Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 032983 SECTION "A"(5)
04-04-2016
WARREN PALMER, III v. N. BURL CAIN, WARDEN
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and as applicable, Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Upon review of the entire record, the Court has determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). For the following reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition for habeas corpus relief be GRANTED.
I. Procedural history
Petitioner, Warren Palmer, III, is a state prisoner incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. On October 1, 1992, Palmer pleaded guilty in the Seventeenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafourche to the reduced charge of second-degree murder under Louisiana Revised Statute 14:30.1 for a crime he committed when he was seventeen (17) years old. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence — the mandatory sentence for second degree murder at the time. He did not appeal the conviction or sentence.
State Rec., Vol. 1 of 2, Transcript of Boykin proceedings, p. 3.
Id. at p. 9.
On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), holding that a mandatory life sentence without parole for juvenile offenders for a crime committed when they were under eighteen years old violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual' punishments. Shortly thereafter, Palmer filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the state district court, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller. The state district court denied the motion, finding that Miller did not apply retroactively. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal denied his related writ application challenging that ruling. The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently denied relief.
Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, 17th Judicial District Court, No. 1992-C-241451. A copy of a supplemental brief in support is contained in the state court record. State Rec., Vol. 1 of 2.
District Court Judgment and Reasons for denying motion to correct an illegal sentence, signed March 24, 2014. See Rec. Doc. 23-1, pp. 22-23 (attachment to Palmer's motion for leave to supplement memorandum in support). The state court record submitted is incomplete and does not contain copies of the majority of pleadings or rulings that pertain to the motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Rec. Doc. 23-1, p. 24, State v. Palmer, 2014-KW-0590 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/1/14).
Rec. Doc. 23-1, p. 25, State ex rel. Palmer v. State, 2014-KH-1575 (La. 11/21/14), 160 So.3d 970.
On January 28, 2015, Palmer filed the instant federal habeas corpus application seeking relief under Miller. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Palmer's application should be dismissed because Miller is not retroactive to cases on collateral review. That motion was denied as improper and construed as an answer to Palmer's federal application for relief. However, the matter was then stayed in the interest of judicial economy due to the United States Supreme Court's March 23, 2015 grant of certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S.Ct. 1546 (2015). Subsequent to the entry of that stay, the Supreme Court in Montgomery held that Miller imposed a substantive rule of law that must be applied retroactively. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 734 (2016). Following the Montgomery decision, Palmer timely moved to lift the stay and for judgment granting relief. The Court lifted the stay and ordered additional briefing in light of the newly issued Montgomery decision. Palmer submitted a counseled supplemental petition for habeas corpus relief and motion for remand with supporting memorandum, arguing that he is entitled to habeas relief because his life sentence without parole is unconstitutional pursuant to Miller and Montgomery. The State filed a response in which it concedes that Palmer's request for relief, i.e., resentencing by the state courts in accord with the dictates of Miller, is proper.
Rec. Doc. 23, Petition. Palmer was granted authorization to proceed with the instant federal application by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Rec. Doc. 19. A review of the state-court procedural history preceding his initial federal habeas corpus application may be found at Rec. Doc. 8.
Rec. Doc. 29.
Rec. Doc. 31.
Rec. Doc. 32.
Rec. Doc. 33.
Rec. Doc. 34.
Rec. Doc. 36, 36-3.
Rec. Doc. 38. The State cites the need for sufficient time to implement both substantive and procedural rules, citing several bills (HB 264, SB 127, HB 554 and SB 278) filed in response to Montgomery v. Louisiana. These proposed bills are presently pending before the Louisiana Legislature.
II. Analysis
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment." Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469 (citation omitted).
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that Miller is in fact retroactive. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016). In reasoning that Miller imposed a substantive rule of law that must be applied retroactively, the Supreme Court explained:
Miller, then, did more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender's youth before imposing life without parole; it established that the penological justifications for life without parole collapse in light of "the distinctive attributes of youth." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2465. Even if a court considers a child's age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects " 'unfortunate yet
transient immaturity.' " Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2469 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S., at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183). Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive for all but " 'the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,' " 567 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 2469 (quoting Roper, supra, at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183), it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for "a class of defendants because of their status"—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth. Penry, 492 U.S., at 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934. As a result, Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. Like other substantive rules, Miller is retroactive because it " 'necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant' "—here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—" 'faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.' " Schriro, 542 U.S., at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998)).Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. at 734. The Supreme Court concluded:
The Court now holds that Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. The conclusion that Miller states a substantive rule comports with the principles that informed Teague. Teague sought to balance the important goals of finality and comity with the liberty interests of those imprisoned pursuant to rules later deemed unconstitutional. Miller's conclusion that the sentence of life without parole is disproportionate for the vast majority of juvenile offenders raises a grave risk that many are being held in violation of the Constitution.Id. at 736.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that Palmer was under the age of 18 when he committed the crime at issue for which he received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole — a sentence that has been declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in an opinion announcing a new substantive rule of law that applies retroactively to Palmer. The state courts denied Palmer relief under Miller based on a conclusion that Miller has no retroactive effect to cases on collateral review — a conclusion that is directly contrary to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Montgomery. For these reasons, the Court finds that Palmer is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief.
Palmer has requested that the Court grant his supplemental petition for habeas corpus relief in order to allow the state courts to resentence him in accordance with the dictates of Miller. The State does not oppose the resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Palmer is entitled to be resentenced in conformity with Miller and that the state courts, in the first instance, are entitled to determine the appropriate sentence. Cf. Hills v. Cain, Civ. Action No. 11-0490, 2012 WL 3524759, at *3 (M.D. La. July 5, 2012) (making an analogous finding with respect to a sentence determined to be unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), adopted, 2012 WL 3524756 (M.D. La. Aug. 15, 2012).
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Palmer's application for federal habeas corpus relief be GRANTED, that his sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence be VACATED, and that the state trial court be ordered to resentence him in conformity with Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2013), within one-hundred twenty (120) days from entry of judgment or release him from confinement.
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc).
Douglass referenced the previously applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended to extend that period to fourteen days. --------
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th day of April, 2016.
/s/ _________
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE