Opinion
Civ. No. 97-3713, SECTION: "R" (3).
March 15, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of plaintiffs to sever third-party demand of defendants Branam, Enterprises, Inc. and American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, against new defendants John Ozborne, Ozterity Lighting, Clare Graham, Judy Chebola and/or the Estate of Judy Chebola and Monty House. For the following reasons, plaintiffs' motion is denied.
I. Background
This case arises out of an accident in which Lora Osgood was killed while rehearsing a bungee jump to be performed at the half time show at Superbowl XXXI, in the Louisiana Superdome. Lora's husband, Scott Osgood, and Lora's sister, Wendy Plunkett, were co-participants in the show and came upon the scene immediately after Lora's death. On December 1, 1997, they sued defendants in this Court, seeking damages for loss of consortium and mental anguish.
This case involves numerous defendants, including the NFL and various contractors, subcontractors and insurers. In order to facilitate the taking of discovery, this Court held a status conference on November 22, 1999, and issued a discovery plan and scheduling order the following day.
On December 27, 1999, plaintiffs settled with Select Production, Inc., one of the primary defendants in this case. Select was a main producer of the half-time show and subcontracted with various entities, including Branam, which asserted a cross-claim against Select. As a result of both the dismissal of Select through settlement and of information Branam obtained through discovery, on January 18, 2000, it filed a third-party demand in order to add the remaining independent contractors also responsible for producing the show. These new defendants have all been served and have retained counsel.
Plaintiffs now move to sever Branam's third-party demand, on the grounds that they will be delayed and prejudiced if the case is allowed to proceed in its present posture. Specifically, plaintiffs state that keeping the new defendants in this case will disturb the discovery plan and scheduling order, and force a continuance of the trial.
II. Discussion
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, "[a]ny claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately." FED. R. Civ. P. 21. In addition, Rule 20(b) states that a district court may
[m]ake such orders as will prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom the party asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against the party, and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20(b). Plaintiffs urge this Court to sever Branam's third-party demand so that its claims against the newly-added defendants may be tried separately. In support, they submit that they have not asserted any claims against, the new defendants, and vice-versa, and that a severance is required to prevent delay and. additional expense that they should not be required to bear. The Court does not agree.
"[F]ederal courts are inclined to avoid duplicating trials of the same matters and therefore exercise their discretion under Rule 20(b) cautiously." CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER MARY KAY KANE, 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1660, 438 (2d ed. 1986). Because the central issue in both cases is the circumstances surrounding Ms. Osgood's accident, Branam's claims against the new defendants involve the same parties, facts, evidence and witnesses as the primary case. Here, plaintiffs do not allege "that trial of the third-party . . . claims would unduly complicate or overburden [the] trial of the primary suit. . . . In fact, a severance would be burdensome for defendants, [plaintiff], and the judicial system as a whole because it would require multiple proceedings to resolve these related issues." Rodriguez v. Shell Oil Co., 950 F. Supp. 187, 192 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (Lake, J.) (denying severance of contribution claims in mass tort litigation), internal quotation marks and citations omitted; see also WRIGHT, MILLER KANE, 6 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1460, 457 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining that when considering motion to sever third-party demand, "the court is typically concerned with . . . whether continued joinder will complicate litigation unduly or will prejudice the other parties in any substantial way"). The Court finds that the interests of justice and economy would best be served by trying this case once.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion to sever third-party demand is denied.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 15th day of March, 2000.