Opinion
2003-05099.
Decided May 24, 2004.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendant St. Charles Hospital and Rehabilitation Center appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Costello, J.), dated May 13, 2003, as denied its motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Montfort, Healy, McGuire Salley, Garden City, N.Y. (Donald S. Neumann, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.
Hanly Conroy, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jayne Conroy of counsel), for plaintiffs-respondents.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., ANITA R. FLORIO, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, REINALDO E. RIVERA, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.
The plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice against, among others, St. Charles Hospital and Rehabilitation Center (hereinafter St. Charles), and Dr. Santiago A. Wong and Dr. Dinesh Shukla, two doctors who treated the infant plaintiff at St. Charles. The Supreme Court denied St. Charles' motion, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that it may be held vicariously liable for the alleged malpractice of Dr. Wong and Dr. Shukla. We disagree.
"As a general rule, a hospital is not vicariously liable for the malpractice of a private attending physician who is not its employee" ( Padula v. Bucalo, 266 A.D.2d 524; see also Hill v. St. Clare's Hosp., 67 N.Y.2d 72, 79; Johanessen v. Singh, 259 A.D.2d 670, 671). However, an exception to the general rule exists when a patient comes to the emergency room seeking treatment from the hospital and not from a particular physician of the patient's choosing ( see Woodard v. LaGuardia Hosp., 282 A.D.2d 529, 530; Abraham v. Dulit, 255 A.D.2d 345; Litwak v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp. of Lackawanna, 238 A.D.2d 881; Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450). St. Charles established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that Dr. Wong and Dr. Shukla were private, attending doctors to whom the plaintiffs were referred through their usual pediatrician and neurologist ( see Ventura v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 297 A.D.2d 801, 802-803; Culhane v. Schorr, 259 A.D.2d 511, 512-513; Nagengast v. Samaritan Hosp., 211 A.D.2d 878, 879; see also Klippel v. Rubinstein, 300 A.D.2d 448). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact on this issue ( see Padula v. Bucalo, supra; Johanessen v. Singh, supra).
SANTUCCI, J.P., FLORIO, SCHMIDT and RIVERA, JJ., concur.