Opinion
20-70903
08-17-2021
FRANCISCO NEPAMUCENO OLIVO, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted August 13, 2021 [**] San Francisco, California
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals, Agency No. A087-765-034
Before: McKEOWN, FORREST, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Francisco Nepamuceno Olivo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") dismissal of his appeal from the Immigration Judge's ("IJ") decision denying his application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Because we lack jurisdiction over Nepamuceno Olivo's petition, we dismiss it.
Nepamuceno Olivo argues that the IJ and BIA erred in determining that he did not establish that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives because they failed to properly apply the legal standard to the undisputed facts. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). But as we have held, "we lack jurisdiction to review the IJ's subjective, discretionary determination that [a petitioner] did not demonstrate 'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship' under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)." Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law[, ] . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1229b, [the cancellation of removal provision].").
Nonetheless, Nepamuceno Olivo argues that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S.Ct. 1062 (2020), establishes that his challenge falls within the exception to this jurisdictional bar set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), which provides that the limitation on judicial review in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) "shall [not] be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Specifically, Nepamuceno Olivo argues that Guerrero-Lasprilla's conclusion that the phrase "questions of law" in § 1252(a)(2)(D) includes "the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts," 140 S.Ct. at 1067, provides for judicial review of whether the BIA correctly applied the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard to the facts of his case.
Not so. Long before the Court concluded in Guerrero-Lasprilla that the phrase "questions of law" in § 1252(a)(2)(D) includes "the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts," id., we concluded the same. See Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the principle announced by the Supreme Court in Guerrero-Lasprilla has long coexisted with our jurisprudence under § 1252, including our holding that the hardship determination is a subjective, discretionary determination that we lack jurisdiction to review. Thus, though we concluded nearly 15 years ago that we possess jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review questions involving the application of statutes or regulations to undisputed facts, neither Ramadan's holding, nor by extension the Court's holding in Guerrero-Lasprilla, "infringe[s] upon the rule that discretionary determinations are beyond our review." De Mercado v. Mukasey, 566 F.3d 810, 815 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009).
Nepamuceno Olivo also argues that the BIA lacked jurisdiction because the defective Notice to Appear ("NTA") that he received was not cured by the satisfactory notices that he subsequently received. His argument is foreclosed by our precedent. In Fermin v. Barr, we held that any "lack of time, date, and place in the NTA sent to [petitioner] did not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction over her case" because the proper remedy for such an error is simply providing "the complete notice at a later time." 958 F.3d 887, 895 (9th Cir. 2020). Because this argument is foreclosed by our precedent, and because we lack jurisdiction to review the agency's determination that Nepamuceno Olivo failed to establish that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives, we dismiss his petition for review.
This conclusion is not affected by Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S.Ct. 1474 (2021), which "concerns the requirements for a notice to appear to trigger the stoptime rule for cancellation of removal; [but] has no bearing on jurisdiction." United States v. Sanchez, No. 20-30084, __Fed. App'x__ (9th Cir. July 14, 2021).
PETITION DISMISSED.
BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, concurring:
As a matter of text, structure, and history, the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) appears to be a mixed question of law and fact. See Trejo v. Garland, 3 F.4th 760, 766-74 (5th Cir. 2021); Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1150-54 (6th Cir. 2021). Under recent Supreme Court precedent, we retain jurisdiction over such questions. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S.Ct. 1062 (2020).
I still concur with the court's decision to dismiss this petition for lack of jurisdiction, however, because binding precedent dictates that we treat the hardship determination as a discretionary question. See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2003). We are accordingly precluded from reviewing petitioner's claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).