Opinion
3:24-cv-00013-JR
06-21-2024
MARIA GUILLEN PARRISH, an individual, CHARLOTTE THOMPSON, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. SHRINERS HOSPITALS FOR CHILDREN, a corporation, Defendant.
FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Jolie A. Russo, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiffs brought this action in Multnomah County, Oregon Circuit Court alleging employment discrimination. Defendant Shriners Hospitals for Children removed to this Court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss all claims. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiffs allege they worked as either a revenue cycle specialization/authorization specialist or nutritional aide and cook for defendant during the Covid-19 pandemic. First Amended Complaint (ECF 1
Plaintiff Maria Parrish alleges:
When the COVID-19 vaccine mandate was imposed, Plaintiff Guillen Parrish applied for a religious exception to the vaccine based on her deeply held Christian beliefs. She believes that her body is not her own, but belongs to God, and that she must do nothing that would jeopardize her health spiritually or physically. Plaintiff Guillen Parrish also cannot knowingly partake of a vaccine which is derived in any measure from the use of fetal cells lines derived from aborted fetuses. She believes that would make her complicit in the act of murder, however far removed, and that she is morally accountable to God. Defendant Shriners denied Plaintiff Guillen Parrish's religious exception; however, she did not learn of this until four days before she was terminated on October 18, 2021.Id. at ¶ 5.
Plaintiff Charlotte Thompson alleges:
After the COVID-19 vaccine mandate was imposed, Plaintiff Thompson applied for a religious exception based on her deeply held Christian religious beliefs. She was shocked and dismayed when her religious exception request was denied without explanation, and that Shriners could reject her religious beliefs. She was willing to do whatever it took to keep her job, including wearing a face mask, shield, and submit to weekly testing. Plaintiff Thompson was terminated on October 18, 2021. Prior to her termination, Plaintiff Thompson experienced harassment and bullying about taking the COVID-19 vaccine, which caused an uncomfortable work environment. She felt that people did not understand that by questioning her vaccination status they were questioning her religion and faith in God.Id. at ¶ 8.
Plaintiffs allege a claim for unlawful employment discrimination based on religion pursuant to Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030. Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs' claims asserting both claims fail to state a claim for relief. In the alternative, defendant moves for summary judgment as to plaintiff Parrish's claim.
Defendant relies on materials outside the complaint regarding the use of fetal cell lines in vaccines and medications arguing that to establish plaintiff's opposition would allow her to object to virtually any medical intervention based on an extremely attenuated connection to fetal cell lines. The Court finds the issues raised in this argument too fact dependent and outside the allegation in the complaint to properly address at this stage of the proceedings.
DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient factual content to establish a plausible claim for religious discrimination. In addition, defendant contends plaintiffs fail to allege what, if anything, they told defendant about the nature of their religious beliefs and how those beliefs related to the vaccine mandate.
To properly plead a religious discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) she had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty; (2) she informed her employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected her to an adverse employment action because of her inability to fulfill the job requirement. Heller v. EBB Auto. Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir.1993).
Oregon's anti-discrimination statutes are analyzed under the same framework as claims bought under Title VII. El v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2020 WL 2616397, at *3 (D. Or. May 22, 2020).
Title VII defines “religion” to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Tiano v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Nevertheless, “Title VII does not protect secular preferences.” Id. at 682; see also Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[a]n individual's assertion that the belief [is religious does not] automatically mean that the belief is religious . . . a threshold inquiry into the religious aspect of particular beliefs and practices cannot be avoided if we are to determine what is in fact based on religious belief, and what is based on secular or scientific principles”) (collecting cases).
With respect to COVID vaccination mandates, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has provided guidance to employers navigating claimed religious exemptions, explaining that, “although Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on religion, an employee's request for an exemption from a COVID-19 vaccination mandate can be denied on the ground that the employee's belief is not truly religious in nature[.]'” Doe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2021). The EEOC's guidance notes objections to the COVID-19 vaccine that “are purely based on social, political, or economic views or personal preferences, or any other nonreligious concerns (including about the possible effects of the vaccine)” are not protected by Title VII. What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, EEOC (Oct. 25, 2021), available at https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws#L. “However, overlap between a religious and political view does not place it outside the scope of Title VII's religious protections, as long as the view is part of a comprehensive religious belief system and is not simply an isolated teaching.” Id.
While plaintiffs allege, they applied for a religious exemption, neither plaintiff provides sufficient allegations that they informed defendant of their particular religious belief and how those beliefs conflicted with the vaccine requirement. Accordingly, the complaint fails to allege plausible factual matter to demonstrate an essential element of their claim. See, e.g., Denton v. Shriners Hosp. for Child., 2024 WL 1078280, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 8, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:23-CV-826-JR, 2024 WL 1075324 (D. Or. Mar. 12, 2024) (Dismissing complaint because it did not identify the specific religious belief violated by the vaccine requirement or inform the defendant of such specific beliefs in seeking the exemption).
Plaintiffs argue the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars defendant from challenging the sincerity of their religious beliefs and thus prevents it from arguing the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate this element. However, defendant accepts the allegation of a sincerely held belief, it simply argues that plaintiffs fail to plead, beyond conclusory terms, and thus inform defendant of a specific belief and how that belief conflicted with the vaccine mandate.
To the extent a given plaintiff's allegations are mere conclusions that the vaccine conflicts with some unidentified personal religious belief, those allegations are inadequate. Judges within this district and throughout the Ninth Circuit hold differing views on how much a plaintiff must plead to assert a bona fide religious belief and indeed “American courts are loath to tell a person that his interpretation of his faith is a wrong one.” Hittle v. City of Stockton, 2022 WL 616722, *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2022), aff'd, 76 F.4th 877 (9th Cir. 2023). Nonetheless, the undersigned is aligned with those courts that are hesitant to find that broad statements of religious opposition are sufficient to state a viable claim, particularly given that plaintiffs are required to plead more than conclusory allegations that merely recite the elements of a given cause of action. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient); Kather v. Asante Health Sys., 2023 WL 4865533, *5 (D. Or. July 28, 2023) (“vague expressions of sincerely held Christian beliefs alone cannot serve as a blanket excuse for avoiding all unwanted employment obligations” and a “‘threadbare reference' to religious beliefs is insufficient at the motion to dismiss stage”). Moreover, a conclusory invocation of religious beliefs in objecting to the mandate is insufficient to plead a claim. See Rogers v. Neb. Urb. Indian Health Coal., Inc., 2023 WL 2990720, *5 (D. Neb. Apr. 18, 2023) (dismissing a Title VII claim where the plaintiff did not “articulate or describe any particular beliefs that she maintains [or] provide even a perfunctory explanation as to how her beliefs conflict with receiving a COVID-19 vaccine”); see also Stephens v. Legacy-GoHealth Urgent Care, 2023 WL 7612395, *4-6 (D. Or. Oct. 23), adopted as clarified by 2023 WL 7623865 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2023) (“[g]eneral references to Christianity do not meet even a ‘fairly minimal' burden at the pleading stage, as such allegations are conclusory and fail to plausibly suggest that a plaintiff's anti-vaccination beliefs are in fact religious”).
In addition, allegations regarding jeopardizing health also fail to establish religious opposition to the vaccination policy. See Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 2023 WL 2455681, *5-6 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 10, 2023) (dismissing Title VII claims where the plaintiffs sought religious exemptions on the basis “that [their bodies were each] a temple of the Holy Spirit,” concluding these are “personal judgments about vaccine safety and not . . . religious reasons . . . the use of religious vocabulary does not elevate a personal medical judgment to a matter of protected religion”); Brox v. Hole, 590 F.Supp.3d 359, 366 (D. Mass. 2022) (“the record suggests that plaintiffs' opposition to receiving the COVID-19 vaccine” - i.e., that God has instilled them with adequate immune systems and a corresponding preference for natural remedies -“is based primarily on philosophical, medical, or scientific beliefs, or personal fears or anxieties rather than bona fide religious practices”) (citation and internal quotations omitted); Mason v. General Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting parents' religious objection to the school's vaccination policy on the grounds that their cited belief in the body's ability to self-heal were scientific and/or secular); see also Geerlings v. Tredyffrin/Easttown Sch. Dist., 2021 WL 4399672, *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2021) (“[r]eligious adherents often profess that faith inspires much of their secular lives, but those activities are still secular . . . it takes more than a generalized aversion to harming the body to nudge a practice over the line from medical to religious”).
Plaintiff Parrish briefly touches upon strongly held beliefs regarding knowingly partaking of a vaccine derived from aborted fetal cell lines in any measure. As Judge Stacie Beckerman of this Court noted:
Courts have found similar anti-vaccination beliefs sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage. For example, in Kather, a judge from this district denied the defendant's motion to dismiss certain plaintiffs' religious discrimination claims under Title VII, noting that one plaintiff “cite[d] opposition to injecting into his body anything that ‘originate[d] from fetal cell lines' ” and it could “be inferred that [this plaintiff's] belief in God inform[ed] his opposition to receiving a vaccine he allege[d] originate[d] from the use of fetal cells,” and that one plaintiff cited her “ ‘Christianity' and resistance to receiving a vaccine developed with fetal cell lines[, which was] another reasonably inferred religious conflict.” 2023 WL 4865533, at *4 (citations omitted).Stephens v. Legacy-GoHealth Urgent Care, 2023 WL 7612395, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Stephens v. Legacy Health, 2023 WL 7623865 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2023).
Indeed, this Court has determined invocation of an anti-abortion stance, guidance from spiritual leaders, and the use of fetal cells in developing Covid-19 vaccines appropriately alleged a bona fide religious belief. Quinn v. Legacy Health, Case No. 3:23-cv-00331-JR (D. Or. June 16, 2023) (ECF 15) at p. 10, see also Keene v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 2023 WL 3451687, *2-3 (9th Cir. May 15, 2023) (reversing the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction premised on a Title VII claim where the plaintiffs -i.e., “Christians who believe in the sanctity of life” - cited the use of fetal cell lines in requesting a religious exception, denoting “the resolution of [whether a belief is religious] is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit [protection]”).
The problem with the current allegations is that plaintiff Parrish neglects to identify any religious tenet or teaching that conflict with defendants' vaccine policy. While religious beliefs regarding abortion, use of aborted fetal cell lines, and the belief in the sanctity of life may suffice to plausibly allege a conflict between a sincerely held religious belief and a given vaccine requirement, plaintiff's complaint does nothing more than plead a conclusory objection to use of aborted fetal cell lines. The complaint does not identify the specific religious belief violated by the vaccine requirement. See Quinn v. Legacy Health, Case No. 3:23-cv-00331-JR (D. Or. June 16, 2023, ECF 15) at p. 2-3 (plaintiff alleges religious exemption request provided detailed specification regarding religious beliefs, from where those beliefs emanated, and how the COVID vaccine violated those beliefs citing Christian scholars).
Courts are not required to “take plaintiffs' conclusory assertions of violations of their religious beliefs at face value.” Bolden-Hardge v. Office of the Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2023). However, it is not clear whether the pleading deficiencies can be cured by amendment. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is granted without prejudice and plaintiffs are allowed to seek leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Shriner's Hospital's motion to dismiss (ECF 8) should be granted without prejudice and plaintiffs should be allowed to seek leave to amend.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the court. Thereafter, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge will be considered as a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to this recommendation.