Opinion
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:19-CV-1640-SCJ
2020-02-14
O'NEAL CONSTRUCTORS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. DRT AMERICA, LLC, Defendant.
Jennifer W. Fletcher, Jesse W. Lincoln, Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff. Gregory Keith Smith, Leah Ward Sears, Peter Montgomery Crofton, Sasha Nina Greenberg, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.
Jennifer W. Fletcher, Jesse W. Lincoln, Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.
Gregory Keith Smith, Leah Ward Sears, Peter Montgomery Crofton, Sasha Nina Greenberg, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.
ORDER
HONORABLE STEVE C. JONES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter appears before the Court on the Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award, filed by Plaintiff, O'Neal Constructors, LLC (Doc. No. [7] ) and the Application by Motion to Vacate in Part Arbitration Award, filed by Defendant, DRT America, LLC (Doc. No. [12] ).
Both parties initially filed separate litigation in Civil Action Nos. 1:19-cv-1640 and 1:19-cv-1557. By order dated June 11, 2019 (Doc. No. [11] ), the Court consolidated the two separate civil actions under the pending civil action number. In addition, unless otherwise indicated, all citations are to the electronic docket and all page numbers are those imprinted by the Court's docketing software (CM/ECF).
I. BACKGROUND
A review of the record shows that Plaintiff, O'Neal Constructors, LLC ("O'Neal") and Defendant, DRT America, LLC ("DRT") entered into a Design-Build contract, which included an arbitration provision. Doc. Nos. [1], p. 14, ¶¶ 6, 17; [12-2], p. 1, ¶ 2 and p. 10, §§ 1.3, 14.4.
O'Neal thereafter entered into a subcontract with Excel Contractors, Inc. ("Excel"), in which Excel agreed to perform certain piping and mechanical work. Doc. No. [1], ¶ 7. A dispute arose between O'Neal and Excel and Excel demanded arbitration against O'Neal and DRT agreed to participate in the arbitration as a third-party respondent. Id. ¶¶ 8–10.
On January 7, 2019, the arbitration panel, after hearings [in Atlanta, Georgia], issued its final arbitration award in favor of O'Neal and against DRT in the total principal amount of $1,415,193.11 within thirty days of January 7, 2019. Doc. No. [1], p. 14, ¶11 and p. 31; [12], ¶ 4. "DRT made partial payment to O'Neal pursuant to the Final Award in the amount of $765,102.62; however, $650,090.49 remains unpaid and due pursuant to the Final Award." Doc. No. [1], ¶ 14.
On April 4, 2019, Plaintiff O'Neal filed a Complaint against Defendant DRT, seeking inter alia confirmation of the arbitration award in the amount of $650,090.49. Doc. No. [1], p. 13. Plaintiff's Complaint was originally filed in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia, but was subsequently removed to the Northern District of Georgia and assigned to the undersigned judge on April 11, 2019. Doc. No. [1].
Upon removal, the case was assigned Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-1640-SCJ.
On April 5, 2019, DRT filed its Application by Motion to Vacate in Part Arbitration Award in the Northern District of Georgia on the grounds that the arbitration panel refused to hear its material evidence, exceeded its powers, failed to issue a mutual, final and definitive award, and due process. Doc. No. [12]. On that same day, DRT's counsel emailed O'Neal's counsel "a courtesy copy of DRT's petition to vacate." Doc. No. [8-1], p. 16. However, there was no "petition," attached to the email. Attached to the email was a "memorandum in support of application by motion to vacate in part arbitration award," that carried no filing stamp or certificate of service. Id. at pp. 16–36. On April 30, 2019, DRT served O'Neal by United States Marshal at O'Neal's headquarters in Greenville, South Carolina. See Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-1557, Doc. No. [5]. O'Neal's counsel made their initial appearance, through the filing of an Answer, in (in Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-1557, pre- consolidation) on May 14, 2019, which is the earliest date when O'Neal's attorneys would have received electronic notifications of filings in the Court's Case Management Electronic Case Filing system, "CM/ECF."
This case was originally filed in Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-1557-SCJ, but as stated above, said case has now been consolidated with the pending case. Said consolidation occurred by order dated June 11, 2019. Doc. No. [11].
Plaintiff O'Neal opposes Defendant DRT's motion to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that it is time-barred. Doc. No. [7].
This matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
One of the purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") is to make arbitration procedure as speedy as possible, and not subject to delay and obstruction in courts. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). The FAA also imposes "a heavy presumption in favor of confirming arbitration awards." Cat Charter, LLC v. Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 842 (2011). Under the FAA, once arbitration has culminated in an award, parties can apply by motion to the district court embracing where the arbitration award was issued to either modify, vacate, or confirm the award. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11, and 12. "Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered." 9 U.S.C. § 12. It has been held that "merely filing [the motion to vacate as opposed to serving the motion] within that time period is insufficient to stop the running of the three-month limitations period." Belz v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, No. 3:13-CV-636-J-34MCR, 2014 WL 897048, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014). For adverse parties who are residents of the district where the award was made, service is made upon the adverse party or the party's attorney "as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the same court [of that district]." 9 U.S.C. § 12. For nonresident adverse parties, service of the notice must be accomplished by marshal. Id.
It does not appear that the parties dispute that the FAA applies to this case. See e.g., Doc. No. [7], p. 2, n.2.
In the case sub judice , arbitration panel delivered its award on January 7, 2019. Doc. No. [1], p. 32. The parties agree that the three-month statute of limitations for serving O'Neal with notice of their motion to vacate the arbitration award ended on April 8, 2019. See Doc. Nos. [7], p. 4 and [8], p. 5.
There does not appear to be a dispute that the award was made in the Northern District of Georgia.
As the party moving to vacate the arbitration award, here, DRT, bears the burden of proving that it accomplished valid service. Belz, 2014 WL 897048, at *6 (citations omitted).
"A party to an arbitration award who fails to comply with the statutory precondition of timely service of notice [of a motion to vacate] forfeits the right to judicial review of the award." Piccolo v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 641 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir. 1981). In addition, "the failure of a party to move to vacate an arbitral award within the three-month limitations period prescribed by [§] 12 of [FAA] bars [that party] from raising the alleged invalidity of the award as a defense in opposition to a motion brought under section 9 of the [FAA] to confirm the award." Cullen v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 863 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1989).
III. ANALYSIS
The Court begins its analysis by considering the dispositive issue of whether Defendant DRT timely served notice of its motion to vacate the arbitration award upon Plaintiff O'Neal. Next, the Court considers whether the arbitration award should be confirmed.
A. Service of Notice of DRT's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award
Defendant DRT attempts to meet its burden of establishing proper service of its motion to vacate arbitration award by asserting three arguments: (1) email of the notice of its motion to vacate satisfied the FAA; (2) the FAA should be read in conjunction with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures to provide for service of the motion within ninety days of filing of the application to vacate; and (3) Plaintiff O'Neal is estopped to deny that it has been timely served with notice of DRT's motion to vacate. Doc. No. [8]. The Court will consider Defendant DRT's arguments in turn after first addressing the threshold issue of whether Plaintiff O'Neal is a resident of the Northern District of Georgia for purposes of service of the notice of the motion to vacate.
Defendant DRT also argues that it can assert its motion to vacate as an affirmative defense to Plaintiff O'Neal's motion to confirm the arbitration award through the consolidation of the cases. However, untimeliness of service bars such a defense. See Cullen, 863 F.2d at 854 ("the failure of a party to move to vacate an arbitral award within the three-month limitations period prescribed by [§] 12 of [FAA] bars [that party] from raising the alleged invalidity of the award as a defense in opposition to a motion brought under section 9 of the [FAA] to confirm the award.").
1. Resident
Whether O'Neal is a resident of the Northern District of Georgia is a threshold issue because if O'Neal is a nonresident, then service must have been accomplished by United States Marshal on or before April 8, 2019. 9 U.S.C. § 12. Given that DRT effected service by United States Marshal on April 30, 2019, well after the April 8, 2019 deadline, if the Court finds that O'Neal is a nonresident, then DRT forfeited the right to apply to this Court to vacate the arbitration award. Doc. No. [10], p. 2. However, if the Court finds that O'Neal is a resident of the Northern District of Georgia, then Court must consider the remaining grounds of the parties' arguments as to timeliness of service.
As stated above, the FAA states in relevant part that "[i]f the adverse party shall be a nonresident then the notice of the application shall be served by the marshal of any district within which the adverse party may be found in like manner as other process of the court." 9 U.S.C. § 12 (emphasis added).
The Eleventh Circuit has not defined residency in the context of § 12 of the FAA. In its briefing, Defendant refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which appears to be appropriate and which states in relevant part, "[f]or all venue purposes ... an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question." In addition, "courts have found consent to personal jurisdiction implicit in agreements to arbitrate within a given forum." Ice House Am., LLC v. Perry, No. 3:08-CV-658-J-34JRK, 2009 WL 10670859, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2009) (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff O'Neal's "consent to arbitrate in metropolitan Atlanta subjects [it] to the personal jurisdiction of this court." Tromp Bakery Sys., LLC v. Fiera Foods Co., No. 1:08-CV-0711-CAP, 2009 WL 10664804, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2009) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff O'Neal is a resident of the Northern District of Georgia for purposes of the § 12 service analysis. Service by a United States Marshal was not required and the focus becomes whether DRT served its notice of motion "as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the same court," i.e., the Northern District of Georgia. 9 U.S.C. § 12. Defendant DRT asserts that those means are set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b) which provides for service by e-mail when the parties have consented to it in writing and by filing on the Court's electronic-filing systems. Doc. No. [8], p. 14. The Court considers DRT's Rule 5(b) argument in the next section of this Order.
It is important to note, that contrary to DRT's argument (Doc. No. [8], pp. 18–19), O'Neal's being subject to personal jurisdiction based on consent to arbitration in the Northern District of Georgia does not end the service of process analysis. As stated in the authority, cited by DRT, Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Center, 896 F.2d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 1990), a finding that a litigant had filed within the statute of limitations "does not end the matter [as] [r]egardless of whether a plaintiff has satisfied the applicable statute of limitations," a plaintiff must comply with the service rules.
a. Electronical mail ("email") service
As stated above, Defendant DRT asserts that as a resident of the Northern District of Georgia, Plaintiff O'Neal could be served with notice of its motion to vacate through any means "prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the same court," and that those means are set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), which provides for service by e-mail when the parties have consented to it in writing. Doc. No. [8], p. 14. Defendant DRT further asserts that "the parties agreed, in writing, to the AAA Construction Arbitration Rules, which provide that the parties may use ‘electronic mail (email) to give the notices required by these rules.’ " Id. (citing Rule 44(b)). Defendant DRT further asserts that "service by email was permissible for the purposes of [ Rule 5 ] and, therefore, for the purposes of [the FAA, 12]." Id. at p. 15.
Rule 5(b) states in relevant part:
A paper is served under this rule by:
(E) sending it to a registered user by filing it with the court's electronic-filing system or sending it by other electronic means that the person consented to in writing--in either of which events service is complete upon filing or sending, but is not effective if the filer or sender learns that it did not reach the person to be served; or
(F) delivering it by any other means that the person consented to in writing--in which event service is complete when the person making service delivers it to the agency designated to make delivery.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E) and (F).
First, the Court agrees that as this case involves O'Neal as a resident of the Northern District of Georgia, the adequacy of service under § 12 is determined by referencing Rule 5, as the FAA incorporates the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure whenever the rules do not conflict with the FAA's specific statutory provisions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6)(B).
Rule 5(b)(2)(E) mandates that parties consent to electronic service before service is complete. The advisory committee note to the 2001 Amendments makes clear that the consent must be express, and not implied by the parties' course of conduct. Adv. Comm. Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (2001 Amends.). Furthermore, a party routinely exchanging documents by email cannot supply the necessary express consent to electronic service, because consent cannot be implied from conduct. Martin v. Deutsche Bank Secs., 676 Fed. App'x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).
To this regard, the course of conduct/arbitration case of Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. SOC-SMG, Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-6008, 2012 WL 5232180, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2012), cited by DRT in its briefing, is factually distinguishable, because in that case, the defendant "initiated contact with [p]laintiffs about the ... litigation and requested that [p]laintiffs send them a copy of the [c]omplaint via email." In the case sub judice , there was no such request by O'Neal prior to the applicable April 8, 2019 service of notice deadline.
The Court notes that DRT argues that consent was provided when O'Neal agreed to arbitrate under the AAA's Construction Industry Rules, which permit service by email. Doc. No. 8, p. 14. The specific contract language states that the arbitration "shall be administered by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with its Construction Industry Arbitration Rules." Doc. No. [9-1], p. 47, § 14.4.1. The Contract further states: "if the parties have selected arbitration as the method of binding dispute resolution, the Federal Arbitration Act shall govern Section 14.4." Id. § 15.1. As correctly stated by Plaintiff O'Neal, "[n]othing in the contract contains express consent by O'Neal to be served via email in a federal court action seeking to vacate an arbitration award." Doc. No. [10], p. 4. Thus, the Court is unable to conclude that O'Neal consented to electronic service for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 when it agreed that the arbitration "shall be administered by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with its Construction Industry Arbitration Rules." Doc. No. [9-1], p. 47, § 14.4.1. The authority cited by DRT, Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 982 (2d Cir. 1996), in which the court held that the arbitration clause incorporated the AAA's arbitration rules, is distinguishable because the present case does not involve the same contract language that was at issue in the Stuart case. The language at issue here, involves how the arbitration was to be administered (or conducted) by the AAA, but does not concern, post-arbitration, court action.
The contract language in Stuart is as follows: "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association." Stuart, 85 F.3d at 982.
The word "administer" means to "manage or supervise the execution, use, conduct of." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 16 (11th ed. 2009).
Further, the Court also upholds O'Neal's argument that even if the AAA service rule applied to the pending federal action, the AAA Rules only allow for electronic service of documents in connection with the initiation or continuation of arbitration, or for any court action "therewith," which this Court understands as meaning related to the initiation or continuation of arbitration. The AAA Rules are silent regarding notice of a motion to vacate an arbitration award, which by its plain terms does not seek to initiate or continue an arbitration.
Said rule states in relevant part:
(a) Any papers, notices, or process necessary or proper for the initiation or continuation of an arbitration under these rules; for any court action in connection therewith; or for the entry of judgment on any award made under these; rules may be served on a party by mail addressed to the party or its representative at the last known address or by personal service, in or outside the state where the arbitration is to be held, provided that reasonable opportunity to be heard with regard thereto has been granted to the party.
(b) The AAA, the arbitrator and the parties may also use overnight delivery, electronic fax transmission (fax), or electronic mail (email) to give the notices required by these rules. Where all parties and the arbitrator agree, notices may be transmitted by other methods of communication.
(c) Unless otherwise instructed by the AAA or by the arbitrator, any documents submitted by any party to the AAA or to the arbitrator shall simultaneously be provided to the other party or parties to the arbitration.
AAA-Constr. Indus. Arb. R. 44 (2015); see also Doc. No. [8-1], p. 14.
See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1296 (defining the word "therewith" as "with that," "thereupon," "forthwith") (11th ed. 2009).
Lastly, O'Neal argues that even if there were a finding of express consent to electronic service, "DRT's April 5, 2019 email did not contain, "notice of a motion," but a "courtesy copy" of their memorandum in support of the motion to vacate. In opposition, Defendant DRT asserts that § 12 of the FAA "speaks only of service of the notice-of-motion, not service of the motion itself." Doc. No. [8], p. 16. However, this argument has been rejected by another court as a "clear misstatement[ ] of applicable law." See Zimmerman, 2012 WL 5232180, at *4 n.9. Likewise, this Court rejects DRT's argument and finds that the failure to attach the actual motion is yet another ground for finding that service was not perfected upon O'Neal prior to April 8, 2019.
b. The Court's electronic-filing system ("CM/ECF")
Lastly, the Court finds that DRT filing its application in the Northern District's ECF does not constitute valid service upon O'Neal pursuant to Rule 5 or Local Rule 5.1(a)(3), NDGa. Doc. No. [8], p. 15.
As stated above, Rule 5(b)(2)(E) provides that "a paper is served under this rule by ... sending it to a registered using by filing it with the court's electronic-filing system." In addition, Local Rule 5.1(A)(3), NDGa provides that "[f]iling in the Court's electronic case files ("ECF") constitutes service of the filed documents on registered users." While Local Rule 5.1(a)(3) states "[f]iling in the Court's electronic case files ("ECF") system constitutes service of the filed documents on registered users," the local rule only becomes operable after the filing of the case initiating/opening document (i.e., motion or complaint) and once the opposing party has made its appearance and been formally served with the initial filing. See Local Rule 83.1(D)(1) (providing for when appearances are made). In essence, Local Rule 5.1(a)(3) and Appendix H of the NDGa's Local Rules should be read together, in pari materia. Appendix H of the Local Rules states: "[a] party may not electronically serve a complaint or summons but instead must perfect service according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure." For purposes of perfecting service and CM/ECF, the Court regards a complaint and an application by motion to vacate an arbitration award as functionally equivalent, as both documents are the initial filing and therefore both are the catalyst to adjudication. The Eleventh Circuit has also previously construed a motion to vacate under the FAA to be the equivalent of an initial pleading like the filing of a complaint. See Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1382 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Proceedings to vacate or confirm an arbitration award are instituted by the filing of a motion in the district court, [ 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 12 ], just as a normal civil action is commenced by filing a complaint in the district court, [ Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 ]. Thus, although technically called a ‘motion,’ the papers filed by a party seeking to confirm or vacate an arbitration award function as the initial pleadings in post-arbitration proceedings in the district court.").
To this regard, the Court's ECF recorded DRT's Petition to Vacate as being filed on April 5, 2019. Doc. No. [10], p. 11. However, as illustrated in the following illustration/CM/ECF screenshot, notice to O'Neal's counsel did not issue via electronic service. This is because, as stated above, under Appendix H, CM/ ECF treated the initial filing (at Doc. No. [1] in Case No.1:19-cv-1557, pre-consolidation) like a complaint. Though O'Neal's counsel may have already been registered users of CM/ ECF, O'Neal's Counsel did not begin receiving notifications in the filed case until after Counsel appeared in the case by Answer on May 14, 2019. Doc. No. [9]. Thus, DRT's additional Rule 5/ electronic filing system's arguments also fail, as they do not fully account for the exact technical and rules-based nature of how CM/ECF functions.
It is also the Court's understanding that even though an attorney is a registered user of CM/ECF, an attorney must be linked to a specific case to receive notifications for that particular case. The CM/ECF registered user process does not automatically link an attorney with a client, the system links attorneys with clients once there has been some type of entry of appearance/ filing to link the two in the subject case (not historical cases).
2. Rule of Civil Procedure 4
Next, Defendant DRT asserts that the FAA should be read in conjunction with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 to provide for service of the motion within ninety days of filing of the application to vacate. Doc. No. [8], p. 16. DRT further asserts that if Rule 4 applies, "then it allows DRT at least 90 days to effect service that relates back to the date of filing, and that 90 days has not expired." Id. at p. 18.
After review, the Court is not persuaded by DRT's arguments because applying the ninety-day service provisions of Rule 4 would violate the general purpose of the FAA, i.e., to make arbitration procedure as speedy as possible and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404, 87 S.Ct. 1801 ; cf. Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1258 (7th Cir. 1992) ("It would defeat the purpose of arbitration if a reviewing court was obligated to give all the due process owed to parties filing actions of a civil nature and deserving of Federal Rule 16 treatment, e.g., a scheduling conference, hearing, etc."); and see generally Technologists, Inc. v. MIR's Ltd., 725 F. Supp. 2d 120, 127 (D.D.C. 2010) ("Section 6 [of the FAA] merely ensures that motions to vacate or confirm arbitral awards are not subject to the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and enables judges to decide arbitration issues on an expedited basis.").
3. Estoppel
Lastly, Defendant DRT asserts that Plaintiff O'Neal is estopped to deny that it has been timely served with notice of DRT's motion to vacate. Doc. No. [8], p. 20. Defendant DRT asserts that "a defendant [is estopped] from denying the sufficiency of service when the defendant has attempted to frustrate efforts to obtain service upon it, but nevertheless have actual notice of the actions against it." Doc. No. [8], p. 22. After review and without more, the Court is unable to uphold DRT's estoppel arguments in that, as stated above, DRT has not shown that the parties' contract contained the express consent of O'Neal to be served with notice of a motion to vacate an arbitration award via email, and DRT has not shown that O'Neal attempted to frustrate efforts to obtain service upon it prior to the applicable deadline of April 8, 2019. Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit has held that "[a] defendant's actual notice is not sufficient to cure defectively executed service." Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
B. Confirmation of the Arbitration Award
As stated above, the FAA "imposes a heavy presumption in favor of confirming arbitration awards; therefore, a court's confirmation of an arbitration award is usually routine or summary." Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 842 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp., 975 F.2d at 1258 (7th Cir. 1992) ("the court's function in confirming ... an arbitration award is severely limited. If it were otherwise, the ostensible purpose for resort to arbitration, i.e., avoidance of litigation, would be frustrated.") (citations and quotations omitted). In light of said authority and in the absence of a timely motion to vacate arbitration award on the part of DRT, the arbitration award is summarily confirmed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Application by Motion to Vacate in Part Arbitration Award, filed by Defendant, DRT America, LLC (Doc. No. [12] ) is DENIED .
The Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award, filed by Plaintiff, O'Neal Constructors, LLC (Doc. No. [7] ) is GRANTED . The Arbitration Panel's Final Award in the outstanding amount of $650,090.49 (plus pre-judgment interest) in Plaintiff O'Neal's favor and against Defendant DRT is CONFIRMED . Plaintiff O'Neal is further awarded its administrative fees of the American Arbitration Association, the compensation and expenses of the Arbitrators, and additional reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses incurred by O'Neal subsequent to the entry of the Final Arbitration Award.
The amount of the remaining reasonable attorney's fees will be determined by motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2). Said motion shall be filed within fourteen days of the entry of the judgment.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff O'Neal and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of February, 2020.