Opinion
May 28, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Amann, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the appellants' contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for renewal ( see, Swenning v Wankel, 140 A.D.2d 428; Mangieri v. Juskowitz, 112 A.D.2d 147; Patterson v. Town of Hempstead, 104 A.D.2d 975).
Nor, did the Supreme Court err in vacating the October 24, 1994, order dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the appellants and reinstating the complaint as against them. The plaintiffs substantially complied with the June 2, 1994, conditional order of preclusion by serving one of the two bills of particulars they were required to serve, as well as the authorizations demanded by the appellants. Under these circumstances, the preclusion order did not become final ( cf., Bock v. Schiowitz, 168 A.D.2d 593). Thus, it was not error for the Supreme Court, upon renewal, to deny the appellants' motion to dismiss and instead impose monetary sanctions against the plaintiffs ( see, George v. Massachusetts Plate Glass Ins. Co., 97 A.D.2d 748; see also, Harris v. City of New York, 211 A.D.2d 663). O'Brien, J.P., Santucci, Joy and Florio, JJ., concur.