Opinion
No. 58545-2-I.
October 1, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 05-2-33408-8, William L. Downing, J., entered July 14, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tahraoui Abdulfhafid rented storage space from Pan Abode Homes, Inc., for several years. When Tahraoui terminated the parties' relationship, but failed to vacate the premises, Pan Abode filed this unlawful detainer action. From a writ of restitution and judgment in favor of Pan Abode, Tahraoui now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
Pan Abode occupies an 8-acre site in Renton, portions of which it leases to subtenants, primarily for storage. In 2001, Pan Abode entered into a rental agreement with Tahraoui for storage space, which Tahraoui used to store various types of equipment that he salvaged. Over time, Tahraoui's need for space increased, and by 2005, he was occupying about 9,000 square feet of space inside a building and about the same amount of space outside the building.
In early 2005, a new owner required Pan Abode to execute licensing agreements with all of its subtenants. In June 2005, after some delay, Tahraoui signed a 12-month licensing agreement. The monthly payments were $1,850 and, consistent with prior agreements, either side could terminate the relationship upon 30 days' notice.
At about this time, Pan Abode's property manager became concerned with the volume of materials that Tahraoui was storing and the potential costs of disposal should he abandon the property. Shortly after Tahraoui signed the license agreement, Pan Abode gave Tahraoui four months to relocate and presented him with an Addendum. If Tahraoui agreed to leave within four months, his monthly payment, which Pan Abode believed was far below market value, would remain the same. If Tahraoui declined to vacate and signed the Addendum, his monthly payments would rise to $3,200 on October 1, 2005.
On September 1, 2005, after various disagreements, Tahraoui gave written notice that he would vacate the space by October 1, 2005. On October 10, 2005, when Tahraoui had not vacated, Pan Abode filed this unlawful detainer action. Tahraoui made no payments after September 1, 2005.
Following a hearing on October 28, 2005, a superior court commissioner rejected Tahraoui's claim that the court lacked jurisdiction and found that Tahraoui was guilty of unlawful detainer under chapter 59.12 RCW. The court issued a writ of restitution, and Tahraoui stayed execution of the writ by posting a bond.
The superior court denied Tahraoui's motion for revision on January 20, 2006, and lifted the stay of enforcement of the writ of restitution. The sheriff completed eviction of Tahraoui from the property on February 2, 2006. Tahraoui sought discretionary review of issuance of the writ of restitution, which this court denied on April 26, 2006. Our supreme court denied further review on September 7, 2006.
Following a trial of all remaining issues in June 2006, the court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a final judgment totaling about $58,000 in favor of Pan Abode. On September 29, 2006, this court denied Tahraoui's challenge to the trial court's disbursement of his $20,000 cash bond. Tahraoui now appeals.
DECISION
Tahraoui first contends the trial court erred in determining that it had subject matter jurisdiction over Pan Abode's unlawful detainer action. He argues that the unlawful detainer statute, RCW 59.12, did not apply because the parties' agreement was a license rather than a lease and the parties therefore did not have a landlord-tenant relationship. He maintains that Pan Abode was required to pursue its claims in an ejectment action. See generally Bar K Land Co. v. Webb, 72 Wn. App. 380, 383, 864 P.2d 435 (1993).
An unlawful detainer action under RCW 59.12.030 is a narrow one, "limited to the question of possession and related issues such as restitution of the premises and rent." Munden v. Hazelrigg, 105 Wn.2d 39, 45, 711 P.2d 295 (1985). By its terms, RCW 59.12.030 is directed to the actions of a "tenant of real property." Tahraoui claims there was no landlord-tenant relationship because the parties restructured their relationship as a "license agreement" in 2005. As support, Tahraoui points to the agreement's characterization of Pan Abode as the licensor and Tahraoui as the licensee. He also relies heavily on the agreement's purported grant to the licensee of a "non-exclusive license" to use the designated portions of the premises. See generally Conaway v. Time Oil Co., 34 Wn.2d 884, 893, 210 P.2d 1012 (1949) (describing basic distinctions between lease and license).
But Tahraoui cites no authority suggesting that the terms of the parties' license agreement are inconsistent with — or preclude — the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship for purposes of RCW 59.12. "The relationship of landlord and tenant is established where the owner of the premises permits another to take possession thereof for a determinate period of time." Hughes v. Chehalis School Dist., 61 Wn.2d 222, 224, 377 P.2d 642 (1963). The evidence established that Tahraoui was the sole occupant of some 18,000 square feet of Pan Abode's property, for which he made monthly payments. This was clearly sufficient to establish that the parties' relationship was that of landlord and tenant. See Hughes, 61 Wn.2d at 224; McCourtie v. Bayton, 159 Wash. 418, 422-23, 294 P. 238 (1930).
Moreover, after giving notice that he would vacate the premises by October 1, 2005, Tahraoui continued in possession of the property without making further payments. See RCW 59.12.030(1). This is precisely the situation that the unlawful detainer statute was intended to address. See Savings Bank of Puget Sound v. Mink, 49 Wn. App. 204, 208, 741 P.2d 1043 (1987) (chapter 59.12 RCW is designed to provide expeditious removal of persons in possession of the property of another "who are either in breach of a condition to that occupancy, have committed waste, have unlawfully entered, or have held over after expiration of a tenancy for a definite term"). Tahraoui has failed to demonstrate any error in the trial court's determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction and that Tahraoui was guilty of unlawful detainer.
Tahraoui next contends the trial court erred in not finding that Pan Abode intentionally changed the locks on the property gates in September 2005 to deny him access. He further claims that Pan Abode's actions violated the terms of the parties' agreement and constituted a valid defense to the unlawful detainer action.
The trial court found that although Pan Abode may have changed the gate locks, "the gates remained open all day, everyday including weekends." The court concluded there was no "meaningful interference" with Tahraoui's access to the property during a period in which Pan Abode hoped that he would vacate the premises.
As the appellant, Tahraoui bears the burden of providing this court with a sufficient record to review the issues raised on appeal. State v. Garcia, 45 Wn. App. 132, 140, 724 P.2d 412 (1986). Tahraoui's failure to submit a verbatim report of proceedings or to identify the evidence presented at trial precludes appellate review of the alleged errors. See Bulzomi v. Dep't of Labor § Indus., 72 Wn. App. 522, 525, 864 P.2d 996 (1994).
Tahraoui also asserts that material factual issues precluded entry of the writ of restitution and that the trial court erred in lifting the stay of enforcement of the writ after denying his motion for revision. But these claims also rest on factual allegations that cannot be reviewed because of the inadequate record on appeal. Nor has Tahraoui cited any relevant authority establishing that the trial court committed legal error.
Tahraoui next contends that Pan Abode was not entitled to an expedited trial under RCW 59.12.130, that Pan Abode failed to file and serve an amended summons and complaint, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award damages under RCW 59.12.170, and that the trial court erroneously permitted disbursement of his bond after entry of the final judgment. But all of these allegations fail because they rest on the faulty assertion that the trial court converted the unlawful detainer action into a general civil action.
Generally, an unlawful detainer action does not permit the litigation of counterclaims, unless they involve facts that excuse a tenant's breach, although under certain circumstances, the trial court has authority to convert an unlawful detainer action into an ordinary civil action for damages. Munden, 105 Wn.2d at 47. But because Tahraoui did not vacate the premises until after issuance of the writ of restitution and continued to dispute Pan Abode's right to possession, the trial court could not convert the unlawful detainer into a general proceeding. See Sprincin King Street Partners v. Sound Conditioning Club, Inc., 84 Wn. App. 56, 68-69, 925 P.2d 217 (1996). Significantly, Tahraoui does not identify any procedural or substantive basis for his assertion that the trial court converted the unlawful detainer proceeding. Tahraoui's claims related to the assertion that the trial court converted the unlawful detainer proceeding are therefore without merit.
Tahraoui next contends that Pan Abode was not entitled to immediate disbursement of his bond upon entry of judgment because it violated the automatic stay provisions of CR 62(a). But because unlawful detainer actions are special proceedings for purposes of CR 81(a), the provisions of RCW 59.12 will generally prevail over inconsistent civil rules. See Kelly v. Powell, 55 Wn. App. 143, 148, 776 P.2d 996 (1989); Canterwood Place L.P. v. Thande, 106 Wn. App. 844, 848, 25 P.3d 495 (2001). RCW 59.12.170 permits immediate enforcement of a judgment if the underlying agreement has expired. Tahraoui has failed to cite any relevant authority supporting application of CR 62(a) to the circumstances here.
Tahraoui also contends the trial court lacked authority to award double rent under RCW 59.12.170 because Pan Abode did not include such a request in its complaint. But under CR 54(c), Pan Abode was entitled to such relief even if not requested in the pleadings. See Kelly, 55 Wn. App. at 148-49; Allstot v. Edwards, 114 Wn. App. 625, 632, 60 P.3d 601 (2002). Moreover, as the trial court noted, the issue was discussed by the parties before trial and therefore came as no surprise.
Tahraoui next contends the trial court erred in denying his request for a trial continuance. We review the trial court's denial of a continuance for an abuse of discretion. See Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. International Ins. Co., 124 Wn.2d 789, 813, 881 P.2d 1020 (1994). Less than one month before the scheduled trial date, Tahraoui requested a six-month continuance, supported by nothing more than conclusory assertions that he needed to address several issues. But given the limited nature of the issues to be resolved in an unlawful detainer proceeding, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying a six-month continuance.
Tahraoui next contends that the evidence failed to support certain trial court findings of fact and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend the findings and conclusions and grant a partial new trial. For support, he relies on numerous factual assertions about the terms of the license agreement and the trial court's failure to address some of his claims. But as already indicated, Tahraoui's failure to provide this court with a sufficient trial record precludes consideration of these alleged errors, all of which arise out of factual matters addressed at trial.
Finally, Tahraoui challenges the trial court's award of attorney fees, which was based on the terms of the license agreement. He argues that portions of the award were unreasonably high. But Tahraoui offers nothing more than conclusory assertions to support these claims. We will not consider issues unsupported by adequate argument. See Saunders v. Lloyd's of London, 113 Wn.2d 330, 345, 779 P.2d 249 (1989).
In summary, Tahraoui has failed to demonstrate any error in the trial court's decisions.
Under the terms of the licensing agreement, Pan Abode is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. See RAP 18.1(a). Its request for attorney fees is therefore granted, subject to compliance with RAP 18.1(d).
Affirmed.