Opinion
No. CV06-4014462 S
June 9, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Motion #116.00)
I FACTS
On January 18, 2006, the plaintiff, Joseph Padula, a former employee of the Weston board of education (board), filed a ten-count complaint against the defendants, the board, and Lynne Pierson, Superintendent of the board. The action arises out of the plaintiff's termination on December 18, 2002.
The board is the only remaining defendant, the count against Pierson individually having been stricken by the court, Arnold, J., on October 16, 2006. As such, I will refer on occasion to the board as "the defendant."
The operative complaint is the four-count third amended complaint filed on March 18, 2008. In count one, the plaintiff alleges a breach of contract, claiming that the defendant failed and/or refused to honor its commitment to provide retirement benefits to the plaintiff despite his eligibility. In count two, the plaintiff alleges the breach of an implied contract in that the defendant maintained a policy and/or practice of providing certain benefits to terminated employees, and subsequently failed or refused to honor its commitment to provide those benefits to the plaintiff, who was otherwise eligible. In count three, the plaintiff alleges a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, alleging that the defendant failed or refused to provide certain benefits to the plaintiff, for which he was eligible, and that the plaintiff, reasonably and to his detriment, relied upon the policy and/or practice the defendant maintained in offering certain benefits to terminated employees. Under counts one through three, the plaintiff alleges that he has suffered damages, including but not limited to lost wages and loss of pension and retirement benefits. Finally, the plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment in count four, based upon the fact that for his entire career with the board, the plaintiff has contributed to a retirement plan, of which he will receive no, or limited, benefit, causing him to suffer damages.
On November 12, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and supporting memorandum. In response, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on March 4, 2009; the defendant filed a reply on March 9, 2009. The matter was heard at short calendar on March 9, 2009.
II DISCUSSION
"Practice book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivers v. New Britain, 288 Conn. 1, 10, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008).
"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988). "In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).
"The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 11.
"A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by such documents as may be appropriate, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and the like." Practice Book § 17-45. "[Section 17-46] sets forth three requirements necessary to permit the consideration of material contained in affidavits submitted in a summary judgment proceeding. The material must: (1) be based on personal knowledge; (2) constitute facts that would be admissible at trial; and (3) affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrett v. Danbury Hospital, 232 Conn. 242, 251, 654 A.2d 748 (1995).
"Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 11. "Such assertions are insufficient regardless of whether they are contained in a complaint or a brief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Westport, 108 Conn.App. 710, 721, 950 A.2d 19 (2008). "Further, unadmitted allegations in the pleadings do not constitute proof of the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court, however, may consider not only the facts presented by the parties' affidavits and exhibits, but also the "inferences which could be reasonably and logically drawn from them . . . " United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 381, 260 A.2d 596 (1969).
"[B]efore a document may be considered by the court [in connection with] a motion for summary judgment, there must be a preliminary showing of [the document's] genuineness, i.e., that the proffered item of evidence is what its proponent claims it to be. The requirement of authentication applies to all types of evidence, including writings . . . Documents in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be authenticated in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, a certified copy of a document or the addition of an affidavit by a person with personal knowledge that the offered evidence is a true and accurate representation of what its proponent claims it to be." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gianetti v. Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, 111 Conn.App. 68, 73, 957 A.2d 541 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 915, 965 A.2d 553 (2009).
Both parties filed supporting documentation. As to the defendant's documentary evidence, the plaintiff objects, on the basis of relevancy, to the internet use policy signed by the plaintiff on September 3, 2002, as well as the affidavit of Robert Miller, which deals with alleged violations of the board's computer policy by the plaintiff involving visits to pornographic and obscene websites. The defendant takes the position that the plaintiff's computer use is relevant as after acquired evidence. In Preston v. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co., 35 Conn.App. 850, 858, 647 A.2d 364 (1994), our appellate court cites to federal law in stating that "after acquired evidence is relevant to the relief due a successful plaintiff in an employment discrimination discharge case," reasoning that "[p]ublic policy would seem to disfavor compensating an employee for the loss of future wages, even tough he was wrongfully discharged, when the employer proves by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it subsequently discovered evidence of employee misconduct that would have justified the termination of employment." Accordingly, the court rejects the Plaintiff's argument. As the plaintiff is an at-will employee, however, the admission of this evidence is not outcome determinative.
As to the other evidence presented, any objection as to those is deemed waived and the documents are admissible within the court's discretion. Holmes v. John M. Glover Agency, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 07 5006575 (January 29, 2009); Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006).
COUNT ONE — BREACH OF CONTRACT
In count one, the plaintiff alleges a breach of contract. In particular, the plaintiff alleges that "[i]n a letter dated December 18, 2002, the [defendant] stated that [he] was terminated due to poor performance and for having made threatening statements; " that the defendant "has a policy and/or practice of providing retirement benefits to terminated employees who were otherwise eligible, including but not limited to payment of a pension and medical benefits; " that "[u]nlike other employees who faced termination in the past, the [p]laintiff was not given any written or verbal warning, nor was he suspended — with or without pay, nor was he given the opportunity to resign; " that [d]espite its policy and/or practice, the [p]laintiff, who was otherwise eligible, was not allowed to receive his retirement benefits" and that the defendant failed and/or refused to honor its commitment to provide retirement benefits to the plaintiff.
The defendant argues that the plaintiff has not offered any admissible evidence that employees similar to him were permitted to retire. The plaintiff responds that a genuine question of material fact exists as to whether the defendant allowed a similarly situated employee of the board to retire in lieu of possible termination. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that "while the Plaintiff may not have been a union member at the time of his termination in the technical sense, he was treated like any other union member for purposes of retirement and employment health benefits . . . " Moreover, the plaintiff argues that in his deposition he named "other employees who were allowed to resign despite the fact that they could have otherwise been terminated for gross misconduct."
The defendant posits that the plaintiff's breach of express contract claim fails as under the express language of the hire letter, he was not entitled to continued health benefits or payment of accumulated sick time because he was undisputedly discharged. The defendant also argues that the plaintiff's assertions that there will be admissible evidence to support his claim at trial is insufficient to maintain the plaintiff's burden regarding summary judgment.
"A contract is express if its terms are stated by the parties, either orally or in writing . . . In other words . . . an express contract is one in which the parties arrive at their agreement and express it in words, either oral or written." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schreiber v. Connecticut Surgical Group, P.C., 96 Conn.App. 731, 738, 901 A.2d 1277 (2006). "A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract . . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . . Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., 252 Conn. 479, 498, 746 A.2d 1277 (2000).
In the present case, with respect to count one based on a breach of contract, the only relevant document provided is the hire letter authored by the defendant and addressed to the plaintiff, dated September 23, 1999, outlining his benefits as part of his employment as Supervisor of Buildings and Grounds. The benefits at issue, as outlined in the letter, are sick leave, vacation time, the State of Connecticut Merf-B Pension Plan (pension plan), and health/medical insurance. As to sick leave, according to the hire letter, the plaintiff is only eligible after three continuous years of service and if terminated for reasons other than discharge. Further, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was paid $9,219.71 for thirty-one days of vacation time. Moreover, as to the pension plan, the plaintiff admitted during his deposition that he was eligible to receive the benefits under the plan. Finally, regarding health/medical insurance, the hire letter clearly states that he shall receive the same benefits as staff covered by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), despite not being a union member himself, however that he "shall be eligible to maintain [his] benefits until age 70" — " upon retirement." (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff, however, was terminated and is, accordingly, not eligible for these health benefits.
The plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he was not a "just cause" employee. It is the general rule in Connecticut that "contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coelho v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 208 Conn. 106, 118, 544 A.2d 170 (1988). "In at-will employment relationships, there is a common-law cause of action in tort for the discharge of an at-will employee if the former employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 86 Conn.App. 842, 852, 863 A.2d 735 (2005); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, supra, 179 Conn. 475.
Accordingly, the defendant's evidence dispels any question of material fact as to its ability to terminate the plaintiff without cause, as the plaintiff fails to cite to or offer evidentiary support for any public policy, a violation of which would prevent the termination of an at-will employee. Moreover, even acknowledging the language in the hire letter granting the plaintiff the same rights as union employees, the plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition that the basis of his claim of breach is not any written policy, but rather, the past practice and oral policy of the defendant. In addition, no allegation nor evidence has been presented to suggest that the CBA contained this alleged policy. Accordingly, by the terms of the hire letter, the defendant is not in breach.
On two prior occasions, this public policy issue has been addressed in this case. See Padula v. Weston Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06 4014462 (October 16, 2006, Arnold, J.) (granting motion to strike counts six, seven, and eight, alleging wrongful termination due to violation of public policy, of the original complaint dated December 12, 2005); see Padula v. Weston Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06 4014462 (March 18, 2008, Hiller, J.) [45 Conn. L. Rptr. 202] (granting motion to strike counts four, five and six, alleging unjust enrichment and wrongful termination, of the amended complaint dated October 30, 2006; the plaintiff agreed to strike the unjust enrichment count during oral argument). Both decisions determined that the plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient public policy as required under Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, supra, 179 Conn. 475. As those decision addressed allegations different from the present case, their holdings are not directly applicable.
The plaintiff's deposition states: "Q: Other than [the past practice]. there's no other document that says [the defendant] had to do it, correct?" — "A: Correct." (p. 92).
There are no issues of material fact as to plaintiff's status as an at-will employee, and the plaintiff has failed to cite to any public policy that would have prohibited his termination. The plaintiff is not in breach of any express contract, and therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to count one.
COUNT TWO — BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT
In count two, the plaintiff alleges the breach of an implied contract, claiming that the defendant maintained a policy and/or practice of providing certain benefits to terminated employees, and subsequently failed or refused to honor its commitment to provide those benefits to the plaintiff, who was otherwise eligible.
In addition to its arguments addressing the breach of contract claim, the defendant also argues that the plaintiff's claims are barred by Fennell v. Hartford, 238 Conn. 809, 681 A.2d 934 (1996), and Biello v. Watertown, 109 Conn.App. 572, 953 A.2d 656, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 934, 958 A.2d 1244 (2008). Specifically, the defendant states that those decisions caution that "such implied contracts, in the municipal setting, could well rupture the public fisc."
The plaintiff takes the position that Fennell and Biello don't apply, as "the Plaintiff in the instant case has brought this claim against his former employer, the Weston Board of Education, which is a political subdivision of the Town of Weston — an entirely separate entity." Moreover, " Fennell and it's progeny deal with specific language from municipal charters which the respective plaintiff's attempted to trump with agreements they claimed had been entered through other sources." The plaintiff concludes that "there is no such express language in the Weston Town Charter that dictates how a Weston Board of Education employee can go about collecting retirement benefits."
The defendant responds that Fennell and Biello apply to the present case to bar claims of an implied contract against a municipality as well as against its board of education, regardless of whether a provision in the town charter contains specific language addressing employment contracts with the board of education.
The plaintiff's basis for his breach of implied contract claim is that the defendant "fail[ed] and/or refus[ed] to honor its commitment" to providing retirement benefits, upon the opportunity to resign in lieu of termination. The plaintiff alleges an implied contract claim and bases the implied contract on the alleged policy and/or practice put forth by the defendant as to other employees.
"[A]n implied contract is one in which some or all of the terms are inferred from the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case, though not expressed in words . . . " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schreiber v. Connecticut Surgical Group, P.C., supra, 96 Conn.App. 738. "Although both express contracts and contracts implied in fact depend on actual agreement . . . [i]t is not fatal to a finding of an implied contract that there were no express manifestations of mutual assent if the parties, by their conduct, recognized the existence of contractual obligations." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Janusauskas v. Fichman, 264 Conn. 796, 805, 826 A.2d 1066 (2003).
Our Supreme Court held in Fennell v. Hartford, supra, 238 Conn. 816, that "[c]ourts have consistently refused to give effect to government-fostered expectations that, had they arisen in the private sector, might well have formed the basis for a contract or an estoppel . . . We believe that implied contract claims in the public sector, based upon pension or employee manuals, would only invite endless litigation over both real and imagined claims of misinformation by disgruntled citizens [and employees], imposing an unpredictable drain on the public fisc . . . Absent a clear legislative indication, we are loathe to attribute an intent to the legislature to draw down the public fisc in favor of those with no substantive entitlement thereto." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The court, in Biello v. Watertown, supra, 109 Conn.App. 572, affirmed the trial court's holding that "the holding in Fennell v. Hartford, supra, 238 Conn. 809, precluded his recovery against the defendant for wage claims under the theories of implied contract, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit." Id., 579. "In rendering judgment in favor of the defendant in the present case, the court quoted extensively from Fennell and agreed with the defendant's position that the doctrines of implied contract, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit do not apply in municipal employee wage claim disputes." Id., 580. The court reasoned: "As Fennell indicates, implied contract claims in the public sector would invite endless litigation on the basis of misinformation by employees, thereby drawing down the public fisc. Such misinformation is even more likely if based on oral rather than written representations." Id., 583.
"The . . . Board of Education is, indisputably, a political subdivision of the state charged with the constitutionally mandated duty of providing public education." Bolden v. New Haven Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 93 0353695 (February 23, 1998, Gray, J.). In particular, it "is an agency of the state in charge of education in a town." R.A. Civitello Co. v. New Haven, 6 Conn.App. 212, 218, 504 A.2d 542 (1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Woodside Green Condominium Ass'n. v. Woodside Green, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 87 0091368 (August 24, 1993, Lewis, J.). Our Supreme Court also has acknowledged, however, that "[a] town board of education can be an agent of the state for some purposes and an agent of the municipality for others . . . A town board of education thus potentially enjoys immunity under two different theories of immunity for acts carried out within its governmental capacity." (Citation omitted.) Heigl v. Board of Education, 218 Conn. 1, 3-4, 587 A.2d 423 (1991).
As an agent of the state or municipality, and acting within its governmental capacity, the reasoning applied to municipalities as to implied contracts also applies to boards of education. The plaintiff in the present case bases his rights on the hire letter from the defendant, outlining the plaintiff's various rights to benefits during and at the end of his employment. The hire letter states that the plaintiff is afforded the same rights as any union employee. To substantiate his rights, however, as previously discussed, the plaintiff fails to provide any written policy applicable to union employees or rights deriving from the CBA. Rather, the plaintiff alleges that his rights derive from an alleged policy and past practice, of which he has heard. As implied contracts are not permitted as to municipalities, and the board of education is an agent of the state or municipality, any alleged oral policy is insufficient to bind the defendant contractually to the plaintiff for the purpose of the employment relationship.
"Q: How are they in breach if you were discharged instead of retiring? — A: They are in breach by violating their own past practice of letting people resign. If I was afforded the same luxury, I would have resigned and then went on to retirement. — Q: That's what the case is really about. You've got this concern that there is a past practice that the Board of Ed has followed. correct? — A: Correct. — Q: And you're upset that they didn't allow you to follow it? — A: Correct. — Q: Other than that, there's no other document that says they had to do it, correct? — A: Correct." (Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 91-92).
Even assuming, arguendo, that this court were to recognize an implied contract on the part of a board of education, there is insufficient evidence to establish the existence of any such contract. The plaintiff fails to provide any affidavits or testimony from any of the alleged employees who were permitted to retire in lieu of termination, leaving the court with a self-serving affidavit and testimony that these other employees and their alleged circumstances exist. Moreover, when questioned during the deposition, the plaintiff responded in the negative to the question when asked whether he can "identify a single individual who they allowed to resign in lieu of termination who subsequently was allowed to collect a retirement medical or pension benefit." Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to count two, as the defendant has demonstrated as a matter of law that the plaintiff cannot maintain an implied contract claim.
The plaintiff named Etih Poidomi, testifying that she was allowed to retire and collect her health benefits. (Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 21.) The plaintiff also named a custodian named Manny, and a security guard, who were both permitted to collect their health benefits upon retiring. ( Id., p. 22.) Others named, who were permitted to retire in lieu of termination, were Guy McDonald, Edward Ward, David Rogers, David Perise, Matthew Oller, Ernie Thompson, and Richard Parkington. ( Id., pp. 23-25).
COUNT THREE — BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
In count three, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing "[i]n failing or refusing to provide [certain] benefits to the [p]laintiff, who was otherwise eligible for same," that "[t]he plaintiff, reasonably relied on the policy and/or practice the [d]efendant maintained in offering said benefits to terminated employees," and that "the [p]laintiff relied on this policy and/or practice to his detriment."
The defendant argues that this count fails as a matter of law, because the plaintiff has no claim for a violation of public policy under Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). In response, the plaintiff counters that because an issue of fact exists as to counts one and two, the breach of contract claims do exist and count three is sufficient.
"[l]t is axiomatic that the . . . duty of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a contractual relationship." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Renaissance Management Co. v. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, 281 Conn. 227, 240, 915 A.2d 290 (2007). "[E]very contract carries an implied duty requiring that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement . . . The covenant of good faith and fair dealing presupposes that the terms and purpose of the contract are agreed upon by the parties and that what is in dispute is a party's discretionary application or interpretation of a contract term . . . To constitute a breach of [the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing], the acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff's right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract must have been taken in bad faith." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., supra, 285 Conn.16-17 n. 18.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that he relied to his detriment on the aforesaid policy and/or practice of the defendant, and, relies upon the second count of breach of implied contract. As the court has granted the motion for summary judgment as to count two, summary judgment must also enter as to count three.
COUNT FOUR — UNJUST ENRICHMENT
In count four, the plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment, "based upon the fact that for his entire career with the [board], [he] has contributed to a retirement plan, of which he will receive no, or limited, benefit," causing him to suffer damages. The defendant counters that the plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he had no claim for unjust enrichment, as the defendant did not hold back the plaintiff's retirement benefits. The defendant further argues that the Plaintiff agreed to withdraw its unjust enrichment claim at oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's second Amended Complaint dated December 12, 2005. The plaintiff responds that the defendant was unjustly enriched, because it did not have to pay out "for [his] unused sick time or the portion of the medical insurance premiums." The plaintiff further responds that he agreed to withdraw the unjust enrichment claim so that he could replead it "to include damages for the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff for his unused sick time as well as its refusal to provide 75% which is reflected in the operative pleading."
The motion to strike where the plaintiff allegedly agreed to withdraw the unjust enrichment count, addressed the amended complaint, dated October 30, 2006, and the court, Hiller, J., granted that portion of the motion during oral argument. The original complaint was dated December 12, 2005 and the first motion to strike was ruled upon by Judge Arnold on October 16, 2006, in which seven of the ten counts were stricken.
The unjust enrichment count in the operative complaint is almost identical to the one stricken in Judge Hiller's decision, but incorporates more of the foregoing allegations. Accordingly, it is sufficiently repleaded.
It is well established "that lack of a remedy under the contract is a precondition for recovery based upon unjust enrichment . . . " (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport v. Kasper Group, Inc., 278 Conn. 466, 472 n. 4, 899 A.2d 523 (2006). "Unjust enrichment applies wherever justice requires compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract . . . A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another . . . With no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances, is just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, it becomes necessary in any case where the benefit of the doctrine is claimed, to examine the circumstances and the conduct of the parties and apply this standard . . . Unjust enrichment is, consistent with the principles of equity, a broad and flexible remedy . . . Plaintiff's seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must prove (1) that the defendants were benefitted, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment," (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vertex v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 573, 898 A.2d 178 (2006).
In the present case, the crux of the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is that the plaintiff has contributed to a pension plan, of which he is now not receiving any benefits, thus enriching the defendant to the extent of such benefits. The plaintiff also argues that the defendant was unjustly enriched by the unpaid sick time and retirement benefits, for which the plaintiff is only eligible upon retirement, and not termination.
In his deposition, the plaintiff testified that he is in fact eligible to receive the benefits under the pension plan and that the only benefit he has to date failed to receive is the ability to retire as opposed to being terminated, giving him access to extended health benefits and sick leave for which he is only eligible if not terminated. Because the plaintiff was an at-will employee, however, the defendant was within its rights to terminate the plaintiff, as discussed above. The plaintiff has failed to present evidence that the defendant has been unjustly enriched. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to count four.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to all four counts.