Opinion
No. CV 03 0196328 S
September 29, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendants move to strike the fourth count of the complaint on the ground the plaintiffs have failed to allege necessary elements of a cause of action for negligent parental supervision for failing to control their minor child.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaints . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). "The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
The plaintiff alleges that she suffered serious and permanent injuries in an automobile accident in which the minor defendant, Luis A. Velez, was operating a motor vehicle with the Plaintiff as a passenger when the car left the road and struck a curb causing the car to overturn. In the fourth count, the plaintiff alleges that her injuries were caused by the negligence and carelessness of the defendant 17-year-old and that immediately prior to the accident the minor defendant was at the home of his parents and, with the knowledge of his mother, the defendant Maria Velez, he consumed alcoholic beverages. He further alleges that the defendant's mother knew or should have know that her minor son was consuming alcoholic beverages, that she should not have permitted him to leave home and that she failed to adequately supervise him. CT Page 10879-i
The defendant argues that the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant mother "had notice that she had the ability of control her child but also that she knew or had reason to know of the necessity and opportunity to exercise such control," citing Trinkaus v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. 78510S (Jan. 30, 2003, Lager, J.) ( 34 Conn.L.Rptr. 27). In Trinkaus, plaintiff was injured in a skiing accident at the Mohawk Mountain ski area in Cornwall, Connecticut when a minor child, Montoni, riding a snowboard, collided with Trinkaus. Montoni was participating in a weekend ski trip sponsored by his Boy Scout troop and Trinkaus sued, among many others, Michael Keirstead, an assistant scout master.
On a motion to strike, the parties in Trinkaus agreed that the applicable rule was the common-law rule that a parent is not liable for the torts of a minor child unless the parent either makes a dangerous instrumentality available to the child which the child is incapable of handling or the parent fails to control a child's known dangerous propensities. The parties agreed that this rule applied to Keirstead, who was acting in lieu of Montoni's parents on the day of the accident. The court determined that the plaintiff's allegations that Keirstead made a dangerous instrumentality available to a child incapable of handling it, i.e. a snowboard to a child he knew or should have known not capable of handling it because he had never used a snowboard before and had not taken lessons, and that it was foreseeable that Montoni would pose a hazard to others were found sufficient to state a cause of action. However, the court found that the allegations did not support a cause of action for failing to control a child's known or specific dangerous propensities.
The question presented here is quite different. Here the complaint alleges that the defendant was aware that her minor son was consuming alcoholic beverages at her home, and that thereafter she permitted him to leave the family home and did not properly supervise her son. The plaintiff's claim is that this knowledge, and failure to act thereon, constitutes negligent behavior. Individuals serving alcohol to minors may be held liable for injuries caused by the minor. Ely v. Murphy, 207 Conn. 88, 95, 540 A.2d 54 (1988); see also, Bohan v. Last, 236 Conn. 670, 674 A.2d 839 (1996). Connecticut law imposes a duty upon a parent to exercise reasonable care in supervising a minor child to prevent him or her from creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others. Natale v. Caron, Superior Court, Judicial District of Norwich, Docket No. 111113 (May 21, 1997, Hendel, J.) ( 19 Conn.L.Rptr. 458). Just as a person serving alcohol to another's minor child may be responsible for injuries caused by that child, a parent serving alcohol to his or her minor child or permitting a minor child to consume alcohol in the family CT Page 10879-j home must be responsible for injuries caused by the minor child.
Accordingly, the motion to strike count 4 is denied.
HILLER, J. CT Page 10879-k