Opinion
Civ. 1:23-CV-532
12-12-2023
JOSHUA I. PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. M. GOURLEY, et al., Defendants.
MUNLEY JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DARYL F. BLOOM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This case comes before the Court for consideration of a partial motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. (Doc. 22). The plaintiff, Joshua Payne, is an inmate in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) who is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (“SCI Camp Hill”). Payne filed this action against several correctional officers at SCI Camp Hill, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (Docs. 1, 21).
Payne's amended complaint alleges that in June of 2022, Defendant Wimer stood outside of Payne's cell and started discussing Payne's mental health information with him. (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 18-19). Payne contends that Wimer continued to discuss Payne's mental health treatment within earshot of other inmates, even after Payne asked to speak somewhere private. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20). Payne was seen by the Program Review Committee (“PRC”) later that day, which consisted of Defendants Gourley, Nicklow, Newsome, Ritchey, and Kendall. (Id. ¶ 21). He claims that he told the PRC members what Wimer did, and they did nothing to help him, instead calling him a “rat” and telling him to stop complaining about staff. (Id. ¶ 23). The amended complaint asserts that Wimer continued to expose Payne's mental health information in front of other inmates, who tormented Payne about the information. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25). Payne claims that due to this torment, he wanted to commit suicide. (Id. ¶ 26).
Payne also asserts that between October 27, 2022, and December 10, 2022, he was denied meals, showers, and yard time on several occasions. (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 27-28). He further alleges that on November 13 and 15, 2022, he was placed in a dirty cell that was covered in feces. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 32). While housed in this cell, he claims that the correctional officers banged on his door to prevent him from sleeping. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34). Payne reported these incidents to the PRC, who he alleges did nothing to intervene. (Id. ¶ 36). Payne claims that due to his treatment by these defendants, his mental health conditions worsened, and he is now always contemplating suicide. (Id. ¶ 37).
Based on these allegations, Payne filed the instant suit against the defendants. (Docs. 1, 21). He names Defendant Wimer, the PRC defendants-Gourley, Nicklow, Newsome, Ritchey, and Kendall-and Defendants Benner and Evans. He alleges that these defendants violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”); the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 40-41). He also asserts a civil conspiracy claim against all defendants. (Id. ¶ 41). He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief. (Id. at 6).
Payne also names Defendant Miller, a Unit Manager at Camp Hill. However, there is no indication that Miller has been served, as there has been no appearance entered on his behalf.
The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss. (Doc. 22). In their motion and at this stage, the defendants do not challenge the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims regarding his conditions of confinement relating to his allegations of being denied showers, food, and yard time and being placed in a dirty cell. They also do not contest Payne's Fourteenth Amendment claim to the extent he alleges a violation of his right to privacy in his medical information. However, they assert that the remainder of the plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law.
The motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. For the following reasons, we recommend that the motion be granted.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non- movant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Payne Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
B. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be Granted.
As we have noted, at this point, the defendants do not contest the Eighth Amendment claims regarding Payne's conditions of confinement and the failure to intervene as it relates to his allegations of being denied meals, showers, and yard and being placed in a dirty cell between October and December of 2022. Further, the defendants concede that Payne would have a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent he is alleging a violation of his right to privacy in his medical information. However, they argue that the remainder of Payne's claims fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed. After consideration, we agree and recommend that the defendants' motion be granted.
Curiously, the amended complaint references a Sgt. Timpe among the allegations that Payne was denied meals, showers, and yard time, but this individual is not named as a defendant in this case.
1. Payne has not Shown the Requisite Personal Involvement of Defendants Benner and Evans.
At the outset, Payne names Defendants Benner and Evans in the caption of his complaint yet fails to assert any allegations against them. It is well settled that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs[.]” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Thus, the plaintiff must plead facts from which we could infer “the defendant's participation in or actual knowledge of an acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015).
Here, Payne does nothing more than name Benner and Evans as defendants without asserting any facts from which we could infer that they were involved in the alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, these defendants should be dismissed.
2. All Claims Against the Defendants in their Official Capacities are Barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to states and state agencies that are sued by citizens in federal court. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). The Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law unless that immunity is waived or abrogated by Congress. The Commonwealth has expressly invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). Further, as a state agency, the Department of Corrections is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Durham v. Dep't of Corr., 173 Fed.Appx. 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2006).
Here, Payne has sued the individual defendants in both their individual and official capacities. However, it is well settled that an action against an individual in his or her official capacity is no different than an action brought against the agency itself. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, the claims brought against the defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed.
3. The Remainder of Payne's Fourteenth Amendment Claims are Barred by the More Specific Provision Rule.
Payne also appears to assert claims under the Fourteenth Amendment relating to his claims that Defendant Wimer disclosed his medical information to other guards and inmates. The Third Circuit has recognized that “the constitutional right to privacy in one's medical information exists in prison.” Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, to the extent Payne is asserting a right to privacy claim based on Wimer's disclosure of his medical information, we believe this claim should proceed.
However, to the extent that Payne asserts any other substantive claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, these claims are barred by the more-specific-provision rule. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision . . . the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”). Accordingly, any such claim must be dismissed.
4. Payne has not Alleged Facts to Support a First Amendment Claim.
Payne also asserts in a vague fashion that the defendants violated his First Amendment rights. However, even a liberal reading of the amended complaint reveals that Payne has not alleged facts that would support a First Amendment claim. Nowhere in the amended complaint does Payne allege violations of his rights to free speech, petition, assemble, or exercise his religion, or that he was retaliated against for exercising any of these rights. See U.S. Const. amend I. Rather, Payne's claims fall squarely within the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, any First Amendment claim should be dismissed.
5. Payne's Eighth Amendment Claim against Defendant Wimer Fails as a Matter of Law.
Payne brings an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Wimer, alleging that Wimer subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to his safety when Wimer disclosed his mental health information loudly at his cell door within earshot of other inmates and guards.
The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from “cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Prison officials have a duty to provide inmates with “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To be liable for an Eighth Amendment violation, prison officials must have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, which, in the prison context, is one of “‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health and safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). This requires a two-part showing-an objective showing that the inmate “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm[,]” Mammana v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and a subjective showing that the prison official knew of the substantial risk to the inmate's safety and disregarded that risk. Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 229.
At the outset, to the extent Payne bases this claim on Wimer's alleged verbal harassment of him regarding his mental health conditions, “[i]t is well settled that verbal harassment of a prisoner, although deplorable, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Robinson v. Taylor, 204 Fed.Appx. 155, 156 (3d Cir. 2006). Similarly, to the extent that Payne is alleging that Wimer was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm when he disclosed this information in the presence of others, Payne has not set forth sufficient factual allegations to support this claim. At most, Payne asserts that Wimer's taunting of him about his mental health issues led other correctional officers and inmates to taunt him. (Doc 21 ¶¶ 24-25). He contends that this led to him want to commit suicide. (Id. ¶ 26).
However, Payne pleads no facts from which we can infer that Wimer knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to Payne, such as facts showing “that the risk of harm was longstanding, pervasive, well documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past[.]” Betts v. New Castle Youth Development Center, 621 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Rather, Payne's claim amounts to conclusory allegations that Wimer should have known that his actions would lead Payne to want to commit suicide. These allegations, standing alone, are not sufficient to permit this Eighth Amendment claim to proceed. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed.
Finally, to the extent Payne asserts a claim against the PRC defendants for a failure to intervene when apprised of Wimer's conduct, this claim also fails. Correctional officers may be held liable for a failure to intervene to stop unconstitutional conduct when they had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and failed to do so. Smithv. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002). However, “[f]or there to be a failure to intervene, it follows that ‘there must exist an underlying constitutional violation.'” Diaz v. Alberts, 2013 WL 420349, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2013) (citations omitted). Accordingly, because we have concluded that Payne has not sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment claim against Wimer, the PRC defendants cannot be liable for a failure to intervene in Wimer's alleged conduct. This claim should be dismissed.
6. The MHPA does not Apply to Payne's Case.
Payne also asserts that the defendants violated the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), 50 P.S. §§ 7101 et seq., when his mental health information was disclosed without his consent. Specifically, he appears to be asserting his claim under § 7111, which provides that “[a]ll documents concerning persons in treatment shall be kept confidential and, without the person's written consent, may not be released or their contents disclosed to anyone[,]” other than the enumerated exceptions listed. § 7111(a).
At the outset, as one court in this circuit has recently noted, “it is not clear that a private cause of action exists to enforce this provision of the MHPA.” Sides v. Wetzel, 2023 WL 7553915, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2023) (citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015)). Additionally, as the Sides court explained, this provision appears to apply to documents concerning an individual's mental health treatment. Sides, 2023 WL 7553915, at *13. Here, Payne's claim asserts that Wimer revealed details about his mental health to others within the prison, not that he distributed or disseminated any documents concerning Payne's mental health treatment. Accordingly, in our view, this claim should be dismissed.
7. Payne cannot bring Claims under the ADA and RA against Individuals.
Payne also purportedly asserts his claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from excluding or discriminating against individuals because of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.; Zied-Campbell v. Richman, 2007 WL 1031399, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2007) (“The plain language of § 12132 applies only to public entities not individuals.”). Similarly, the RA prohibits suits brought against individuals. A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools, 286 F.3d 791, 804 (3d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Payne's ADA and RA claims brought against the individual defendants should be dismissed.
8. Payne has not Alleged Facts to Support a Conspiracy Claim.
Payne further asserts a wide-ranging conspiracy claim against all named defendants, alleging that they conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Noticeably absent from the amended complaint, however, are any allegations that there was a meeting of the minds among any of the defendants to deprive Payne of a constitutional right, a prerequisite to any § 1983 civil conspiracy claim. Startzell v. City of Phila., Pennsylvania, 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). Rather, the amended complaint levels allegations that Wimer and other correctional staff engaged in conduct separate from the other defendants, and that the PRC defendants failed to intervene when Payne informed them of this alleged misconduct. We cannot infer from any of these conclusory allegations that any of the defendants came to an agreement to deprive Payne of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, this claim fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
9. Payne has not Alleged a Physical Injury to Support a Claim for Compensatory Damages.
Among Payne's requests for relief is a claim for compensatory damages in the amount of $200,000 to account for physical and emotional injuries Payne allegedly sustained. However, as the defendants note, Payne's amended complaint contains no allegations of a physical injury suffered as a result of the defendants' conduct. This is fatal to Payne's claim for compensatory damages since the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a prisoner to “demonstrate physical injury before he can recover for mental or emotional injury[.]” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533 (3d Cir. 2003). As the Supreme Court has explained, “the abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for § 1983 damages.” Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986).
Here, Payne has not alleged that he suffered a physical injury. At best, Payne's amended complaint can be construed to assert allegations that he missed meals and suffered from sleep deprivation due to the correctional staff banging on his cell door. (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 27-28, 33-34). However, “loss of food, water, and sleep are not themselves physical injuries.” Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 534. Additionally, although Payne alleges that he wanted to commit suicide, there is nothing in the amended complaint from which we can infer that Payne suffered a physical injury related to his desire to commit suicide. Accordingly, any claim for compensatory damages should be dismissed.
10. Payne's Claim for Declaratory Relief Fails as a Matter of Law.
Payne also asserts a claim for declaratory relief, which the defendants urge us to dismiss given that the amended complaint only alleges past, rather than ongoing, conduct by the defendants. Indeed, “[d]eclaratory judgment is not meant to adjudicate alleged past unlawful activity.” Wenzig v. Service Employees International Union Local 668, 426 F.Supp.3d 88, 100 (M.D. Pa. 2019). This is particularly so where a plaintiff is requesting that the Court “ ‘declare' that his constitutional rights were violated.” Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 Fed.Appx. 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that “[d]eclaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct.”).
Here, Payne's amended complaint simply asks this Court to declare that the defendants violated his rights. (Doc. 21 at 6). In our view, this claim for declaratory relief, which is requested solely to adjudicate past alleged wrongful conduct, should be dismissed.
III. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' partial motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 22) be GRANTED as follows:
1. The plaintiff's First Amendment, ADA, RA, MHPA, and civil conspiracy claims should be dismissed.
2. The plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Wimer, as well as any related failure to intervene claim against Defendants Gourley, Nicklow, Newsome, Ritchey, and Kendall, should be dismissed.
3. The plaintiff's requests for compensatory damages and declaratory relief should be dismissed.
4. The plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims regarding the denial of meals, shower, and yard time, as well as being placed in a dirty cell should proceed forward, as well as any Fourteenth Amendment claim premised on Payne's right to privacy in his medical records.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.