Opinion
C.A. NO. 00A-06-008-NAB.
Submitted: October 3, 2000.
Decided: December 6, 2000.
Appeal From a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Decision Affirmed.
Denise Parker-Dodge, Woodstown, New Jersey, Pro Se Appellant.
Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee Pet Kare II.
James Hanley, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for the Board.
ORDER
Having reviewed the parties' submissions, as well as the record below, the Court concludes as follows:
1. Claimant Denise Parker-Dodge worked as assistant store manager for Pet Kare II (Employer) for approximately 2 1/2 years until she was terminated on February 11, 2000. She filed with the Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance a petition for unemployment insurance compensation benefits. Employer asserted that Claimant had not properly punched in and out of work and inflated her time cards. Claimant asserted that the time clock did not work properly and that employees other than herself also filled in their cards by hand. The claims deputy found that Claimant had been discharged for just cause in connection with her work and denied her petition.
2. Claimant appealed the denial of her petition, and an appeals referee held a hearing. After hearing the evidence, the referee found that Claimant was discharged without just cause and reversed the deputy's denial of benefits.
3. On Employer's appeal, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (Board) held a hearing and subsequently reversed the referee's decision. Because Claimant argued that she hand wrote her time cards because the time lock did not work, the determinative question was whether the time clock worked properly. The Board accepted records from other employees as evidence that the time clock did work. The Board also found Claimant to be a less credible witness than Employer. For these reasons, the Board denied Claimant's petition, based on its findings that Claimant was not recording her time accurately and that this behavior constituted wilful or wanton misconduct. Claimant filed a timely appeal to this Court. Briefing is complete, and the issues are ripe for decision.
4. On appeal, Claimant raises numerous questions of fact. She argues that the Board ignored certain evidence, including (1) evidence that other employees also handwrote their time cards; (2) the fact that Employer offered only one questionable time card; and (3) Claimant's belief that the real reason she was fired was because of conflicts with Donald Fessman, president of Pet Kare II. Claimant also objects to the fact that the phrase "shaving hours" was used by Employer but not defined by either the referee or the Board. Employer responds that the Board's factual findings are supported by the evidence and that the decision was free of legal error.
5. The function of this Court on review of a Board decision is to determine whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make factual findings. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the Board's factual findings.
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, Del.Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del.Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994).
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del.Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1965).
Title 29 Del. C. § 10142(d).
6. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Claimant has not completely apprehended the appellate standard. On review of a factual determination made by the Board, this Court is to assess whether substantial evidence existed on the record to support the Board's finding. Because of the leeway usually accorded a pro se litigant, the Court will construe Claimant's assertions that the Board "ignored" certain evidence as argument that substantial evidence does not exist to support the Board's findings.
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d at 688.
See, e.g., Vick v. Haller, Del.Supr., No. 149, 1986, Christie, C.J. (March 2, 1987).
7. Employer testified before the Board that he had warned Claimant "several times" (and specifically in November 1999) about her time cards because he had received complaints from other employees that Claimant was not working all the time she recorded. He stated that she handwrote the cards rather than punching them, and that she "did her own figuring of the times that she actually worked, [which] didn't always correspond." Claimant acknowledged that the time cards presented by Employer showed that she had handwritten her cards more often than other employees, although she argued that time cards which Employer had not submitted as evidence would show otherwise. Lorraine Levering and James Punnall, two other employees, testified that they had been able to use the clock to record their time. Having reviewed the record of both hearings, the Court concludes that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's findings that other employees used the clock to record their hours and that the clock worked as to the time of day.
Transcript of the Referee's Hearing, at 5.
Id.
The parties agree that the clock required an adjustment at the beginning of each month.
8. The Board also made a credibility finding that Employer was more credible than Claimant in regard to whether the clock worked properly. The Board is the factfinder, and its resolutions of conflicts of testimony and determinations as to witness credibility are conclusive. Furthermore, the Board is free to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony, and it did so in regard to Claimant's less than credible assertions about the time clock. This Court will not revisit the Board's findings as to the credibility of the witnesses.
General Motors Corp. v. McNemar, Del.Supr., 202 A.2d 803, 807 (1964).
Coleman v. Dept. of Labor, Del.Super., 288 A.2d 285 (1972).
9. Claimant objects to the fact that Employer's phrase "shaving hours" was not defined. In the context of the issues presented in this case, it is clear that all parties understood this phrase to refer to Employer's allegation that Claimant sometimes failed to record her time accurately. This phrase, although a colloquialism, is neither abstruse nor hyper technical, and needs no further definition.
For all these reasons, the decision of the Board denying Claimant's petition for unemployment insurance benefits must be and hereby is Affirmed .
It Is So ORDERED.