Opinion
NO. CIV. S-08-567 LKK/DAD
02-13-2013
JOSE ONTIVEROS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT ZAMORA and ZAMORA AUTOMOTIVE GROUP (form unknown), Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff Jose Ontiveros has brought a putative class action against his former employer Stockton Auto Cars, Inc. d/b/a Stockton Honda ("Defendant"), eight other auto dealerships, Zamora Automotive Group, and Robert Zamora, alleging the following causes of action: (i) failure to pay overtime wages; (ii) failure to pay the minimum wage; (iii) failure to provide rest periods; (iv) failure to pay timely wages due at termination; (v) failure to provide accurate, itemized wage statements; (vi) failure to pay reporting time wages; (vii) unlawful kickbacks of wages; (viii) unlawful business practices under California Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 due to violations of state and federal law; and (ix) civil penalties under California's Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor Code § 2698, et seq. ("PAGA").
Defendant's motion to compel individual arbitration, strike class allegations, and stay or dismiss the proceedings herein came on for hearing on February 11, 2013. Having considered the matter, for the reasons set forth below, the court will deny the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was formerly employed by defendant as an auto mechanic. He initiated this lawsuit on March 12, 2008. (ECF No. 1.) The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that auto mechanics employed by defendant and other dealerships in the Zamora Automotive Group are paid on what is essentially a piece rate system, one that leaves them unpaid for time when they are not working on a repair job, but are still required to be at work. Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on November 18, 2008. (ECF No. 18). In response to defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 26), the court held that plaintiff had failed to sufficiently allege that defendant Robert Zamora could be held liable (i) under an alter ego theory, and (ii) solely by virtue of owning and controlling Zamora Automotive Group, but had sufficiently alleged his liability (iii) for civil penalties due to Labor Code violations that he caused, and (iv) as plaintiff's joint employer. (Order, February 20, 2009, ECF No. 29.)
This matter was subsequently stayed from March 27, 2009 to October 31, 2009 in order to give the parties time to pursue mediation. (ECF Nos. 34, 37.) It was again stayed, and then administratively closed, from July 13, 2010 to July 25, 2012, pending the outcome of a related state court proceeding. (ECF Nos. 51, 58, 64.) In other words, this action has been stayed for approximately 31 of the 59 months since it was filed.
According to the parties' stipulation seeking the second stay (ECF No. 45), the related case addressed whether defendants were entitled to insurance coverage for the costs of defending the instant action and any potential indemnity. See Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Zamora, Superior Court of California for the County of San Joaquin, case no. 30-2009-00222363-CU-IC-STK. According to the parties, this case is now on appeal at the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District, case no. C069644. (ECF Nos. 59, 60.)
On September 7, 2012, after the stay was lifted, the court entered a pretrial scheduling order that, inter alia, ordered defendants to produce payroll and personnel documents related to class certification within 60 days, and ordered plaintiff to file a motion for class certification within 30 days of production of those documents. (ECF No. 70.)
On December 5, 2012, plaintiff filed his motion for class certification. (ECF No. 73.) One day earlier, defendant filed the instant motion to compel individual arbitration, strike class allegations, and stay or dismiss the proceedings herein. (ECF No. 72.)
As defendants' motion seeks to stay this action or strike the class allegations in their entirety, it must be considered before turning to plaintiff's motion for class certification.
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION
According to defendants, plaintiff signed a document entitled "Applicant's Statement & Agreement" (hereinafter, "Agreement") on May 11, 2007, which included the following arbitration provision:
I also acknowledge that the Company utilizes a system of alternative dispute resolution which involves binding arbitration to resolve all disputes which may arise out of the employment context. Because of the mutual benefits (such as reduced expense and increased efficiency) which private binding arbitration can provide both the Company and myself, I and the Company both agree that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either party may have against one another (including, but not limited to, any claims of discrimination and harassment, whether they be based on the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, as well as other applicable state or federal laws or regulations) which would otherwise require or allow resort to any court or other governmental dispute resolution forum between myself and the Company (or its owners, directors, officers, managers, employees, agents, and parties affiliated with its employee benefit and health plans), arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with my seeking employment with, employment by, or other association with the Company, whether based on tort, contract, statutory, or equitable law, or otherwise, (with the sole exception of claims arising under the National Labor Relations Act, which are brought before the National Labor Relations Board, claims for medical and disability benefits under the California Workers' Compensation Act, and Employment Development Department claims) shall be submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbitration. I acknowledge that the Company's business (repairing automobiles and selling automobiles and parts coming from outside the State) and the nature of my employment in that business affect interstate commerce. I agree that the arbitration and this Agreement shall be controlled by the Federal Arbitration Act, in conformity with the procedures of the California Arbitration Act (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1280, et seq, including section 1283.05 and all of the Act's other mandatory and permissive rights to discovery). However, in addition to requirements imposed by law, any arbitrator herein shall be a retired California Superior Court Judge and shall be subject to disqualification onOn the basis of this provision, defendant moves to compel individual arbitration with plaintiff, to strike the class allegations in the operative complaint, and to stay or dismiss the action.
the same grounds as would apply to a judge of such court. To the extent applicable in civil actions in California courts, the following shall apply and be observed: all rules of pleading (including the right of demurrer), all rules of evidence, all rights to resolution of the dispute by means of motions for summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and judgment under Code of Civil Procedure Section 631.8. Resolution of the dispute shall be based solely upon the law governing the claims and defenses pleaded, and the arbitrator may not invoke any basis (including but not limited to, notions of "just cause") other than such controlling law . . . . Awards shall include the arbitrator's written reasoned opinion. Disputes shall be resolved based solely on the law governing the claims. Both the Company and I agree that any arbitration proceeding must move forward under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4) even though the claims may involve or relate to parties who are not parties to the arbitration agreement and/or claims that are not subject to arbitration: thus, the court may not refuse to enforce this arbitration agreement and may not stay the arbitration proceeding despite the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2(c). I UNDERSTAND BY AGREEING TO THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION, BOTH I AND THE COMPANY GIVE UP OUR RIGHTS TO TRIAL BY JURY. (ECF No. 72-2.)
While the Agreement does not include an explicit class arbitration waiver, at least two California Courts of Appeal have recently determined that arbitration agreements containing similar language include implicit class action waivers because they are phrased purely in bilateral terms ("the mutual benefits . . . which private binding arbitration can provide both the Company and myself", "I and the Company both agree that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either party may have against one another," etc.). See Kinecta Alt. Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court, 205 Cal.App.4th 506, 518-19 (2012); Reyes v. Liberman Broad., Inc., 208 Cal.App.4th 1537 (2012), review granted by Reyes v. Liberman Broad., Inc., 288 P.3d 1287 (Cal. 2012).
III. STANDARD RE: MOTION TO COMPEL INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ("FAA"), "A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
9 U.S.C. § 2 "create[s] a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
While the FAA reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration," AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24), "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
"[T]he federal law of arbitrability under the Federal Arbitration Act governs the allocation of authority between courts and arbitrators. Because the FAA mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed, the FAA limits courts' involvement to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue." Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In construing arbitration agreements, courts must "apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. What law should the court apply in deciding this motion?
This matter presents an interesting choice-of-law question. The court has jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), as it is a putative class action in which "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant."
Ordinarily, when the court sits in diversity, it must apply the substantive law of the forum in which it is located. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted:
The highest state court is the final authority on state law, but it is still the duty of the federal courts, where the state law supplies the rule of decision, to ascertain and apply that law even though it has not been expounded by the highest court of the State. An intermediate state court in declaring and applying the state law is acting as an organ of the State and its determination, in the absence of more convincing evidence of what the state law is, should be followed by a federal court in deciding a state question.Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177-8 (1940).
The choice-of-law provision in the Agreement provides, "I agree that the arbitration and this Agreement shall be controlled by the Federal Arbitration Act, in conformity with the procedures of the California Arbitration Act (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1280, et seq, including section 1283.05 and all of the Act's other mandatory and permissive rights to discovery)."
Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 1283.05 addresses deposition procedures in arbitration.
The parties have failed to adequately brief the question of how, in practice, the court's interpretation of the Agreement should be "controlled by the Federal Arbitration Act, in conformity with the procedures of the California Arbitration Act." Plaintiff's opposition argues that the court should stay individual arbitration of his PAGA claims under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(c). (Opposition 12, ECF No. 98.) Defendant responds, correctly, that the Agreement explicitly provides that there shall be no stay under this section. (Reply 7, ECF No. 101.) Neither party otherwise argues that procedures under the California Arbitration Act ("CAA") should not apply.
This provision reads, "[T]he court may not refuse to enforce this arbitration agreement and may not stay the arbitration proceeding despite the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2(c)."
It is well-settled that the FAA permits the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act. This is the case "even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward." Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478-9 (1989).
In Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., 207 Cal.App.4th 1115 (2012), the California Court of Appeals considered an arbitration agreement with identical language ("shall be controlled by the Federal Arbitration Act, in conformity with the procedures of the California Arbitration Act"). It concluded in a footnote, with no further discussion, that "[t]here is no dispute the FAA governs the arbitration agreement." Id. at 1120 n.2.
This conclusion is puzzling because it renders the phrase "in conformity with the procedures of the California Arbitration Act" mere surplusage. It is a settled canon of contractual interpretation that "[i]n the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof . . . an intepretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203 (1981). Similarly, "[w]here the whole can be read to give significance to each part, that reading is preferred; if such a reading would be unreasonable, a choice must be made." Id., § 202 cmt. d. Likewise, Cal. Civ. Code § 3541 sets forth the maxim, "An interpretation which gives effect is preferred to one which makes void."
Under California law, "The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity." Cal. Civ. Code § 1638. "[T]he meaning [of contractual language] is to be obtained from the entire contract, and not from any one or more isolated portions thereof." Lemm v. Stillwater Land & Cattle Co., 217 Cal. 474, 480 (1933).
If, following the latter directive, one examines the whole of the arbitration clause in the Agreement, one finds at least one other reference to procedural provisions under the CAA: "Both the Company and I agree that any arbitration proceeding must move forward under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4) even though the claims may involve or relate to parties who are not parties to the arbitration agreement and/or claims that are not subject to arbitration: thus, the court may not refuse to enforce this arbitration agreement and may not stay the arbitration proceeding despite the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2(c)." (ECF No. 72-2.) Section 1281.2(c) sets forth circumstances under which a court need not order the parties to arbitration, such as on-going third-party litigation, arising out of the same or related transactions, that may give rise to conflicting rulings. The qualification, in the quoted contractual provision, that the FAA will trump the CAA in this circumstance indicates that the parties do intend the CAA's procedural rules to govern.
Accordingly, the court will proceed to interpret this agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act, but if at any point it appears that the FAA conflicts with the procedures outlined in the CAA, the court will apply the latter.
B. Has defendant waived its right to compel arbitration?
i. Standard re: Waiver
Under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2, a party "may challenge the validity or applicability of [an] arbitration provision by raising the same defenses available to a party seeking to avoid the enforcement of any contract. These contract-based challenges are governed by the applicable state law." Cox, 553 F.3d at 1121 (internal citations and quotations omitted). That is to say, under federal arbitration law, the question of waiver is resolved under state law. Accordingly, the court will assess whether defendant has waived its right to compel arbitration under California law.
Under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), a court may deny a petition to compel if it determines that "[t]he right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner . . . ." The California Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that "[w]hen no time limit for demanding arbitration is specified [in the arbitration agreement], a party must still demand arbitration within a reasonable time." Wagner Const. Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., 41 Cal.4th 19, 29 (2007) (internal citations omitted). "[I]n the absence of legal excuse, a party's failure to timely demand arbitration results in a contractual forfeiture of the right to compel arbitration." Platt Pac., Inc. v. Adelson, 6 Cal.4th 307, 318-19 (1993).
"A party who resists arbitration on the ground of waiver bears a heavy burden [of proof], and any doubts regarding a waiver allegation should be resolved in favor of arbitration." St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v. PacifiCare of Cal., 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
In St. Agnes, the California Supreme Court set forth the following standard for determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitration:
(1) whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the parties were well into preparation of a lawsuit before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place; and (6) whether the delay affected, misled, or prejudiced the opposing party.Id. at 1196 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
ii. Analysis
(a) Actions inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; delay in seeking arbitration enforcement
The crux of plaintiff's waiver argument is that defendant simply waited too long to invoke its right to arbitrate, instead proceeding as it it were intent on fully litigating the matter. Plaintiff claims that these actions were inconsistent with the right to arbitrate, and also represent an undue delay. (Opposition 2-5, ECF No. 98.)
Defendant responds that, at the time this action was filed, it had determined that the California Supreme Court's decision in Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 443 (2007) precluded it from enforcing the Agreement and compelling plaintiff to arbitrate the dispute. (Mot. to Compel Arb. 13-14, ECF No. 72-1; Reply 3-4, ECF No. 101.) Three years later, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011), defendant concluded that the arbitration agreement was now enforceable.
Gentry holds that, in certain cases, a court may not enforce express waivers of class or representative actions in arbitration agreements if it determines that individual arbitration may preclude employees from vindicating unwaivable statutory rights (such as the right to overtime pay) that express public policy in favor of enforcing wage and hour laws. Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 563-4.
In reaching this holding, the California Supreme Court relied heavily on its reasoning in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148 (2005), which held that certain class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion were unenforceable, as contrary to public policy against exculpation of fraud or willful injury. Id. at 453-4.
Discover Bank, in turn, was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Concepcion, which held that the FAA preempts state law, and therefore, "[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons." 131 S.Ct at 1752. Thus, "class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA." Id. at 1750-1751.
There is a marked split among the California Courts of Appeal as to the continuing viability of Gentry in light of Concepcion. Some courts have held that Gentry is no longer good law. See, e.g., Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 206 Cal.App.4th 949 (2012) ("[W]e find that the Concepcion decision conclusively invalidates the Gentry test"). Other courts have determined that Concepcion likely overrules Gentry, but Gentry remains binding precedent until a higher court says otherwise. See, e.g., Truly Nolen of America v. Superior Court, 208 Cal.App.4th 487, 507 (2012) ("Although we agree . . . that Concepcion implicitly disapproved the reasoning of the Gentry court, the United States Supreme Court did not directly address the precise issue presented in Gentry. Under the circumstances, we decline to disregard the California Supreme Court's decision without specific guidance from our high court"). Still other courts maintain that Gentry remains good law despite Concepcion. See, e.g., Franco v. Arakelian Enter., Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 314, 326 (2012) ("We conclude that Gentry remains good law because, as required by Concepcion, it does not establish a categorical rule against class action waivers but, instead, sets forth several factors to be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a class action waiver precludes employees from vindicating their statutory rights"). On September 19, 2012, the California Supreme Court granted review of Iskanian, supra, presumably to resolve this split among the California Courts of Appeal.
At this juncture, the court does not take a position on Gentry's continued viability, merely noting the (obvious) point that it is an open question of law.
Defendant's argument - that it delayed in moving to compel arbitration until it concluded that Gentry was no longer valid under Concepcion - was successfully raised in each of the following cases:
• Quevedo v. Macy's, Inc., 798 F.Supp.2d 1122 (C.D.Cal. 2011) (holding that defendant Macy's reasonably concluded that it could not enforce an arbitration agreement under Gentry and thereby did not waive its right to compel arbitration), a case on which defendant herein relies heavily. The Concepcion decision was announced on April 27, 2011. Less than one month later, on May 25, 2011, Macy's filed a motion to compel arbitration.
• Reyes v. Liberman Broad., Inc., 208 Cal.App.4th 1537 (2012), review granted by Reyes v. Liberman Broad., 288 P.3d 1287 (Cal. 2012) (holding that defendant reasonably concluded that it could not enforce an arbitration agreement under Gentry and therefore did not waive its right to compel arbitration). Defendant Liberman Broadcasting, Inc. informed plaintiff Reyes "that it intended to move to compel arbitration just one month after the Supreme Court issued Concepcion . . . and filed its motion to compel a month later." Id. at 629.
• Iskanian, 206 Cal.App.4th at 387 ("There is no basis to find that [defendant] unreasonably delayed in renewing
its motion to compel arbitration. The issue of whether a party has sought arbitration within a reasonable time is a question of fact. [Defendant] sought to compel arbitration less than three weeks after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Concepcion").
In light of these opinions, it is helpful to construct a timeline of the relevant events in the instant matter:
• March 12, 2008: plaintiff files complaint
• January 5, 2009: defendant files Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
• February 20, 2009: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings granted in part and denied in part
• March 27, 2009: matter stayed
• October 31, 2009: matter reopened
• July 13, 2010: matter administratively closed
• April 27, 2011: Concepcion decision announced
• July 26, 2012: matter reopened
• September 4, 2012: status conference held, at which the court ordered defendant to produce certain documents within sixty days, and plaintiff to file a motion for class certification within thirty days thereafter. Defendant makes no mention of arbitration.
• November 27, 2012: on a telephone call, defendant's counsel asks plaintiff's counsel whether plaintiff would agree to individual arbitration. (Gulledge Dec. ¶ 2, ECF No. 72-3.)
• November 29, 2012: defendant's counsel sends plaintiff's counsel a letter requesting submission of claims to arbitration, and asking for a response in one day. (Gulledge Dec. ¶ 3.)
• December 4, 2012: defendant files the instant motion to compel individual arbitration.
• December 5, 2012: plaintiff files a motion for class certification.
The contrast between the diligence of the defendants in Quevedo, Reyes, and Iskanian, and that of the defendant herein is notable. "If a party wishes to compel arbitration, he must take active and decided steps to secure that right . . . ." Davis v. Blue Cross of Northern Cal., 25 Cal.3d 418, 425-426 (1979). Defendant did not promptly move to compel arbitration after the stay herein was lifted. Instead, defendant waited until four months after the stay was lifted (and, not incidentally, two-and-a-half months after a status conference with the court) before it communicated to opposing counsel its intent to initiate arbitration.
Defendant attempts to justify this delay by claiming that it "promptly brought this motion, once the matter was active again and at least one decision of the Eastern District confirmed that individual arbitration can be compelled in the context of class or representative claims." (Mot. to Compel 14, ECF No. 72-1.) This decision is Luchini v. Carmax, Inc., No. 12-0417, 2012 WL 3862150 (E.D.Cal. Sep. 5, 2012) (O'Neill, J.) (denying plaintiff an interlocutory appeal of a prior order compelling arbitration of plaintiff's wage and hour claims, and dismissing without prejudice plaintiff's class, collective, and representative claims).
Defendant's argument is unavailing. While this court must (and does) respect the decisions of fellow judges in this district, their decisions are not binding upon the court. Further, even cursory inspection of the cited opinion cites shows that Judge O'Neill's order compelling arbitration (i.e., the order which plaintiff therein sought permission to appeal) was issued on July 23, 2012, i.e. , three days before the stay was lifted in this matter. See Luchini v. Carmax, Inc., No. 12-0417, 2012 WL 2995483 (E.D.Cal. Jul. 23, 2012). If defendant was waiting for a signal from this judicial district as to the potential non-viability of class arbitration waivers in light of Concepcion, that signal was available on the day the stay was lifted.
Defendant's position is also weakened by the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 6684748 (9th Cir. 2012), a consumer case in which the court refused to accept Wells Fargo's argument that its arbitration demand would have been futile before Concepcion. The Ninth Circuit noted, "The futility of an arbitration demand . . . is not clear cut here. In contemporaneous consumer litigation, litigants did succeed in compelling arbitration despite the existence of the Discover Bank rule. Especially because the CAA did not prohibit class arbitration, a motion to compel arbitration was not inevitably futile under the prescribed case-by-case analysis." Id. at *6 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in the interval between the issuance of the Gentry and Concepcion decisions, courts have ordered the parties to arbitration in putative wage-and-hour class actions. See, e.g., Borrero v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. S-10-322, 2010 WL 4054114 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 15, 2010) (applying Gentry factors and ultimately finding enforceable the class action waiver in an arbitration agreement). If nothing else, the Gutierrez decision casts doubt on the credibility of defendant's claim that its arbitration rights were unenforceable pre-Concepcion. This is particularly true given that one of the factors to be weighed by courts in determining the enforceability of class action waivers under Gentry is "the risk of retaliation that current employees face." 42 Cal.4th at 463 (noting that "fear of retaliation for individual suits against an employer is a justification for class certification in the area of employment litigation."). Surely defendant does not mean to suggest that it was foreclosed from arbitrating employment disputes under Gentry because it was likely to retaliate against current employees for exercising their rights?
In sum, the court finds that defendant did not act diligently to exercise its right to arbitrate this dispute. Defendant's actions were "inconsistent with the right to arbitrate" and defendant "delayed for a long period before seeking a stay." St. Agnes 31 Cal.4th at 1196.
(b) Actions inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; substantial invocation of the litigation machinery
In support of its waiver argument, plaintiff further asserts that neither of the Answers that defendant filed herein (ECF Nos. 12, 22) allege its right to arbitrate or its intention to do so. Moreover, defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 26-1) in order to narrow the claims asserted against it. (Opposition, ECF No. 98.)
Defendant counters that since it "reasonably believed that it could not successfully move to compel arbitration, its relatively limited use of the judicial process should not be held against it." (Mot. to Compel Arb. 13, ECF No. 72-1.)
It is the court's view that defendant's conduct was inconsistent with the right to arbitrate, and that it substantially invoked the litigation machinery before moving for arbitration. As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gutierrez, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 6684748, undermines defendant's claim that it was precluded by Gentry from exercising its right to arbitrate this dispute. By foregoing its right to arbitrate before the stay and instead seeking to narrow the issues at issue through motion practice, defendant evinced an intent to litigate, rather than arbitrate this matter. "Partial or piecemeal litigation of issues in dispute, through pretrial procedures, may in many instances justify a finding of waiver." McConnell v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 105 Cal.App.3d 946, 951 (1980). It appears that defendant chose to invoke arbitration only in the face of a class certification motion. "This is like testing the water before taking the swim. If it's not to your liking you go elsewhere. A waiver of the right to arbitrate may properly be implied from any conduct which is inconsistent with the exercise of that right." Id.
In short, plaintiff has shown that defendant took actions "inconsistent with the right to arbitrate" and that "the litigation machinery [was] substantially invoked and the parties were well into preparation of a lawsuit before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate." St. Agnes, 31 Cal.4th at 1196.
(c) Prejudice to the opposing party; bad faith
According to the California Supreme Court, "whether or not litigation results in prejudice . . . is critical in waiver determinations." St. Agnes, 31 Cal.4th at 1203. "Prejudice typically is found only where the petitioning party's conduct has substantially undermined th[e] important public policy [in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution] or substantially impaired the other side's ability to take advantage of the benefits and efficiencies of arbitration." Id.
The St. Agnes opinion offers several examples of prejudicial conduct, including "judicial litigation of the merits of arbitrable issues." Id. at 1203. "[W]aiver does not occur by mere participation in litigation; there must be judicial litigation of the merits of arbitrable issues, although waiver could occur prior to a judgment on the merits if prejudice could be demonstrated." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). As discussed above, defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings that sought to narrow the claims at issue before it moved for arbitration. This issue could have been arbitrated, but defendant sought to litigate it, thereby undermining the public policy in favor of arbitration. As the California Supreme Court has noted, "The courtroom may not be used as a convenient vestibule to the arbitration hall so as to allow a party to create his own unique structure combining litigation and arbitration." Christensen, 33 Cal.3d at 784 (quoting De Sapio v. Kohlmeyer, 321 N.Y.2d 402 (N.Y. 1974)).
Moreover, viewing the totality of the circumstances, there is little doubt that defendant's conduct has prejudiced plaintiff in this litigation. Plaintiff argues that he has been unduly prejudiced by years of litigation that could have been avoided if defendant had timely asserted its arbitration rights. (Opposition 5, ECF No. 98.) Numerous opinions, including St. Agnes, teach that arbitration offers important public policy benefits in the form of speed and cost savings. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate . . ., [a party] trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration"). While "[c]ourts will not find prejudice where the party opposing arbitration shows only that it incurred court costs and legal expenses," St. Agnes, 31 Cal.4th at 1203, this is not a license for parties to litigate for years on end and then suddenly invoke arbitration. Defendant's belated assertion of its arbitration rights has slowed the resolution of the underlying dispute and has forced all of the parties, and this court, to incur unnecessary costs. Tellingly, at the September 4, 2012 status conference, when the court met with the parties to set a schedule for plaintiff to move for class certification, defendant did not even mention that it was considering arbitrating this matter. This litigation has been active for some 28 of the 59 months since it was filed. Defendant did not give plaintiff any indication of its intention to arbitrate until almost 57 months into the litigation. It is striking that defendant sought to invoke its right to arbitrate on November 27, eight days before plaintiff's motion for class certification was filed (pursuant to court order), and that its November 29 written arbitration demand gave plaintiff only one day to respond. Given that defendant filed the instant motion (consisting of 17 pages of legal argument and two supporting declarations) on December 4, it is reasonable to infer that defendant began preparing the motion in advance of its initial offer to arbitrate. These are not the actions of a party that is serious about honoring a contractual agreement to engage in a "speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution," St. Agnes, 31 Cal.4th at 1204 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Defendant argues that any costs or expenses incurred by plaintiff or his attorneys during litigation are "self-inflicted wounds" since defendant knew he had signed an arbitration agreement, yet chose to pursue his claims in court. This argument is unavailing, as plaintiff denies ever having signed the Agreement. Moreover, in any event, defendant's delay would reasonably mean to plaintiff that defendant was not seeking to use arbitration rather than litigation.
A long line of California Supreme Court cases holds that a party can waive its right to arbitrate through bad faith conduct. See St. Agnes, 31 Cal.4th at 1196 ("The decisions likewise hold that the 'bad faith' or 'wilful misconduct' of a party may constitute a waiver and thus justify a refusal to compel arbitration") (quoting Davis, 25 Cal.3d at 425-6); Christensen, 33 Cal.3d at 781 ("[W]hile there is no 'single test' for establishing waiver, the relevant factors include whether the party seeking arbitration . . . has acted in 'bad faith' or with 'wilful misconduct'"); Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 605 (1982) (same); I.A.T.S.E. v. Color Corp. Amer., 47 Cal.2d 189 (1956) ("If the [arbitration] provision is not itself repudiated and the issue that is raised by the alleged breach is one that is within the coverage of the provision, the defendant should be supported in insisting on arbitration of the issue unless his bad faith and wilful misconduct are sufficiently obvious to justify a discretionary refusal of such support") (citing Corbin on Contracts). If one is to take seriously the view that arbitration is freely-chosen, consensual, and tailored to the parties' desires, then parties wishing to arbitrate disputes should be required to invoke their rights with some measure of good faith. The alternative is to encourage parties to lull their opponents into believing that a dispute will be litigated, while they wait for an opportune moment to spring the trap door of arbitration.
See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,559 U.S. __ , 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010) ("Underscoring the consensual nature of private dispute resolution, we have held that parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.").
This court will not countenance sandbagging. I find that the plaintiff herein has been prejudiced by defendant's conduct, and in light of the factors discussed above, that defendant has waived its right to arbitrate this dispute.
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff disputes signing the Agreement, and argues that it is therefore unenforceable. The court need not reach this argument. Even if the Agreement is enforceable, defendant has waived its arbitration rights thereunder.
The court also need not reach the following issues:
• Defendant's evidentiary objections. (ECF No. 101-1.)
• Plaintiff's argument that Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 443, is still good law, and that he has made a sufficient showing to find a waiver of classwide arbitration unenforceable thereunder.
• Plaintiff's argument that, under Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal.App.4th 489 (2011), employees cannot be compelled to individually arbitrate PAGA claims.
Plaintiff's motion for class certification remains under submission.
The court hereby orders that defendant's motion to compel individual arbitration, strike class allegations, and stay or dismiss the proceedings herein is DENIED in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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LAWRENCE K. KARLTON
SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT