Opinion
No. 06-5108-cv.
October 4, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Robinson, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL S. PASCAZI,pro se, Fishkill, New York.
APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: DIANA R.H. WINTERS, Assistant Solicitor General (Michelle Aronowitz, Deputy Solicitor General; Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General; Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, on the brief).
PRESENT: HON. DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge , HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, HON. DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
Michael Pascazi appeals from a judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Robinson, J.) dismissing his complaint. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
In September 2003, Pascazi and his company, Fiber Optek Interconnect Corp. ("Fiber Optek"), brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ("Pascazi I"), seeking a declaratory judgment that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA"), 47 U.S.C. § 253, preempts New York Labor Law § 220(3) and that the New York State Department of Labor ("DOL") lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate his preemption claim because the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. Pascazi also sought to enjoin DOL from continuing its administrative proceedings against him and Fiber Optek for failing to pay prevailing wages on public works projects, as required by New York Labor Law § 220(3). A month later, the District Court (Brieant, J.) dismissed Pascazi's complaint, abstaining from intervening in the ongoing state proceedings on the basis of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Pascazi did not appeal and the judgment became final.
In November 2004, Pascazi brought the present suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Pascazi claims that DOL is violating his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by continuing to proceed against him and Fiber Optek. He again asserts that the TCA preempts New York Labor Law § 220(3) and that the FCC's jurisdiction over this matter is exclusive. As before, Pascazi seeks an injunction prohibiting DOL from proceeding with its enforcement actions. He also requests a declaratory judgment that such proceedings violate his due process rights. On September 28, 2006, the District Court (Robinson, J.) granted DOL's motion to dismiss pursuant to Younger v. Harris. On October 26, 2006, Pascazi filed this appeal.
Rather than review the District Court's dismissal on basis of the Younger abstention doctrine, we affirm its judgment because the District Court's prior judgment of dismissal in Pascazi I collaterally estops Pascazi from contesting abstention in the present suit.
"The doctrine of collateral estoppel (or `issue preclusion') bars relitigation of a specific legal or factual issue in a second proceeding where (1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and actually decided, (3) there was [a] full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits." Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hussein, 178 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pascazi contends that DOL waived collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense in the District Court. In fact, DOL specifically argued for dismissal on "res judicata" grounds (referring to both issue and claim preclusion). See Nestor v. Pratt Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 70 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that "res judicata" is often understood to encompass both issue and claim preclusion). DOL also highlighted the many similarities between the claims inPascazi I and those in the present suit.
Where the circumstances bearing on the District Court'sYounger abstention analysis are unchanged, dismissal on the basis of the Younger abstention doctrine forecloses the Younger issue in a subsequent action seeking substantially the same relief on substantially the same claim. See Grieve, 269 F.3d at 153-54. A dismissal onYounger abstention grounds constitutes a final judgment on the merits for collateral estoppel purposes,id. at 153, and "conclusively establishe[s]" the "propriety of a federal court's abstention in favor of the state court's adjudication" in all subsequent appeals between the same parties that present "substantially the same claims." Id. at 153-54.
Pascazi's claims in this suit involve the same parties and present substantially the same claims as in Pascazi I. The common issue is "the propriety of a federal court's abstention in favor of the state [tribunal's] adjudication."Id. at 154. In Pascazi I, the District Court refused declaratory and equitable relief, citingYounger. Pascazi now seeks the same relief against the same defendant on a substantially similar basis. As inGrieve, the District Court's judgment of dismissal in Pascazi I "conclusively established" the propriety of federal court abstention; Pascazi is therefore collaterally estopped from contesting abstention in this suit.Id.
Pascazi has failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that any legally relevant facts have changed since Pascazi I. In Pascazi I, the District Court concluded that abstention was appropriate because the three requirements for application of the Younger abstention doctrine were satisfied: (1) DOL's administrative proceedings were ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicated an important state interest; and (3) the state agency (or the state court on review) afforded Pascazi "an adequate opportunity for judicial review" of his federal claims. See Diamond "D" Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002). Pascazi does not contest that the DOL proceedings are still ongoing, and nothing since Pascazi I has changed New York's interest in enforcing its Wage Law. While Pascazi protests that only the FCC can hear his preemption claim, nothing in the record indicates that the state agency or state courts are unwilling or unable to adjudicate his federal preemption and FCC exclusivity claims. In fact, DOL is empowered to "determine questions of facts upon which [its] jurisdiction depends."Mailand Farms, Inc. v. Hartnett, 612 N.Y.S.2d 606, 606 (2d Dep't 1994). In addition, Pascazi may seek review of any administrative orders that issue against him in the state court system. Therefore, the circumstances that had bearing on the District Court's judgment of dismissal in Pascazi I are unchanged.
Although Pascazi styles the present suit as a civil rights action pursuant to § 1983, collateral estoppel cannot be overcome by such formal differences. See Grieve, 269 F.3d at 151-52 (ruling that the first suit, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, collaterally estopped the second suit, a non-habeas action). Pascazi's § 1983 suit presents the same substantive issues that were conclusively resolved in Pascazi I; his claims are therefore collaterally estopped.
We have considered Pascazi's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.