Opinion
2:22-cv-03178-BHH-MGB
12-15-2022
Timothy Pennington, Jr., #388561, Plaintiff, v. Cherokee County Jail; Steve Mueller; and Nurse Lydia, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Timothy Pennington, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
In the instant case, Plaintiff claims that Sheriff Steve Mueller, Nurse Lydia, and the Cherokee County Detention Center (collectively, “Defendants”) violated his Eighth Amendment rights on or around August 2, 2022, when they allegedly “shipped [him] to SCDC knowing that [he] tested positive for COVID-19 without informing [him].” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Despite testing positive, Plaintiff claims that he was not “separated” from other inmates, “nor did [he] receive any treatment.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff contends that he could have died “from this situation” and is therefore “requesting money damages in the amount of fifty thousand dollars.” (Id.) This is the extent of the Complaint.
On October 7, 2022, the undersigned issued an order (Dkt. No. 5) notifying Plaintiff that the Court could not authorize service of process in his case until he filed a set of proposed service documents and a properly completed Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (“Form AO 240”), which is construed as a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.Under General Order, In Re: Procedures in Civil Actions Filed by Prisoner Pro Se Litigants, No. 3:07-mc-5014-JFA (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2007), the undersigned gave Plaintiff twenty-one days to bring his case into proper form by submitting the outstanding documents, which he did on October 31, 2022. (See Dkt. Nos. 8, 9, 9-1.) With the case in substantially proper form, the undersigned issued a second order (Dkt. No. 10) on November 7, 2022, granting Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2).
Although Plaintiff had already filed a Form AO 240, he had failed to respond to Question Nos. 3-8 on the application. (See Dkt. No. 2.) The accompanying financial certificate was also incomplete, as it did not fully answer the questions regarding the status of Plaintiff's inmate account. (See Dkt. No. 2-1.) Consequently, Plaintiff's application did not contain the necessary information to allow this Court to determine whether he had sufficient funds to prepay the filing fee here.
In that same order, the undersigned explained to Plaintiff that the granting of his in forma pauperis status triggered the Court's duty under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to review the Complaint for frivolousness and/or failure to state a claim. (See Dkt. No. 10 at 1-2.) The undersigned then informed Plaintiff that, based on an initial review, the Complaint was likely subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 2-3.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him twenty-one days to cure the identified pleading deficiencies by filing an amended complaint with the Court. The undersigned explicitly warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with these instructions within the time prescribed by the order would result in summary dismissal. (Id. at 3.) Despite this warning, Plaintiff has not filed an amended pleading or responded to the undersigned's second order in any way, and the time to do so has lapsed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, to state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show two essential elements: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The undersigned finds that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to raise a plausible claim under § 1983 for several reasons.
At the outset, inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not “persons” and do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. See Sumpter v. Georgetown Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 0:20-cv-1770-JMC-PJG, 2020 WL 3060395, at *2 (D.S.C. June 8, 2020). Accordingly, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff (see Dkt. No. 10 at 2), the Cherokee County Detention Center is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the “physical building” or the “staff and collection of officials it houses.” Studley v. Watford, No. 3:16-cv-439-JMC-PJG, 2016 WL 2893157, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 2853546 (D.S.C. May 16, 2016); see also Barnes v. Bakersville Corr. Ctr. Med. Staff, No. 3:07-cv-195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff must name specific staff members to state a claim against a “person” as required under § 1983). Consequently, any such claims against the Cherokee County Detention Center are subject to summary dismissal.
Second, a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017). To that end, the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior generally are not applicable in § 1983 actions. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
Here, Plaintiff does not specify how Defendants Mueller and/or Lydia were involved in the purported deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights. In fact, beyond the cursory allegation that Plaintiff did not receive treatment for his COVID-19 diagnosis, the Complaint provides no factual support whatsoever regarding Plaintiff's medical needs during the time in question. While the federal pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 at 678; see also Garner v. Cohen, No. 2:16-cv-561-TLW-MGB, 2016 WL 9175627, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2016) (finding complaint's “vague references to [Pro se] Plaintiff's rights being violated, absent any specific facts or allegations against the Defendants, [were] wholly insufficient to state any sort of plausible claim”), adopted, 2017 WL 2645754 (D.S.C. June 20, 2017). And without any factual allegations regarding Defendants' personal roles in the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the claims against them are plainly subject to summary dismissal.
As the undersigned explained to Plaintiff (see Dkt. No. 10 at 2-3 n. 1), to demonstrate a constitutional violation based on inadequate medical treatment, the plaintiff must show that, objectively, he had a serious medical need and that, subjectively, the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. As to the first prong, a “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). As to the second prong, a claim of deliberate indifference requires a showing that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014).
The undersigned notes that the Complaint also seems to suggest that Defendants may have violated other inmates' rights by failing to separate Plaintiff from the general population. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6, asserting that that Defendants “put . . . others at risk” when they failed to remove Plaintiff from the general inmate population.) However, it is well-established that Plaintiff cannot pursue a lawsuit or claims on behalf of other inmates. See Davis v. Boome, No. 1:14-cv-422-TLW, 2015 WL 1538318, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 6, 2015); see also Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that a prisoner cannot act as a “knight-errant” for others). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring claims based on the purported health risks to other inmates, they are likewise subject to summary dismissal.
Finally, the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 damages claims against state prison officials in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against the State, as well as its agencies, divisions, departments, officials, and other “arms of the State”); Fordham v. Bachman, No. 2:16-cv-249-RMG-MGB, 2016 WL 11409542, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 1688743 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2016) (finding prison officials immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment as arms of the State). Plaintiff's request for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities are therefore precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. (See Dkt. No. 10 at 3.)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed without further leave to amend, as Plaintiff has already had the opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018). The Clerk of Court shall not issue the summonses or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).