Opinion
Docket No. 80503.
Decided February 5, 1986. Leave to appeal denied, 425 Mich ___.
William T. King, for plaintiff.
Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen Freeman (by Joseph A. Fink and John M. Lichtenberg), for defendant.
Plaintiff was employed by defendants from July of 1973 until January, 1981. During this period of time plaintiff developed an alcohol problem. The parties agreed that plaintiff would attend an alcohol treatment program as a condition to retaining his job. Plaintiff failed to attend a scheduled meeting and was fired in January of 1981. This suit was filed in August of 1983. At all pertinent times, plaintiff was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Defendants brought motions for summary judgment and accelerated judgment. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), was plaintiff's exclusive remedy and that, therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Plaintiff now appeals as of right.
The trial court was incorrect in stating that federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction. Harris v Edward Hyman Co, 664 F.2d 943 (CA 5, 1981), reh den 669 F.2d 733, and Ciba-Geigy Corp v Local 2548, United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 391 F. Supp. 287, 296 (D RI, 1975). The grant of summary judgment, however, need not be reversed. When a trial court reaches the right result for the wrong reason we do not reverse. Robertson v Detroit, 131 Mich. App. 594; 345 N.W.2d 605 (1983).
The reason that summary judgment was correct is because the applicable period of limitation is six months. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) and Del Costello v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151; 76 L Ed 2d 476; 103 S Ct 2281 (1983). As plaintiff waited 2 1/2 years, his claim is barred. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.