Opinion
Case No. 2:04-cv-724.
September 13, 2005
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant Anjana Samadder, M.D., Inc., alleging that Defendant discriminated against him by failing to give him the results of a medical test performed by Dr. Anjana Samadder. In moving for summary judgment, Defendant suggests, inter alia, that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Plaintiff in this case.
Although the Complaint only names the corporate entity as a defendant, the allegations in the complaint appear to also assert claims against Dr. Samadder in her individual capacity. (Complaint at p. 3). Moreover, Dr. Samadder has entered an appearance, through counsel, and has filed a motion for summary judgment in this case.
"Subject matter jurisdiction" is the Court's authority to hear a case. See Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin Associates, 150 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 1998); Campanella v. Commerce Exchange Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 1998).
On August 17, 2005, this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Order (August 17, 2005)). On August 24, 2005, Plaintiff filed an affidavit that appears to be, at least in part, a response to the show cause order. (Doc. # 56). Additionally, on August 26, 2005, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Reasons Why this case should not be dismissed against doctor Sammader." (Doc. # 57) Finally, on September 6, 2005, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Support Motion to continue case against Doctor samdder [sic] MD and Anjana Samadder INC." (Doc. # 61). For the following reasons, this Court concludes that Plaintiff's responses to the Court's show cause order are sufficient to establish the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have a continuing obligation to examine their subject matter jurisdiction throughout the pendency of every matter before them. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin Associates, 150 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 1998). It is well established that Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377;Rapier v. Union City Non-Ferrous, Inc., 197 F. Supp.2d 1008, 1012 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citations omitted).
By contrast, "[p]owers not given to the federal courts by Congress are reserved to the primary repositories of American judicial power: state courts." Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir. 1996).
Congress has provided for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in two basic jurisdictional statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1332. Section 1331 confers jurisdiction upon federal courts over civil actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In this case, Plaintiff has not identified any Constitutional or statutory provision upon which his claims are based. Even absent the explicit identification of an applicable constitutional or statutory provision, Plaintiff's allegations appear insufficient to establish a federal claim.
Plaintiff alleges, in conclusory fashion, that Defendant discriminated against him based on national origin. (Compl. at p. 3). While discrimination based on national origin is certainly the subject of several constitutional and federal law prohibitions, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to establish any such claims. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant acted under color of state law. Because there is no evidence to suggest that Defendant was, at any time, a "state actor," Plaintiff cannot assert a claim under § 1983. See Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d 353, 358-59 (6th Cir. 2001).
Moreover, while there are several federal statutory provisions that prohibit private entities and/or individuals from discriminating based on national origin, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to support such claims. For example, this is not an employment action, thus, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply. Nor do the fact appear to bring this case within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Section 1981 generally prohibits discrimination based on race in the making and enforcing of contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. While there is a very fine line between discrimination based on race and discrimination based on national origin, see Nieto v. United Auto Workers Local 598, 672 F. Supp. 987, 989 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (citing Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)), Plaintiff has explicitly stated that he does not allege discrimination based on race. (Reasons Why this case should not be dismissed against doctor Sammader at p. 4). Thus, there can be no claim under § 1981.
Plaintiff's only other allegation is that Defendant violated his federal rights by denying Plaintiff access to the results of certain medical tests based on the alleged belief that Plaintiff did not have medical insurance. (Compl. at p. 1; Eric Paasewe Affidavit, at pp. 10-12). While such a denial may be, in the words of Plaintiff, "very very wrong," (Passewe Aff. at p. 12), Plaintiff has failed to identify any federal provision that would prohibit such conduct.
Section 1332 confers jurisdiction upon federal courts in civil actions involving citizens of different states, also known as "diversity jurisdiction." Douglas, 150 F.3d at 607. Section 1332 provides, in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between —
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
* * *
For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff has specifically alleged that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Compl. at p. 3). Additionally, although Plaintiff has not specifically identified his citizenship, the complaint indicates that he is not a United States citizen. (Id.).
In response to this Court's show cause order, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which he indicates that he was born in Africa. (Paasewe Aff. at p. 1). Plaintiff also indicates that he is "not a citizen of America." (Paasewe Aff. at p. 18). Such allegations would appear to bring this case within § 1332(a)(2). Defendant has not disputed Plaintiff's foreign citizenship.
However, § 1332 also provides that, if an alien is admitted to the United States for permanent residence, that person shall be deemed a citizen of the state in which he or she is domiciled. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff's affidavit indicates that he is "not illegal . . . in this great country," and has lived in Ohio for the past 17 years. (Paasewe Aff. at pp. 1, 18). Thus, if Plaintiff were considered a permanent resident of the United States domiciled in Ohio, diversity jurisdiction would be destroyed. See Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347, 1349-50 (11th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff also indicates that he has been living in the United States for 19 years. (Paasewe Aff. at p. 18).
Defendant is a corporation organized under the law of the state of Ohio with its principal place of business in Columbus, Ohio. Affidavit of Anjana Samadder, M.D. at ¶ 14).
Aliens who have been accorded lawful permanent resident status under the immigration laws, i.e., those aliens with "green cards," are considered aliens "admitted for permanent residence," while aliens admitted to the United States on any lesser status are not. See Kato v. County of Westchester, 927 F. Supp. 714, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citations omitted). See also Foy, 108 F.3d at 1349-50.
Plaintiff argues, in one of his several responses to the show cause order, that, while he "did not get his citizenship and green card because of his passed [sic] marrige [sic], [his] . . . paper works [sic] are all in process with the US Immigration. . . ." (Reasons Why this case should not be dismissed against doctor Sammader, at p. 2). In Foy, the Eleventh Circuit explained that a party who has not received permanent resident status under the immigration laws at the time the complaint is filed does not constitute a "permanent resident" of the United States under § 1332(a). Foy, 108 F.3d at 1349-50. Defendant has not addressed Plaintiff's status as a permanent resident of the United States. See Karazanos v. Madison Two Associates, 147 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[w]e think it more efficient and more consistent with the statutory structure to indulge the assumption that an alien is domiciled outside the United States, and to leave it to the challenger to allege otherwise").
Accordingly, this Court cannot conclude, at this time, that Plaintiff is a "permanent resident" of the United States. Therefore, this Court concludes that, construed liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), Plaintiff's complaint, along with his various responses to the Court's show cause order, are sufficient to allow this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
This Court notes, however, that the existence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. See In re Lewis, 398 F.3d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 2005).
IT IS SO ORDERED.