law or the facts such as would affect the outcome of the decision. Motions for reargument should not be used merely to rehash the arguments already decided by the court.
Woodward v. Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co., 2001 WL 1456865 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2001).
See Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458 (Del. 1979) (providing a historical analysis of the power of trial courts to grant a new trial).
DISCUSSION
For the reasons outlined in the Order granting a new trial, the Court remains convinced that the verdict on the tortious interference with contract claim is against the great weight of the evidence and would result in manifest injustice if it were permitted to stand. Therefore, the Court stands by its decision to grant a new trial on the tortious interference with contract claim. The Court finds no basis for upsetting the jury's finding that Defendant committed defamation. However, it is necessary to hold a new trial on the limited issue of damages for defamation because the jury award was not allocated between the defamation claim and the unsupportable tortious interference with contract claim.CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion is denied .
IT IS SO ORDERED.