Opinion
7:22-CV-74 (WLS)
06-11-2024
CHARLES ANTHONY PARKER, JR., now known as ASHLI LYNN SKYE, Plaintiff, v. STAN SHEPARD, et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS Q. LANGSTAFF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff executed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in March 2022, representing that she is a transgender woman who uses she/her pronouns. (Doc. 1). The Court directed Plaintiff to file a recast Complaint, and her recast Complaint was filed with the Court on September 19, 2022. (Docs. 5, 6). By dated October 18, 2022, certain claims were allowed to proceed. (Doc. 8). By Order dated June 15, 2023, certain claims and Defendants were dismissed, leaving only Plaintiff's deliberate indifference to safety claims against Defendants Shepard, Emmons, Shropshire, Bryant, Walton, and Dominiak.(Doc. 57).
Plaintiff originally named “Shepherd” and “Stropshire” as Defendants, but the Court notes that these Defendants' names are correctly spelled “Shepard” and “Shropshire”. (Docs. 6, 69-4, 69-6). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to correct the spelling of the names of these Defendants on the docket.
Pending is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants Shepard, Emmons, Shropshire, and Bryant. (Doc. 69). Although Defendants label this motion as one seeking partial summary judgment, it in fact seeks complete summary judgment on behalf of Defendants Shepard, Emmons, Shropshire, and Bryant. Id. Plaintiff was notified of the filing of these Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, advised of her obligations under the law, and directed to respond thereto within thirty (30) days. (Doc. 70). Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants' motion, nor has any mail sent by the Court to Plaintiff been returned as undeliverable.
In her deliberate indifference to safety claims against Defendants Shepard, Emmons, Shropshire, and Bryant, Plaintiff contends that these Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the threat posed to Plaintiff by inmate Phillip Frazier while Plaintiff was confined at Valdosta State Prison (“VSP”) between June and September 2021. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants repeatedly denied her protective custody despite her reports of attacks and threats from Frazier. Id.
In her recast, unsworn Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that between May 29, 2021 and June 1, 2021, her cellmate Phillip Frazier beat Plaintiff and held her at knife point. Id. Plaintiff was able to escape Frazier on June 1, 2021. Id. Plaintiff then asked Defendant Shropshire and Defendant Bryant to put Plaintiff into protective custody, but they both denied the requests. Id. On June 8, 2021, while at the Atlanta Medical Center, Plaintiff executed a sworn affidavit and sent it to Defendant Emmons, asking for protective custody based on being victimized by Frazier. Id. Plaintiff's request was denied. Id.
On July 14, 2021, Frazier was released from lockdown and began threatening Plaintiff with a homemade knife. Id. Plaintiff contacted her sister, who reported the event to prison administrative staff, but nothing was done to protect Plaintiff, and Plaintiff and Frazier were housed in adjacent buildings. Id. In August 2021, Frazier ambushed Plaintiff on the sidewalk, punching her in her right temple. Id.
Following a subsequent attempt to castrate herself, Plaintiff again asked Defendants Emmons, Shropshire, and Bryant to place Plaintiff in protective custody, but these requests were again denied. Id. In September 2021, Plaintiff spoke to Regional Director Stan Shepard in the presence of Defendants Emmons and Shropshire, telling Shepard about the ongoing issues with Frazier and Emmons and Shropshire's lack of regard for Plaintiff's personal safety. Id. According to Plaintiff, she was not thereafter provided any protective measures. Id. Legal Standards
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
As the parties moving for summary judgment, Defendants have the initial burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains in the case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1991). The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record, including pleadings, discovery materials, and affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3). Defendants have supported their Motion for Summary Judgment with Plaintiff's deposition testimony and Defendants' declarations. (Docs. 69-3 - 69-7).
It is well settled that “[a] prison official's ‘deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-829 (1994). “[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. . . [although i]t is not . . . every injury suffered by one inmate at the hands of another that translates into a constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Id. at 832, 834. To establish a claim of deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must produce “sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment in this context of inmate-on-inmate violence “when a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, exists and the official does not respond reasonably to the risk.” Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talledega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014).
Defendants' evidence
Defendant Emmons states in his declaration that he was the warden at VSP from July 1, 2018 through February 29, 2022. (Doc. 69-5, ¶ 2). Emmons acknowledges that Plaintiff sent him a statement while she was housed at the Atlanta Medical Center but denies that Plaintiff was denied protection. Id. at ¶ 3. Emmons states that Plaintiff and inmate Frazier were in a “romantic relationship”, and had some sort of disagreement on June 1, 2021. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff asked to be separated from Frazier, and Frazier was taken to segregation, while Plaintiff remained in her cell. Id. According to Emmons, as Plaintiff and Frazier were separated, no further action was required. Id. According to Plaintiff's movement history, she was also placed in segregation later on June 1, 2021, and she was taken to Atlanta Medical Center on June 2, 2021 for an unrelated medical visit. Id. When Plaintiff returned to VSP, Frazier “was never placed in the same dormitory or cell as [Plaintiff]”. Id. In regard to Plaintiff's claim that she and Frazier were later placed in adjoining buildings, Emmons states that these buildings were separated by locked fences, and that Frazier getting into Plaintiff's dormitory and punching her was “very unlikely”. Id. at ¶ 7.
Defendant Shropshire states in his declaration that he was Deputy Warden of Security at VSP between May 2019 and March 1, 2023. (Doc. 69-6, ¶ 2). Shropshire states that he did not deny Plaintiff protection, and recalls Plaintiff and Frazier were in a relationship. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. After Plaintiff and Frazier argued, Plaintiff asked to be moved. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff and Frazier were placed in different housing units, although Shropshire has no recollection of Plaintiff relating that Frazier had a knife, had beaten her, or that Plaintiff felt threatened or afraid. Id. at ¶ 4. Shropshire states that he does not recall a phone conversation with Plaintiff's sister or Plaintiff asking for protection based on a fear of inmates going to jump Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.
Defendant Bryant states in her declaration that she is a Unit Manager at VSP, having held this position since May 2019. (Doc. 69-1, ¶ 2). Bryant does not recall Plaintiff requesting protection or expressing fear of inmate Frazier, and Bryant states that she did not deny Plaintiff protection. Id. at ¶ 3.
Defendant Shepard states in his declaration that he was the Southeast Regional Direction for the Georgia Department of Corrections between January 2018 and June 2023. (Doc. 69-4, ¶ 2). Shepard does not recall Plaintiff requesting protection or expressing a fear of inmate Frazier, and states that he did not deny Plaintiff protection. Id. at ¶ 3. Shepard does not remember any interaction with Plaintiff at VSP. Id. at ¶ 5.
Plaintiff's deposition
Defense counsel took Plaintiff's deposition on August 17, 2023. (Doc. 69-3). Plaintiff testified that she was in a nine (9) month consensual relationship with her cellmate inmate Frazier, during which Frazier was abusive. Id. at 21. On May 29, 2021, during a lockdown, Frazier allegedly beat Plaintiff and threatened her at knifepoint. Id. at 22-24. Once Frazier released Plaintiff from the cell, Plaintiff saw Defendant Emmons on a walkway and proceeded to tell Defendant Emmons what had happened and to ask for protective custody. Id. at 25. Emmons “referred it to Scropshire [sic]”, who had walked up to Plaintiff and Emmons. Id. at 29. Plaintiff told Shropshire that she wanted protective custody. Shropshire told Plaintiff that they did not have protective custody at VSP and that Plaintiff and Frazier would “get over it”. Id. at 30. Plaintiff had not reported any concerns regarding Frazier prior to the May 29, 2021 incident. Id. at 33.
Defendant Bryant subsequently told Plaintiff that she had two (2) options: return to her cell or go to lockdown, a disciplinary measure. Id. at 36. Plaintiff chose to go to lockdown. Id. Plaintiff later returned to her cell before being sent to Atlanta Medical Center for unrelated treatment. Id. at 38, 43. Frazier had been placed in lockup, and Plaintiff was placed into a single cell. Id. at 44, 76. According to Plaintiff, both she and Frazier had do-not-associate orders in their prison files, requiring the prison to “make reasonable accommodations to protect the inmate” from the alleged attacker. Id. at 74-75. Plaintiff and Frazier were subsequently placed in adjacent buildings, with a fence in between, putting them “within spitting distance” of each other. Id. at 76, 77. Although the fence gates were to be locked at all times, Plaintiff testified they were not locked. Id. at 77.
Plaintiff testified that Frazier by-passed guards on various occasions to attempt to get to Plaintiff, although on most of the occasions guards or locked doors stopped Frazier from actually physically accessing Plaintiff. Id. at 79-80, 89, 92-93. Frazier did punch Plaintiff in early September. Id. at 114. Plaintiff maintains that she was constantly asking the Defendants to place her in protective custody during this time period. Id. at 78-79. Plaintiff testified that at times during this period she was in “the hole”, and that “[t]he only times I would come out of the hole is when Phillip Frazier was in the hole.” Id. at 96. Plaintiff stated that in the hole she “was secure and [] felt secure” Id. Analysis
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party, as set forth in her recast Complaint and deposition testimony, Plaintiff was attacked by inmate Phillip Frazier and held at knifepoint between May 31, 2021 and June 1, 2021. Plaintiff thereafter informed the Defendants of the attack and of her fears of a future attack, and asked to be placed in protective custody. Defendants did not place Plaintiff in protective custody but did offer Plaintiff segregation and placed Plaintiff and Frazier in separate buildings of the prison, separated by fences that were supposed to be locked. Frazier was able to gain access to Plaintiff's location on a number of occasions thereafter, once punching Plaintiff in the face.
“To prove that [Defendants were] deliberately indifferent to the risk that [s]he would be injured, [Plaintiff] ha[s] to prove: ‘(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence.'” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013) quoting Townsend v. Jefferson County, 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010). Additionally, “[a]s with any claim brought under § 1983, to succeed, the inmate must demonstrate a causal connection between the prison official's conduct and the Eighth Amendment violation.” Rodriguez v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007).
“In determining subjective knowledge, a court is to inquire whether the defendant was aware of a ‘particularized threat or fear felt by [the plaintiff].” McBride v. Rivers, 170 F. A'ppx 648, 654 (11th Cir. 2006), quoting Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2003). The facts taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff show that Defendants had subjective knowledge of a “particularized threat or fear” felt by Plaintiff, as they were informed on multiple occasions of the past interaction between Plaintiff and Frazier, of Plaintiff's fear of future attacks, and of Plaintiff's requests for protection. Cf. McBride, 170 F. A'ppx at 655 (Plaintiff “did not identify a specific prior incident, from which the defendant[s] could infer that a substantial risk existed”, and “failed to show that defendants had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm”.).
However, the facts taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff further show that Defendants acted reasonably in responding to Plaintiff's reports of attack and potential future harm from inmate Frazier. “The reasonableness of a prison official's response to a substantial risk of serious harm depends on the facts the official knew when [he] learned about the threat . . . [and] the prison official responds reasonably by taking the time to investigate the threat and look into different options all while making sure the prisoners are being supervised.” Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 2020). The Defendants, knowing that Plaintiff had been attacked and threatened by inmate Frazier while Plaintiff and Frazier were cellmates, and that Plaintiff continued to have fear regarding Frazier, kept Plaintiff and Frazier separated at all times after the incident in June 2021 and after Plaintiff returned to VSP from the Atlanta hospital. They further offered Plaintiff the possibility of going into segregation. Although Plaintiff and Frazier were at times housed in adjacent buildings, the buildings were separated by locked fences, and there is no indication that Defendants were aware that gates were unlocked on the fences separating the prison buildings.
In Mosley, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a plaintiff's argument that if a prisoner tells prison officials he is in fear for his life, any response less than placing the prisoner in protective custody is objectively unreasonable. Id. at 1271. The court found that the officer's response to the prisoner plaintiff's reports of threats was reasonable, in that the officer separated the plaintiff from the threatening inmate, in a lockable cell, with measures in place to account for prisoners' whereabouts. Id. at 1275.
Although Frazier continued to try to access Plaintiff, and ultimately punched Plaintiff on a sidewalk, Plaintiff testified that on more than one occasion prison officers intercepted Frazier's attempts to reach Plaintiff, and that the prison had at least some measures in place to keep them separated.
[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted. A prison official's duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety, a standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials' unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions. Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-845.
“A resulting harm . . . cannot alone establish a culpable state of mind, and in evaluating whether Defendants exhibited a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”, the Court must “focus not on isolated failures - or impossibilities, as the case may be - but rather on the defendants' entire course of conduct.” Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1287-1288 (11th Cir. 2020), internal citations omitted; see also McConico v. Cook, 2022 WL 4113131 (S.D.Ala. 2022) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate that prison officials recklessly disregarded COVID risk in light of defendants implemented multiple monitoring, cleaning, and movement limitations on inmates to prevent disease spread).
Moreover, Plaintiff has not established the “necessary causal link” between the Defendants' actions or inactions and a resulting harm. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1539 (11th Cir. 1993). In order to establish the “necessary causal link” between the Defendants and the alleged harm, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the prison officials
had the means substantially to improve the inmate's safety, knew that the actions [they] undertook would be insufficient to provide the inmate with reasonable protection from violence, and had other means available to [them] which [they] nevertheless disregarded.Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 622, internal citations omitted.
Plaintiff has not rebutted Defendant Emmons' testimony that officials believed the situation had been addressed by keeping Plaintiff and Frazier separated in secured areas. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not established that some additional form of protective custody, beyond what was offered to her as an option, was even available. Plaintiff testified that she moved in and out of segregation depending on where Frazier was located, and Plaintiff testified that she was told there was no protective custody at VSP, or was not an option for Plaintiff. (Doc. 69-3, pp. 30, 36). Thus, Plaintiff has not shown, with the facts taken in the light most favorable to her as the non-movant, that Defendants had the means to substantially increase Plaintiff's safety or that Defendants knew their actions to be insufficient to provide Plaintiff reasonable protection from harm. In sum, “[b]ecause the defendants acted reasonably, they cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment”. Swain, 961 F.3d at 1289.
Qualified immunity
As the Court finds no constitutional violation based on the facts provided, Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity. Baltimore v. City of Albany, Ga., 183 F. A'ppx 891, 896 (11th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendants Shepard, Emmons, Shropshire, and Bryant on Plaintiff's deliberate indifference to safety claim regarding inmate Phillip Frazier. (Doc. 69).
If this recommendation is adopted, the following claim and Defendants will remain pending in the case:
• Deliberate indifference to safety against Defendants Dominiak and Walton, regarding the placement of shackles on Plaintiff.
As the dispositive motion deadline has long expired, this remaining claim against the remaining 2 Defendants appears to be now ready for trial.
Objections
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Any objection 1 o is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination as to those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made; all other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed by the District Judge for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.