Opinion
2011-11-22
Keith ORSI, etc., et al., respondents, v. Susan HARALABATOS, etc., et al., appellants, et al., defendants.
Phillips Lytle LLP, New York, N.Y. (Eric M. Kraus and Craig R. Bucki of counsel), for appellants. Silberstein, Awad & Miklos, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Joseph C. Muzio and Dana E. Heitz of counsel), for respondents.
Phillips Lytle LLP, New York, N.Y. (Eric M. Kraus and Craig R. Bucki of counsel), for appellants. Silberstein, Awad & Miklos, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Joseph C. Muzio and Dana E. Heitz of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., MARK C. DILLON, SANDRA L. SGROI, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the defendants Susan Haralabatos and Stony Brook Orthopaedic Associates appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Sweeney, J.), dated July 20, 2010, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendants Susan Haralabatos and Stony Brook Orthopaedic Associates for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is granted.
“ ‘The essential elements of medical malpractice are (1) a deviation or departure from accepted medical practice, and (2) evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of injury’ ” ( Barnett v. Fashakin, 85 A.D.3d 832, 834, 925 N.Y.S.2d 168, quoting DiMitri v. Monsouri, 302 A.D.2d 420, 421, 754 N.Y.S.2d 674; see Guzzi v. Gewirtz, 82 A.D.3d 838, 918 N.Y.S.2d 552). Thus, on a motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in a medical malpractice action, the defendant health care provider has the initial burden of establishing the absence of any departure from good and accepted medical practice or that the plaintiff was not injured thereby ( see Wexelbaum v. Jean, 80 A.D.3d 756, 757, 915 N.Y.S.2d 161; Rebozo v. Wilen, 41 A.D.3d 457, 458, 838 N.Y.S.2d 121). “[T]o defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party need only raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the element of the cause of action or theory of nonliability that is the subject of the moving party's prima facie showing” ( Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d 18, 24, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176).
In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, the defendants Susan Haralabatos and her employer, Stony Brook Orthopaedic Associates (hereinafter together the defendants), submitted affirmations from expert physicians that were sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the post-operative care received by the injured plaintiff following repair of a bone fracture did not depart from good and accepted standards of medical practice, and that, in any event, any alleged departures did not proximately cause the injured plaintiff's injury ( see Lowhar v. Eva Stern 500, LLC, 70 A.D.3d 654, 655, 894 N.Y.S.2d 490; Wiands v. Albany Med. Ctr., 29 A.D.3d 982, 983, 816 N.Y.S.2d 162). Therefore, the defendants met their burden of establishing their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
While the plaintiffs, in opposition, submitted an affirmation from an expert physician that raised triable issues of fact as to whether Dr. Haralabatos may have departed from good and accepted practice, they failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged departures proximately caused the injured plaintiff's condition ( see Wilkins v. Khoury, 72 A.D.3d 1067, 1068, 900 N.Y.S.2d 347; see generally Fahey v. A.O. Smith Corp., 77 A.D.3d 612, 616, 908 N.Y.S.2d 719).
Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them should have been granted.