Patten v. Patten

Full title: WILLIAM EARLY PATTEN APPELLANT v. PATRICIA ANN PATTEN (NOW NAVE) APPELLEE

Court: Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

Date published: Feb 24, 2017

NO. 2015-CA-001812-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2017)

Opinion

NO. 2015-CA-001812-MR

02-24-2017

WILLIAM EARLY PATTEN APPELLANT v. PATRICIA ANN PATTEN (NOW NAVE) APPELLEE

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Elizabeth S. Hughes Nora A. Koffman Lexington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Patricia A. Nave, pro se Lexington, Kentucky

KRAMER, CHIEF JUDGE

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY NEIL PHILPOT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CI-04382 OPINION
AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: KRAMER, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND JONES, JUDGES. KRAMER, CHIEF JUDGE: William Early Patten appeals from the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on September 21, 2015, and the order denying his subsequent motion to alter, amend or vacate brought pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05. After a careful review of the record, we affirm because: the settlement agreement and divorce decree unambiguously require Patten to pay half of his two sons' health insurance and unreimbursed health-related expenses for as long as they are eligible for dependent coverage under their mother's health insurance policy; the issue of whether Patten is obligated to pay part of his daughter's health insurance and unreimbursed health-related expenses is not ripe for review; and Patten's equal protection claim is moot.

Patten and Patricia Ann Patten (now Nave) were divorced in 2011. At issue is the length of time Patten is obligated, under the terms of their settlement agreement, to pay fifty percent of the health insurance costs and unreimbursed health-related expenses for any or all of their three children.

On December 8, 2011, Patten and Nave entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to the dissolution of their marriage. At the time of the dissolution, the parties' two sons were fifteen and sixteen years of age. The third child, a daughter, became emancipated before the entry of the agreement. The settlement agreement contained the following provision for child support and for the payment of the children's health insurance and health-related expenses:

The parties have agreed through temporary orders currently in place that Husband shall pay child support in the amount of $1020.00 per month and said order shall continue subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Dissolution in the same amount. Said child support amount is consistent with the Kentucky Child Support Guidelines.

Said Child support shall continue until the children reach the age of eighteen years or graduate from high school whichever event occurs last. . . .

Wife shall continue to maintain health insurance coverage on behalf of the minor children for so long as said children are eligible for dependent coverage and Husband shall reimburse her 50% of said cost quarterly. The parties shall divide the unreimbursed expenses incurred on behalf of the children with said expenses to include, but not be limited to medical, surgical, dental, orthodont[ic], optometric, nursing and hospital services; for professional counseling or psychiatric therapy for diagnosed medical disorders; and for drugs and medical supplies, appliances, laboratory, diagnostic, and therapeutic services. The parties will divide said medical expenses (as defined by above) with William to pay 50% and Patricia to pay 50% of said expenses.

Emphasis added.

Upon finding that the written agreement was not unconscionable, the trial court approved it and incorporated it by reference into the decree of dissolution, which was entered on December 12, 2011. According to Patten, the decree was prepared and tendered by the parties. It provided in part:

4. Child Support: Husband shall continue [to] pay to Wife child support in the amount of $1,020 each month as he has done per previous Order of the Court. This amount of child support is consistent with KRS [Kentucky Revised Statutes] 403.211 and 212. Child support shall continue until the children reach the age of eighteen years or graduate from high school whichever occurs last. . . .

5. Children's Health Insurance: Wife shall continue to provide health insurance to the minor children for so long as they are eligible for dependent coverage and Husband shall reimburse her 50% of said cost quarterly. The parties shall divide equally, 50/50, unreimbursed medical expenses incurred on behalf of the minor children.

Emphasis added.

On May 21, 2015, Nave filed a motion to compel Patten to reimburse her for a portion of the quarterly payment of health insurance for their sons. The trial court held a case management conference to address the motion and several other motions filed by Nave. Nave informed the court at that time that the sons were both nineteen years of age and the daughter was twenty-three. On July 13, 2015, Nave renewed her motion for reimbursement of insurance and added a request for reimbursement of health-related expenses for the sons. This filing sought to compel payment of $621.00 for reimbursement pertaining to the third quarter health insurance payment and $141.83 for the reimbursement of healthcare expenses, for a total of $762.83.

Patten filed a response combined with a motion to terminate payment of health insurance and healthcare expenses for the sons, and to terminate any such obligation that might exist with regard to the daughter.

Nave's health insurance policy provides dependent coverage until the age of 26, or until the dependent becomes covered as an employee, i.e., "for so long as [the children] are eligible for dependent coverage." Nave argued that the terms of the settlement agreement required the insurance costs for the sons to be equally divided until they reached that age or became covered employees. Nave acknowledged that she has not sought reimbursement for any costs related to the daughter, but refused to concede that no obligation on Patten's part existed in that regard.

The trial court entered an order directing Patten to pay the amounts sought in the motion to compel and to continue to pay his share of the sons' health insurance costs and healthcare expenses until they are no longer eligible for coverage under Nave's insurance plan. Patten filed a CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend or vacate. The trial court denied the motion except insofar as it addressed his motion to terminate in regards to the health insurance and healthcare expenses of the daughter. The trial court refused to enter an order stating that Patten had no obligations in that regard. This appeal by Patten followed.

The standard of review for interpreting a settlement agreement is as follows:

The terms of a settlement agreement set forth in a decree of dissolution of marriage are enforceable as contract terms. KRS 403.180(5). The construction and interpretation of a contract is a matter of law and is reviewed under the de novo standard. Absent an ambiguity in the contract, the parties' intentions must be discerned from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence.

Cagata v. Cagata, 475 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Ky. App. 2015), review denied (Dec. 10, 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). When a contract is unambiguous, a court will interpret its terms "by assigning language its ordinary meaning and without resort to extrinsic evidence." Frear v. P.T.A. Indus., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Ky. 2003) (footnote omitted).

Patten contends that he is not required to pay a portion of his sons' health insurance costs and unreimbursed healthcare expenses because they are no longer minors. We disagree. The settlement agreement and decree unambiguously provide that Nave is required to maintain health insurance on behalf of the sons for "so long as they are eligible for dependent coverage." Contrary to Patten's argument, the reference to "minor children" in those documents clearly was intended to distinguish between the sons and the daughter, because the sons were the only "minor children" that Patten and Nave had at the time those documents were entered in the record, due to the fact that their daughter had reached the age of majority by that time. Therefore, the term "minor children," as used in the aforementioned documents, refers to the sons of Patten and Nave.

Further, the divorce decree requires Nave to maintain health insurance for the sons "for so long as they are eligible for dependent coverage," and the settlement agreement uses similar language. These unambiguous terms clearly indicate that Nave must maintain health insurance for the sons until they are no longer eligible for dependent coverage under her health insurance policy. According to the record, Nave's health insurance policy that was in effect on January 1, 2011, and was in effect at the time the settlement agreement and divorce decree were entered into the record, provided that dependent coverage was available for "[c]hildren, up to the end of the month in which their 26th birthday occurs." Presumably, Patten, who himself is a lawyer, was aware of this provision in Nave's health insurance policy before he signed the settlement agreement. If he was not aware, he certainly should have made himself aware of the terms of Nave's health insurance policy before he signed the settlement agreement. Moreover, the fact that the parties clearly intended for Nave to maintain health insurance for the sons for so long as they were eligible for dependent coverage, i.e., beyond the age of majority, is also apparent because in specifying the terms of child support elsewhere in the settlement agreement, the parties agreed that Patten would continue to pay Nave child support "until the children reach the age of eighteen years or graduate from high school[,] whichever event occurs last." Therefore, the parties specified an exact age when child support would cease, but did not do the same for health insurance purposes. Rather, they agreed that health insurance would be maintained for so long as the sons were eligible for dependent coverage and that they would share the costs of that coverage.

Similarly, the provision for payment of unreimbursed healthcare expenses refers to expenses incurred for the sons, who were minors when the settlement agreement and divorce decree were entered in the record, and who are covered by Nave's health insurance policy. Consequently, the plain language of the settlement agreement requires Nave to maintain health insurance on behalf of the sons for as long as they are eligible for dependent coverage under her policy, and Patten is required to reimburse Nave for fifty percent of this cost. The plain language of the agreement also requires Patten and Nave to split the cost of the sons' unreimbursed healthcare expenses 50/50 during the time that the sons are eligible for dependent coverage under Nave's policy.

Patten's next argument concerns the trial court's denial of his motion for a ruling terminating any obligation to pay health insurance and healthcare expenses for his daughter. The daughter turned eighteen years of age in February 2010, before the execution of the settlement agreement and entry of the decree in December 2011. Patten contends that neither the agreement nor the decree contains any language obligating him to share in her healthcare expenses. In her brief, Nave acknowledges this. Patten argues that he is entitled to a court order stating that he is not obligated to contribute to any past, present or future expenses for the daughter. However, the trial court may not enter such an order because it is unable to issue advisory opinions.

[U]nless and until ... some demand [is] made ..., there is no justiciable issue before the Court for determination. The Court will not render advisory opinions or consider matters which may or may not occur in the future. It is a fundamental tenet of Kentucky jurisprudence that courts cannot decide matters that have not yet ripened into concrete disputes. Courts are not permitted to render advisory opinions.

Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Ky. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

There is no present actual controversy presented by the adverse parties concerning the daughter because Nave has made no claim to recover expenses for the daughter from Patten. Consequently, the matter is not ripe for resolution, and the trial court did not err in refusing to enter an order on the matter.

In his final argument, Patten contends that the trial court's order requiring him to continue paying fifty percent of his sons' health insurance and unreimbursed health-related expenses violates his right to equal protection. Specifically, he alleges that

the portions of the Kentucky child support statute which require divorced or divorcing parties and unmarried parents to pay for the cost of health insurance for emancipated children violates equal protection because married parents are not subject to such statutory requirements and cannot be forced to provide such coverage for their adult children.

However, as previously noted, we will not address any claims concerning the parties' daughter because there has been no claim to recover expenses concerning her. As for Patten's equal protection claim concerning his obligation to pay half of his adult sons' health insurance and unreimbursed expenses, Patten is obligated to do so because he contractually agreed to do so when he signed the settlement agreement. Thus, whether a statute would or would not require him to pay for his adult sons is inconsequential in this case. Parties may agree to terms beyond what the statutes require, and that is what happened here. Therefore, this claim is moot.

Accordingly, the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, and its order denying Patten's CR 59.05 motion are affirmed.

ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Elizabeth S. Hughes
Nora A. Koffman
Lexington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Patricia A. Nave, pro se
Lexington, Kentucky