Opinion
5:20-CV-00466-D
01-25-2022
William Earl Patterson, Plaintiff, v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
ROBERT T. NUMBERS, II, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff William Patterson challenges Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Katherine D. Wisz's denial of his application for social security income. Patterson claims that ALJ Wisz erred in determining the residual functional capacity (RFC) and evaluating the medical opinion evidence. Both Patterson and Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, have moved for a judgment on the pleadings in their favor. D.E. 19, 22.
After reviewing the parties' arguments, the court has determined that ALJ Wisz reached the appropriate determination. The RFC accounts for Patterson's well-supported limitations. And the undersigned finds no error in ALJ Wisz's consideration of the medical opinion evidence. So the undersigned recommends that the court deny Patterson's motion, grant Kijakazi's motion, and affirm the Commissioner's determination.
The court has referred this matter to the undersigned for entry of a Memorandum and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
I. Background
In October 2017, Patterson applied for disability benefits, alleging a disability that began in August 2016. After the Social Security Administration denied his claim at the initial level and upon reconsideration, Patterson appeared before ALJ Wisz for a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to benefits. ALJ Wisz determined that Patterson had no right to benefits because he was not disabled. Tr. at 15-23.
ALJ Wisz found that Patterson's left tibia fracture, left foot drop, and obesity were severe impairments. Tr. at 17. ALJ Wisz also found that Patterson's impairments, either alone or in combination, did not meet or equal a Listing impairment. Tr. at 18.
ALJ Wisz then determined that Patterson had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work with other limitations. Id. Patterson can stand or walk for two hours and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. Id. He can occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds and frequently lift and carry 10 pounds. Id. Patterson can occasionally push and pull with his lower left extremity. Id. While seated, he must be allowed to elevate his lower left extremity 45 degrees. Id.
Patterson can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Id. He can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Id. And Patterson can have occasional exposure to hazards. Id.
ALJ Wisz concluded that Patterson could not perform his past work as a merchandise deliverer. Tr. at 22. But considering his age, education, work experience, and RFC, ALJ Wisz found that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Patterson could perform. Tr. at 22-23. These include addresser, call out operator, and document preparer. Id. Thus, ALJ Wisz found that Patterson was not disabled. Tr. at 23.
After unsuccessfully seeking review by the Appeals Council, Patterson began this action in September 2020. D.E. 5.
II. Analysis
A. Standard for Review of the Commissioner's Final Decision
When a social security claimant appeals a final decision of the Commissioner, the district court's review is limited to determining whether, based on the entire administrative record, there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's findings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence is defined as “evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion.” Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996).
B. Standard for Evaluating Disability
In making a disability determination, the ALJ engages in a five-step evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650 (4th Cir. 2005). The ALJ must consider the factors in order. At step one, if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claim is denied. At step two, the claim is denied if the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting him or her from performing basic work activities. At step three, the claimant's impairment is compared to those in the Listing of Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. If the impairment is listed in the Listing of Impairments or if it is equivalent to a listed impairment, disability is presumed. But if the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC to determine, at step four, whether he can perform his past work despite his impairments. If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the analysis moves on to step five: establishing whether the claimant, based on his age, work experience, and RFC can perform other substantial gainful work. The burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps of this inquiry but shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995).
C. Medical Background
Patterson underwent back surgery in 2013. Tr. at 40. He returned to his work as a delivery driver. Id.
In August 2016, Patterson was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Tr. at 19. Providers at the Duke Emergency Department assessed an open tibial plateau fracture and an open distal tibial fracture of his left leg. Tr. at 311. Patterson also had rib fractures and a dislocated knee. Id. He remained hospitalized for about two weeks. Tr. at 19. Patterson underwent several surgeries on his left leg. Tr. at 310-478.
Problems with non-union of his left leg fractures hampered Patterson's recovery. Tr. at 479-80. And he later developed a left foot drop. Tr. at 499. In recovering from his injuries, providers have noted that Patterson has weakness, numbness, and reduced range of motion in his lower left extremity. Tr. at 503-05, 531-32, 536, 542-43, 58797-98, 608-09. Patterson also experienced swelling, so providers recommended that he elevate his leg. Tr. at 514, 527, 545, 547- 48, 563, 593, 644.
In addition to his left leg pain and weakness, Patterson claims depression, diminished bilateral hand strength, and chronic low back pain since his back surgery. Tr. at 530. He reported to providers that activity aggravated his pain. Tr. at 540, 595.
At an August 2017 follow-up visit to his orthopedist, Patterson reported that he was doing well. Tr. at 19. Imaging studies revealed joint space maintenance and good nail positioning. Id. Providers recommended that Patterson wear a support stocking and continue physical therapy. They also prescribed medications to him. Id.
The next month, Dr. Rachel Reilly, a trauma surgeon at Duke, opined that Patterson could perform light work with no climbing or prolonged standing, lifting no more than 30 pounds, and being allowed breaks as needed. Tr. at 20.
In December 2017, Peggy Anglin, PT, performed a Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) for workers compensation. Tr. at 611-37. Anglin found that Patterson could not walk for five minutes. Tr. at 623. He experienced pain, an unstable gait, and an elevated heart rate in covering a short distance. Id. Patterson sustained a standing position for almost eight minutes and sitting for about 29 minutes. Tr. at 625. Patterson could not squat, bend, or lift more than ten pounds. Id. Anglin concluded that Patterson could not perform sedentary work. Tr. at 613-14.
Dr. Reilly issued a letter in February 2018 endorsing the FCE conclusion that Patterson could not perform sedentary work, noting impaired balance and mobility as well as weak hand strength. Tr. at 674. She reiterated this opinion in a Medical Source Statement the next month. Tr. at 1103-06. And Dr. Reilly found that Patterson met the criteria of Listing 1.02. Tr. at 1107. In an office visit, Dr. Reilly remarked that Patterson may experience intermittent knee swelling for the rest of his life. Tr. at 1278. She recommended that he wear compression stockings and elevate his knee to reduce swelling. Id.
Dr. Samuel Adams, an orthopedic surgeon, also provided a Medical Source Statement concluding that Patterson could not perform sedentary work. Tr. at 1682-84. Dr. Adams also found that Patterson had moderate to severe limitations in maintaining attention and concentration, maintaining a schedule and attendance, and completing a normal workday or work week. Id. And in October 2018, Dr. Adams found that Patterson met Listing 1.02. Tr. at 1685.
Patterson testified that he has significant pain and swelling in his left leg. Tr. at 44-45. His leg swells if he does not elevate it throughout the day. Tr. at 45-46. He elevates his leg two or three times a day for thirty minutes each time. Tr. at 49.
Patterson estimated he could lift 30 pounds. Tr. at 19. He cannot sit or stand for long periods, or walk extended distances. Id. And Patterson has trouble with stairs. Id.
Patterson wears a brace for his foot drop and occasionally uses a cane for balance problems. Tr. at 45. Sue Jeffreys, Patterson's girlfriend, testified that they bought an adjustable bed and recliner so he could properly elevate his leg. Tr. at 53. She estimated that Patterson could sit for 30-40 minutes before needing to alternate positions. Tr. at 54.
D. Residual Functional Capacity
Patterson contends that ALJ Wisz erred in determining his RFC by failing to explain how the medical opinions support the assessed limitations. The Commissioner asserts that a review of the decision shows how the medical evidence supports the RFC. The undersigned finds that substantial evidence supports ALJ Wisz's RFC determination.
The RFC is a determination, based on all the relevant medical and non-medical evidence, of what a claimant can still do despite her impairments; the assessment of a claimant's RFC is the responsibility of the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1545, 404.1546; Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2. If more than one impairment is present, the ALJ must consider all medically determinable impairments, including medically determinable impairments that are not “severe, ” when determining the claimant's RFC. Id. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The ALJ must also consider the combined effect of all impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient severity. Id. § 404.1523; see Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[I]n evaluating the effect[] of various impairments upon a disability benefit claimant, the [Commissioner] must consider the combined effect of a claimant's impairments and not fragmentize them.”).
The ALJ must provide “findings and determinations sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review.” DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Wyatt v. Bowen, 887 F.2d 1082, 1989 WL 117940, at *4 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). The ALJ's RFC determination “must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g. laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g. daily activities, observations).” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting SSR 96-8p). Furthermore, “[t]he record should include a discussion of which evidence the ALJ found credible and why, and specific application of the pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence.” Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.2d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013). Fourth Circuit precedent “makes it clear that it is not [the court's] role to speculate as to how the ALJ applied the law to [her] findings or to hypothesize the ALJ's justifications that would perhaps find support in the record. Fox v. Colvin, 632 Fed.Appx. 750, 755 (4th Cir. 2015).
Social Security Ruling 96-8p explains how adjudicators should assess residual functional capacity. The Ruling instructs that the residual functional capacity “assessment must first identify the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis, including the functions” listed in the regulations. “Only after that may [residual functional capacity] be expressed in terms of the exertional levels of work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy.” SSR 96-8p. The Ruling further explains that the residual functional capacity “assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” Id.
There is no “per se rule requiring remand when the ALJ does not perform an explicit function-by-function analysis[.]” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636. But “[r]emand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review.” Id. (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)). The function-by-function requirement can be satisfied by reference to a properly conducted analysis by a state agency consultant. See, e.g., Linares v. Colvin, No. 5:14-CV-00129, 2015 WL 4389533, at *3 (W.D. N.C. July 17, 2015) (“Because the ALJ based his RFC finding, in part, on the function-by-function analysis of the State agency consultant, the ALJ's function-by-function analysis complied with [Soc. Sec. Ruling] 96-8p.” (citing Lemken v. Astrue, No. 5:07-CV-33-RLV-DCK, 2010 WL 5057130, at *8 (W.D. N.C. July 26, 2010))).
As noted above, ALJ Wisz concluded that Patterson could perform sedentary work with restrictions on his exertional and postural movements and environmental exposure. Tr. at 18.
Patterson alleges that ALJ Wisz failed to explain how she derived the RFC from the medical evidence. He claims that she erred in not discussing the FCE or conducting a function-by-function assessment. The sparse analysis, he argues, thwarts meaningful review.
The undersigned disagrees and concludes that substantial evidence supports ALJ Wisz's RFC determination. In making her RFC finding, ALJ Wisz noted Patterson's accident and injuries, which required multiple surgeries. But a year after his accident, he had made progress in his recovery.
Objective testing showed joint space maintenance with good hardware placement. Tr. at 19. Patterson stated that he was doing well after his surgeries. Id. Examination revealed no defect, crepitus, or misalignment. Id. And Patterson's gait was undisturbed, although he had a foot drop, which providers described as mild in nature. Id.
Patterson required only medication, physical therapy, and compression stockings for his ongoing symptoms Id. And he later reported that he responded positively to medications and physical therapy. Id.
At this time, his treating provider stated that he could perform work at the light exertional level with restrictions on standing, climbing, and lifting. Tr. at 20.
ALJ Wisz referenced Anglin's FCE. Tr. at 21. Her conclusion that Patterson was incapable of sedentary work was unpersuasive, as Anglin was not an acceptable medical source. Id. While Patterson may believe the FCE itself requires more analysis, the Regulations do not require an ALJ to discuss every piece of evidence. Reid v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014).
As Kijakazi points out, several factors of the FCE challenge its relevancy to a disability inquiry. The walking tests performed measured aerobic capacity, not functional ability. For some tests, Patterson rated his pain levels between two and four out of ten, suggesting low-grade pain. And the test results themselves are not expressed in vocationally-relevant terms.
The FCE was performed as part of a workers compensation assessment. The FCE measured some functions, but it is unclear if it evaluated Patterson's maximum abilities. So it may not account for the factors relevant to determining a claimant's RFC.
Patterson alleges trouble with extended exertional activities as well as postural movements. Tr. at 19. But the record contains limited evidence supporting his claims. Yet ALJ Wisz parsed the relevant evidence, accurately summarizing the accident and recovery. And she determined that his symptoms did not preclude all work activity.
So the evidence does not support that Patterson is more limited than the RFC determined. Because substantial evidence in the record supports the RFC, this issue does not establish a basis for remand.
E. Medical Opinion Evidence
Patterson next claims that ALJ Wisz erred in considering the medical opinion evidence. The Acting Commissioner contends that ALJ Wisz explained why she found certain medical source statements unpersuasive. The undersigned finds no error in that ALJ Wisz's consideration of the opinion evidence.
The Regulations direct the ALJ to consider each medical opinion in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c A medical opinion is a statement from a medical source about what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether you have one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions in the [following] abilities ...
(A) Your ability to perform physical demands of work activities, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or other physical functions (including manipulative or postural functions, such as reaching, handling, stooping, or crouching);
(B) Your ability to perform mental demands of work activities, such as understanding; remembering; maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; carrying out instructions; or responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, or work pressures in a work setting;
(C) Your ability to perform other demands of work, such as seeing, hearing, or using other senses; and
(D) Your ability to adapt to environmental conditions, such as temperature extremes or fumes.Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(2), 416.913(a)(2).
The Regulations provide that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [claimant's] medical sources.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ must evaluate each medical opinion and articulate the “persuasiveness” of all medical opinions by considering five factors:
Because Patterson filed his application after March 2017, the revised rules regarding the assessment of medical opinion evidence govern how the ALJ considers the medical opinions in this case.
(1) supportability, meaning that “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) ... the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be”; (2) consistency, meaning that the more consistent an opinion is with other evidence in the record, the more persuasive the medical opinion will be; (3) the medical source's relationship with the claimant, which considers the length of the treating relationship, frequency of examinations, purpose of the treating relationship, extent of the treatment relationship, and whether the medical source examined the claimant; (4) specialization, meaning that “a medical source who has received advanced education and training to become a specialist may be more persuasive”; and (5) other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion.”Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).
Supportability and consistency are the “most important” factors, and the ALJ must discuss how they considered these factors in the written opinion. Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ may explain their consideration of the other factors but is only required to do so when contrary medical opinions are equally persuasive in terms of both supportability and consistency. Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3). In that situation, the ALJ must then articulate the remaining factors and their application to the persuasiveness of the medical opinion. Id.
The regulations require the ALJ to “articulate in [her] determination or decision how persuasive [she] find[s] all of the medical opinions and all of the prior administrative medical findings in [the] case record.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(b), 416.920c(b). However, when a medical source provides multiple opinions, the ALJ may use a single analysis to evaluate all the opinions from a single source, and the ALJ is “not required to articulate how [she] considered each medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding from one medical source individually.” Id.
ALJ Wisz found persuasive Dr. Reilly's September 2017 statement that Patterson could perform a reduced range of light work. Tr. at 20. She remarked that the assessment was consistent with treatment notes detailing Patterson's recovery at that time. Id. ALJ Wisz noted Patterson had good results from surgeries and physical therapy regarding his leg mobility. Id.
But ALJ Wisz concluded that the Dr. Reilly's 2018 statement that Patterson functioning was below the sedentary level was not a medical opinion. Tr. at 21. While it noted impaired mobility, balance, and hand strength, the letter detailed no specific functional abilities. Id. And it did not describe how Patterson's limitations would affect his ability to perform work activities. Id.
ALJ Wisz found other statements from Drs. Reilly and Adams, determining that Patterson could not perform sedentary work and that he met Listing 1.02, were unpersuasive. Tr. at 21. She remarked that these opinions were provided on forms without specific function assessments. Id. And they addressed a matter reserved to the Commissioner. Id.
ALJ Wisz noted Anglin's conclusion that Patterson could not perform sedentary work unpersuasive, but observed that Anglin was not an acceptable medical source. Tr. at 21.
Patterson argues that these new rules for evaluating medical opinions ignore Fourth Circuit case law that confirms the “treating physician rule.” The undersigned disagrees. Patterson's argument relies on case law applying the former Regulations. But “cases applying the former regulations under the treating source rule . . . are no longer good law to the extent they rely on the treating source rule.” Melanie Lynne H. v. Saul, No. CV 20-1028-JWL, 2020 WL 6262193, at *7 (D. Kan. Oct. 23, 2020) (finding that under the new regulations, ALJ need not weigh a medical opinion and party should not argue that a medical opinion deserves greater or lesser weight).
Patterson also contends that ALJ Wisz failed to comply with the new rules because she did not address the supportability and consistency of Dr. Reilly's 2018 statements. This argument, too, lacks merit. ALJ Wisz properly applied § 404.1520c, and emphasized the supportability and consistency factors when assessing the persuasiveness of the statements from these sources. Tr. at 20-21. And supportability and consistency, not the source of the opinion, are the most important factors in evaluating the persuasive value. 20 CF.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).
ALJ Wisz correctly observed that Drs. Reilly and Adams found Patterson incapable of sedentary work on forms generated by Patterson's attorney. Tr. at 21. These providers did not include specific functional limitations addressing Patterson's abilities as neither doctor cited to any objective evidence or findings to support their conclusions. Id. And they addressed an issue reserved to the Commissioner. Id.
Dr. Reilly's statement was inconsistent with the record. In August 2017, a year after his accident, Patterson reported that he was doing well, with medication, support stockings, and physical therapy as the treatment modalities. Tr. at 19. A follow-up visit, Patterson reported a good response to medication and physical therapy. Id. And he had no gait disturbance, except for a mild foot drop. Id.
In her Medical Source Statement the next month, Dr. Reilly concluded that Patterson could perform light work with additional limitations on lifting, climbing, and standing, and being allowed additional breaks. Tr. at 20. Yet five months later, despite no evidence of decline, Dr. Reilly determined that Patterson was incapable of even sedentary work.
The only evidence that could support this later conclusion that Patterson could not perform sedentary work is the December 2017 FCE. But the record reflects Patterson's progress following his accident. After the accident and surgeries, Patterson experienced pain, tenderness, reduced range of motion, and foot drop. But he did not require an assistive device to ambulate. And Patterson reported good response to medication and physical therapy. So it is not unreasonable to conclude that his symptoms improved. In sum, the evidence did not support that Patterson was as limited as the FCE determined, or as he alleged.
And this later statement offers no evidence on which it is based. Instead, it merely states that Patterson's impairment began in August 2016 and checks three boxes declaring that Patterson cannot perform light or sedentary work. Tr. at 1103-06. The form offers no evidentiary support, such as test results, examination findings, treatment notes, or clinical observations, for the conclusions it offers.
Lacking both supportability and consistency, ALJ Wisz properly found Dr. Reilly's later statements unpersuasive. The fact that she was a treating provider is less relevant to the evaluation. So the evidence does not support Dr. Reilly's later findings. And her assessment is inconsistent with other records.
Similarly, Dr. Adams's statement of Patterson's mental limitations lack support in the record. Tr. at 1682-84. He, too, fails to identify the basis of his conclusions.
And contrary to Dr. Adams's finding, no provider assessed Patterson with a mental impairment. Patterson has identified no evidence that he experienced significant limitations in mental work activities, like maintaining attention or concentration, as Dr. Adams found. And the record contained no allegations of, or treatment for, mental health impairments. Tr. at 20.
And the statements by Drs. Reilly and Adams that Patterson's impairments meet Listing 1.02 conflicts with ALJ Wisz's step three finding that he did not have a joint dysfunction with an inability to ambulate effectively for the required durational period. Tr. at 18. This follows the conclusions of the state agency reviewer who, on reconsideration, concluded that Patterson's impairments did not meet Listing 1.06, which also requires an inability to ambulate effectively. Tr. at 86.
Finally, there is no error in ALJ Wisz's finding Dr. Reilly's September 2017 statement persuasive but declining to adopt a limitation to allow unscheduled breaks. She also did not endorse that Patterson could perform work at the light exertional level. And nothing requires an ALJ to adopt fully all conclusions set forth in a medical opinion. See Morgan v. Colvin, No. 5:15-CV-266-D, 2016 WL4217822, at *5 (E.D. N.C. July 21, 2016) (explaining that even when an ALJ gives significant weight to a medical opinion, “an ALJ is not bound to accept or adopt all the limitations set forth therein.”), adopted by 2016 WL 4218333 (Aug. 9, 2016); see also Eddie v. Berryhill, No. 5:16-CV-801-D, 2017 WL 4002147, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 24, 2017) (“[T]he ALJ was not required to adopt fully the limitations suggested by Dr. Wilson's opinion because he assigned it great weight”), adopted by 2017 WL 3995813 (Sept. 11, 2017); Gallion v. Berryhill, No. 5:16-CV-00312-FL, 2017 WL 3431915, at *5 (E.D. N.C. July 26, 2017).
Additionally, Patterson testified that he elevated his feet two or three times a day, for thirty minutes each time. Conceivably, he could maintain this schedule outside of work hours or within the normal breaks allotted in a normal workday. Even if ALJ Wisz adopted this limitation, as Patterson described it, is not inconsistent with his RFC.
So Patterson has failed to show that ALJ Wisz erred in considering the statements from medical providers. So the undersigned recommends that the court deny his claim on this issue.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that the court deny Patterson's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (D.E. 19), grant Kijakazi's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (D.E. 22), and affirm the Acting Commissioner's determination.
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”) on each party who has appeared in this action. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals.