Opinion
No. 05-04-00941-CV
Opinion issued February 1, 2006.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 02-05539-C.
Reversed and Rendered.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, BRIDGES, and LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Scott Palmer and Scott Palmer P.C. appeal the trial court's judgment reversing the decision of the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) and ordering that Denna Shaw receive unemployment benefits. In two points of error, appellants contend the trial judge erred in reversing the TWC's decision because there was substantial evidence to support the TWC's decision. The facts are known to the parties and are not recited in detail. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.1. We reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment that appellee take nothing under her claim for unemployment benefits.
After leaving Palmer's employment, Shaw filed for unemployment benefits. Although the TWC initially granted Shaw benefits, Palmer appealed, and the TWC reversed its decision, concluding Shaw had voluntarily left work without good cause. Shaw appealed to the county court at law. After a hearing, the trial judge reversed the TWC's decision and ordered Shaw receive unemployment benefits. This appeal followed.
Appellants argue the trial judge erred in reversing the TWC's decision because there was substantial evidence to support the TWC's decision. We agree. A party "aggrieved by a final decision" of the Texas Workforce Commission may obtain judicial review of that decision. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.201 (Vernon 1996). Judicial review is "by trial de novo based on the substantial evidence rule." Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.202 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Under this hybrid review, the trial judge "conducts an evidentiary hearing for the limited purpose of determining `whether at the time the questioned order was entered there then existed sufficient facts to justify the agency's order.'" Bd. of Tr. of Big Spring Firemen's Relief Ret. Fund v. Firemen's Pension Comm'r, 808 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, no writ) (citing Gerst v. Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tex. 1966)); see Firemen's Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 1984) ("The reviewing court must inquire whether the evidence introduced before it shows facts in existence at the time of the administrative decision which reasonably support the decision."). While the trial judge "must hear and consider evidence to determine whether reasonable support for the administrative order exists," the "agency itself is the primary fact-finding body, and the question to be determined by the trial court is strictly one of law." Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956.
Thus, while the reviewing court is to a certain extent a fact-finder, it may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on controverted issues of fact. When there is substantial evidence which would support either affirmative or negative findings the administrative order must stand, notwithstanding the agency may have struck a balance with which the court might differ. The trial court may not set aside an administrative order merely because testimony was conflicting or disputed or because it did not compel the result reached by the agency. Resolution of factual conflicts and ambiguities is the province of the administrative body and it is the aim of the substantial evidence rule to protect that function. The reviewing court is concerned only with the reasonableness of the administrative order, not its correctness.
The reviewing courts need not consider "incredible, perjured, or unreasonable testimony because such evidence is not substantial." However, the reviewing court may go no further than to examine the evidence for these infirmities. If there is substantial evidence which supports the order, the courts are bound to follow the discretion of the administrative body.
Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In this case, after a hearing, the Texas Workforce Commission Appeal Tribunal officer found Shaw "voluntarily left work rather than comply with a reasonable request made by the employer" and that she "quit because she refused to implement a new office procedure . . . because she felt it was another employee's job and not her own." The hearing officer also found Shaw's job was not in jeopardy and had she not quit, further work would have been available for her with the employer. The hearing officer concluded that the request made by the employer was reasonable given Shaw's position and duties. Because Shaw voluntarily left her employer without good cause connected to the work, she was not entitled to benefits.
By appealing this order, Shaw had the burden of demonstrating that the order was not supported by substantial evidence. Although Shaw argued in the county court at law about disputed facts, those disputed facts did not constitute evidence that was "incredible, perjured or unreasonable." Rather, the testimony provided "a story upon which reasonable minds might differ." See Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956. In fact, Shaw's own testimony at the hearing established she refused to perform a particular job assignment, and that before leaving the office that day, she gave a note to a coworker stating that her boyfriend would "contact Mr. Palmer regarding her things." The reviewing court-in this case, the county court at law-is concerned only with the reasonableness of the commission's order, not with its correctness. Thus, that reasonable minds might differ does not present grounds for reversal. If there is substantial evidence supporting the commission's order-as there was in this case-the reviewing court is bound to follow the discretion of the administrative body. See Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956. Because the trial judge failed to do so, we sustain appellants' two points of error.
We reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment that Shaw take nothing. See Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 957.