Opinion
04-09-2024
Tokunbo ONILUDE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Sivin, Miller & Roche LLP, New York (Edward Sivin of counsel), for appellant. Sylvia O. Hinds–Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York (Martin K. Rowe III of counsel), for respondent.
Sivin, Miller & Roche LLP, New York (Edward Sivin of counsel), for appellant.
Sylvia O. Hinds–Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York (Martin K. Rowe III of counsel), for respondent.
Kern, J.P., Singh, Scarpulla, O’Neill Levy, Michael, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Paul L. Alpert, J.), entered on or about March 30, 2023, awarding defendants costs and disbursements, and bringing up for review an order, same court and Justice, entered on or about August 19, 2022, which, after a jury trial, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Appeal from aforesaid order, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment.
[1, 2] We reject the contention that the doctrine of law of the case barred Supreme Court from entering judgment for defendants as a matter of law. Defendants’ new motion was based on different evidence from the evidence underlying the prior order—namely, the testimony of an eyewitness to the events that led to plaintiff’s arrest (see e.g. Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 106 A.D.3d 525, 526, 965 N.Y.S.2d 451 [1st Dept. 2013]; cf. Brownrigg v. New York City Hous. Auth., 29 A.D.3d 721, 722, 815 N.Y.S.2d 681 [2d Dept. 2006]). As we held in an earlier appeal, the eyewitness, whose testimony was never sought during discovery and had been improvidently excluded from the first trial, "offered highly relevant and non-cumulative trial testimony" by giving a first-hand account of the incident and testifying about her statements to police (Onilude v. City of New York, 178 A.D.3d 499, 499–500, 115 N.Y.S.3d 272 [1st Dept. 2019]). In any event, this Court is not bound by Supreme Court’s prior orders regarding probable cause to arrest but may make its own determination of the issue (see Erickson v. Cross Ready Mix, Inc., 98 A.D.3d 717, 718, 950 N.Y.S.2d 175 [2d Dept. 2012]; cf. Martin v. City of Cohoes, 37 N.Y.2d 162, 165, 371 N.Y.S.2d 687, 332 N.E.2d 867 [1975]).
[3] Supreme Court properly directed judgment in favor of defendants based on the trial evidence (see CPLR 4404[a]). Specifically, consistent testimony of the eyewitness and police officers, supported by documentary evidence, established that the eyewitness identified plaintiff by his race, sex, clothing, and precise location. Additionally, a police officer and plaintiff testified that no one else in the vicinity matched the description. This established probable cause for the initial arrest (see People v. Coleman, 77 A.D.3d 591, 591–592, 911 N.Y.S.2d 288 [1st Dept. 2010], lv denied 16 N.Y.3d 829, 921 N.Y.S.2d 193, 946 N.E.2d 181 [2011]; People v. Young, 277 A.D.2d 176, 717 N.Y.S.2d 122 [1st Dept. 2000], lv dismissed 96 N.Y.2d 789, 725 N.Y.S.2d 654, 749 N.E.2d 223 [2001]). Probable cause for the subsequent detention of plaintiff was established by the eyewitness’ specific identification of plaintiff from a photograph (see Jones v. City of New York, 206 A.D.3d 635, 638–639, 169 N.Y.S.3d 662 [2d Dept. 2022], lv denied and dismissed 39 N.Y.3d 970, 179 N.Y.S.3d 648, 200 N.E.3d 553 [2022]). The evidence at trial therefore provided a complete defense to the cause of action for false arrest (see De Lourdes Torres v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 759, 27 N.Y.S.3d 468, 47 N.E.3d 747 [2016]; Roberts v. City of New York, 171 A.D.3d 139, 146, 97 N.Y.S.3d 3 [1st Dept. 2019], affd 34 N.Y.3d 991, 114 N.Y.S.3d 42, 137 N.E.3d 497 [2019]).
[4] Contrary to plaintiff’s position, other evidence presented at trial does not compel a result in his favor. Plaintiff points specifically to two pieces of evidence: first, testimony from another neighbor recounting his statement to the investigating detective that the assailants did not live in the neighborhood; second, to "discrepancies" between the eyewitness’ testimony that she saw one man on the street, and the detective’s secondhand notes that she told the arresting officers that she saw two men. This evidence, however, does not present "materially impeaching circumstances" that the jury could reasonably interpret as discrediting the trial testimony by the eyewitness (Jones, 206 A.D.3d at 639, 169 N.Y.S.3d 662; see Roberts, 171 A.D.3d at 146–148, 97 N.Y.S.3d 3).
We have considered plaintiff’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing.