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finding that the plaintiff's uncharged claim was not reasonably related to charge where plaintiff presented "no factual allegations" prompting state agency to investigate unrelated claims
Summary of this case from Walsh v. Dendar, LLCOpinion
No. 1:02-cv-142.
September 16, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Sammy R. Pearison ("Pearison"), an African-American, brings this action claiming race discrimination in employment. It is not clear from the complaint whether the race discrimination claim is being asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), or the Tennessee Human Rights Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-101-4-21-401, or both. For purposes of this memorandum opinion, the Court infers that Pearison probably intends to make a race discrimination claim under both Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act.
Pearison also makes a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., which forbids employment discrimination against qualified disabled individuals and imposes a duty on employers to make reasonable accommodations to known physical or mental limitations. Pearison contends he is a "50% disabled vet" but he does not explain the precise nature of his alleged disability. In his motion for summary judgment [Court File No. 5], Pearison merely says he was injured in the United States military service while on active duty without describing the injury.
Pearison is not represented by an attorney. As a general rule, pro se complaints are liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 903 (6th Cir. 1992); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f) provides that all complaints shall be construed so as to do substantial justice. However, the Court is not required to invent and conjure up claims for pro se plaintiffs. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). While pro se plaintiffs are held to less stringent and somewhat more relaxed standards of drafting pleadings than licensed attorneys, the federal courts are not willing to go so far as to abrogate and ignore basic pleading requirements in pro se cases. Even the most inexperienced, novice pro se litigants are required to meet the minimum pleading standards required by the FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Id.; see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
I. Defendant's Name Corrected
The complaint names Pinkerton Security Service as a defendant. The defendant states there is no corporate entity known as Pinkerton's Security Service and this defendant's correct name is actually Pinkerton's, Inc. [Court File No. 2]. Accordingly, the style of this action is CORRECTED and REVISED to reflect that the plaintiff is suing Pinkerton's, Inc. and not Pinkerton Security Service.
II. Pending Motions
There are three motions before the Court. Pearison moves for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. [Court File No. 5]. After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that the motion is not well taken and it is DENIED.
Defendant Pinkerton's, Inc. ("Pinkerton") moves pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the plaintiff's ADA claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the alternative, Pinkerton moves pursuant to Rule 56 for partial summary judgment to dismiss the ADA claim. [Court File No. 6]. The motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED and the ADA claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 56. Pearison did not timely file an administrative complaint with either the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or the Tennessee Human Rights Commission ("THRC") concerning his ADA claim. Pearison has not exhausted his administrative remedies on the ADA claim. The ADA claim is beyond the scope of the administrative complaint that Pearison filed with THRC alleging race discrimination, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the ADA claim.
Pinkerton also moves pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) that Pearison be required to provide a more definite statement of his Title VII complaint regarding alleged race discrimination in employment. [Court File No. 5]. The motion for more definite statement is GRANTED.
III. Standard of Review — Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; National Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907.
IV. Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion [Court File No. 5]
Pearison's ADA claim is being DISMISSED. Consequently, the Court will focus its attention here only on the claim of race discrimination in employment. Pearison has not met his initial burden under Rule 56 of demonstrating that there are no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Pearison does not submit any proof in support of his motion in the proper form in accordance with Rule 56. He has not submitted any sworn affidavits or depositions. The parties have not yet undertaken discovery. There are attached to Pearison's motion various documents but none of the documents are authenticated and made part of an affidavit or deposition. The Court cannot consider such unauthenticated documents and records as admissible proof under Rule 56 and the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Moreover, Pearison has not stated any valid reason why he should be entitled to summary judgment based on the facts and the applicable law. The reasons given by Pearison are insufficient to justify the Court granting him summary judgment. The gist of Pearison's motion is that he wants summary judgment on an expedited basis because Pinkerton and its predecessor corporations have delayed or allowed too much time to elapse, and Pearison believes they should have reached a settlement agreement with him during the administrative investigation by the THRC. THRC urged the parties to compromise and negotiate a settlement agreement. During the administrative proceeding, Pearison made one or more offers of settlement which were rejected by Pinkerton. Pearison apparently believes that summary judgment should be entered in his favor because Pinkerton declined to reach a settlement despite being urged to do so by THRC.
These are not an adequate grounds for summary judgment. The mere fact that Pearison's race discrimination claim has been pending for a long time does not mean he is entitled to summary judgment. The Court must base its decision on the facts and the law, not how long the race discrimination claim has been in existence. It is irrelevant whether the parties may have had communications and discussions about a possible settlement during the administrative proceeding and whether THRC urged the parties to reach a settlement agreement. The Court has no doubt that THRC, as a standard policy, urges the parties in virtually all employment discrimination cases to compromise and enter into settlement agreements wherever possible. Pearison places undue emphasis and attaches too much importance to THRC's customary practice of mailing out form letters encouraging settlement agreements.
Before Pearison can obtain summary judgment under Rule 56, he must show that based on the undisputed material facts, he should prevail as a matter of law on his race discrimination in employment claim. He has not met this burden. Accordingly, Pearison's summary judgment motion [Court File No. 5] is DENIED.
IV. Pinkerton's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Court File No. 6]
Pinkerton moves for partial summary judgment to dismiss the ADA claim because it exceeds the scope of the employment discrimination charge that Pearison filed with the THRC. The Court will decide Pinkerton's motion as one for partial summary judgment under Rule 56 rather than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because the Court is taking into consideration matters outside the pleadings. There is attached to Pinkerton's memorandum of law, a declaration under penalty of perjury by Deborah Leatherberry and an authenticated copy of the administrative complaint of employment discrimination that Pearison filed with the THRC. [Court File No. 7]. The last sentence of Rule 12(b)(6) provides that if matters outside the complaint are presented to and not excluded by the Court, then a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of pursuant to Rule 56.
In the administrative charge Pearison filed with THRC, he alleged race discrimination but he did not make any claim or allegation concerning employment discrimination based on a disability. On page 8 of the administrative charge under paragraph V, Pearison was asked to specify each category of alleged discrimination. The following question was posed to him: "Do you believe the action was taken because of any one (or more) of the categories listed below?" Pearison placed check marks next to race and religion. There was a place for him to check and indicate disability but Pearison did not check it. [Court File No. 7, Exhibit B, Attachment to Affidavit of Deborah Leatherberry]. The first time that Pearison raised a claim concerning ADA and employment discrimination based on a disability is when he filed his suit in this Court on May 13, 2002.
The Court finds that Pearison has not exhausted his administrative remedies on the ADA claim. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 of the ADA mandates compliance with the administrative procedures provided in Title VII. Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 277-78 (1st Cir. 1999); Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996); Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107, 111 (7th Cir. 1996); Pollard v. City of Northwood, 161 F. Supp.2d 782, 793 (N.D.Ohio. 2001); Nichols v. General Motors Co., 978 F. Supp. 743, 746 (S.D.Ohio 1997); Bates v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 957 F. Supp. 125, 127 (M.D.Tenn. 1997), aff'd, 156 F.3d 1228 (Table, text at 1998 WL 466490) (6th Cir. July 31, 1998)). Exhaustion of administrative remedies and compliance with the Title VII administrative process must occur before a federal court may entertain Pearison's lawsuit seeking recovery for a violation of the ADA. Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 309 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 951 (2001); Jones v. Sumser Retirement Village, 209 F.3d 851 (6th Cir. 2000); Bonilla, 194 F.3d at 277-78; Carmack v. Matco Tools, 178 F.3d 1293 (Table, text at 1999 WL 196527) (6th Cir. March 22, 1999)); Nichols, 978 F. Supp. at 746.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(e) of Title VII provides that a charge of employment discrimination shall be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within 300 days if the aggrieved person has initially instituted proceedings with an authorized state agency. Although Pearison properly filed his race discrimination complaint with THRC, an authorized state agency, he did not include in his administrative complaint any claim or allegation concerning employment discrimination on the basis of disability. This omission of a disability or ADA claim from the complaint filed with THRC precludes Pearison from maintaining an ADA claim in the present suit filed in federal district court. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); Bonilla, 194 F.3d at 278; Carmack, 1999 WL 196527; Nichols, 978 F. Supp. at 746.
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Pearsion's ADA claim. The federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the ADA claim unless Pearison either explicitly files it in an administrative charge with EEOC or THRC, or the ADA claim can reasonably be expected to grow out of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint. Weigel v. Baptist Hospital of East Tennessee, 2002 WL WL 1489616, *10 (6th Cir. July 15, 2002); Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Parma, OH, 263 F.3d 513, 534 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1438, 152 L.Ed.2d 382 (2002); Strouss v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 250 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2001); Jones, 209 F.3d at 853; Duggins v. Steak 'N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 1999); Abeita v. Trans America Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1998); Ang v. Proctor Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 546-47 (6th Cir. 1991). The suit Pearison has filed in this Court must be limited and restricted to the scope of the THRC investigation reasonably expected to grow out Pearison's administrative complaint. Weigel, 2002 WL 1489616 at *10; Ang, 932 F.3d at 545; EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1977); Nichols, 978 F. Supp. at 746.
In his administrative complaint filed with the THRC, Pearison need not attach the correct legal conclusions to his factual allegations, conform to legal technicalities, or use the precise wording that might be required in a formal pleading to be filed in federal district court. In other words, Pearison was not necessarily required to specifically cite or refer to ADA in his administrative complaint. A claimant's written charge to THRC and EEOC must be sufficiently precise to identify the parties and describe generally the discriminatory acts or practices by the employer leading to the administrative complaint. Jones, 209 F.3d at 853; Abeita, 159 F.3d at 254; Soletro v. Nat'l Fed. of Independent Business, 130 F. Supp.2d 906, 915 (N.D.Ohio. 2001). This liberal rule for making administrative complaints to THRC and EEOC does not excuse Pearison from filing charges on a particular disability discrimination claim or ADA claim before filing suit in federal district court. At the very least, the ADA claim must reasonably be expected to grow out of the THRC investigation, or the facts alleged in the THRC complaint must be sufficiently related to Pearison's ADA claim such that those factual allegations would reasonably prompt a THRC investigation of the ADA claim. Jones, 209 F.3d at 853; Davis v. Sodhexo, 157 F.3d 460, 463-64 (6th Cir. 1998).
The complaint that Pearison made to THRC clearly does not meet this test. Nowhere in his administrative complaint to THRC does Pearison mention or indicate that he might have a claim under ADA concerning disability discrimination. In the THRC/EEOC complaint form, Pearison did not check the box indicating disability discrimination. Cf. Soletro, 130 F. Supp.2d at 915. There are no claims presented and no factual allegations in the THRC complaint that are sufficiently related to Pearison's ADA claim that would prompt an investigation by THRC of an ADA claim. An objectively reasonable person could not expect that an ADA claim would grow out of a THRC investigation into Pearison's complaint for employment discrimination on the basis of race and religion. Accordingly, Pinkerton's motion for partial summary judgment [Court File No. 6] is GRANTED and Pearison's ADA claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
V. Pinkerton's Motion for More Definite Statement of Complaint
Pinkerton moves pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) for a more definite statement of the complaint with regard to the race discrimination claim. The motion [Court File No. 6] is GRANTED. On or before September 30, 2002, Pearison shall file his amended complaint or more definite statement of the complaint in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) and 12(e).
VI. Service of Process
On or before September 30, 2002, Pearison shall notify the Court in writing whether he has effected proper service of process upon each defendant in compliance with FED. R. CIV. P. 4. Rule 4(l) provides that the person effecting service of process shall make proof thereof to the Court. Pearison is required to file proof of service of process with the Clerk of Court to be docketed in the record of this case.