Opinion
March 27, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Collins, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Contrary to the defendants' contention, the motion at issue was to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and not for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not treat the motion as one for summary judgment (cf., CPLR 3211 [c]; Rokeach v. Zaltz, 112 A.D.2d 209). Therefore, contrary to the defendants' contention, the plaintiff had no obligation to demonstrate evidentiary facts to support the allegations contained in the complaint that a general partnership agreement existed between Douglas and Alexander Paulsen and was breached by Alexander (see, Palmisano v. Modernismo Publs., 98 A.D.2d 953).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action will be denied in its entirety where the complaint asserts several causes of action, the motion is aimed at the pleading as a whole without particularizing the specific cause of action sought to be dismissed, and at least one of the causes of action is legally sufficient (Halpern v. Halpern, 109 A.D.2d 818; Martirano Constr. Corp. v. Briar Contr. Corp., 104 A.D.2d 1028; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3211:26; 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N Y Civ Prac ¶ 3211.38). We agree with the Supreme Court that the first cause of action sufficiently states a cause of action based on a breach of an alleged general partnership agreement. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint was properly denied. Bracken, J.P., Brown, Kunzeman and Spatt, JJ., concur.