Opinion
No. 17-55262
06-12-2019
RICKY BELMONTE PAUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY FLORES, R.N., in his individual capacity and L. GONZALES, c/o, Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 3:14-cv-01800-H-KSC MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding Before: WALLACE, FARRIS, and TROTT, Circuit Judges
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Ricky Belmonte Paugh, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court's judgment following a jury verdict in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Lam v. City of San Jose, 869 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2017) (formulation of jury instructions); Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidentiary rulings); Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1252 (9th Cir. 2000) (trial supervision); Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d 466, 468 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Paugh's writs of habeas corpus ad testifcandum because the district court properly determined that the effort and resources to produce the witnesses was not justified by their proposed testimony. See Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d at 468 n.1 (standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing limited testimony regarding Paugh's criminal history because this evidence was admissible, in its own right, under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1)(A). Contrary to Paugh's contentions, the district court was not required to allow evidence of the defendants' litigation or employment history as a condition of introducing Paugh's criminal history. See Harper, 533 F.3d at 1030 (standard of review).
We reject as without merit Paugh's contentions that his appointed counsel was ineffective, either in failing to maintain his witness list, or in failing to object to the court's final jury instructions. See Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff in a civil case has no right to effective assistance of counsel).
We reject as without merit Paugh's contention that he received untimely notice of changes to jury instructions. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(1) (service of pleadings must be made on a party's attorney unless the court orders service on the party).
We reject as undeveloped Paugh's contentions (1) that the district court did not allow his counsel to have sidebar conferences; and (2) that his mother was not allowed to testify. See Ind. Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2003) (bare assertion of an issue does not preserve a claim; "We require contentions to be accompanied by reasons.").
AFFIRMED.