Opinion
C. A. PC-2023-01202
03-06-2024
PACE ORGANIZATION OF RHODE ISLAND v. SARAH FREW, IN HER CAPACITY AS TAX ASSESSOR FOR THE CITY OF EAST PROVIDENCE
For Plaintiff: Robert Fine, Esq. Samuel A. Budway, Esq. For Defendant: Michael S. Marcello, Esq. Justin T. Bonnick, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Robert Fine, Esq. Samuel A. Budway, Esq.
For Defendant: Michael S. Marcello, Esq. Justin T. Bonnick, Esq.
DECISION
LICHT, J.
Petitioner PACE Organization of Rhode Island (Petitioner or PACE) has moved for summary judgment asking this Court to find that G.L. 1956 § 44-3-3(a)(12) exempts Petitioner from real and personal property taxes. Accordingly, Petitioner asks this Court to order that Respondent Sarah Frew, in her capacity as Tax Assessor for the City of East Providence (Respondent or the Tax Assessor), reimburse Petitioner for taxes paid under protest with interest and remove Petitioner's property from the City of East Providence's tax rolls. Respondent opposes Petitioner's motion and has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking this Court to find that (1) § 44-3-3(a)(12) does not exempt Petitioner from real and personal property taxes; (2) Respondent has no obligation to refund Petitioner for taxes previously paid; and (3) PACE's property must remain on the City of East Providence's tax rolls. For the reasons stated herein, this Court grants the Tax Assessor's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and denies PACE's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I
Facts and Travel
PACE is a Rhode Island nonprofit corporation that provides healthcare services to Medicaid eligible and low-income elderly people in East Providence and throughout Rhode Island. PACE's Pet. for Relief from Assessment (Pet.) ¶¶ 1-2. PACE owns real estate located at 10 Tripps Lane, East Providence, Rhode Island (10 Tripps Lane) and also maintains tangible personal property in East Providence. Id. ¶ 3. The Tax Assessor assessed a tax against PACE based on her valuation of 10 Tripps Lane and PACE's tangible personal property as of December 31, 2021. Id. ¶ 4. PACE challenged the tax assessment as illegal on the grounds that § 44-3-3(a)(12) prevents taxation on 10 Tripps Lane and PACE's tangible property as such property is held for the aid and support of the aged poor. Id. ¶ 5. PACE timely made payment on all taxes in connection to the Tax Assessor's assessments when due and without incurring penalty or interest. Id. ¶ 6. PACE timely filed accounts with the Tax Assessor, as required by G.L. 1956 §§ 44-5-15 and 44-5-16. Id. ¶ 7.
The Petition cites G.L. 1956 § 44-3-3(12). However, it is clear from the language they cite that they are actually referring to G.L. 1956 § 44-3-3(a)(12).
On August 3, 2022, PACE timely appealed the Tax Assessor's assessments pursuant to § 44-5-26. Id. ¶ 8. On November 18, 2022, the Tax Assessor denied PACE's appeal and application for tax exemption, citing that PACE is not a "library or society organized for the support of the aged poor" and does not provide its services exclusively to the poor. Id. ¶ 9; Pet. Ex. B. As such, on December 9, 2022, PACE appealed the Tax Assessor's assessment and decision to the Board of Assessment Review (the Board). Id. ¶ 10. After hearing PACE's appeal on February 7, 2023, the Board issued a decision on February 13, 2023, denying PACE's appeal and application for tax exemption. Id. ¶ 11. Subsequently, PACE brought a timely Petition for Relief from Assessment to this Court.
II
Standard of Review
"'Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.'" Voccola v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC, 209 A.3d 558, 560 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Rohena v. City of Providence, 154 A.3d 935, 937 (R.I. 2017)). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Quest Diagnostics, LLC v. Pinnacle Consortium of Higher Education, 93 A.3d 949, 951 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotations omitted); see Super. R. Civ. P. 56. The "moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact." McGovern v. Bank of America, N.A., 91 A.3d 853, 858 (R.I. 2014) (citations omitted). Then, the burden shifts and, as reiterated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court:
"The party opposing summary judgment bears the burden of proving, by competent evidence, the existence of facts in dispute. The opposing party will not be allowed to rely upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but rather, by affidavits or otherwise the opposing party has an affirmative duty to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact." Henry v. Media General Operations, Inc., 254 A.3d 822, 834 (R.I. 2021) (cleaned up, citations omitted).
"In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party[,]" Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc., 82 A.3d 527, 532 (R.I. 2013), and "does not pass upon the weight or the credibility of the evidence[.]" Palmisciano v. Burrillville Racing Association, 603 A.2d 317, 320 (R.I. 1992).
III
Analysis
A
The Meaning of § 44-3-3(a)(12)
The first issue this Court must resolve is determining the meaning of § 44-3-3(a)(12) (the Statute). To ascertain the Statute's meaning, the Court must first determine whether the Statute is unambiguous. Second, if the Court finds the Statute to be ambiguous, the Court must resolve the ambiguity through the established principles of statutory interpretation.
1 The Ambiguity of § 44-3-3(a)(12)
"'[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.'" Planned Environments Management Corp. v. Robert, 966 A.2d 117, 121 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)). As such, "'when we examine an unambiguous statute, there is no room for statutory construction and we must apply the statute as written.'" Planned Environments Management Corp., 966 A.2d at 122 (quoting State v. Oliveira, 882 A.2d 1097, 1110 (R.I. 2005)). Once this is done, "the work of judicial interpretation is at an end." DeAngelis v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 656 A.2d 967, 969 (R.I. 1995).
Where a statute's poor draftsmanship actually renders the statute ambiguous, statutory construction is necessary. See In re J.T., 252 A.3d 1276, 1280 (R.I. 2021) ("It is readily apparent that we are faced with ambiguous statutory language. The inartful drafting of the pertinent statutory language here renders it plainly 'susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning.' . . . Again, 'because we are confronted with a genuine ambiguity, and not one divined by crafty lawyering, we 'will employ our well-established maxims of statutory construction in an effort to glean the intent of the Legislature.'" (internal quotations omitted)); see also Cuticchia v. Town of Andover, 121 N.E.3d 703, 709 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019) ("Our mandate is to give ambiguous, imprecise, or faultily drafted statutes a reasonable construction, with the primary goal of constru[ing] the statute to carry out the legislative intent, and to avoid[] a construction which would negate legislative intent or defeat its intended utility." (internal quotations omitted)); see also Jacques v. Richard, 346 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708-09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (finding that because a statute "is at best a model of confusing and ambiguous legislative draftsmanship" that it is "necessary to apply such canons or rules of construction as are pertinent" to derive the statute's meaning).
The parties' respective readings of the Statute drastically differ due to their diverging views as to whether the Statute applies to types of uses or types of entities. Petitioner argues that the Statute unambiguously provides tax-exempt status to five separate and distinct uses. Pet'r's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Pet'r's Mem.) 5-7; Pet'r's Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. and in Obj. to Resp't's Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Pet'r's Reply) 1-2. Respondent contends that the Statute's unambiguous language renders Petitioner ineligible for tax-exempt status because it does not qualify as one of the three stated entity types--a library, library society, or non-profit hospital. Resp't's Mem. in Opp'n of Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Resp't's Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Resp't's Opp'n) 6-7, 11.
As the parties' arguments on summary judgment illustrate, the Statute is being read in a number of different ways. For illustrative purposes, the Court will lay out the possible readings of the Statute's language.
The Statute itself reads as follows: "
"(a) The following property is exempt from taxation:
". . .
"(12) Property, real and personal, held for, or by, an incorporated library, society, or any free public library, or any free public library society, so far as the property is held exclusively for library purposes, or for the aid or support of the aged poor, or poor friendless children, or the poor generally, or for a nonprofit hospital for the sick or disabled;" Section 44-3-3(a)(12).
At oral argument, the Court asked each party to strike through the language of the Statute that did not apply in its interpretation of it.
PACE provided the following two versions of how the Statute should be read; the first interpretation reads as follows:
"(a) The following property is exempt from taxation:
". . .
"(12) Property, real and personal, held for, or by, an incorporated library, society, or any free public library, or any free public library society, so far as the property is held exclusively for library purposes, or for the aid or support of the aged poor, or poor friendless children, or the poor generally, or for a nonprofit hospital for the sick or disabled;"
Petitioner's reading of the statute reflects that which is argued in their Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. Pet'r's Mem. 2, 4-5.
PACE's second interpretation reads as follows:
"(a) The following property is exempt from taxation:
". . .
"(12) Property, real and personal, held for, or by, an incorporated library, society, or any free public library, or any free public library society, so far as the property is held exclusively for library purposes, or for the aid or support of the aged poor, or poor friendless children, or the poor generally, or for a nonprofit hospital for the sick or disabled;"
Petitioner's reading of the statute reflects Petitioner's counsel's physical markup of the Statute that was handed in to the Court at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment on February 5, 2024.
For its part, the Tax Assessor contends that the Statute's application to distinct tax-exempt entities does not encompass an entity such as PACE as evidenced by the following pertinent language:
"(a) The following property is exempt from taxation:
". . .
"(12) Property, real and personal, held for, or by, an incorporated library, society, or any free public library, or any free public library society, so far as the property is held exclusively for library purposes, or for the aid or support of the aged poor, or poor friendless children, or the poor generally, or for a nonprofit hospital for the sick or disabled;" (italics used because the Tax Assessor's counsel underlined those words)
Respondent's reading of the statute reflects Respondent's counsel's physical markup of the Statute that was handed in to the Court at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment on February 5, 2024.
As these illustrations accentuate, there are conflicting readings of the Statute. In the Court's view, the Statute's plain and ordinary meaning cannot possibly be derived based on the plain language contained therein. Rather, the Statute itself is riddled with confusing punctuations and unclear phrasing that renders its drafting inartful at best. The Court finds that both Petitioner and Respondent's readings of the Statute are reasonable based on the various ambiguities of the Statute's text, which makes it exceedingly difficult to decipher exactly what property the Statute is attempting to decree tax-exempt. Therefore, because the Statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the Statute is ambiguous, necessitating the Court to interpret the Statute in accordance with the Legislature's intent and to attribute to the Statute the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes.
2 The Court's Interpretation of § 44-3-3(a)(12)
Having determined that the Statute is ambiguous, the Court looks to our Supreme Court for guidance on how to proceed. "Only when the statute is ambiguous and susceptible to more than one interpretation does this Court have the responsibility to glean the intent and purpose of the Legislature from a consideration of the entire statute, keeping in mind the nature, object, language and arrangement of the provisions to be construed." Castelli v. Carcieri, 961 A.2d 277, 282 (R.I. 2008) (quoting In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 668 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I. 1996)) (cleaned up, internal quotations omitted). "It is our task in interpreting a legislative enactment to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent and to attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes. In doing so, we must not interpret a statute in a manner that would defeat the underlying purpose of the enactment. Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, we must make an interpretation grounded in policy considerations." Dias v. Cinquegrana, 727 A.2d 198, 199-200 (R.I. 1999) (cleaned up, internal quotations omitted, internal citations omitted). "As we have held, '[t]his [C]ourt will not construe a statute to reach an absurd result.'" In re B.H., 194 A.3d 260, 264 (R.I. 2018) (citing Long v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1074, 1081 (R.I. 2009)).
"The plain language of the taxing statute mandates that all real property is taxable 'unless otherwise specially provided.'" City of Providence v. Killoran, 447 A.2d 369, 371 (R.I. 1982) (internal quotation omitted). "[I]f a doubt or ambiguity exist[s] in a statute granting an exemption, such doubt must be resolved in favor of taxation." Id.; see also Lifespan Corp. v. City of Providence, 776 A.2d 1061, 1062 (R.I. 2001) ("It is well settled that statutes exempting property from taxation must be construed strictly."). "'Exemption from taxation cannot be read into the statute by implication. Since a grant of exemption is not to be presumed, any doubt or ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the public. The burden is upon the person claiming an exemption to show that he is within the terms of the statute.'" Killoran, 447 A.2d at 371 (quoting Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 62 R.I. 302, 307-08, 5 A.2d 293, 296 (1939)).
Respondent argues that, if the Statute is deemed ambiguous, precedent requires competing interpretations of a tax statute to be resolved in favor of taxation. Resp't's Opp'n 11-12; Resp't's Surreply 2. Petitioner makes no argument as to how the Statute should be construed if deemed ambiguous but merely contends that it is not.
There is little doubt that the Statute is ambiguous; the parties' contradictory readings of the Statute exemplify this point. Accordingly, this Court must now decipher the Legislature's intent so that the meaning of the Statute may be properly derived. To do so, the Court has traced the history of the Statute.
In the General Laws of 1857, the first time it appeared in the General Laws, the Statute's initial form provided that "[t]he following property, and no other, shall be exempt from taxation: . . . almshouses and public libraries, and the land and buildings used in connection therewith, . . ." G.L. 1857 § 8-37-2. In this initial version, how the property was used, either as a library or an almshouse, determined its exempt status.
The Court cannot locate the specific Public Laws which initially enacted or subsequently amended the Statute. Rather, the Court has examined how it appeared in each version of the Rhode Island General Laws.
An almshouse is "[a] dwelling for the poor publicly or privately supported within a city or county; a house where the poor can live without paying rent." Black's Law Dictionary (11 ed. 2019).
In the General Laws of 1872, the Statute read "[t]he following property and no other shall be exempt from taxation: . . . the property, real and personal, held for or by any incorporated library society, or any free public library, or any free public library society[.]" G.L. 1872 § 8-38-2. In this version, the focus was on the type of entity. Thus, all property of such designated entities would be exempt.
In the General Laws of 1882, the Statute had a widened scope to articulate the manner in which the property must be used:
"Sec. 2. The following property, and no other, shall be exempt from taxation: . . . the property, real and personal; held for or by any incorporated library society, or any free public library, or any free public library society, so far as said property shall be held exclusively for library purposes, or for the aid or support of poor friendless children, or for the aid or support of the aged poor, or for the aid or support of the poor generally, or for a hospital for the sick or disabled, and any fund given or held for the purpose of public education; . . ." G.L. 1882 § 8-41-2.
This version combined the type of entity owning the property and the use to which the property was used.
In the General Laws of 1896, the Statute exhibited minimal changes, mainly changing a few commas and semicolons:
"Sec. 2. The following property_ and no other, shall be exempt from taxation: . . . the property, real and personal, held for or by any incorporated library society, or any free public library, or any free public library society, so far as said property shall be held exclusively for library purposes, or for the aid or support of poor friendless children, or for the aid or support of the aged poor, or for the aid or support of the poor generally, or for a hospital for the sick or disabled, and any fund given or held for the purpose of public education; . . ." G.L. 1896 § 8-44-2; Resp't's Opp'n Ex. 6.
In this version, a comma was removed after the first use of the word "property."
In the General Laws of 1901, the Statute altered the order in which the uses appeared, inserted a comma separating "library" and "society," and inserted semicolons in two places:
Considering that the Rhode Island General Assembly did not authorize nonprofit corporations until 1920, the separation of "library" and "society" using a comma could have been an attempt to allow charitably organized entities to receive tax-exempt status as a "society," provided they utilized their property in accordance with the recognized types of uses. See G.L. 1920, ch. 1925, Title III, § 72. However, the Court's mere observation on this point is not sufficient to read into the Statute an intention behind the inclusion of the comma.
"Sec. 2. The following property and no other shall be exempt from taxation: . . . the property, real and personal, held for or by any incorporated library, society, or any free public library, or any free public library society, so far as said property shall be held exclusively for library purposes, or for the aid or support of the aged poor, or for the aid or support of poor friendless children, or for the aid or support of the poor generally; or for a hospital for the sick or disabled; and any fund given or held for the purpose of public education; . . ." G.L 1901 ch. 844, § 2; Resp't's Opp'n Ex. 7.
Since the 1901 General Laws, the Statute has had minimal changes, including adding the word "nonprofit" before the word "hospital," converting the semi-colons back to commas, adding commas in the phrase "held for or by," and modifying a few of the words in the clauses. The Statute now reads:
At some point after the 1901 General Laws, the taxing statute was reformatted as to separately list out the specific kinds of exemptions rather than grouping them together in a single section. Accordingly, the education language previously contained in the Statute has been relocated elsewhere in G.L. 1956 §44-3-3.
"(a) The following property is exempt from taxation:
". . .
"(12) Property, real and personal, held for, or by, an incorporated library, society, or any free public library, or any free public library society, so far as the property is held exclusively for library purposes, or for the aid or support of the aged poor, or poor friendless children, or the poor generally, or for a nonprofit hospital for the sick or disabled;" Section 44-3-3(a)(12).
The early history of the Statute accentuates the Legislature's initial intention of providing an exemption specifically to libraries and later to "any incorporated library society, or any free public library, or any free public library society." While the 1852 Statute could be viewed as use oriented with the focus on "public libraries" and "almshouses," the 1872 Statute, which contains more of the language actually contained in the current version of the Statute, seems to apply to certain entities. However, when the Statute appears in the 1882 General Laws, the General Assembly had vastly expanded its scope by adding numerous clauses, including the pertinent language of "for the aid or support of the aged poor," as well as additional language for hospitals and public education.
The Court cannot read the mind of the General Assembly in supplementing the Statute with this new language. Although the 1872 version of the Statute appears to condition exemption eligibility on the type of entity holding the property, the additional language in the 1882 Statute was tacked on in a clumsy manner, making it difficult to comprehend the new scope of the Statute. Nonetheless, the Court views the history of the Statute to evidence an intention by the Legislature to provide tax-exempt status to specific entities enumerated under the Statute. This interpretation is bolstered by the 1872 version of the Statute that focused largely on the types of entities that were eligible, such as libraries and library societies. Further, the Court views the 1882 Statute's inclusion of "held for or by" followed immediately by specifically named entities to signify the General Assembly's intention to have such property utilized by certain entities. The later language specifying certain uses, such as "for the aid or support of the aged poor," only appears after specific entity types are listed and after the qualifier language of "so far as the property is held exclusively for." Again, this Court acknowledges the inartful draftsmanship utilized in even the 1882 Statute, and later the 1896 Statute, especially considering that the provisions for hospitals and public education are not clearly differentiated from the use provisions. However, the Court attributes this discrepancy to imprecise drafting rather than an explicit intention to provide tax-exempt status to any entity that uses property in accordance with the Statute's uses.
Turning to the Statute's current form, the Court similarly acknowledges that the Statute is linguistically and structurally confusing. Thus, the parties' conflicting readings of the Statute are understandable under the circumstances. However, irrespective of the various ambiguities embedded in the Statute, this Court finds that certain aspects of its drafting indicate an intention to exempt on the basis of the type of entity rather than the type of use. First, the Statute immediately states that an exemption exists for real and personal property "held for, or by."
The use of this language indicates to the Court that the Statute requires a specific entity to hold the property to be eligible for exemption. If the Statute had only intended to enumerate various uses, the terms "held" and "by" would not be necessary and, instead, only the term "for" would be needed. Second, immediately after stating the "held for, or by" language, the Statute goes on to state various entities: "an incorporated library, society, or any free public library, or any free public library society." If the Statute only intended to apply to certain uses, as Petitioner argues, the inclusion of such language would be unnecessary. Instead, the Statute's inclusion of such specifically named entities evidences an intention to limit what organizations can claim an exemption under the section. Third, the Statute specifically expresses that such property must be held by "an incorporated library, society, or any free public library, or any free public library society, so far as the property is held exclusively," and then goes on to state various uses, including "for the aid or support of the aged poor." The Court reads the Statute as asserting that such named entities must use the property exclusively in accordance with one of the stated uses. As such, rather than the aged poor clause being an independent basis of eligibility, it modifies how the aforementioned entities must use the property to remain exemption eligible. Fourth, the Statute's structure for libraries and societies largely mirrors the form used in the clause for nonprofit hospitals. Just as the first section of the Statute lays out the various library and society entities that must hold the property followed by the uses such entities must utilize the property for, the latter clause of the Statute designates the entity to hold the property--a nonprofit hospital--followed by the permissible uses such entity must use the property--for the sick or disabled. The Court views this similarity in structure as an indication that the Statute's applicability is to be predicated on the type of entity claiming exemption, with the type of use only coming into play after entity status is met. In the Court's eyes, any other interpretation of the statute, such as the meaning put forth by Petitioner, would be a manipulation of the Statute in order to infer a tax exemption where one is not explicitly provided.
The Court's interpretation of the Statute is further strengthened by the lack of case law in Rhode Island applying the Statute in the manner argued by Petitioner. The Court's research yielded only three cases that discuss the applicability of the Statute; these cases were also cited by the parties in their papers. In Lifespan Corp., the Rhode Island Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that the Statute exempts from taxation real and personal property that is held exclusively for a hospital for the sick or disabled. Lifespan Corp., 776 A.2d at 1062. Lifespan Corp. does not touch on the applicability of the clause cited by the parties. Next, in St. Clare Home v. Donnelly, 117 R.I. 464, 368 A.2d 1214 (1977), the Rhode Island Supreme Court refrained from making any determination as to whether a home for the aged poor was exempt under the Statute. St. Claire Home, 117 R.I. at 466-70, 368 A.2d at 1216-18. Instead, the Court ordered remand whereby "the burden of establishing that the property [came] within the statutory exception [would] be upon the home." Id. at 471, 368 A.2d at 1218. Lastly, in Demarco v. Town of Hopkinton, No. WC 94-400, 1995 WL 941420, at *2 (R.I. Super. Mar. 31, 1995) (Goldberg, J.), the Rhode Island Superior Court merely acknowledged St. Clare Home in passing. While the Superior Court stated very briefly that St. Clare Home involved petitioners claiming exemption under the Statute which "provide[d] mandatory tax exemption for homes for the aged," St. Clare Home never actually decided whether homes for the aged qualified under the Statute, leaving it to be decided on remand. Seeing that Rhode Island is devoid of cases applying the Statute to exempt types of uses irrespective of the entity undertaking such use, the Court can find no precedent which supports the reading of the Statute advanced by Petitioner; instead, caselaw bolsters this Court's interpretation.
Moreover, this Court's interpretation of the Statute is reinforced by considerations of public policy. At oral argument, the Court posed that, accepting PACE's view, even a for profit nursing home would be tax exempt provided that it only had Medicaid patients. However, this Court does not believe that the General Assembly would have intended to exempt the property of for profit entities. This observation led the Court to ask Respondent to provide it with information as to how it treated nonprofit nursing homes and assisted living facilities. Following the hearing, and at the Court's request, Respondent submitted information concerning the tax treatment of East Providence's assisted living homes, nursing homes, elderly daycare centers, and homes for the aged (collectively, the Elderly Facilities). Def.'s Suppl. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Def.'s Suppl. Mem.) Ex. A. Of the fourteen Elderly Facilities, eleven are for profit and currently taxed without exemption. Id. Of the three nonprofits to receive some level of exemption, two are fully exempt by acts of the General Assembly; the other's charter exempts it from taxation up to a certain amount but it has instead opted for a payment-in-lieu-of-taxes (PILOT) agreement. Id. Exs. C, D, E, F, G. If this Court were to interpret the Statute as Petitioner urges, the Statute would arguably open the floodgates in allowing even for profit facilities to be eligible for tax exemption on their real and personal property so long as they serve the aged poor. At least in this Court's view, that would be an absurd result.
The eleven Elderly Facilities that are fully taxed are as follows: Eastgate Nursing & Rehabilitation Center; Bella Villa Independent and Assisted Living; Anchor Bay; Harris Health Center; Currently Vacant (Formerly Elderwood); Waterview Villa Rehabilitation and Health Care Center; Orchard View Manor; Bella Vita Adult Daycare; Evergreen House Health Center; Colonial Manor Assisted Living; and PACE.
United Methodist Health Care Center was exempt from taxation as a result of a 1956 Special Act of the General Assembly and was later fully exempt by the General Assembly in 2013 under G.L. 1956 § 44-3-3(40). Def.'s Suppl. Mem. Ex. C. Hattie Ide Chafee Nursing Home was exempt from taxation by a 1957 Special Act of the General Assembly, which was amended in 1969 and again in 2011, imposing a cap in assessment of $20,000,000. Id. Exs. D, E. Tockwotton Home was exempt from taxation on any amount not exceeding $20,000 as a result of its 1857 charter, but subsequently was allowed a further exemption through a 2008 PILOT agreement with the City of East Providence. Id. Exs. F, G.
Therefore, based on the Statute's history, text, and caselaw application, as well as considerations of policy, this Court interprets the Statute to apply to certain specific entities engaged in certain specific uses. Because exemption is not to be presumed and any doubt or ambiguity must be resolved in favor of taxation, the Court finds that Petitioner is not tax-exempt under the Statute and denies Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment.
In its supplemental memorandum, PACE urges, as further support for its position, the Court to consider the fact that for fifteen years, the City of Providence considered PACE's property tax-exempt. Pet'r's Suppl. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Pet'r's Suppl. Mem.) 3; see also Pet'r's Suppl. Mem. Ex. A. However, "[n]o right to exemption can be claimed merely because of a failure to tax for a period of years." Powers v. Harvey, 81 R.I. 378, 386, 103 A.2d 551, 555 (1954) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, this fact has no bearing on this Court's analysis.
IV
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, § 44-3-3(a)(12) is deemed ambiguous as it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Accordingly, this Court finds that § 44-3-3(a)(12) affords tax-exempt status to the specific types of entities enumerated under the Statute, provided that such entities exclusively utilize the property in accordance with the Statute's permissible uses. Therefore, this Court grants Respondent's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel shall prepare the appropriate order and judgment.