Opinion
2023-CA-1418-MR
08-23-2024
JOHNATHAN PARKS APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Aaron Reed Baker Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Russell Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, SPECIAL JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CR-00068
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Aaron Reed Baker
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Russell Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BEFORE: CALDWELL, COMBS, AND KAREM, JUDGES.
OPINION
COMBS, JUDGE:
This is a criminal case in which the Appellant, Johnathan Parks, appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence of the Grayson Circuit Court. He argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. After our review, we affirm.
Leitchfield Police Officer Eugene Cain provided testimony as the pertinent facts giving rise to the charges against Parks. At around 5:30, on the morning of January 18, 2023, while Officer Cain was conducting routine patrol, he ran a license plate check on a red Chevrolet Sonic. Dispatch advised that the registered owner, Melinda Smith, had a possible warrant for her arrest. Based upon this information, Officer Cain initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle.
Officer Cain approached the vehicle and observed Parks in the driver's seat. He also observed a woman who identified herself as Melinda Smith, the owner of the vehicle, lying across the back seat. Officer Cain asked Parks and Smith for identification. Smith provided her Social Security card. Parks provided a Kentucky identification card; he admitted that he did not have an operator's license.
A second officer, Officer Wright, arrived at the scene, and Officer Cain asked Parks to exit the vehicle and to stand near the trunk. While Officer Cain continued to talk with Parks at the rear of the car, Officer Wright observed a small plastic bag on the driver's seat with possible narcotics residue inside. Parks was searched. A small glass vial of suspected methamphetamine and a piece of plastic bag suspected to contain heroin were recovered from his person. He was placed under arrest.
Ten or fifteen minutes after stopping the vehicle, Officer Cain ran the identification information provided by Parks and Smith. He discovered that Smith did not have a warrant for her arrest and that the warrant was for another individual also named Melinda Smith. The vehicle was towed, and Smith left the scene on foot.
On March 10, 2023, Parks was indicted by a grand jury on charges of first-degree possession of a controlled substance -- methamphetamine; first-degree possession of a controlled substance -- drug unspecified; failure of a non-owner to maintain insurance; and no operator's license. By the court's order entered on July 5, 2023, the matter was set for trial by jury on September 22, 2023.
On September 20, 2023, Parks filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the allegedly illegal search and seizure conducted during the traffic stop. He argued that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended beyond its original purpose and that for that reason, the evidence recovered should be excluded. After a twenty-minute evidentiary hearing conducted on the morning of trial, the circuit court denied the motion. In its oral ruling, the court found that Officer Cain had initiated the traffic stop based on his good-faith belief that Melinda Smith was the driver of the vehicle and that she had an outstanding warrant for her arrest. The court noted that probable cause, established during the stop, supported the search of Parks's person. The court allowed the incriminating evidence to be admitted. The court also dismissed with prejudice the charge of possession of a controlled substance -- drug unspecified.
After the jury heard evidence related to the remaining charges, it returned a verdict of guilty as to each one. Parks was sentenced to eighteen months under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Parks argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence gathered against him because Officer Cain lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the traffic stop. Parks contends that the Commonwealth cannot show that at the time Officer Cain encountered him, the officer had any reason to believe that he was likely engaged in unlawful activity.
Before addressing the substance of the appeal, we first address the Commonwealth's contention that Parks advances an argument that is unpreserved for our review. Parks concedes in his brief that the basis of his contention that the search was illegal differs from the basis of his argument before the trial court. Nevertheless, as was noted by this Court in Commonwealth v. Garrett, 585 S.W.3d 780, 789-90 (Ky. App. 2019), the "oft-cited" opinion in Gallman v. Commonwealth, 578 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1979), addresses this issue. It provides as follows:
All searches without a valid search warrant are unreasonable unless shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a valid
warrant. The burden is on the prosecution to show the search comes within an exception.Gallman, 578 S.W.2d at 48 (emphasis added). The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the applicability of any exception to the warrant requirement, not the defendant. Commonwealth v. Clayborne, 635 S.W.3d 818, 824 (Ky. 2021). Thus, a criminal defendant has no duty before the circuit court to "preserve" for appellate review which exception to the warrant requirement the Commonwealth failed to establish. Garrett, 585 S.W.3d at 789-90 . The Commonwealth's contention to the contrary lacks merit.
Upon our review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we typically consider whether the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Simpson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544 (Ky. 2015). However, in this case, the parties are in agreement concerning the essential facts surrounding the traffic stop. Parks contends that the trial court erred in its application of the law to the facts, arguing that the error as to the identity of the registered owner of the vehicle undermined any basis to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. Thus, he contends that the court erred in failing to determine that the ensuing search and seizure were illegal and that the evidence thus obtained was tainted and should have been suppressed.
We undertake a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the facts to determine whether its decision to deny the motion to suppress was correct as a matter of law. Goff v. Commonwealth, 618 S.W.3d 503 (Ky. App. 2020); Payton v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 468 (Ky. 2010).
The seminal case pertaining to investigative detentions is Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). We consider "the totality of the circumstances . . . to see whether the detaining officer ha[d] a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where a police officer has an objective basis for suspecting that criminal activity is afoot, he may detain a vehicle and its occupants in order to conduct an ordinary traffic stop; however, his investigation must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial stop. Nunn v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.3d 741 (Ky. 2015); Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412 (Ky. 2013). In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), a plurality of the Court emphasized that the scope of an investigatory stop "must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification" and "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id. at 500, 103 S.Ct. at 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d at 238. It emphasized that a person "may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so[.]" Id. at 498, 103 S.Ct. at 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d at 236 (emphasis added). "Police officers may not extend or prolong traffic stops without reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct further criminal investigation." Commonwealth v. Clayborne, 635 S.W.3d 818, 824 (Ky. 2021) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015)).
Officer Cain's decision to stop Smith's Chevrolet was justified by information indicating that its registered owner was subject to an arrest warrant. The stop was conducted before dawn, and Officer Cain was unaware of any evidence or circumstance which would indicate that Smith was not the driver of the vehicle registered to her. Because he observed the vehicle before daybreak, it was not immediately apparent that the driver was male. Under these circumstances, Officer Cain was duly authorized to initiate an investigatory stop of the vehicle either to confirm or to allay his suspicion about the vehicle's driver.
Once it was apparent to Officer Cain that Parks was not the registered owner of the vehicle subject to the arrest warrant, his task arguably would have appeared to be complete. There would have been no reason to engage Parks further. However, as Officer Cain observed Parks, he also saw a female lying in the backseat. He was authorized to ask for identification, and the traffic stop -although extended -- was not improperly prolonged beyond its original lawful purpose. See Carlisle v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.3d 168 (Ky. 2020). Before Officer Cain could confirm her identity as the subject of the arrest warrant, additional grounds appeared that other criminal activity was afoot. Parks admitted that he was driving without a license. Officer Cain lawfully asked Parks to exit the vehicle. Thus, independent, reasonable suspicion justified and authorized the extended detention. Carlisle, supra. Finally, the subsequent search of Parks's person was supported by probable cause, i.e., the plastic baggie was in plain view on the driver's seat, supporting a suspicion that contraband or evidence of a crime would likely be found. Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532 (Ky. App. 2003).
The search was not conducted in violation of Parks's Fourth Amendment protections. The trial court did not err in declining to suppress the evidence as it was the result of a legal and justifiable search.
We affirm the judgment and sentence of the Grayson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.