Opinion
23A-CR-2955
10-04-2024
Ebonie Parks, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana Victoria Bailey Casanova Casanova Legal Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ian A. McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Jeffrey L. Marchal, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D31-2203-F5-5826
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana Victoria Bailey Casanova Casanova Legal Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ian A. McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FOLEY, JUDGE.
[¶1] Ebonie Parks ("Parks") challenges the calculation of credit time associated with her pretrial home detention, seeking application of statutory amendments regarding credit time that became effective after Parks committed her offense but before she was sentenced. Based on the plain language of the amended statutes, we agree with Parks that the amended statutes apply. We therefore reverse and remand for the award of credit time based on the amended statutes.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On the evening of February 25, 2022, Parks drove her sister, Arieal Smith ("Smith"), to a club in Indianapolis. There was an altercation between Smith and Secoya Williams ("Williams"), which led to Smith's ejection from the club. Parks and Smith returned to the vehicle. As they were leaving, Smith shot and killed Williams outside the club. Parks then drove Smith away from the scene.
[¶3] The State charged Parks with Level 5 felony assisting a criminal. Parks was arrested on February 28, 2022, and held in custody until March 23, 2022, when she was released to pretrial home detention with electronic monitoring. On August 31, 2022, the trial court modified Parks's pretrial release conditions so that Parks was still on electronic monitoring but no longer on home detention.
[¶4] Following a bench trial, the trial court found Parks guilty as charged. On November 17, 2023, the court sentenced Parks to two years on home detention. For the time Parks was incarcerated after her arrest, the trial court awarded Parks twenty-four days of accrued time credit and eight days of good time credit. For the time Parks was on pretrial home detention, the trial court awarded Parks forty-one days of good time credit with no accrued time credit. Parks now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] Parks contends that the trial court erred in calculating credit time for her period of pretrial home detention. The crux of the issue is whether amendments to Indiana Code sections 35-50-6-4 and 35-50-6-3.1-which took effect after Parks committed the Level 5 felony, but before she was sentenced-applied to Parks.
[¶6] Indiana Code section 35-38-3-2 provides that, "[w]hen a convicted person is sentenced to imprisonment," the trial court shall enter a judgment that "include[s] . . . the amount of credit time earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing, including time on pretrial home detention." Regarding pretrial home detention, when Parks committed the Level 5 felony offense in February 2022, Indiana Code section 35-50-6-4(i) provided as follows:
A person placed on pretrial home detention awaiting trial is assigned to Class P. A person assigned to Class P may not be reassigned to another credit time class while the person is on pretrial home detention awaiting trial.
A related statute, Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1(f), provided:
A person assigned to Class P earns one (1) day of good time credit for every four (4) calendar days or partial calendar days the person serves on pretrial home detention awaiting trial. A person assigned to Class P does not earn accrued time for time served on pretrial home detention awaiting trial.
[¶7] These statutes were amended effective July 1, 2023, which was before the trial court sentenced Parks. The result of the amendments was to eliminate Class P credit time for pretrial home detention-which was uniform across offense levels-and assign those on pretrial home detention to a credit time class that instead corresponded to their offense level. Compare Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1, -4 (2016) with I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1, -4 (2023). The new version of Indiana Code section 35-50-6-4(b) provides that, in general, "a person . . . is initially assigned to Class B" if he or she "is . . . imprisoned awaiting trial or sentencing for a crime other than a Level 6 felony or misdemeanor[.]" Moreover, following the amendments, Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1(c)(3) states that a "person assigned to Class B earns one (1) day of good time credit for every three (3) calendar days or partial calendar days the person is . . . on pretrial home detention." As to Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1, which sets forth the rate at which an individual accrues good time credit, both the prior version and the amended version contain the same language about when this credit time statute applies, specifying in subsection (a) that "[t]his section applies to a person who commits an offense after June 30, 2014." Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1(a).
[¶8] Parks argues that the 2023 amendments apply, resulting in 161 days of accrued time credit and fifty-four days of good time credit for her time on pretrial home detention, rather than forty-one days of good time credit and no accrued time credit under the prior statutory scheme. Parks focuses on the language in subsection (a), which states: "This section applies to a person who commits an offense after June 30, 2014." Id. Parks argues that, because she committed the instant criminal offense after June 30, 2014, and was not yet sentenced when the amended credit time statutes became effective, the amended statutes apply.
[¶9] To resolve this appeal, we must engage in statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law subject to de novo review. See Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016). When we engage in statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of our legislature. Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012). The best evidence of our legislature's intent is the language used in the statute. Id. Moreover, where-as here-we are asked to determine whether an amended credit time statute applies, our task is simple if the "issue is resolved by the language of the statute." Cottingham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 82, 85-86 (Ind. 2012). Indeed, if the plain language of the statute answers whether the statute applies, we apply that language. See id. If, however, the legislature's intent is unclear based on the statutory language, we revert to the "general rule" that "the credit time statutes applicable . . . are those in force on the date the offense was committed." Id. at 86 (citing Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220, 222 n.2 (Ind. 1999)). There are exceptions to that general rule. See id. at 85. Nevertheless, when the "issue is resolved by the language of the statute," we need not revert to that general rule or decide whether exceptions to the rule apply. Id. at 85-86 (determining an amended credit time statute did not apply based on the language of the statute).
This general rule appears to stem from principles animating our reading of penal statutes, in that "[a] person has the right to know what actions are proscribed by the State and it follows that he should also know the consequences of committing the actions as well." Jackson v. State, 275 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. 1971). Thus, "[i]t is the law [that] is in effect at the time the crime is committed [that] must be controlling." Id. Notably, however, whereas "Indiana treats pre-sentence imprisonment as a form of punishment," we do not regard our legislature's credit time statutes as penal in nature; rather, we regard credit time statutes as "'remedial legislation'" that "'should be liberally construed in favor of those benefitted by the statute.'" Niccum v. State, 181 N.E.3d 993, 995 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting Purdue v. State, 51 N.E.3d 432, 436 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016)).
[¶10] Here, Parks seeks application of the amended versions of Indiana Code section 35-50-6-4, which would place her in credit time Class B instead of Class P, and Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1, which would give her three-for-one good time credit instead of four-for-one with no accrued time. As to the latter statute calling for three-for-one credit, the first subsection provides that "[t]his section applies to a person who commits an offense after June 30, 2014." I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1. It is undisputed that Parks committed the offense after June 30, 2014. We therefore conclude that, based on the plain language of the statute, Parks is entitled to application of the amended version of the credit time framework.
[¶11] The State invites us to look past the plain language of subsection (a). Indeed, even though our legislature said that the statute "applies to a person who commits an offense after June 30, 2014," id., the State contends that our legislature did not mean for subsection (a) to apply in this manner. In so arguing, the State points out that the quoted language was retained from the prior version of the statute. The State seems to suggest that retained statutory language has less force than newly adopted language. But we are aware of no such principle of statutory interpretation. To the contrary, in Cottingham- which the State contends supports its position-the Indiana Supreme Court's reading of a credit time statute hinged on the language our legislature chose to retain from a prior version of the statute. See id. at 86 (noting that "[b]y using 'is placed' (or by not amending that language as it existed in the prior statute), . . . the Legislature intended for this amendment to apply only to those persons who 'are placed' on home detention on or after the amendment's effective date" (quoting I.C. § 35-38-2.6-6)). Thus, Cottingham supports our reading of the amended statute, indicating that we should give full force to the retained language-because that plain language forms part of the current statute.
[¶12] Based on the plain language of Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1, we conclude that the amended statutory framework applies to Parks because she committed the offense after June 30, 2014. See I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1(a) ("This section applies to a person who commits an offense after June 30, 2014."). We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to award credit time to Parks based on the amended credit time statutes that were effective on the date she was sentenced.
At times, the parties focus on the doctrine of amelioration. However, because this case is resolvable based on the plain language of the statutes at issue, we do not look to this doctrine. Cf. Cottingham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 82, 85-86 (Ind. 2012).
[¶13] Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.