Opinion
CIV-20-205-D
04-23-2021
ALLEN ALEXANDER PARKS, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA MAXFIELD GREEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (without prepayment of fees), has filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 1, 27). United States Chief District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Docs. 6, 26). The undersigned Magistrate Judge has reviewed the Amended Complaint (Doc. 27) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As explained fully below, it is recommended that the Court dismiss certain of Plaintiff's claims and find that he has sufficiently alleged certain other claims.
I. Overview of Amended Complaint
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asserts six claims for relief arising out of his incarceration at the Oklahoma County Detention Center (“OCDC”) between January 3, 2017, and June 22, 2018. (Doc. 27, at 5-7; id. at Ex. 1, at 1-9; id. at Ex. 2, at 1-14). He names eighteen defendants, each of whom are sued in both their individual and official capacities. (Id.) Plaintiff has requested only monetary relief. (Doc. 27, at 6-7; id. at Ex. 2, at 13-14). For ease of reference, the Defendants can be broken into the following groups:
• (1) Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County (“the County”);
• (2) Oklahoma County Sheriff P.D. Taylor (“Sheriff Taylor”);
• (3) Danny Honeycutt, General Counsel for Sheriff Taylor and OCDC;
• (4) Lieutenant Ronnie Neal, OCDC staff; (5) Officer FNU DeCloud, Medical Security Officer at OCDC; (collectively (4) and (5), “the OCDC Employees”);
• (6) Armor Correctional Health Inc. (“Armor”), an entity contracted to provide health care services to OCDC detainees and inmates;
• (7) Armor Correctional Health - OCDC Division (“Armor OCDC”);
• (8) “John or Jane Doe,” Head Administrator of Medical Policy for Armor (“Armor Medical Administrator”); (9) “John or Jane Doe,” Head Administrator of Medical Policy for Armor OCDC (“Armor OCDC Medical Administrator”);
• (10) Nurse Shokooh Hopkins, (11) Nurse Gayla Conrey, (12) Nurse Shanasha Siah, (13) Nurse Mary Gilmore, (14) Nurse Lauren Perez, (15) Nurse Sarah Reeves, (16) Nurse Linda Jackson, (17) Nurse Tadasha Morris, (18) Nurse Kristie Bruneau; (collectively (10)-(18), “the Armor Nurses”).(Ex. 27, at 4; id. at Ex. 2, at 2-9).
Plaintiff asserts his six causes of action as follows:
(A) “denial of reasonably adequate medical care for a pre-trial detainee (deliberate indifferent failure to provide prescription [or adequate] medication to treat chronic hypertension (high blood pressure) that was/is as serious medical need,” in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution, asserted against all 18 defendants in their official and individual capacities (Doc. 27, at 5-6; id. at Ex. 2, at 1-3);
(B) “denial of reasonably adequate medical care for a pre-trial detainee (deliberate indifferent failure to provide prescription eyeglasses, that were prescribed by a
doctor; that was/is a serious medical need,” in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, asserted against Defendants
• the County,
• Sherriff Taylor,
• Honeycutt,
• Officer DeCloud,
• Armor,
• Armor OCDC,
• Armor Medical Administrator,
• Armor OCDC Medical Administrator, and
• Hopkins,
in their official and individual capacities (Doc. 27, at 6-7; id. at Ex. 2, at 3-5);
(C) “unlawful retaliation against a pre-trial detainee, for exercising the right to freedom of speech (via by communicating the filing of grievance complaints),” in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, asserted against all 18 defendants in their official and individual capacities (Doc. 27, Ex. 2, at 6-8);
(D) “denial of equal protection under the law (discrimination against indigent inmate with serious medical needs: prescription eyeglasses),” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, presumably asserted against the County (id., at 8-9);
(E) “denial of due process (deliberately indifferent malicious falsification of medical reports),” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, asserted against all 18 defendants in their official and individual capacities (id., at 9-11); and
(F) “deliberately indifferent failure to train and/or supervise,” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, asserted against
• the County
• Sheriff Taylor
• Honeycutt
• Armor
• Armor OCDC
• Armor Medical Administrator
• Armor OCDC Medical Administrator in their official and individual capacities (id., at 11-12).
II. The Court's Duty to Screen Prisoner Complaints
Federal law mandates the screening of each complaint in a civil action filed by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity and each case in which the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), 1915(e)(2). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
The court's review of a complaint under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors that required for reviewing a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court must accept Plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A complaint fails to state such a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint, however, are not assumed to be true; legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that although courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, courts “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint”). Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal). “A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
III. Plaintiff Has Failed to Allege the Personal Participation of the Armor Medical Administrator or the Armor OCDC Medical Administrator; Thus, All Claims Against Them Should Be Dismissed.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint names the Armor Medical Administrator and the Armor OCDC Medical Administrator as Defendants in their official and individual capacities for five of his six claims. (Doc. 27, at 5-6; id. at Ex. 1, at 4; id. at Ex. 2, at 111). However, he does not know the names of the individuals filling these roles, referring to them as “John or Jane Doe.” Throughout the Amended Complaint, he fails to allege anything fact-specific about either Administrator in connection with the alleged violations of his rights, apparently merely assuming that such positions must exist to implement policies and direct Armor employees at OCDC.
For a defendant to be liable for any civil rights violation, the defendant must have had direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation. See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993)) (affirming district court's dismissal where “plaintiff failed to allege personal participation of the defendants”). In other words, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate each defendant personally participated in the alleged violation, see Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976), by “‘identify[ing] specific actions taken by particular defendants.'” See Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532 (10th Cir. 2011)). Because Plaintiff has failed to make any such allegations against the Armor Medical Administrator or the Armor OCDC Medical Administrator, it is recommended that the Court dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against them, in both their official and individual capacities.
IV. Plaintiff May Only Assert Official Capacity Claims Against the County and Armor. The Remaining Official Capacity Claims Should Be Dismissed.
In Oklahoma, each organized county can sue and be sued through the board of county commissioners. Okla. Stat. tit. 19, §§ 1, 3, 4. Claims brought against individual municipal employees sued in their official capacities are considered to be claims for municipal liability against the county; therefore, the results of suing the individual defendants in their official capacities are the same as suing the county through its board of county commissioners. Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Suing individual defendants in their official capacities under § 1983 . . . is essentially another way of pleading an action against the county or municipality they represent.”); Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009) (“To the extent [plaintiff] brings a claim against [the sheriff] in his official capacity, it is the same as bringing a suit against the county.”); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 167, n. 14 (1985) (holding that an official capacity “suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity;” holding that “[t]here is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials [because] local government units can be sued directly”).
Plaintiff has asserted municipal liability claims against the County by suing the Board of County Commissioners. Thus, his claims against Sheriff Taylor in his official capacity should be dismissed as redundant. See Espinosa Hernandez v. Bd. of Cty. Commissioners of Oklahoma Cty., 2019 WL 3069430, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 12, 2019) (“Plaintiff sued both the Board of County Commissioners and Sheriff Whetsel in his official capacity....[T]he official capacity claim against Defendant Whetsel is a claim against Oklahoma County, and therefore is redundant.”). Plaintiff has also asserted claims against the County in its “individual capacity” (Doc. 27, at 4), which should also be dismissed as redundant.
Plaintiff has asserted an official capacity claim against Armor, the entity contracted to provide health care services to OCDC detainees and inmates. Tenth Circuit case law has extended the doctrine of municipal liability to private § 1983 defendants acting under color of state law. See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003); Lee v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, 2020 WL 959243, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 27, 2020) (analyzing municipal liability claims against jail's health care contractor). Thus, Plaintiff's claims against Armor OCDC and against the individual Armor Nurses in their official capacities are also claims against Armor for municipal liability and should be dismissed as redundant. Espinosa Hernandez, 2019 WL 3069430, at *7 (analyzing claim against Armor for municipal liability; dismissing official capacity claims against individual employees as redundant). Plaintiff has also asserted claims against Armor and Armor OCDC in their “individual capacities” (Doc. 27, Ex. 1, at 3), which should also be dismissed as redundant.
Finally, Plaintiff has asserted claims against Honeycutt and the OCDC Employees in their official capacities. However, the OCDC “is not a person or legally created entity that can be sued under § 1983.” Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 630 Fed.Appx. 742, 744 (10th Cir. 2015). Indeed, it “do[es] not have [a] legal identit[y] separate from that of Oklahoma County.” Willis v. Oklahoma Cty. Detention Ctr., 2019 WL 4397338, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 13, 2019). Because the claims against Honeycutt and the OCDC Employees in their official capacities are functionally claims for municipal liability, they should be dismissed as redundant to the claims against the County.
Accordingly, with regard to Plaintiff's official capacity claims, the court should analyze further only the claims against the County and Armor, which he has named as Defendants in five of his six causes of action.
V. Plaintiff's Six Causes of Action
A. Plaintiff Alleges Defendants Were Deliberately Indifferent in Failing to Treat His High Blood Pressure.
In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying him reasonably adequate medical care, specifically by failing to provide him with medication to treat his chronic high blood pressure. (Doc. 27, at 5-6; id. at Ex. 2, at 1-3). “The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause entitles pretrial detainees to the same standard of medical care that the Eighth Amendment requires for convicted inmates.” Lance v. Morris, 985 F.3d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 2021). “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05.
For a pretrial detainee to state a cognizable claim for inadequate medical attention under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Plaintiff must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. This standard includes both an objective component and a subjective component. To establish the objective component, the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious to constitute a deprivation of constitutional dimension. A medical need is [objectively] serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. The subjective component requires Plaintiff to establish that a medical official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [s]he must also draw the inference.Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 989-90 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
1. Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Against the Remaining Individual Capacity Defendants for Failing to Treat his High Blood Pressure.
Plaintiff alleges that while he was in OCDC custody, each of the Armor Nurses took his blood pressure and received readings that were dangerously high. (Doc. 27, Ex. 3, at 5-6). He alleges that he informed each of the nurses that he suffers from chronic high blood pressure, along with painful and dangerous symptoms, and that he requested medication and daily blood pressure checks. (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff states that “[a]t first” each of the Armor Nurses “said that they would immediately” prescribe Plaintiff hypertension medication and order daily blood pressure checks. (Id. at 8). However, Plaintiff alleges that once the Armor Nurses were told that he had filed a lawsuit and grievances against OCDC personnel and nurses, they changed their minds, became “personally angry” at him, feared getting fired if they treated his high blood pressure, and purposefully falsified his medical records to reflect lower blood pressure readings. (Id. at 8-10).
Plaintiff describes an incident in January 2018, in which Defendant Hopkins took Plaintiff's blood pressure and found it to be dangerously high after she observed Plaintiff fall down a flight of stairs. (Id. at 33-41). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officer DeCloud was present and observed the interaction. (Id. at 46). According to Plaintiff, Officer DeCloud told Hopkins:
I've got a message to deliver directly from Sheriff Taylor and Danny Honeycutt to you Ms. Hopkins.. [D]on't you realize that Allen Parks is the same [person] who sued us before in a federal lawsuit for deliberate indifference? And now, Parks has been filing complaint grievance(s) .... Taylor and Honeycutt told me to tell you that they know all about Parks, and that Taylor and Honeycutt are already well aware that Parks apparently needs to be given high blood pressure medication, [and] continuous blood pressure checks . . . However, Taylor and Honeycutt each told me to directly order you to not provide Parks any blood pressure medication, nor blood pressure checks . . . since Parks won't obey Taylor and Honeycutt['s] orders for Parks to stop filing complaint grievances. That hopefully denying Parks his much needed blood pressure medication . . . will get Parks to comply in stopping to file such grievance complaints....(Id. at 46-48).
Plaintiff also alleges that in February 2018, he was medically evaluated by Defendant Conrey after an altercation with Defendant Lt. Neal. (Id. at 54-59). Plaintiff alleges that after Conrey observed Plaintiff's blood pressure to be very high, she told him that he was “in immediate danger of having a heart attack or stroke.” (Id. at 58). According to Plaintiff, Lt. Neal heard Conrey give this description of Plaintiff's medical status. (Id. at 59). Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Neal told Conrey:
Sheriff Taylor and Danny Honeycutt told me to tell you that absolutely no medical staff are to take any action to provide Parks any prescribed blood pressure medication, nor is Parks to be given any daily blood pressure checks, since Parks wants to keep complaining against us, by filing all them [] grievances ....I'm giving you a direct order from Sheriff Taylor and general counsel Danny Honeycutt not to provide or order Parks to receive any medically prescribed blood pressure medication nor any daily blood pressure checks.(Id. at 60-61).
For screening purposes, the Court is required to accept Plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to him. It is not clear that high blood pressure alone is a “serious medical need” that satisfies the objective prong of the deliberate indifference analysis. See Rainey v. Boyd, 2012 WL 3778356, at *10 (D. Colo. Aug. 15, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3778351 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2012) (“Although high blood pressure may mandate treatment by a physician in the form of medication, suffering high blood pressure alone has been found not to constitute a sufficiently serious medical condition for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.”). However, Plaintiff also alleges that he suffered various painful symptoms and that medical providers acknowledged he was at risk for serious health complications as the result of his high blood pressure. (See, e.g., Doc. 27, Ex. 3, at 42-45). For the purposes of screening, the undersigned believes that Plaintiff's allegations relating to his high blood pressure satisfy the standard that the condition be diagnosed as mandating treatment or obviously necessitates a doctor's attention. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need of which Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, the OCDC Employees, and the Armor Nurses were aware.
Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged that although these Defendants were aware of his serious medical need, they all consciously disregarded the risks to Plaintiff's health and safety. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Armor Nurses decided not to treat him after Lt. Neal and Officer DeCloud communicated threats made by Sheriff Taylor and Honeycutt for the purpose of preventing Plaintiff from receiving medical treatment, in retaliation against him for filing lawsuits and grievances. (Id. at 8-10, 46-47, 60-61). Courts facing similar allegations - that a medical provider was aware of an objectively serious health condition but refused to treat it - found they stated a claim of deliberate indifference. See Chapman v. Santini, 805 Fed.Appx. 548, 558 (10th Cir. 2020) (“In short, [the plaintiff] told Dr. Santini about a serious problem, and the medical records that Dr. Santini acknowledged reviewing confirmed that problem. But still Dr. Santini did nothing. This inaction would permit a finding that the subjective component was satisfied.”); Gray v. Geo Grp., Inc., 727 Fed.Appx. 940, 945-46 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding a complaint stated a deliberate indifference claim where it alleged the doctor “was aware of [the plaintiff's] knee injury and the chronic pain it caused him but did not take reasonable steps to abate it”); Green v. Fed. Bureau Of Prisons, 2009 WL 150650, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2009) (“Green does more than disagree with the prison's approach to his medical treatment. Green alleges that, not only did the defendants fail to provide him with his desired treatment, they completely failed to treat him for over a year.”).
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged both the objective and subjective components of a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, Lt. Neal, Officer DeCloud, and Nurses Hopkins, Conrey, Siah, Perez, Reeves, Jackson, Morris, Bruneau, and Gilmore. Thus, it is recommended that the Court find that Plaintiff has stated a claim against these Defendants in their individual capacities for their failure to treat Plaintiff's high blood pressure.
2. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Municipal Liability Claim Against the County or Armor for Failing to Treat his High Blood Pressure.
To state a claim against the official capacity Defendants, the County and Armor, Plaintiff must demonstrate municipal liability. To assert a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must first demonstrate the existence of a “municipal policy or custom” in one of the following forms:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions - and the basis for them - of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these policymakers' review and approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.Waller v. City and Cty. Of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff has failed to identify an actionable policy or custom of the County or Armor. Plaintiff has not identified a formal regulation or policy statement by the County or Armor that resulted in Defendants' alleged deliberate indifference to his high blood pressure. Plaintiff has also failed to allege there was an informal custom or widespread practice by the County or Armor of deliberate indifference to OCDC inmates' high blood pressure. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Sheriff Taylor and Honeycutt directed the OCDC Employees and the Armor Nurses to withhold medical treatment from Plaintiff specifically. (See, e.g., Doc. 27, Ex. 3, at 8-9). Plaintiff also has not alleged that County or Armor policymakers delegated authority to subordinates and then ratified the resulting policy choices. Plaintiff has asserted a separate cause of action for failure to train or supervise relating to all of the alleged violations of his rights (see above, at page 3, claim (F)), so this basis of municipal liability will be analyzed separately below.
Liberally construing the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege liability against the County and Armor on the basis of a policy established by Sheriff Taylor, who is identified by Plaintiff as the “delegated OCDC policy maker” of Armor and the County. (Doc. 27, Ex. 2, at 2). The alleged policy - withholding treatment for Plaintiff's high blood pressure as retaliation for his history of filing grievances and lawsuits - does not satisfy the requirements for imposition of municipal liability. “[M]unicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (emphasis added). However,
[n]ot every decision by municipal officers automatically subjects the municipality to § 1983 liability. Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. The fact that a particular official - even a policymaking official - has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion. The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable.Id. at 481-83 (emphasis added) (citation and footnotes omitted). Thus, Plaintiff's municipal liability claim relies on Plaintiff's inference that Sheriff Taylor possessed final authority to establish a policy that certain OCDC inmates could be punished by refusing them health care for serious medical needs. However, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support a plausible allegation that the County or Armor formally empowered Sheriff Taylor to establish an unconstitutional policy of withholding necessary medical care as retaliation. Holding the County or Armor liable for Sheriff Taylor's alleged retaliatory conduct against Plaintiff would effectively result in an impermissible imposition of liability premised on respondeat superior. Waller, 932 F.3d at 1283 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.... [I]n other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Instead, the government as an entity may only be held liable when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that any failure to treat his high blood pressure was the result of a policy or custom of the County or Armor. The undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's official capacity claims against the County and Armor for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs related to Plaintiff's high blood pressure.
B. Plaintiff Alleges Defendants Were Deliberately Indifferent in Failing to Provide him Prescription Eyeglasses.
Plaintiff asserts that individual Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, Officer DeCloud, and Nurse Hopkins, along with official-capacity Defendants the County and Armor, violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with prescription eyeglasses. (Doc. 27, Ex. 2, at 4-5). He alleges that OCDC has a formal policy requiring inmates to pay for their own prescription glasses and that he is indigent and cannot afford to do so. (See id. at Ex. 3, at 16). He alleges that the individual Defendants refused to seek an exception to this policy for him as retaliation for his filing of grievances. (Id. at 36, 46-49). The legal standards for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and municipal liability set forth in Section V(A) above are applicable to this claim as well.
1. Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Against the Individual-Capacity Defendants for Failing to Provide him Prescription Eyeglasses.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint recounts his January 2018 eye examination during which a Dr. Vernard allegedly found Plaintiff to be legally blind without glasses, and he recites various limitations and symptoms that he suffers as a result, including the inability to work safely, read, identify faces and shapes, and inaccurate depth perception, dizziness, and migraines. (Doc. 27, Ex. 3, at 11-15). Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Vernard and his nurse each told Plaintiff that although OCDC policy stated that prescription eyeglasses would not be provided free of charge to inmates, they would contact the County, Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, and the Armor OCDC Medical Administrator seeking a medical exemption for Plaintiff. (Id. at 16-18).
Plaintiff has also included a “Patient Note” demonstrating the results of his January 2018 eye examination. (Doc. 27, Ex. 4, at 1).
Plaintiff also alleges that Nurse Hopkins acknowledged that Plaintiff “was rendered legally blind without the aid of medically prescribed eyeglasses and that [Plaintiff's] medical condition of [] extremely poor vision was substantial and serious enough that [Plaintiff] . . . was required to be provided medically prescribed eyeglasses.” (Id. at 35). Hopkins allegedly told Plaintiff she would request an exemption from OCDC policy from Sheriff Taylor and the Armor OCDC Medical Administrator to provide Plaintiff prescription glasses free of charge. (Id. at 36). However, Hopkins allegedly changed her mind after Officer DeCloud told her that Sheriff Taylor and Honeycutt had “told [DeCloud] to directly order [Hopkins]” not to request prescription eyeglasses for Plaintiff. (Id. at 4648). Plaintiff alleges that DeCloud and Hopkins both expressed their specific intent to prevent Plaintiff from filing grievances by denying him prescription eyeglasses. (Id. at 4749).
For screening purposes, the undersigned deems that Plaintiff's need for prescription eyeglasses to correct his allegedly very poor vision sufficiently alleges an objective serious medical need of which individual Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, Officer DeCloud, and Nurse Hopkins were aware. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1443 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Benter v. Peck, 825 F.Supp. 1411, 1419 (S.D. Iowa 1993) for the proposition that “denial of prescription eyeglasses can violate the Eighth Amendment when the eyeglasses represent a serious medical need”). Plaintiff has also alleged that although these Defendants were aware of Plaintiff's serious medical need, they all chose not to provide him with prescription eyeglasses in order to dissuade him from filing grievances regarding prison conditions. Accepting these allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, he has alleged the subjective component of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs - that the Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health and safety. Thus, it is recommended that the Court find that Plaintiff has stated a claim against Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, Officer DeCloud, and Nurse Hopkins in their individual capacities for failing to provide him prescription eyeglasses.
2. Plaintiff Has Stated a Municipal Liability Claim Against the County, But Not Armor, for Failing to Provide him Prescription Eyeglasses.
Liberally construing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the court understands Plaintiff's municipal liability claim against the County and Armor regarding the failure to provide him prescription eyeglasses to be premised on OCDC's medical policy in the OCDC inmate handbook. (Doc. 27, Ex. 3, at 17). The OCDC inmate handbook, revised January 2017, states:
[e]ye exams and glasses may be available to inmates who have been incarcerated for more than one year at the inmate's expense by submitting a medical request form explaining what is needed and we will contact you on how to pay for the exam. All services must be paid for prior to appointments being made. Inmates are required to arrange for payment in advance to the optometrist prior to the appointment being scheduled by the Detention Center. An inmate will be transported for the appointment and the optometrist will send the glasses to the facility.(Id. at Ex. 4, at 36). Plaintiff alleges that he is indigent and as a result of this policy, he was unable to obtain a pair of prescription eyeglasses even though he had a serious medical need. (Id. at Ex. 3, at 16-17). Plaintiff has identified a formal policy with a direct causal link to his alleged injury - his inability to obtain prescription eyeglasses to correct his very poor vision. Waller, 932 F.3d at 1284 (“After establishing a municipal policy or custom, a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged.”). As Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the OCDC policy resulted in deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, it is recommended that the Court find that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a municipal liability claim against the County based on its failure to provide him prescription eyeglasses. Because Plaintiff has identified only a formal policy statement attributable to OCDC and not to Armor, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this claim against Armor.
C. Plaintiff Alleges Defendants Retaliated Against Him in Violation of the First Amendment.
Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against “for exercising the right to freedom of speech (via by communicating the filing of grievance complaints).” (Doc. 27, at 6-8). A claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment consists of three elements:
(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant's adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000).
1. Plaintiff Has Stated a Retaliation Claim Against the IndividualCapacity Defendants.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, the OCDC Employees, and the Armor Nurses retaliated against him for his filing of grievance complaints and lawsuits “by refusing to provide [Plaintiff] the medical treatment of chronic hypertension medication and prescription eyeglasses . . ., which would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to exercise his right of freedom of speech.” (Doc. 27, Ex. 2, at 7-8). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Taylor and Honeycutt directed the OCDC Employees to instruct the Armor Nurses to withhold medical treatment and eyeglasses as retaliation for Plaintiff filing grievances and lawsuits. (Id. at Ex. 3, at 8-10, 46-50, 60-65). Plaintiff alleges that because of the retaliatory scheme established by Sheriff Taylor and Honeycutt and communicated by the OCDC Employees, the Armor Nurses in fact refused to provide him with the medical treatment that he needed for his high blood pressure and poor vision. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that the Armor Nurses complied with the retaliatory withholding of medical care because they “feared getting fired” and “were personally angry at [Plaintiff], for filing grievances and lawsuits against their co-workers.” (Id. at 9).
Accepting these allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has stated a claim against the named Defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiff's filing of grievances and lawsuits is constitutionally protected activity. See Gee v. Pacheco, 672 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiff's activity of “filing specific grievances against Defendants and filing a particular habeas petition with the court” satisfied first prong of retaliation claim). And having medical care withheld would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected activity. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015) (“denial of medical treatment is a deprivation likely to dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in future First Amendment activity”); O'Brien v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 592 Fed.Appx. 338, 343 (6th Cir. 2014) (“a delay in treatment and discontinuance of medication would likely deter a prisoner . . . who believed he needed the medication to avoid the symptoms from which he allegedly suffered”). Finally, Plaintiff has alleged substantial motivation, as he asserts that the Defendants verbalized that their actions were substantially motivated by Plaintiff's filing of grievances and lawsuits. (See, e.g., Doc. 27, Ex. 3, at 9). Accordingly, it is recommended that the court find that Plaintiff has stated a claim against individual Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, the OCDC Employees, and the Armor Nurses for retaliation.
2. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Retaliation Claim Against the County or Armor.
Plaintiff also asserts official capacity claims against the County and Armor for retaliation, stating that Defendants “knowingly allow[] their subordinate defendant(s) (via by an obvious failure to train or supervise said subordinate defendant(s)) to retaliate against [Plaintiff] and other OCDC inmates who[] file grievance complaints.” (Doc. 27, Ex. 2, at 6-7). However, Plaintiff has alleged a separate cause of action for failure to train or supervise (see page 3, claim (F), above), alleging the failure “was affirmatively linked to [Plaintiff]. . . being retaliated against.” (Id. at 12). Thus, Plaintiff's municipal liability claims regarding retaliation will be addressed with the failure to train or supervise analysis below at Section V(F).
D. Plaintiff Has Stated an Equal Protection Claim Against the County.
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment via “discrimination against indigent inmate with serious medical needs: prescription eyeglasses.” (Doc. 27, Ex. 2, at 8). Plaintiff does not specify which Defendants violated his equal protection rights. (Id.) Liberally construed, the undersigned understands Plaintiff to allege that the County violated his equal protection rights through the OCDC policy that prevents inmates from receiving prescription eyeglasses unless they pay for them in advance, thereby treating indigent inmates differently than inmates with access to money. (Id. at Ex. 3, at 16-17; id. at Ex. 4, at 36).
The Equal Protection clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim, “plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were treated differently from others who were similarly situated to them.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1173 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has met that threshold by alleging that he, an indigent inmate, was treated differently from inmates with money because he could not access prescription eyeglasses and the inmates with money could.
The court will apply strict scrutiny if “the classification involves a suspect class or interferes with a fundamental right.” Tennyson v. Carpenter, 558 Fed.Appx. 813, 819 (10th Cir. 2014). “[N]either prisoners nor indigents constitute a suspect class warranting strict scrutiny review.” Harrison v. Bent Cty. Corr. Facility, 24 Fed.Appx. 965, 967 (10th Cir. 2001). Since Plaintiff's claim does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, “[h]e . . . must prove that the distinction between himself and other inmates was not reasonably related to some legitimate penological purpose.” Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 371 (10th Cir. 1994). See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”).
Having reviewed Plaintiff's pleading, giving it the liberal construction due a pleading filed by a pro se litigant, accepting its allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated an equal protection claim against the County based on OCDC's policy requiring inmates to pre-pay for prescription eyeglasses. The Supreme Court has recognized equal protection violations against indigent individuals when “the class discriminated against . . . shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973). Plaintiff has alleged both that he was unable to pay for prescription eyeglass and, as a result, absolutely deprived of the opportunity to obtain prescription eyeglasses. Although it is possible that the County can articulate how the OCDC's policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, the undersigned recommends that the Court find that Plaintiff's equal protection claim against the County is sufficient as pleaded for the instant stage of litigation.
E. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Due Process Claim Against Any Defendant.
Plaintiff alleges a due process violation via “deliberately indifferent malicious falsification of medical reports.” (Doc. 27, Ex. 2, at 9). Plaintiff alleges the individual Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, the OCDC Employees, and the Armor Nurses “caused and/or carried out the unconstitutional act(s) of maliciously falsifying [Plaintiff's] blood pressure and/or prescription eyeglasses evaluation(s), and omitting the true medical account and finding(s) of these medical evaluation(s).” (Id. at 10). Plaintiff also brings official capacity claims against the County and Armor for “knowingly allow[ing] their subordinate defendant(s) to maliciously falsify (via by an obvious failure to adequately train or supervise) medical report(s) at free will.” (Id. at 9-10).
“The Due Process Clause guarantees due process only when a person is to be deprived of life, liberty or property.” Templeman, 16 F.3d at 369. A Fourteenth Amendment due process claim requires “there exist[] a constitutionally cognizable liberty or property interest with which the state has interfered.” Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006). “Finding such a violation in the prison setting is particularly daunting.” Chambers v. Colo. Dep't of Corrs., 205 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff has neither articulated a specific liberty or property interest nor provided any support for finding a liberty or property interest exists. See Head v. Bailly, 2019 WL 1779340, at *3 (D.N.M. April 23, 2019) (“[T]here is no authority for a constitutional right to own or review the inmate's own medical records.”). Rather, liberally construed, Plaintiff's allegation of “deliberately indifferent malicious falsification of medical reports” appears to reiterate his claims alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Together, the falsification of medical reports and “deliberate refusal to provide medical attention, as opposed to a particular course of treatment” can state an Eighth Amendment violation. Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1304 (10th Cir. 1997). See also Parnisi v. Colo. State Hosp., 1993 WL 118860, at *2 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding plaintiff's allegation that defendants “purposefully refused to treat his brain and heart condition, . . . [and] sought to cover-up their refusal to treat him by falsifying his medical records” stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment).
As discussed above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has stated two Fourteenth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs: one claim regarding failure to treat his high blood pressure (against thirteen Defendants in their individual capacities) and one claim regarding the refusal to provide him prescription eyeglasses (against four Defendants in their individual capacities and one Defendant in its official capacity). Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants falsified his medical records are properly considered in support of Plaintiff's claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Thus, the Court should find that Plaintiff has failed to state a Due Process claim against any Defendant related to the alleged falsification of his medical records.
F. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Claim for Failure to Train or Supervise Against Any Defendant for Any of the Constitutional Violations He Alleges.
Plaintiff's final claim alleges “deliberately indifferent failure to train and/or supervise” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 27, Ex. 2, at 11). Plaintiff names remaining Defendants the County, Armor, Sheriff Taylor, and Honeycutt. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants have demonstrated an “obvious failure to train and/or supervise the subordinate defendant(s) . . . affirmatively linked to [Plaintiff] being unconstitutionally deprived of chronic hypertension medication, daily blood pressure checks, prescription eyeglasses, being retaliated against, and the falsification of [Plaintiff's] medical records.” (Id. at 11-12). Failure to train or supervise employees is one manner of demonstrating a municipal policy or custom in order to establish municipal liability for a violation of rights. Waller, 932 F.3d at 1283. The only remaining Defendants subject to municipal liability are the County and Armor, sued in their official capacities.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint could also be liberally construed as asserting individual capacity supervisory liability claims against Defendants Sheriff Taylor and Honeycutt. However, supervisory liability is a theory of proving liability of individual defendants under § 1983. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining that supervisory liability is a form of alleging an individual's personal liability without direct participation); Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2010) (“there's no special rule of liability for supervisors”). Because the court analyzes Plaintiff's individual capacity claims against Defendants Sheriff Taylor and Honeycutt for their direct participation in the underlying constitutional violations alleged, supervisory liability need not be addressed.
As the court considers this theory, it must be “mindful of the Supreme Court's warning that ‘[a] municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.'” Id. at 1285 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). See also Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The causation element is applied with especial rigor when . . . the municipal liability claim is based upon inadequate training [and] supervision.”).
[F]or claims of inadequate hiring, training, or other supervisory practices, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequences. Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action, as [a] less stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities.Waller, 932 F.3d at 1284 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “In the context of a ‘failure to train' claim under § 1983, even a showing of gross negligence by the municipality is inadequate to meet the state-of-mind requirement.” Blueberry v. Comanche Cty. Facilities Auth., 672 Fed.Appx. 814, 817 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 & n.7 (1989)).
The deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm. In most instances, notice can be established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct.Waller, 932 F.3d at 1284 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id.
Deliberate indifference may be found absent a pattern of unconstitutional behavior only in a narrow range of circumstances where a violation of federal rights is a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a municipality's action or inaction.Id.
Liberally construed, Plaintiff's allegations fail to identify a specific failure in the County or Armor's training or supervision necessary to prevent constitutional violations of the sort that he alleges. See Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2010) (“a plaintiff must identify a specific deficiency that was obvious and closely related to his injury) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, Plaintiff makes a blanket, generalized allegation that the County and Armor failed to train or supervise employees, which resulted in Plaintiff suffering the various constitutional harms he brings as claims. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege that the County or Armor had “actual or constructive notice” that their failure to train or supervise would be “substantially certain to result” in the constitutional violations Plaintiff lists. Considering that the violations Plaintiff alleges against the individual employees of OCDC and Armor are each the result of intentional, vengeful behavior targeted specifically at Plaintiff, it is difficult to fathom how either the County or Armor could be on notice that such alleged behavior would result from a failure in training or supervision.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to describe any actions taken by the County or Armor that could satisfy the “stringent” deliberate indifference standard necessary to state a claim. The undersigned recommends dismissing Plaintiff's claims against the County and Armor for failure to train or supervise.
VI. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the court dismiss the following claims:
• All of Plaintiff's claims against the Armor Medical Administrator and the Armor OCDC Medical Administrator;
• Plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, Lt. Neal, Officer DeCloud, Armor OCDC, and the Armor Nurses - Hopkins, Conrey, Siah, Perez, Reeves, Jackson, Morris, Bruneau, and Gilmore - in their official capacities;
• Plaintiff's claims against the County, Armor, and Armor OCDC in their individual capacities;
• Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging deliberate indifference to his high blood pressure against the County and Armor in their official capacities;
• Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging failure to provide prescription eyeglasses against Armor in its official capacity;
• Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim against the County and Armor in their official capacities;
• Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against all Defendants;
• Plaintiff's failure to train or supervise claims against the County and Armor in their official capacities.
The undersigned additionally recommends finding that Plaintiff has adequately stated the following claims:
• Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging deliberate indifference to his high blood pressure against Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, Lt. Neal, Officer DeCloud, and Nurses Hopkins, Conrey, Siah, Perez, Reeves, Jackson, Morris, Bruneau, and Gilmore, in their individual capacities;
• Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging failure to provide prescription eyeglasses against Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, Officer DeCloud, and Nurse Hopkins, in their individual capacities;
• Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging failure to provide prescription eyeglasses against the County in its official capacity;
• Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Sheriff Taylor, Honeycutt, Lt. Neal, Officer DeCloud, and Nurses Hopkins, Conrey, Siah, Perez, Reeves, Jackson, Morris, Bruneau, and Gilmore, in their individual capacities;
• Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against the County in its official capacity.
Due to the number and complexity of Plaintiff's allegations, these recommendations are summarized in the following chart:
(Claim A) Deliberate indifference to high blood pressure
(Claim B) Failure to provide prescription eyeglasses
(Claim C) Retaliation for free speech
(Claim D) Equal Protection: prescription eyeglasses policy
(Claim E) Due Process: Falsification of medical reports
(Claim F) Failure to train or supervise
County
Official
Dismiss
Stated
Dismiss
Stated
Dismiss
Dismiss
Individual
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
Sheriff Taylor
Official
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Individual
Stated
Stated
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Honeycutt
Official
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Individual
Stated
Stated
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Lt. Neal
Official
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
N/A
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Officer DeCloud
Official
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
Stated
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Armor
Official
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Individual
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Armor OCDC
Official
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Individual
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Armor Medical Admin.
Official
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Individual
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Armor OCDC Medical Admin.
Official
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Individual
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
Dismiss
Hopkins
Official
Dismiss
Dismiss
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
Stated
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Conrey
Official
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
N/A
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Siah
Official
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
N/A
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Perez
Official
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
N/A
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Reeves
Official
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
N/A
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Jackson
Official
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
N/A
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Morris
Official
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
N/A
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Bruneau
Official
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
N/A
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Gilmore
Official
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
Individual
Stated
N/A
Stated
N/A
Dismiss
N/A
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before May 14, 2021, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to file a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation does not terminate the referral in the present case.