Opinion
No. 2396 C.D. 2011
03-06-2013
Anthonee Patterson, Appellant v. Kenneth Shelton, Individually, and President of the Board of Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc.
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McGINLEY
Anthonee Patterson (Patterson) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) which granted summary judgment in favor of Bishop Kenneth Shelton (Shelton) and dismissed Patterson's Complaint based on Patterson's "lack of standing" under the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Law (NCL), 15 Pa.C.S. §§5101-5997.
Factual and Procedural Background
This marks the fourth time this Court has been called upon to review action by the trial court in the underlying tangle of controversies involving a religious schism which has spanned over two decades. In all, seven lawsuits were instituted by various parties against a church, its corporate trustee and various officials in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, and United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
These lawsuits are recounted in more detail in this Court's previous opinion in Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Shelton, (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 376 C.D. 2000 and 559 C.D. 2000, filed April 10, 2001). See also Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., et al, v. Roddy Shelton, II, 740 A.2d 751 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), for an insightful history of this complex and protracted dispute. See also Joseph Askew v. Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 2d 584 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ("Askew I") and Joseph Askew v. Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 2d 25 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ("Askew II").
The key players involved in the present offshoot of the controversy are: (1) the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith (the "Church"), an unincorporated association, founded in 1919; (2) the "Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc.", (the "Corporate Trustee"), a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation formed in 1947 to act as the trustee and hold property in trust for the Church ; (3) Patterson, a life-long member, elder, and minister of the Church; and (4) Shelton, the current "Bishop" and/or "Overseer" of the Church and "President" of the Corporate Trustee.
The Corporate Trustee's Charter provided that the purpose for which it was formed was to "take, receive, have and hold and manage real and personal property in trust for the uses and purposes specified by the General Assembly of the Church" and that said purposes did "not contemplate pecuniary gain or profit incidental or otherwise to its members." Charter, June 27, 1947, at 1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 266a.
The dispute began in 1991 when then-Bishop S. McDowall Shelton, died, leaving vacancies in the offices of "Overseer" of the Church and "President" of the Corporate Trustee. Immediately upon Bishop S. McDowall Shelton's death, Shelton and his "faction" took control of the accounts, trusts and properties of the Church and Corporate Trustee. After extensive litigation initiated by two other dissident factions of the Church congregation over the leadership of the Church and Corporate Trustee, the trial court ultimately determined, and this Court later affirmed, that Shelton and his Board of Trustees were in control.
Patterson was the leader of one such faction.
See Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Shelton, (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 376 C.D. 2000 and 559 C.D. 2000, filed April 10, 2001).
Patterson's Action in Equity Which
Is the Subject of This Appeal
On July 24, 1995, Patterson, as life-long member, elder and minister of the Church, commenced an action in equity against Shelton, in Shelton's individual capacity and as the President of the Board of Trustees of the Corporate Trustee. Patterson alleged that since taking control of the Church and Corporate Trustee in 1991, Shelton and his Board of Trustees have misappropriated funds, "looted the Church's assets," paid themselves salaries in contravention of Church By-Laws, and funded private expenditures, lavish vacations, lingerie, cars, homes and other personal incidentals with assets which were donated and designated for Church religious and charitable missions.
Erik Shelton was also named as a Defendant but on November 30, 2005, he was voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit.
Specifically, Patterson alleged that Shelton took physical possession of cash offerings designated for the Church from churches throughout the Eastern United States and converted them to his own use; converted $111,537 from the Gresham Trust, a fund held for the benefit of Church members in need of social services; converted $111,533 from a Church account held at Fidelity National Bank; converted $10,585 from the Church's "Bus Rally Money Account;" converted $64,000 from a Church account at Commonwealth Federal and Loan which was dedicated for youth studies; and converted $8,000 from two accounts at Mid Atlantic Bank donated by Church members for the purpose of financially assisting the Church's international missions. Complaint, ¶¶12(a)-(f) at 5-7; R.R. at 127a-129a.
Patterson requested, inter alia: (1) the appointment of a receiver to take control of the assets of the Church held by the Corporate Trustee; (2) an order requiring Shelton to issue annual financial reports for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994; and (3) an accounting.
The parties engaged in discovery. Patterson retained James A. Stavros, CPA (Stavros), a forensic financial investigator, to analyze the finances and expenditures of the Church and the Corporate Trustee. Stavros authored a report which detailed his findings that Shelton and his Board of Trustees withdrew hundreds of thousands of dollars from Church accounts with no accounting of where the funds went and that they expended Church funds on a significant amount of "personal" items and expenditures that appeared to be outside the normal course of business and outside Church laws and customs. He concluded that Church accounts had declined by nearly $1 million under Shelton's control.
This included vacations all over the world including, but not limited to: Cannes, France, Disney World, Switzerland, and purchases from stores such as Victoria's Secret.
Shelton did not retain a financial expert to counter Patterson's report.
In January 2006, the parties agreed to submit to binding arbitration. The Arbitrator concluded that the credible evidence established that Shelton had engaged in various acts of fraud, mismanagement, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary responsibilities, violations of By-laws and the Articles of Incorporation in seizing corporate funds and assets and depleting bank accounts designated for Church-related purposes. The Arbitrator concluded that Shelton had diverted Church funds and assets to himself and others for his and their benefit. The Arbitrator appointed a receiver and directed Shelton to account for all Church funds removed by him or those acting with him.
Shelton filed a motion to vacate the award which the trial court denied. On appeal, this Court overturned the arbitration award because the arbitrator went beyond the scope of his authority in fashioning relief. See Shelton v. Patterson, 942 A.2d 967 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). This Court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether Patterson was entitled to relief under the NCL.
On remand, Shelton moved for summary judgment on the ground that Patterson lacked "statutory standing" under Section 5782 of the NCL, 15 Pa.C.S. §5782. Shelton argued that only an officer, director, or member of a nonprofit corporation has "statutory standing" to enforce a right of a nonprofit corporation through a derivative action. Section 5782 of the NCL, which is contained in Subchapter F governing "derivative actions," provides:
Actions against directors, members of an other body and officers15 Pa.C.S. § 5782.
(a) General rule - Except as provided in subsection (b), in any action or proceeding brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more members of a nonprofit corporation against any present or former officer, director or member of an other body of the corporation because the corporation refuses to enforce rights that may properly be asserted by it, each plaintiff must aver and it must be made to appear that each plaintiff was a member of the corporation at the time of the transaction of which he complains. (Emphasis added).
Shelton pointed to the Corporate Trustee's Articles of Incorporation which limited its membership in the nonprofit corporation to its Board of Trustees. Shelton asserted that because Patterson was never a member of the Board of Trustees he was never a "member" of the Corporate Trustee, and thus, he had no "statutory standing" to bring claims that are derivative of the Corporate Trustee's rights.
The trial court agreed that under Section 5782 of the NCL, Patterson could only bring suit if he was a member of the Corporate Trustee at the time of the alleged events outlined in the Complaint. The trial court looked to Article IX of the Articles of Incorporation which states: "membership in the corporation [Corporate Trustee] shall consist of those persons serving as members of the Board of Trustees." The trial court concluded that because Patterson had never been a member of the Board of Trustees he was not a member of the Corporate Trustee. The trial court reasoned that because the NCL created the cause of action and designated who may sue; standing was a jurisdictional prerequisite to any action. Grom v. Burgoon, 672 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. 1996). The trial court "finding no possible way to affirm that [Patterson] has standing" granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Trial Court Opinion, January 25, 2012, at 3.
This Court's review of issues of standing, which are questions of law, is plenary, under the de novo standard. Hunt v. Pennsylvania State Police, 603 Pa. 156, 983 A.2d 627 (2009).
The Statutory Standing Provisions of
Section 5782 of the NCL Applies to "Derivative" Actions
After review of the transcript of the argument on the summary judgment motion and reviewing the parties' briefs, it appears that the focus of the parties and the trial court was on Patterson's status and whether he met the definition of a "member" of the Board of Trustees and the Corporate Trustee. No one seemed to question whether Patterson's action was, in fact, a derivative action as envisaged by this section. The threshold inquiry, in this Court's view, must be whether Section 5782 of the NCL controlled.
Section 5782 of the NCL, 15 Pa.C.S. §5782, by its express language, limits those who may bring a derivative action against a board of directors or management on behalf of a nonprofit corporation. An action is derivative if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation or its members as a whole. Abraham Lincoln Hotel Corp. v. Metropolitan Edison, 4 Pa. D. & C. 4th 85 (1988), affirmed, 620 A.2d 534 (Pa. Super. 1992); Hendrickson v. Vandling, 41 Pa. D. & C. 3d 568 (1983). In effect, the suing shareholder claims to be acting on behalf of the corporation , because the directors and management have failed to exercise their authority for the benefit of the company and all of its shareholders.
In Davis v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 451 F.2d 659 (3rd Cir.1971), the Third Circuit distinguished between a derivative action and an individual action as follows:
It is hornbook law that claims asserted for the benefit of stockholders qua stockholders in a corporation because of the tortious acts of its officers or those actions in conjunction with them is a class suit, a derivative action, and recovery is for the benefit of the corporation directly and indirectly to its stockholders. It is equally
clear that where a corporation, tortiously conspires with others to damage an individual and does so a cause of action arises which belongs to the individual.451 F.2d at 662 (Emphasis added).
Pennsylvania corporate commentators also recognize this distinction:
Where there is a breach of the contract existing between the corporation and a shareholder by reason of his status as a shareholder, as distinguished from a breach of a contract between the corporation and a third person; or where there is a breach of the fiduciary duty which the directors, officers, or majority shareholders owe to a shareholder or the minority shareholders, as such, as distinguished from the breach of such a duty owed to the corporation, the shareholder injury by such breach has a direct, personal cause of action.W. Edward Sell & William H. Clark, Jr., Pennsylvania Business Corporations (1997) § 1782.2. See also William M. Fletcher, 12B Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations ("Fletcher") § 5911 ("If the injury is one to the plaintiff as a shareholder as an individual, and not to the corporation, as where the action is based on a contract to which the shareholder is a party, ... it is an individual action.").
When an injury to a corporation results in injury to the corporation's shareholders, it "is regarded as 'indirect,' and insufficient to give rise to a direct cause of action by the stockholder," requiring that a "derivative action" be brought on behalf of the corporation. Burdon v. Erskin, 401 A.2d 369, 370 (Pa. Super. 1979) (citing Kelly v. Thomas, 234 Pa. 419, 428, 83 A. 307 (1912)). See also John L. Motley Assocs., Inc. v. Rumbaugh, 104 B.R. 683, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("An action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder in his own name but must be brought in the name of the corporation."); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 710 A.2d 1169, 1176 (Pa. Super. 1998) ("[W]here the gravamen of a claim is injury to a corporation, the shareholders of the corporation may not claim injury to themselves rather than the corporation.").
An example of derivative claims previously asserted against the Corporate Trustee and Shelton (and others) is found in the related case commenced by Joseph Askew (Askew) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2009. See footnote 1.
In Askew I, Askew, who claimed to be a member of the Church, brought an eight-count complaint against Shelton, the Corporate Trustee and the other managers of the Corporate Trustee (collectively "Defendants"). In Count II, Askew alleged breach of fiduciary duty owed to the Corporate Trustee. In Count IV, Askew alleged that the Board of Trustees failed to present the members of the Corporate Trustee with an annual report containing specific financial information under Section 5553 of the NCL. In Count V, Askew sought the removal of Shelton as President of the Corporate Trustee.
Defendants moved to dismiss these counts because Askew lacked standing under the NCL to bring derivative claims.
The District Court agreed that these claims were derivative because any alleged failure to satisfy a supposed duty of loyalty and care owed to the Corporate Trustee would "injure[] only that corporation." Askew I, 644 F.Supp. 2d at 590. The District Court determined Count IV was also a derivative claim because that section guarantees a nonprofit corporation "the right to self-knowledge" and that "[a]ny right that Section 5553 may confer is a right of the corporation , and a claim to encore this section necessarily falls within the ambit of Section 5782." Askew I, 644 F.Supp 2d at 590 (Emphasis added). As for Count V, the District Court found that under Section 5726 of the NCL, a court is only empowered to remove a director "upon petition of any member or director" of the nonprofit corporation. Id.
The District court concluded that since Askew was not a member or director of the Corporate Trustee, he did not have "statutory standing" to seek these kinds of relief.
Even though the District Court found that Counts II, IV and V were derivative claims, the District Court explained that Askew's claims in Counts I and VI for breach of fiduciary duty to the Church and unjust enrichment for misappropriation of Church funds were not derivative of the Corporate Trustee's rights. Therefore, they were not claims "that only the Corporation's [Corporate Trustee] members directors or officers can bring." Askew I, 644 F.Supp. at 590.
This Court believes that same analysis is applicable here.
Patterson's Action Is Not a Derivative Action
Like Counts II, IV and V of Askew's Complaint, Patterson did not bring his lawsuit to enforce the rights of the Corporate Trustee. He did not claim that the Corporate Trustee was harmed by the unauthorized and wrongful misconduct of Shelton and his Board of Trustees. He did not purport to act on behalf of the Corporate Trustee. Patterson alleged, not that the Corporate Trustee was harmed, but that the Church and its members were harmed by Shelton's "looting" of the Church's assets which the Corporate Trustee was obligated to hold "in trust" for the purposes set forth in its Articles of Incorporation. Patterson brought the action against Shelton, as President of the Board of Trustees and the person with full control of the Corporate Trustee. This was an action by an individual who claimed injury to himself - as a member of the Church. It was a direct , third-party claim against Shelton, as the person who controlled the nonprofit Corporate Trustee and who owed fiduciary duties to the Church and its members, i.e., the beneficiaries of the trust relationship between the Church and the nonprofit Corporate Trustee. See, e.g., Bolton v. Stillwagon, 410 Pa. 618, 190 A.2d 105 (1963).
When a nonprofit corporation is incorporated to act as a trustee its board of directors or other body of the corporation are held to the same degree of responsibility and accountability as if not incorporated. A nonprofit corporate trustee may be accountable or responsible for failure to handle the property it holds "in trust" for the purposes set forth in its articles of incorporation. Section 5547(a) of the NCL provides:
General rule - Every non-profit corporation incorporated for a charitable purpose or purposes may take, receive and hold such real and personal property as may be given, devised to, or otherwise vested in such corporation, in trust, for the purpose or purposes set forth in its articles. The board of directors or other body of the corporation shall , as trustees of such property, be held to the same degree of responsibility and accountability as if not incorporated , unless a less degree or a particular degree of responsibility and
accountability is prescribed in the trust instrument, or unless the board of directors or such other body remain under the control of the members of the corporation or third persons who retain the right to direct, and do direct, the actions of the board or other body as to the use of the trust property from time to time. (Emphasis added).15 Pa.C.S. § 5547(a).
A lesser degree of responsibility and accountability was not prescribed in the trust instrument.
The Board of Trustees was not under the control of anyone else.
Here, the Articles of Incorporation establish the fiduciary relationship the Corporate Trustee was to have with the Church's assets and property. The Corporate Trustee was to "take, receive, have and hold and manage real and personal property in trust for the uses and purposes specified by the General Assembly of the Church." Articles of Incorporation, at 1; Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 41b. The Corporate Trustee and its members were prohibited from realizing any "pecuniary gain or profit, incidental or otherwise." Articles of Incorporation, at 1; S.R.R. at 41b.
Even notwithstanding the Articles of Incorporation, officers or authorities of a Church are prohibited by statute, i.e., Section 7 of the Act of April 26, 1855, as amended, 10 P.S. §81, from diverting Church property from a use to which it was dedicated to another inconsistent use. St. John the Baptist Greek Catholic Church of Allentown v. Musko, 448 Pa. 136, 292 A.2d 319 (1972); St. John Chrysostom Greek Catholic Church of Pittsburgh v. Elko, 436 Pa. 243, 259 A.2d 419 (1969), certiorari denied, 399 U.S. 920 (1970).
None of Patterson's claims belongs to the nonprofit Corporate Trustee whose primary duty it was to preserve the Church's assets. Instead, Patterson's claims derive from his membership in the Church and from the trust relationship that existed between the Church and the nonprofit Corporate Trustee.
Accordingly, the "statutory standing" prerequisites of Section 5782 of the NCL do not bar Patterson's action.
The protections afforded to officers and directors under the limitation on standing to bring derivative actions are not implicated where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to enforce his own rights against the nonprofit corporation and/or its managers and directors. White v. Associates in Counseling, 767 A.2d 638 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
Standing to Bring a Third-Party Action
Against Officers and Directors of
A Nonprofit Corporate Trustee
Neither do the remainder of the provisions of the NCL bar Patterson's action. The nonprofit corporation involved was actually "the trustee" of the Church's assets. Unlike the section of the NCL governing "derivative actions" (requiring that such a lawsuit be maintained by a member) there are no "statutory standing" jurisdiction prerequisites to an action by a party who seeks to enforce his own rights against a nonprofit corporation which was formed to act as a trustee.
Patterson argues, unnecessarily, that he has standing as "an other body" under Section 5893(a) of the NCL entitled, "Review of contested corporate action" which provides, in pertinent part: "any person whose status as, or whose rights or duties as, a member, director, member of an other body, officer or otherwise of a nonprofit corporation are or may be affected by any corporate action, the court may hear and determine the validity of such action." This Court does not agree that this section is applicable.
First, Patterson is not "a member of an other body...of the nonprofit corporation." His action is to enforce his own rights as a member of the Church congregation against the officers and directors of the nonprofit corporation.
Second, the action which Patterson contests is not the type of "corporation action" which is subject to this section. Corporate action subject to this section includes: "the election, appointment...suspension, removal or expulsion of members of the nonprofit corporation;" or an action "which is required" to be taken under the nonprofit law or which is required to be submitted for action to the members of the nonprofit corporation. 15 Pa.C.S. §5791. None of Patterson's allegations involve this type of action. Rather, they involve the "looting" of the Church's assets.
Third, those cases decided under this section which involved "standing" of health insurance subscribers to challenge corporate action to retain profits do not apply. Those cases hold that in order to have standing to contest corporate action that the protestor contends harmed the nonprofit corporation or them as a member, officer, director etc., of the nonprofit corporation, the person must be in the same class as director. See Herman v. Capital Blue Cross, 11 A.3d 23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 34 A.3d 84 (2011); Petty v. Hospital Service Association of Northeastern Pennsylvania, 967 A.2d 439 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) affirmed, ___ Pa. ___, 23 A.3d 1004 (2011). Again, that is not the situation here.
If a nonprofit corporation is sued in its capacity as a trustee, its officers and directors must be held to the same accountability and responsibility as any other trustee "as if not incorporated." 15 Pa.C.S. § 5547(a). Section 199 of the Restatement Second of Trusts provides that a beneficiary of a trust can maintain a suit:
(a) to compel the trustee to perform his duties as a trustee;Restatement (Second) of Trusts §199 (1959).
(b) to enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust;
(c) to compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust;
(d) to appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property and administer the trust;
(e) to remove the trustee.
Patterson's action sounds in breach of trust. He alleges that Shelton, as the person in control of the nonprofit Corporate Trustee, was accountable and responsible to hold the Church's assets in trust. Instead, Shelton engaged in self-dealing and depleted the Church's funds for his own pecuniary and personal gains.
Section 200 of the Restatement 2d of Trusts provides that "[n]o one except a beneficiary or one suing on his behalf can maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce the trust or enjoin redress for breach of trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts §200 (1959). Standing is precluded unless a party can "plead and prove an immediate, direct and substantial injury." 1000 Grandview Assn., Inc. v. Mt. Washington Assoc., 434 A.2d 796, 797 (Pa. Super. 1981). This does not mean an economic injury must be present. "[I]t is clear that some interests will suffice to confer standing even though they are neither pecuniary nor readily translatable into pecuniary terms." Wm. Penn Parking, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 193, 346 A.2d 269, 281 (1975).
In the context of churches, other courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have found that a church member may sue on behalf of the church. See, e.g., Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 566 (1829) (some of the persons belonging to a voluntary religious society, and having a common interest, may sue in behalf of themselves and others having the like interest, as part of the same society, for purposes common to all, and beneficial to all); Bridges v. Oates, 605 S.E.2d 685 (N.C. App. 2004); Nash v. Sutton, 14 S.E. 77 (N.C. 1891) (member of a congregational church has standing to maintain an action on behalf of the congregation when a trustee has acted beyond the scope of his or her authority); South Kenton Union Sunday School Ass'n v. Espy, 17 Ohio C.C. 524 (1899) (if trustees of a religious organization have conveyed its property without authority, individual members of such organization may maintain an action on behalf of the entire congregation to have the unauthorized conveyance set aside).
In Mount Jezreel Christians Without a Home v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Church, 582 A.2d 237 (D.C. 1990), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed whether members of a church may file suit against the board of trustees of their church on the theory that members were "trust beneficiaries." That court permitted a suit by members of Mount Jezreel Church to go forward with their claim of breach of fiduciary duty by the trustees in managing the church's assets and business affairs. The court explained that the members had "standing to sue the trustees in the event that the trust property is used or disposed of in a manner contrary to the stated purposes of the [church] trust." Id. at 239.
Similarly, in Askew I, the District Court determined, and this Court concurs, that the members of a Church's congregation suffer injury when the Church's assets, which were held in trust, are misused. Askew I, 644 F.Supp. 2d at 591. The District Court clarified that only through Askew's membership in the Church was he qualified to bring an action on behalf of the Church under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.1 (governing standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of unincorporated associations).
In Askew II, the District Court went on to find that Askew was not a "member" of the Church because he was expelled through the procedures in Article XIII of the Church's By-Laws.
Here, there is no question that Patterson was a member of the Church when he instituted the action. As a member of the Church congregation, Patterson was part of the beneficiary class for which the Corporate Trustee held the Church's assets in trust. As such, he has standing to bring this action to enforce his own rights and the rights commonly held by all beneficiaries to obtain restoration to the Church of its full losses. Thus, the action should not have been dismissed due to lack of standing under the NCL.
Shelton argues that Patterson was not a member of the Church congregation because he "abandoned" the Church. However, the record demonstrates that the Church never took any action to remove Patterson. Article XIII of the Church By-laws provided a method for the expulsion or suspension of members. The Church could have used those procedures to remove Patterson who Shelton alleges abandoned the Church, but it did not do so.
As noted, the Church is an unincorporated association. This Court notes that its conclusion that Patterson has standing is also wholly consistent with principles governing standing to sue on behalf of an unincorporated association. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 2152 (action by unincorporated association must be brought in name of member as trustee ad litem).
To hold otherwise would, as a practical matter, insulate these most serious allegations from judicial review. --------
The order of the trial court is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of March, 2013, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is hereby reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to conduct a trial on the remaining factual and legal issues raised in Anthonee Patterson's complaint. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge