Summary
refusing to dismiss appeal when the opening brief was filed three days late
Summary of this case from Andreason v. Royal Pest ControlOpinion
C.A. No: 99A-05-013-RSG.
Date Submitted: August 2, 2000.
Date Decided: October 31, 2000.
Motion for Relief from Judgment: DENIED.
ORDER
Upon consideration of Appellee Kathy Kerchner's pro se Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b)(1), the Court finds as follows:
1. On May 27, 1999, OperaDelaware ("Employer") appealed the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("Board") which reversed the Appeals Referee's determination that Kathy Kerchner ("Claimant") was disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits because she was discharged from her work for just cause.
On June 22, 2000, this Court reversed the decision of the Board and determined that Claimant was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. On August 2, 2000, Claimant filed this Rule 60 motion seeking relief from that decision by reason of mistake by the Court in reviewing the evidence.
2. Rule 60(b) permits the Superior Court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order on the grounds of "(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Relief under Rule 60(b) is a unique remedy and requires a showing of "extraordinaiy circumstances." Rule 60 motions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Relief under paragraph (b) is not available to a party who received an adverse verdict and judgment, then elected neither to seek a new trial nor to appeal from the decision. Rule 60 relief is also not a substitute for the timely filing of an appeal. A party must abide by the decisions he made in the course of litigation, even when rulings are made which he may not have expected.
Dixon v. Delaware Olds, Inc., Del.Supr., 405 A.2d 117, 119 (1979); Jewell v. Div. of Social Services, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 88, 90 (1979).
Dixon, 405 A.2d at 119.
Id.
State v. Skinner, Del. Supr., 632 A.2d 82 (1993).
Dixon, 405 A.2d at 119.
3. Claimant asserts that the Court made a mistake in reviewing the evidence by determining that Claimant knew her job was in jeopardy, that she was paid after her termination, and that she entered into the termination contract by her own free will. Claimant has not, however, demonstrated extraordinary circumstances that would warrant the granting of a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment. Claimant did not appeal this Court's decision denying her unemployment insurance benefits and Claimant is now using this motion as a substitute for an appeal. Therefore, Claimant is barred from relief under Rule 60(b).
For the reasons stated above, Claimant's Motion for Relief from Judgment is DENIED.