Summary
dismissing claims brought by private parties under the Consumer Fraud Act and Deceptive Trade Practices Act for non-compliance with the three-year limitations period applicable to such claims under 10 Del. C. § 8106
Summary of this case from State ex Rel. Brady v. Pettinaro EnterOpinion
No. 03C-12-022-FSS.
Submitted: April 1, 2004.
Decided: July 30, 2004.
Upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss — GRANTED
Renee D. Veney, Esquire, Kimmel Silverman, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Tracy A. Burleigh, Esquire, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman Goggin, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant.
OPINION and ORDER
This case involves an automobile, and alleged violations of both Delaware and federal, consumer protection statutes. Plaintiff's car developed a problem, which persisted almost from when he bought it until after his extended warranty expired. After Plaintiff had driven 75,000 miles, and the warranty ended, Plaintiff filed suit for the car's contract price plus nearly triple that amount in statutory damages, $100,000. This decision addresses when causes of action accrue under various consumer laws, for statute of limitations purposes.
In Delaware, actions based on statutory violations are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Further, actions based on the federal Magnuson-Moss Act are governed by the four-year statute of limitations in Delaware's Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-725(1). Plaintiff's claims were filed outside all arguably applicable limitations periods, including strictly hypothetical ones used by the court merely for argument's sake. Because of this, and the fact that Plaintiff's warranties are not the kind that actually extend the statute of limitations, Plaintiff's claims are barred.
10 Del. C. § 8106.
I.
On March 10, 1999, Plaintiff, Lavon Pender, purchased a new 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee from Gambacorta Chrysler Jeep, one of Defendant DaimlerChrysler's authorized dealers. Along with the car, Plaintiff acquired a standard warranty providing that Defendant promised to cover the cost of parts and labor to repair components defective in material, workmanship or factory preparation for three years or 36,000 miles, whichever occurred first. Also, Plaintiff purchased a service contract, effective when the basic warranty expired. The service contract was for six years or 75,000 miles, whichever came first, and provided that Defendant promised to pay the total cost for parts and labor to correct defects in materials or workmanship, less a fifty-dollar deductible per visit.
The car had various problems — the remote in March 1999, ashtray and wiper blades in September 1999, seat frame in August 2001 and blower fan in January 2002. Each time Plaintiff returned the car to the dealer. Plaintiff also complained twice about a stalling problem in July and September, 1999.
More importantly, Plaintiff first encountered what would become an ongoing idling problem on July 20, 1999. Plaintiff took the car back to the dealer, and again on October 1, 1999, October 29, 1999, November 12, 1999 and November 17, 1999. On all but one occasion the dealer verified that the idling problem existed and attempted repair. Plaintiff was never charged for the repairs. Plaintiff complained again about the idling problem on November 15, 2001, and for the last time on July 8, 2003. By then, the car was over four years old and it had 74,906 miles. It also still has the idling problem. Presumably, the 2003 repair visit was meant to establish that the problem that existed in 1999 and which was worked on through 2001 was still extant when the warranty expired.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant's failure to repair the car's defects violates Delaware's Automobile Warranty Act, and in turn, Delaware's Consumer Fraud Act, and the federal Magnuson-Moss Act. Plaintiff further contends that, as a result of Defendant's misrepresentations about the car and attendant warranty, Defendant violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Defendant counters simply that all of Plaintiff's claims are barred by applicable statutes of limitations. According to Defendant, Plaintiff filed suit after any remotely conceivable limitations period. Plaintiff retorts that Defendant's repeated attempts to fix the car tolled the limitations period. According to Plaintiff the limitations period did not begin to run until the last repair attempt or the warranty's expiration in 2003. Thus, Plaintiff had until 2006 or 2007 to file suit concerning the problem that appeared in 1999.
II.
Procedurally, on December 2, 2003, Pender filed a complaint against DaimlerChrysler alleging, as mentioned, violations of four statutes in connection of his purchase of the Jeep Grand Cherokee: Delaware's Automobile Warranty Act, or Lemon Law, Consumer Fraud Act and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the federal Magnuson-Moss Act. Chrysler filed a motion to dismiss on January 2, 2004 and Pender answered on January 20, 2004. Oral argument on the motion to dismiss was held on February 19, 2004. Subsequently, on March 11, 2004, Chrysler filed an opening brief in support of its motion. On March 26, 2004, Pender filed an answering brief in opposition to Chrysler's motion, and Chrysler completed the motion practice by filing a reply brief on April 1, 2004.
6 Del. C. § 5001, et seq.
6 Del. C. § 2511, et seq.
6 Del. C. § 2531, et seq.
15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq.
III.
Under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss is appropriate where plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. All allegations made in the complaint must be accepted as true. The complaint can only be dismissed if it is without merit as to a matter of fact or law. A motion to dismiss must be denied, however, if plaintiff may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances. Where a defendant supports its pleading with affidavits and depositions, the motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.
American Insurance Company v. Material Transit, Incorporated, 446 A.2d 1101, 1102 (Del.Super.Ct. 1982).
Diamond State Telephone Company v. University of Delaware, 269 A.2d 52, 58 (D el. 1970).
Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978) (citing Klein v. Sunbeam Corporation, 94 A.2d 385, 391 (Del. 1952)).
Shultz v. Delaware Trust Company, 360 A.2d 576, 578 (Del.Super.Ct. 1976) (citing Brown v. Colonial Chevrolet Company, 249 A.2d 439, 441-42 (Del.Super.Ct. 1968)).
IV.
As mentioned, the issue is whether Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statutes of limitations, three years as to Plaintiff's state law-based claims and four years as to his Magnuson-Moss Act claim. Each of the claims is indeed barred. The "Lemon Law," Consumer Fraud Act and Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims are barred by § 8106 of Title 10, and the Magnuson-Moss Act claim by § 2-725(1) of Title 6. Because the warranty is for repair or replacement, and not future performance, the four-year limitations period in § 2-725(1) applies and is not extended under the "future performance" exception.A. Three-Year Statute of Limitations
Section 8106 states:
. . . no action based on a statute . . . shall be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the accruing of the cause of such action. . . .
10 Del. C. § 8106. See generally Butler v. Butler, 222 A.2d 269, 272 (Del. 1966) (confining "action based on a statute" to actions to recover money or property where new right created by statute).
The three-year period begins to run when a cause of action accrues. A cause of action accrues on the date plaintiff can first bring an action. Put another way, the limitations period "begins to run at the time of the wrongful act."
Dofflemyer v. W.F. Hall Printing Company, 558 F. Supp. 372, 379 (D.Del. 1983).
Curran v. Time Insurance Company, 644 F. Supp. 967, 972 (D .Del. 1986). See gene rally 6 Del. C. § 5002 (Lemon Law duty to rep air applies only after consumer reports nonconformity to seller within one year of automobile's delivery).
David B. Lilly Company, Incorporated v. Fisher, 18 F.3d 1112, 1117 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff's Lemon Law claim most likely accrued on July 20, 1999, the date he reported the idling problem to the dealer. Before then, Plaintiff had not experienced major problems with the car and he could not have thought bringing suit would be necessary. When Plaintiff first reported the idling problem, however, he triggered the Lemon Law and the three-year limitations period under § 8106 began to run. Plaintiff's suit, filed December 2, 2003, is outside the limitations period by more than a year.
Plaintiff's Consumer Fraud Act cause of action is similarly barred by the statute of limitations. A violation of the Lemon Law automatically constitutes a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. Assuming that Defendant violated the Lemon Law, Plaintiff's July 20, 1999 Lemon Law accrual date is the Consumer Fraud Act accrual date. Again, because Plaintiff filed suit on December 2, 2003, he was late by more than a year.
Plaintiff's Deceptive Trade Practices Act cause of action is likewise barred, but in a slightly different time frame. Plaintiff alleges the statute was violated when Defendant made incorrect representations about the vehicle's characteristics and quality, and that repairs would be made under the warranty. Those representations are generally made at the time of purchase. The wrongful act occurred, and the statute of limitations began to run, then, on the car's purchase date, March 10, 1999. Moreover, the idling problem, reported by Plaintiff on July 20, 1999, implicitly contradicted representations concerning quality made by Defendant when the car was sold. Therefore, at the latest, Plaintiff was required to bring this claim by July 20, 2002.
B. "Time of Discovery" Rule Inapplicable
Even a gratuitous, lenient application of the Lemon Law does not save Plaintiff. Under the law:
(a) It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken to conform a new automobile to the manufacturer's express warranty if . . .:
(1) [s]ubstantially the same nonconformity has been subject to repair or correction 4 or more times by the manufacturer, its agents or its dealers and the nonconformity continues to exist. . . .
Here, Plaintiff returned the car to the dealer five times between July 20, 1999 and November 17, 1999 for the idling problem. After the fifth failed repair attempt, if not before, Plaintiff undeniably knew that the car's idling problem was a continually existing nonconformity.
Relying on Pack Process, Incorporated v. Celotex Corporation, Plaintiff essentially argues that the "time of discovery" rule applies to his three, state law-based claims. That rule provides for tolling of the statute of limitations where "an injury was inherently unknowable" and the "injured party . . . was blamelessly ignorant." In Pack Process, the injury was inherently unknowable to plaintiff. There, defendant roof manufacturer's agents, using their expertise, were contractually required to determine whether a defect existed. Because plaintiff in Pack Process did not have expertise, any injury there was inherently unknowable to plaintiff. Further, plaintiff was deemed blamelessly ignorant of the problem's severity because defendant represented that necessary repairs were a result of ordinary wear and tear when in fact they were not.
503 A.2d 646 (Del.Super.Ct. 1985).
Id. at 650.
Unlike Pack Process, the injury here was not inherently unknowable and Plaintiff was not blamelessly ignorant. On the contrary, Plaintiff's repeatedly returning the car to the dealer undeniably establishes that Plaintiff was aware of the nonconformity, before the fifth repair attempt. But, even assuming arguendo that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until after the fifth repair attempt on November 17, 1999, Plaintiff still missed the deadline by more than a year.
C. Magnuson-Moss Act
Remaining is Plaintiff's Magnuson-Moss Act claim. That Act, inter alia, is tied to Delaware's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, and claims brought under the Act are governed by the statute of limitations in the UCC. Section 6 Del. C. § 2-725 of Title 6 states:
6 Del. C. § 1-101, et seq.
Dalton v. Ford Motor Company, Del. Super., C.A. No. 00C-09-155, Carpenter, J. (Feb. 28, 2002).
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued . . .
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made. . . .
6 Del. C. § 2-725. See also Wilson v. Class, 1992 WL 68920, at *3 (Del.Super.) (warranty limitations period accrues on date defendant charged with breach tenders delivery of goods).
The "time of discovery" rule has not been extended to warranty cases. Rather, the purchase date is paramount.
See generally Kaufman v. C.L. McCabe Sons, Incorporated, 603 A.2d 831, 835 (Del. 1992) (where injury is "inherently unknowable" and plaintiff is "blamelessly ignorant," limitation period does not begin running until plaintiff has reason to know wrong committed).
SR Associates, L.P. v. Shell Oil Company, 725 A.2d 431, 435 (Del.Super.Ct. 1998) (citing Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Incorporated, 698 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D.Del. 1988)).
SR Associates, 725 A.2d at 435 (citing Harvey v. Sears, Roebuck Company, 315 A.2d 599, 601 (Del.Super.Ct. 1973)).
Plaintiff's Magnuson-Moss Act claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant tendered delivery of Plaintiff's car on March 10, 1999. Thus, any breach occurred on that date. Plaintiff was required under 6 Del. C. § 2-725 to file an action by March 10, 2003. The "time of discovery" rule does not apply to this, a warranty case. But even if the rule applied, Plaintiff would still have missed the deadline. Using Pack Process's reasoning, the statute of limitations would have begun to run on this claim November 17, 1999. Plaintiff filed suit more than two weeks after November 17, 2003, the hypothetical deadline.
D. "Future Performance" Exception Inapplicable
Plaintiff's final argument, that this case falls within the "future performance" exception to § 2-725, is equally unavailing. Section 2-725, subsection 2, states:
. . . where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Systems, Incorporated is helpful. In that case, a contract between buyer and seller for expansion joints included language requiring that, if at any time up to twelve months following acceptance of the equipment by the buyer the equipment should succumb to defects, the seller had to repair all defects. Ontario Hydro held that this was a repair or replacement warranty, not a future performance warranty. Essentially, a future performance warranty must "expressly provide some form of guarantee that the product will perform in the future as promised." Conversely, a repair or replacement warranty merely provides that "if a product fails or becomes defective, the seller will replace or repair" the product. Distinguishing between the two, a repair or replacement warranty "merely provides a remedy if the product becomes defective," while a future performance warranty " guarantees the performance of the product itself. . . ."
569 F. Supp. 1261 (D.Del. 1983).
Id. at 1266.
Id.
Id.
The warranties here are repair or replacement warranties. Even though Plaintiff purchased an extended, service contract, the "future performance" exception is inapplicable. Under the limited express warranty of three years or 36,000 miles, whichever occurred first, Defendant agreed to cover the cost of parts and labor needed to repair any defective, covered component. Similarly, under the service contract of six years or 75,000 miles, whichever occurred first, Defendant agreed to pay the total cost to correct any defective, covered component. The warranties do not include performance assurances by Defendant or guarantees that repairs will be unnecessary. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations as explained above.
V.
In closing, the court understands the dilemma with which Plaintiff was confronted. Anyone who has owned a car with an ongoing problem appreciates the inconvenience and frustration Plaintiff experienced. Deciding to forsake the service department and go to court is daunting. Nevertheless, the statute of limitations does not let consumers have it both ways. Absent misrepresentations or fraud, which are not alleged here, plaintiffs cannot wait five years and put 75,000 miles on a "lemon" before filing suit. They must go to court in the proper time frame.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismissis GRANTED.