Opinion
No. 1-665 / 00-2008.
Filed February 6, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, CYNTHIA DANIELSON, Judge.
The plaintiff appeals the district court's grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment and argues the court erred in holding his claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. AFFIRMED.
Steven J. Crowley and Nicholas G. Pothitakis of Crowley, Bunger Pothitakis, Burlington, for appellant.
Rand S. Wonio and Troy D. Venner of Lane Waterman, Davenport, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.
Plaintiff Tyler Parrott was injured when his grandfather, James Chase, backed over him with a riding lawn mower. Parrott filed suit against his grandfather and Hassenfritz Company, the owner of the mower. Parrott claimed Hassenfritz was liable as the "owner of a motor vehicle" under Iowa Code section 321.493 (1997). The district court subsequently granted Hassenfritz's motion for summary judgment, finding the lawn mower was not a "motor vehicle" as contemplated by Iowa Code section 321.493. The supreme court denied Parrott's application for an interlocutory appeal regarding the dismissed claim against Hassenfritz.
Parrott and Chase reached a settlement agreement in the fall of 1999, but the case was dismissed without prejudice on January 2, 2000, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1 before a dismissal was filed with the court. Parrott filed an untimely motion for reinstatement and the motion was denied.
Parrott filed a second lawsuit against Chase and Hassenfritz alleging essentially the same claims raised in his first action. After the settlement between Parrott and Chase was effectuated, Hassenfritz moved for summary judgment claiming the doctrine of res judicata barred the relitigation of its liability under section 321.493. Parrott claimed that because the rule 215.1 dismissal was without prejudice, the prior summary judgment proceedings in his first suit did not bar his subsequent action against Hassenfritz. The district court concluded Hassenfritz had been dismissed in the prior action as a result of the summary judgment, and Parrott had not timely appealed from the summary judgment ruling following the rule 215.1 dismissal of the case. As a result, the court concluded Parrott's second action against Hassenfritz was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Parrott appeals.
I. Standard of Review.
The review of a grant or denial of summary judgment is at law. Iowa R. App. P. 4.
II. Discussion.
Parrott's argues on appeal that because the original action below was dismissed by operation of rule 215.1, and because such dismissals are deemed to be without prejudice, he should be able to maintain this second action against Hassenfritz. He consequently believes he stands in relation to Hassenfritz as if the first action had never been instituted and that, therefore, his claim against Hassenfritz in the present case should be allowed to proceed.
We begin our analysis by noting that the dismissal of a case under rule 215.1 is without prejudice. A judgment of dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as if no action had been instituted. See Pollock v. Deere Co., 282 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1979). A judgment of dismissal "without prejudice" is not ordinarily res judicata of the merits of the controversy. Windus v. Great Plains Gas, 116 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Iowa 1962). Further, a rule 215.1 dismissal does not generally preclude the filing of a new action between the parties. Pollock, 282 N.W.2d at 738. However, we agree with the district court that Hasenftitz's situation is distinguishable from the situations addressed in Pollock and Windus. Hassenfritz clearly stands in an entirely different position than did the defendants in Pollock and Windus. In Polluck, two suits brought by a plaintiff against only Deere and Co. were dismissed for lack of prosecution. Polluck thereafter brought a third action against Deere. The district court concluded the two prior dismissals — although without prejudice — resulted in an adjudication that precluded the third action. Our supreme court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Deere and held that the two dismissals pursuant to rule 215.1 were without prejudice and did not result in an adjudication on the merits in the defendant's favor. It is significant that Deere's liability was not adjudicated by summary judgment before the action was dismissed for lack of prosecution. In the instant case, however, the district court adjudicated the merits of Parrott's claim against Hassenfritz by summary judgment before the claims against the second defendant, James Chase, were dismissed pursuant to rule 215.1.
In Windus, as in the case now before us, there were multiple defendants. However, all of the Windus defendants were dismissed pursuant to rule 215.1. Windus, 116 N.W.2d at 414. Each of the defendants therefore stood in the same relative position for purposes of the rule 215.1 dismissal. In sharp contrast, as noted previously, Parrott's action against Hassenfritz was dismissed by summary judgment before the action against Chase was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
Hassenfritz contends Parrott could have preserved his claim by appealing from the summary judgment order either (1) within thirty days of the rule 215.1 dismissal, or (2) within thirty days after expiration of the deadline for filing an application for reinstatement under the rule. Parrot filed no such appeal and the summary judgment in favor of Hassenfritz resulted in a final adjudication.
Because our decision in this case does not require it, we do not decide the question of whether the thirty-day period during which Parrott could have filed a notice of appeal to contest the summary judgment in favor of Hassenfritz commenced upon dismissal of the prior action pursuant to rule 215, 1 or upon expiration of the period during which an application for reinstatement could have been filed.
Because the summary judgment in the prior suit resulted in an adjudication, we conclude Parrott's claim against Hassenfritz is barred. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a "final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive . . . and constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action." Iowa Coal Mining Co., Inc. v. Monroe County, 555 N.W.2d 418, 440 (Iowa 1996). Res judicata in the sense of claim preclusion means that further litigation on the claim is barred. Res judicata in the sense of issue preclusion means that further litigation on a specific issue is barred. Israel v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 339 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1983).
We hold that Parrott's action against Hasenfritz is barred by both issue preclusion and claim preclusion. It is barred by claim preclusion because (1) a final adjudication has already occurred, (2) the same parties were involved, and (3) the same issues were involved. See In re L.F., 590 N.W.2d 284, 285 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). It is further barred by issue preclusion because (1) the issue involved is identical, (2) the issue was raised and litigated in the prior action, (3) the issue was material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action, and (4) the issue's determination was necessary and essential to the judgment. Harrison v. State Bank of Bussey, 440 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court order granting summary judgment in favor of Hassenfritz.
AFFIRMED.