Summary
holding that liability for unjust enrichment may accrue, ‘[w]here, as in the present case, no express contractual relationship exists between the parties'
Summary of this case from Tamposi v. DenbyOpinion
No. 89-198
Decided August 27, 1990
1. Restitution — Unjust Enrichment Doctrine of unjust enrichment is that one shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself at expense of another contrary to equity; hence where no express contractual relationship exists between the parties, a trial court may require an individual to make restitution for unjust enrichment if he has received a benefit that would be unconscionable to retain.
2. Restitution — Unjust Enrichment Trial court's determination as to whether facts and equities of case require restitution for unjust enrichment will generally be deferred to on appeal unless determination is unsupported by the record.
3. Restitution — Unjust Enrichment In action by construction subcontractor claiming that, although it had no express contractual relationship with defendant homeowners, defendants nonetheless received and retained windows supplied by subcontractor and failed to pay for them and were thus liable under a theory of unjust enrichment, superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding in favor of defendant homeowners, since under all the circumstances homeowners were not enriched at the expense of subcontractor, and their retention of windows was not unconscionable.
4. Appeal and Error — Reversal — Grounds In a bench trial in which a subcontractor sought recovery for unjust enrichment, the superior court's failure to produce a written opinion, even if error, did not prejudice subcontractor's case and therefore did not justify reversal. RSA 491:15.
5. Appeal and Error — Reversal — Grounds In a bench trial in which subcontractor sought recovery for unjust enrichment, superior court's admission of certain bank records, even if error, did not prejudice subcontractor's case and therefore did not justify reversal.
Rinden Professional Association, of Concord (Paul A. Rinden on the brief and orally), for the plaintiff.
Marshall D. Hickok, of Manchester, by brief and orally, for the defendants.
The facts underlying this action are discussed in Pella Windows and Doors, Inc. v. St. Mary's Bank, which we also decide today. The plaintiff, Pella Windows and Doors, Inc. (Pella) claims that although it had no express contractual relationship with Jack and Cheryl Faraci, these defendants nonetheless received and retained windows supplied by Pella, failed to pay Pella for them, and are therefore liable to Pella for the cost of the windows under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. After a bench trial, the Superior Court (Goode, J.) held in favor of the Faracis, and Pella appealed. We affirm.
[1, 2] "The doctrine of unjust enrichment is that one shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself at the expense of another contrary to equity." Cohen v. Frank Developers, Inc., 118 N.H. 512, 518, 389 A.2d 933, 937 (1978) (quoting American University v. Forbes, 88 N.H. 17, 19-20, 183 A. 860, 862 (1936)). Where, as in the present case, no express contractual relationship exists between the parties, "a trial court may require an individual to make restitution for unjust enrichment if he has received a benefit [that] would be unconscionable to retain." Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 127, 441 A.2d 1167, 1171 (1982). Unless it is unsupported by the record, we generally defer to the trial court's determination as to "whether the facts and equities of a particular case [warrant]" such a remedy. R. Zoppo Co., Inc. v. City of Manchester, 122 N.H. 1109, 1113, 453 A.2d 1311, 1314 (1982).
The record provides ample evidence that the Faracis' retention of the windows was not unconscionable; the Faracis spent well in excess of their originally anticipated construction costs — costs that were to have included expenditures for the windows in question, and which, according to Mr. Faraci, did include such expenditures. Furthermore, since the Faracis' excess expenditures were approximately double the amount claimed by Pella as unjust enrichment, it is reasonable to conclude that Pella actually fared better than did the Faracis when all was said and done. In weighing the equities, therefore, it is difficult to see in what sense the Faracis profited from, or enriched themselves by, any benefit they may have received at the expense of Pella. Thus, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding in favor of the Faracis.
[4, 5] Pella also assigns error to the superior court's failure to produce a written opinion, RSA 491:15, and to its admission of certain bank records over the plaintiff's hearsay objection, N.H. Rs. Ev. 802, 803(6). Neither the superior court's omission, nor its evidentiary ruling, if error, was prejudicial to Pella's case, and neither, therefore, would justify reversal. See Attorney General v. Morgan, 132 N.H. 406, 408, 565 A.2d 1072, 1074 (1989).
Affirmed.
HORTON, J., did not sit.