Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-702, Section "K" (4).
April 8, 2005
ORDER
Before the Court is defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 14). Having considered the pleadings, memoranda, testimony, and relevant law, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion.
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff was employed by Global Santa Fe Drilling Company working as an assistant derrickman. Plaintiff filed a Seaman's Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1916, alleging that "as a result of his repeated accidents and witnessing accidents in the course and scope of his employment [he] has suffered severe neurological problems, including but not limited to panic attacks and depression." Complaint ¶ IV. The Plaintiff alleges that the cause of his injuries was negligence attributable to the defendant and unseaworthiness of the vessel. Id. at ¶ V. Plaintiff further states "[a]s a direct result of this incident, plaintiff has sustained debilitating injuries to his mind and body, including severe neurological problems, panic attacks, and depression, as well as other injuries." Id. at ¶ VIII. The Complaint does not name any specific physical injuries or the dates on which they were sustained; the "injury" alleged in Plaintiff's complaint appears to be his severe neurological problems.
The incident that triggered the filing of this lawsuit occurred in January 2003 when Plaintiff was driving on his way to work and began experiencing chest pains, shortness of breath, and rapid breathing. Plaintiff's depo., Exhibit B, Defendant's Mtn.at 24. Plaintiff stated his hands started shaking and his arms were getting numb. Id. He went to the hospital for two to three days after which he was released. Id. Plaintiff stated the following: "She [the doctor] said job-related stress . . . caused my chest pains and shortness of breath. They did tests. I stayed in the hospital for two or three days. That is all she could find. That is all she said. Id. at 25.
On February 11, 2003, the Plaintiff was scheduled to return to the rig and he requested and was placed on a medical leave of absence. During this time, plaintiff received short term disability benefits for a non-work related illness. Letter from Benefits Administration, Exhibit D, Defendant's Mtn. Plaintiff denies that his injury was non-work related. Plaintiff received these payments through August 12, 2003. Letter terminating benefits, Exhibit E, Defendant's Mtn. Plaintiff filed this suit under the Jones Act and General Maritime law on March 10, 2004.
From Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant's motion, Plaintiff's opposition, and the deposition of the Plaintiff, the Court has attempted to decipher the facts and the allegations that form the basis of Plaintiff's claim, as they are far from clear and concise. Plaintiff sustained a hand injury in 2000 and brought a claim which was settled and returned to work. Plaintiff's depo., Exhibit B, Defendant's Mtn. at 107. In his deposition, Plaintiff recalls an unreported incident sometime in 2001 where he allegedly jammed his neck when he struck his head on an object. Id. at 7-10; Plaintiff's Opp. Plaintiff stated this injury was "not a recordable type," "nothing that I see fit to report." Plaintiff's depo., Exhibit B, Defendant's Mtn. at 7-10. In April 2002, Plaintiff was standing on a tool box and reached down to pick up some drill slips, when his feet slipped from under him causing him to fall on his ribs on his left side. Plaintiff's depo., Exhibit A, Plaintiff's Opp. at 6-7, 75-76. Plaintiff indicated a few days after the incident, he was working on light duty, stepped on a mouse hole cover which flipped up, causing him to fall on his left arm injuring his left shoulder and ribs on his left side. Id. at 100-101; Plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatory 12, Exhibit C, Defendant's Mtn.
After these April incidents, Plaintiff returned to work for a period of eight months. Plaintiff's depo, Exhibit B, Defendant's Mtn. at 11. From 2002 on, Plaintiff has not sustained a physical injury aboard a Global Marine Rig. Id. at 10. Regarding Plaintiff's injury in April when he fell off the box, Plaintiff stated that his injury has healed and is not a problem in terms of doing the work on the rig. Id. at 81-82. Plaintiff further agreed that from all of the physical accidents that he reported on the rig, he has "physically healed from them. Yes." Id. at 106-107. Plaintiff does state that although his ribs ultimately did heal, they have not "healed back right." Plaintiff's Depo, Exhibit A, Plaintiff's Opp. at 73-74.
Plaintiff also bases his claim upon witnessing and hearing some of the following work-related accidents which contributed to his job-related stress: Rance Puckette injuring his back while pulling slips (Exhibit B, Defendant's Mtn. at 15-17); John Russ slipping and falling on a workboat ( Id. at 17-18); Brian Allfred falling down and injuring his neck ( Id. at 28); Steve Griffin poking his wrist with a knife ( Id. at 29). When asked to identify the accidents referred to in the Complaint, Plaintiff described the incident when his neck was jammed, discussed supra; falling from the tool box when reaching to get the slips, discussed supra; stepping on the mouse hole cover, discussed supra. Plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatory No. 12, Exhibit C, Defendant's Mtn. Plaintiff also stated, "In addition, I have been involved in, and have witnessed accidents too numerous to mention." Id. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322. "[M]ere allegations or denials" will not defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Rather, the non-movant must come forward with "specific facts" that establish an issue for trial. Id. When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must avoid a "trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts" are tasks for the trier-of-fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. To that end, the Court must resolve disputes over material facts in the non-movant's favor. "The party opposing a motion for summary judgment, with evidence competent under Rule 56, is to be believed." Leonard v. Dixie Well Service Supply, Inc. 828 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1987).
ANALYSIS
The facts of this case require the Court to look at cases resolving claims of purely emotional injury and claims for physical and emotional injury. The Fifth Circuit left open the possibility that a plaintiff may recover for purely emotional injuries under a zone of danger theory when the facts support such a claim. Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc. 966 F.2d 166, 168-169 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc). However, the Court in this case affirmed the judgment of the district court granting defendant's summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for post-traumatic stress disorder because it was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the alleged negligence of the employer. Id. at 168-69. In this district, courts have held that one may cover for purely emotional harm under a zone of danger theory if the claimant was objectively within the zone of danger; claimant feared for his life at the time of the accident or person was in danger, and his emotional injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's alleged negligence. Anselmi v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 813 F.Supp.436, 442 (E.D.La. 1993) (J. Feldman); see also Williams v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.C.C., 1998 WL 42586 (E.D.La.) (J. Vance). The facts of this case clearly do not support and neither does the Plaintiff allege that he was within a zone of danger, that he feared for his life, or that his emotional injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendant's negligence. Plaintiff's Complaint appears to the Court that it is a claim for purely emotional injuries. Thus, under the law, Plaintiff's claim must fail. However, the Plaintiff in its Opposition states that this lawsuit is based upon his emotional injuries as a result of his repeated physical injuries. Although the Court is skeptical of Plaintiff's assertions in the Opposition, it will examine those cases considering both physical and emotional injuries and the facts supporting these physical/emotional injury claims.
In this case, plaintiff was captain of a workover barge when a second tug caught on fire. Id. at 167. The plaintiff was involved in rescuing crew members; however, the plaintiff was not involved in fighting the fire; nor did the fire spread to his tug. Id. No one was injured in the fire. Later that same day, the plaintiff went to a local hospital where he was treated for several days and then transferred to a psychiatric hospital. Id. at 168.
"Beyond question, purely emotional injuries will be compensated when maritime plaintiffs satisfy the `physical injury or impact rule.'" Gough v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 966 F.2d 763, 765 (5th Cir. 1993) ( citing Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc. 966 F.2d 166, 168-169 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Either a physical injury or physical impact has traditionally been required." (citations omitted). In Gough, the accident involved a fishing vessel which backed over a natural gas pipeline which caused a fireball to sweep through the ship killing eleven of its fourteen member crew. Id. at 764. The plaintiff, the captain of the crew, survived by fleeing the pilot house and jumping overboard. Id. The Court described the physical injuries of the plaintiff:
"[t]o avoid the flames, Captain Gough had to jump overboard into the Gulf of Mexico. Even in the water, the heat was unbearable, and Captain Gough inhaled fumes from the fire. He also ingested salt water, as another victim of the disaster pulled him underwater. Besides being submerged in the ocean, Captain Gough suffered multiple contusions. Finally, some testimony suggests that Captain Gough suffered minor burns, although no medical record confirmed these opinions.Id. at 766. Following the incident, the plaintiff was only in the hospital two days but soon began experiencing nightmares, flashbacks, and depression after which psychiatrists and psychologists diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 764. The Court noted that the one purpose of the impact or injury rule is "`to provide courts with an objective means of ensuring that the alleged mental injury is not feigned.'" Gough, 996 F.2d at 765. "A more important purpose of the rule is to provide a principled basis for limiting liability. Traumatic events may cause foreseeable emotional distress through a broad range of time and space." Id. In this case, the Court was "persuaded that Captain Gough suffered a sufficient physical impact" even though "his physical injuries had little compensable value." Id. at 764 and 765. The Court distinguished the facts in Gough's accident from those in Gaston v. Flowers Transp., 866 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1989) where the Court found the plaintiff who only suffered a bruised elbow did not establish that he had suffered a physical impact or "significant physical injury." Id. at 766.
In Gaston, a seaman brought action against his employer for a purely emotional injury for seeing his half-brother crushed to death as he attempted to save him. The plaintiff suffered a bruised elbow, which the Court named "only trivial physical injury." Id. at 817. The Court held there was no recovery under the Jones Act under these circumstances for purely emotional injuries. Id. at 821.
The facts in this case do not support a claim for emotional injuries caused by Plaintiff's alleged physical injuries. Plaintiff settled his hand injury with the Defendant and Plaintiff did not report his alleged neck injury until this lawsuit. Furthermore, the alleged injuries in April of 2002, as stated by Plaintiff, are healed and did not prevent him from working for eight months following these incidents. It is true that "traumatic events may cause foreseeable emotional distress through a broad range of time and space," but the Court does not find that slipping on a rig floor or falling after stepping on a mouse hole cover can be considered a traumatic event. Furthermore, because the emotional injuries did not manifest themselves until nine months after the alleged physical injury, the Court does not find that these accidents could have caused any kind of foreseeable emotional distress. Plaintiff provides a letter by Dr. Hancock who evaluated Plaintiff in his office following the incident in January 2003. See Exhibit B, Plaintiff's Opp. March 14, 2003. The Court has reviewed this letter and finds that it does not provide any indication of causation between the physical and emotional injuries.
Moreover, the crux of Plaintiff's claim is the conglomeration of incidents that occurred while being employed at Global which caused his anxiety attack in January 2003 and alleged severe neurological problems thereafter. The Court finds Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co., 2 F.3d 480 (2nd Cir. 1993) insightful. In this case, plaintiff brought a claim for emotional injuries after a series of negligent actions caused by the negligence and unseaworthiness on the part of Exxon. Id. at 480. Plaintiff presented several incidents which he claimed "all added up" and caused him great psychological stress: being knocked down by a wave; falling on a deck and spraining his neck; spraining his knee; being blown around due to adverse conditions; observing a fellow crewman get severely injured; spraining his foot on the vessel's mooring lines; burning his hands in an overheated pump room. Id. at 481. The Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. "Whatever the standards for such a claim [negligent infliction of emotional distress] may be, a plaintiff cannot recover under any theory of negligence unless his injuries are foreseeable." Id. at 484. The Court found that the plaintiff alleged no facts which would lead a reasonable trier of fact to believe "there was a foreseeable risk of emotional injury." Id. The Court further stated that although Exxon had a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work, it had no duty to keep the plaintiff "safe from the rigors of a job as a seaman" and the plaintiff's "allegations refer to seemingly common occurrences for seamen." Id. The Court pointed out that had plaintiff brought a claim for negligence alleging physical injuries, the Court might rule differently. Id. at 484. "If Exxon was negligent in the manner that it monitored the maintenance of its ships, and such negligence, for example, caused [plaintiff's] sprained ankle, we might hold that those injuries were foreseeable. In contrast, however, emotional injuries resulting from nothing more than the accumulation of years of common encounters with the hardships of the sea are clearly not foreseeable." Id.
Similarly, the Plaintiff in this case has not alleged in the Complaint that the negligence or unseaworthiness of the defendant caused his physical injuries; neither has the Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence for this claim in his Opposition. This case appears to be a claim for emotional injuries due to a conglomeration of events that occurred during his employment. Those incidents referring to witnessing other workers' injuries are not actionable in this case, as explained herein. Futhermore, after carefully examining the record, the only physical injuries could possibly be considered are the two incidents in April 2002. Although the plaintiff claims his emotional condition is caused by a multitude of accidents both sustained and witnessed by him, the Court will take the liberty to isolate those injuries that may be considered an actionable claim. In doing so, the Court finds there is not sufficient evidence to support that these two accidents could have led to the emotional injury that occurred eight months later. Futhermore, the lapse in time between the alleged physical injuries and plaintiff's emotional injuries undermines the causal link necessary. The Plaintiff has not given sufficient proof to raise an issue of material fact that his damages relate to a single incident. Moreover, Plaintiff provides no medical evidence to this effect, but relies upon a multitude of non-actionable claims.
In the pre-trial order, it was raised for the first time that plaintiff developed Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, the definition of which is informative.
Following a severe trauma, any type of psychiatric illness may develop. One type of syndrome which may develop following a serious trauma has been identified and diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD. PTSD is the designation assigned to a group of certain identifiable symptoms in the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-III-R). It is a mental disturbance that originates in response to an overwhelming encounter with the possibility of violent death.
49 Am. Jur. Proof of Fact 2d Post-Traumatic Stress § 73. Clearly, the facts in this case fail to present any evidence of an overwhelming encounter or the possibility of violent death. See also Richard Newman Rachel Yehuda, PTSD in Civil Litigation: Recent Scientific and Legal Development, 37 Jurimetrics Journal 257 (1997) (defining traumatic event as one "that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others"). After much consideration, the Court finds the facts and record in this case do not present sufficient evidence to overcome defendant's motion.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 14) is GRANTED.