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Osterback v. Kemp

United States District Court, N.D. Florida
Oct 15, 2003
CASE NO. 4:01cv207-RH (N.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2003)

Opinion

CASE NO. 4:01cv207-RH

October 15, 2003


ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART


Plaintiff is an inmate in the Florida Department of Corrections. While at Walton Correctional Institution, he filed grievances and challenged actions of correctional authorities in various respects, often successfully. He was transferred to nearby Santa Rosa Correctional Institution on February 1, 2000. Plaintiff complained of actions of the Santa Rosa librarian, Defendant Barry Zane Rhodes, and filed a grievance against Mr. Rhodes with the Florida Bar, which was promptly dismissed as unfounded. Soon after the dismissal, in September 2000, Mr. Rhodes recommended Plaintiffs transfer to another institution, explicitly based on the filing of the Bar grievance. Plaintiff was transferred to Hamilton Correctional Institution.

By his complaint in this action, Plaintiff asserts that each of these transfers was made in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment rights. He seeks damages and injunctive relief against a number of correctional officials.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge has entered a Report and Recommendation, which thoroughly documents the authorities in this area. No purpose would be served by reiterating that discussion in this order. Instead, this order announces the court's decision, which accepts the Magistrate Judge's recommendation in part, and summarizes the basis for the ruling.

The Magistrate Judge has recommended that the motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to the first transfer and denied with respect to the second. I accept the recommendation and grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the first transfer, disagree with the recommendation and thus grant the motion for summary judgment with respect to the damages claim arising from the second transfer, and accept the recommendation and thus deny the motion for summary judgment with respect to the claim for injunctive relief arising from the second transfer.

A summary of the grounds for this ruling is as follows. The authorities supporting the ruling are well set forth in the Report and Recommendation.

First, Plaintiffs various complaints and grievances constituted speech and petitions to the government protected by the First Amendment, as Defendants apparently acknowledge.

Second, at least for purposes of the pending summary judgment motion, Plaintiff has adequately supported the assertion that the transfers were made as a result of Plaintiff's complaints and grievances.

Third, in light of the deference properly afforded the decisions of prison authorities on matters of safety and proper administration of facilities, the transfer of Plaintiff from Walton to Santa Rosa was not unconstitutional. This is so because the transfer was "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests" separate and apart from any purpose to retaliate. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (applying standard to prisoners' religion claim), quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (applying standard to prisoners' free speech and association claims). Any adverse effect on Plaintiff was not sufficient to preclude a transfer based on those legitimate penological interests.

Fourth, whether the same is true with respect to the transfer from Santa Rosa to Hamilton cannot be determined as a matter of law based on this record; this is, instead, a triable issue.

Fifth, the law on this issue — transfer of a prisoner in response to an unfounded Bar grievance against a librarian with whom the prisoner has contact on a daily basis — was not sufficiently clearly established at the time of this transfer to overcome the defense of qualified immunity. Defendants thus are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim for damages based on this transfer.

Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); see generally Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In qualified immunity cases, a critical issue is the level of generality at which the applicable law is assessed. Here, it does not matter that the prison official at issue was the librarian, rather than some other official. It does not matter that the grievance that led to the action was filed with the Florida Bar, rather than some other outside agency; it may not even matter that the grievance was filed with an outside agency, rather than within the Department of Corrections itself. Still, not all transfers brought about as a result of protected activity are unlawful, as confirmed by the ruling in the case at bar with respect to the first transfer. At some point, friction between inmate and staff, even if caused by the inmate's protected activity, warrants a transfer to a sufficiently comparable facility, in the interest of safety and proper prison maintenance. The defense of qualified immunity is overcome only when it is clear at the time of the proposed transfer that the line has been crossed-that a transfer under these circumstances would be unconstitutional. Cf. Martin v. Baugh, 141 F.3d 1417, 1420 (11th Cir. 1998) (upholding qualified immunity defense to public employee's First Amendment claim and noting that the law applicable to such claims makes it rare for the result to be sufficiently clear to overcome qualified immunity defense). The authorities in place at the time of the transfer in the case at bar did not make it clear that the second transfer, even on Plaintiffs version of the facts, would be unconstitutional.

In light of these rulings, this matter will be remanded to the Magistrate Judge for appropriate further proceedings. In light of the dismissal of all damages claims, the Magistrate Judge may reconsider as and when appropriate the issue of the number and identity of proper defendants.

For these reasons,

IT IS ORDERED:

Defendants' motion for summary judgment (documents 82 and 85) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Summary judgment is granted with respect to all claims arising from Plaintiffs transfer from Walton Correctional Institution to Santa Rosa Correctional Institution and with respect to all claims for damages arising from Plaintiffs transfer from Santa Rosa Correctional Institution to Hamilton Correctional Institution. Summary judgment is granted with respect to all claims against any Defendant in his or her individual capacity. Summary judgment is denied with respect to claims against Defendants in their official capacities for injunctive relief arising from Plaintiffs transfer from Santa Rosa Correctional Institution to Hamilton Correctional Institution. I do not direct the entry of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). This matter is remanded to the Magistrate Judge for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.

SO ORDERED


Summaries of

Osterback v. Kemp

United States District Court, N.D. Florida
Oct 15, 2003
CASE NO. 4:01cv207-RH (N.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2003)
Case details for

Osterback v. Kemp

Case Details

Full title:MARK OSTERBACK, Plaintiff, v. DOYLE KEMP, et al., Defendants

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Florida

Date published: Oct 15, 2003

Citations

CASE NO. 4:01cv207-RH (N.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2003)