Opinion
No. 01-CV-72993-DT
October 31, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice. Neither party responded to the other's motion. The Court finds that the parties have adequately set forth the relevant law and facts and oral argument would not aid in the disposition of the instant motion. See E.D. MICH. L.R. 7.1(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the motion be decided on the briefs submitted. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED; Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1998, Plaintiff sued the UAW International, alleging that his September 1997 removal as president of UAW Local 140 was political retaliation by UAW International President Stephen Yokich for Plaintiff's failure to "support and endorse a candidate for office that President Yakich wanted him to support." Plaintiff complained that President Yokich and the International Union violated article 48, section 5 of the UAW Constitution when they removed him from office.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, maintaining that Plaintiff was removed because an audit determined that Plaintiff had misappropriated union funds by receiving income in excess of the allowable compensation for a local union president. As a result of the investigation, the insurance company who bonded Plaintiff in his position as local president cancelled the bond. Because Plaintiff was no longer bonded, President Yokich was required to remove Plaintiff from his position as president of the Local 140. Plaintiff mentioned in his brief that he entered into a repayment agreement on August 1, 1997, after the investigation started but before he was removed. Plaintiff alleged that he agreed to repay the excess compensation and that no disciplinary action would be taken against him. The agreement was signed by the assistant director of the auditing department of the UAW International and Plaintiff. Plaintiff's 1998 lawsuit, however, was based squarely on the UAW Constitution and not the repayment agreement.
After Plaintiff was removed, he initiated the intra-union appeals process to review President Yokich's decision. The International Executive Board (hereinafter "IEB") held a hearing and denied Plaintiff's appeal. Plaintiff was then granted a hearing in front of the Public Review Board (hereinafter "PRB"). The PRB's final decision was pending at the time the Court decided the issues in Plaintiff's 1998 case.
On May 6, 1999, the Court issued an opinion and order and found that Plaintiff should have exhausted his intra-union remedies before bringing suit in federal court. Further, the Court addressed the merits of the dispute and found that President Yokich's action in removing Plaintiff was reasonable and did not violate the UAW Constitution.
On October 6, 2000, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Wayne County Circuit Court alleging that Defendants violated the repayment agreement by removing him from office. Plaintiff also alleged state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty and defamation. Defendants subsequently removed the action to this Court and the state law claims were remanded to Wayne County Circuit Court. On February 27, 2001, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in this Court, again asserting that Defendants violated article 48, section 5 of the UAW Constitution and the repayment agreement when they removed him from office.
On March 1, 2001, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the state court action concerning the breach of fiduciary duty and defamation claims that were remanded by this Court. In the amended complaint in state court, Plaintiff re-alleged the two remanded state claims and once again asserted that Defendants breached the UAW Constitution. Plaintiff also added one claim for fraud and intentional misrepresentation and one claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On March 29, 2001, Defendants again removed the action to this Court. On May 21, 2001, the Court once again remanded the breach of fiduciary duty and defamation claims. The Court retained jurisdiction over the claim alleging a breach of the UAW Constitution because it fell within the purview of this Court's original jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 185. The Court also retained jurisdiction over the fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims as they were preempted by the federal labor claim. Because there were two identical breach of contract actions pending before this Court, both actions were consolidated and the parties agreed at a May 30, 2001 scheduling conference to be bound by the Court's decision on the parties' briefs filed in the first federal action.
The Court found in its June 14, 2001 Opinion and Order that Plaintiff's breach of contract action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Concomitantly, the Court remanded Plaintiff's state law claims of fraud and intentional misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant's filed a motion for reconsideration, and on July 11, 2001, the Court vacated its earlier decision remanding Plaintiff's state law claims. The Court entered a new order, this time dismissing Plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice.
Plaintiff makes a motion to remand, effectively objecting to the Court's July 11, 2001 opinion and order. Conversely, Defendant also effectively objects to the Court's July 11, 2001 opinion and order, arguing in its motion that Plaintiff's claims should have been dismissed with prejudice.
III. ANALYSIS
On July 11, 2001, after considering the materials submitted by Defendants on their motion for reconsideration, the Court ordered that dismissal of Plaintiff's claims of fraud and intentional misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, rather than remanding them to the state court, was proper. Plaintiff contests the Court's dismissal of those claims in its Motion to Remand. Plaintiff argues that his fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims do not require the collective bargaining agreement to be interpreted, and therefore, those claims are not preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 185.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are preempted by § 301. Suits that arise out of contracts between employers and labor organizations may be brought in federal court, despite the fact that the federal courts may not have independent jurisdiction to hear a claim on the underlying contract. See 28 U.S.C. § 185; Textile Workers Union of Am. Lincoln Mill of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451-52 (1957). The Supreme Court explained that § 301 is also substantive because it provides one forum in which labor employment contracts may be interpreted, thus allowing for uniform interpretation. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1985). Extending that rationale, the Supreme Court held that not only are the actual labor agreements pre-empted by § 301, but state law claims that turn upon interpretation of the labor agreement, or, as the Supreme Court put it, claims that are "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract," are pre-empted as well. Id. at 213.
Here, Plaintiff's first claim, fraud and intentional misrepresentation, is based on alleged misrepresentations made by Defendants to induce Plaintiff to sign a repayment agreement. The repayment agreement is a "contract" under § 301. See In re General Motors Corp., 3 F.3d 980, 983 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The term `contract' as used in section 301 of the LMRA is not limited to collective bargaining agreements, but can embrace understandings other than those usually understood as collective bargaining agreements."). Therefore, Plaintiff's claim turns on interpretation of a § 301 contract, and is thus preempted. See Adkins v. General Motors Corp., 946 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff's claims of fraud and misrepresentation based upon union president's statements were "so intertwined with the terms of the collective bargaining agreements present in the case that they may not be separated" from the § 301 claim and are therefore preempted) (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213).
Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress stems from allegations that Defendants intentionally and wrongfully caused Plaintiff's bond to be revoked in violation of the repayment agreement. Therefore, this claim is also preempted by § 301. See DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that "section 301 preempted the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.")
Because these claims are preempted by § 301, they are also barred by res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata exists to put an end to litigation, and does so by barring relitigation on every issue actually litigated or which could have been raised with respect to that claim. See Westwood Chem. Co. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1981). The Court held in its June 14, 2001 opinion that Plaintiff was barred from bringing his breach of contract action because "Plaintiff in this case is attempting to present the `same alleged transactional injuries' pleaded in 1998 under a different legal theory in 2001." Pearson v. UAW Intern. Union, No. 00-CV-74765-DT; 01-CV-71222, 2001 WL 914294, *4 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Plaintiff's fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims turn on the same events and § 301 contract that were addressed in the June 14, 2001 opinion of this Court. Both claims are premised on events relating to the repayment agreement that was signed in 1997, and the termination that also occurred in 1997. Clearly, Plaintiff could have raised these preempted claims when he filed his initial complaint in 1998. As a result, it was proper for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claims, as opposed to remanding them.
Defendant argues in a motion that not only should Plaintiff's claims have been dismissed, but they should have been dismissed with prejudice. Defendant argues that failure to dismiss Plaintiff's claims with prejudice will allow Plaintiff to repeatedly re-file his claims, despite the fact that he is barred from doing so. The Court agrees, and notes that Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint in the Wayne County Circuit Court on July 25, 2001, alleging, among other things, a slightly modified version of the same claims for fraud and intentional misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress that are barred by res judicata. Because the doctrine of res judicata exists to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication," Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980), the Court can best promote those ends of res judicata by dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.
Plaintiff also argues that the Court lacked the ability to reconsider its order of June 14, 2001, in which the Court remanded Plaintiff's fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. The Court has no opinion on that issue because it is moot. Plaintiff's claims are currently before this Court again on Plaintiff's second amended complaint. See Order of August 30, 2001. The Court currently has jurisdiction to rule on these claims, and holds that it is proper to dismiss with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENTED; Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.