Opinion
Civ. No. 97-1010, SECTION "T" (2).
February 10, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
This is a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which plaintiff, Vernon Orange, a convicted prisoner, seeks damages for alleged violation of his constitutional rights. In light of prior proceedings in this case and the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, a single claim remains; i.e., that defendant Casey Cagle failed to protect Orange from attack and injury by another inmate. Trial is scheduled for March 27, 2000. All parties have consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Record Doc. No. 33.
Pending before me are two motions for summary judgment: one filed by defendant, the other filed by plaintiff, and both addressing the issue whether plaintiff has exhausted his available administrative remedies concerning the single remaining claim, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In his motion, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that his complaint should therefore be dismissed. In his motion, plaintiff asserts that he has in fact exhausted his administrative remedies and that the Court should make that finding in his favor.
Having considered the motions, the opposition memoranda, all affidavits and exhibits submitted with the motion materials, the record and the applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that both motions are DENIED for the following reasons.
(1) SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is "material" if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the action under governing law.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). No genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented.National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994).
To withstand a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at trial must come forward with evidence to support the essential elements of its claim. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-23 (1986)). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial."Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
The Court must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 40 F.3d at 712-13. "Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts, however, will not prevent the award of summary judgment. . . ." Id. at 713. "Factual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an actual controversy exists." Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1998); accord Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Significantly for purposes of evaluating the pending motions, the Court is prohibited from making credibility determinations when deciding a motion for summary judgment. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . [when] ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . . The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor."Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; accord SMWNPF Holdings, Inc. v. Devore, 165 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 1999); Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1999); Crowe v. Henry, 115 F.3d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1997).
Thus, if resolution of a material fact in dispute turns on a credibility determination, the Court cannot grant summary judgment. The Court can not resolve such a conflict by determining that one piece of evidence is more believable than another or that an affiant's testimony is not credible. "The decision as to whether to believe [plaintiff's] or [defendant's] explanation of the facts requires the type of credibility determination by the court that is plainly inappropriate on motion for summary judgment." Id. at 298.
(2) STATUTORY EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."
The exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 293-95 (5th Cir. 1998). "Rather, the amended statute [ 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)] imposes a requirement, rather like a statute of limitations, that may be subject to certain defenses such as waiver, estoppel or equitable tolling."Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 889 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). Thus, as a general matter, a prisoner like Orange must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit against prison officials, "[a]bsent a valid defense to the exhaustion requirement." Id. at 890. When a prisoner fails to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, without a valid excuse, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the prisoner's complaint, but the dismissal must be without prejudice to refiling after exhausting his administrative remedies. Id. at 891.
Two recent decisions in the Fifth Circuit illustrate the application of the statutory exhaustion requirement. In Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit held that Section 1997e(a) requires only the exhaustion of "available" administrative remedies. Thus, the Whitley court held, where there were no administrative remedies capable of providing monetary recovery, a prisoner who sought only compensatory damages was not required to exhaust those remedies prior to filing suit. Id. at 886. The Whitley court concluded: "[W]e decline to interpret § 1997e in a manner that requires exhaustion of unavailable remedies." Id. at 887.
In Wendell, plaintiff was a prisoner who had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The district court dismissed his Section 1983 complaint without prejudice, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit on appeal. Wendell, 162 F.3d at 891. The Fifth Circuit made it clear, however, that the mere fact of a prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not end a court's analysis of the statutory exhaustion requirement. Instead, the Court noted that the exhaustion requirement is subject to certain defenses, and it affirmed the district court's dismissal without prejudice only after finding that the plaintiff/prisoner "has not raised any valid excuse for failing to exhaust administrative remedies" and that "dismissal of [the prisoner's] claims in this case will not cause any injustice or render judicial relief unavailable." Id. at 892.
(3) ANALYSIS
Applying the foregoing standards to the captioned case, I find that both motions must be denied for two reasons.
First, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Orange exhausted available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Defendant argues that his affidavits and other materials submitted in support of his motion establish the following: (1) The St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office employs an administrative remedies process for considering inmate grievances that includes the possibility of monetary compensation. (2) Orange is familiar with and in fact filed various grievances pertaining to many of allegations raised in the instant suit. (3) None of the records of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office contain any indication that Orange either filed a grievance or completed the administrative remedies process as to the particular claim that remains for adjudication in this case, and none of defendant's affiants know of any such grievance having been filed by Orange.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, has submitted a pro se opposition memorandum that he has declared is true and correct and has signed under penalty of perjury, stating in broad terms that he has fully exhausted all administrative remedies that were available to him at the St. Tammany Parish jail. Record Doc. No. 98. While he makes no specific reference in his opposition memorandum to his claim against Cagle, he has attached two documents, labeled Plaintiff's Exhibits P-22 and P-10, to his own motion papers, Record Doc. No. 105, indicating that he specifically asserted his claim against Cagle in administrative remedies procedure grievance forms he submitted at the St. Tammany Parish prison.
Defendant has characterized Orange's assertions in this regard alternatively as "no evidence," Record Doc. No. 104, Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 4, and as "not true documents of the St. Tammany Parish Jail but . . . in fact documents which Vernon Orange created after this litigation began and after he obtained some blank inmate request forms or grievance forms." Record Doc. No. 106, Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 4.
However, this Court cannot find as part of its summary judgment determination either that Orange's statements made under penalty of perjury or the documentary evidence he has submitted are false or fraudulent, or that defendant's evidence in support of his motion is believable, while plaintiff's is not, because to do so would constitute a credibility finding that is impermissible on summary judgment. Accordingly, I must conclude that summary judgment is inappropriate because a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Second, even if Orange's blanket and unspecific statement, made under penalty of perjury, that he exhausted his administrative remedies could be viewed as vague and conclusory, and even if the exhibits he submitted could somehow conclusively be identified as fraudulent and thus insufficient to constitute competent evidence and inadequate to defeat summary judgment, he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement under the criteria described inWendell for a variety of reasons.
Defendant delayed more than two years before raising the exhaustion issue. Plaintiff has long since been transferred away from the St. Tammany Parish jail to another institution. Requiring Orange now to exhaust administrative remedies at his former place of incarceration would present myriad logistical difficulties. In addition, as the case law discussed above makes clear, any dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies would have to be without prejudice to his refiling the complaint in this Court after he has done so. Even if Orange could overcome all logistical difficulties and undertake the process of exhausting administrative remedies in St. Tammany Parish, it would be a vain, useless and judicially uneconomical act to require him to do so. Defendant's submissions in connection with the pending motions make it clear that St. Tammany Parish jail officials consider Orange a liar who has fabricated his claim against Deputy Cagle. There appears to be virtually no possibility that Orange will obtain any relief through the jail's administrative remedies procedure. Thus, Orange would almost certainly return to this Court, once again asserting his claim against Cagle, in a case that has already been pending almost three years and which already has endured one appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Trial in this Court is set to begin in about six weeks. Difficult arrangements for receiving the testimony of several witnesses who are incarcerated persons, including plaintiff, have been made. Further delay in determining this case judicially is unwarranted. Under the particular circumstances presented by this case at this precise time, I cannot conclude that "dismissal of [Orange's] claims in this case will not cause any injustice." Wendell, 162 F.3d at 891.
For all of the foregoing reasons, both motions for summary judgment are DENIED, and the parties are instructed to finalize their trial preparations.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of February, 2000.