Opinion
Civil No. 3:18-CV-310
02-22-2019
AYODELE OKE, Plaintiff, v. MARK GARMAN, et al., Defendants.
(Judge Rambo)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Statement and Facts of the Case
This is a civil rights case filed by the pro se plaintiff, Ayodele Oke, a state prisoner currently incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") at the State Correctional Institution at Forest. Oke's claims arise out of an alleged lack of medical treatment he received while he was incarcerated at SCI Rockview in 2016. He brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various defendants, including correctional staff and medical staff at Rockview, alleging constitutional and state law violations.
Oke alleges in his complaint that in February of 2016, he wrote a request to see Dental at Rockview, claiming that he had severe toothaches and that he was in constant and excruciating pain. (Doc. 1, ¶ 22). He claims that he could not eat or drink at times, and that the pain affected his sleep and gave him migraine headaches. (Id., ¶ 21). Dental scheduled an appointment to see him sometime in March. (Id., ¶ 23). On March 19, the plaintiff still had not been seen by anyone at Dental, and he wrote another request and stated that he needed immediate treatment for his pain. (Id., ¶ 24). Ultimately, Oke was not seen by Dental in March.
On April 3, Oke filed a grievance through the prison grievance system, claiming that Dental still had not seen him and that he was in unbearable pain. (Id., ¶ 27). On April 7 and April 8, Oke informed Defendant Kazlaski, who he refers to as "Nurse Bob," about his excruciating pain, to which Kazlaski allegedly replied that dental was "backed up," and that the plaintiff should have gotten appropriate medical care for his tooth. (Id., ¶ 31). On April 17, Oke filed another grievance pertaining to Dental's failure to see him for this tooth pain. (Id., ¶ 35). He contends that he never received a response to this grievance. (Id.)
Finally, on April 18, the plaintiff complained to C.O. Ceprish about his tooth pain, claiming that he had been, and still was, in excruciating pain. (Id., ¶ 36). C.O. Ceprish called Dental and informed them that Oke needed serious medical care, and Ceprish and another correctional officer brought Oke to Dental that day. (Id., ¶¶ 37-38). Oke was seen by Dr. Italia, who found that the plaintiff's wisdom tooth was black, cracked, and contained a big hole. (Id., ¶¶ 39-40). Dr. Italia immediately performed surgery on the plaintiff, in which he extracted the rotten tooth. (Id., ¶¶ 41- 42). When Oke told Dr. Italia that he had been in excruciating pain, Dr. Italia allegedly responded, "I'm sure you were." (Id., ¶¶ 45-46). Dr. Italia told Oke that he would be given Motrin twice per day for the pain. (Id., ¶ 47). However, on April 19, one day after his surgery, Oke alleges that Nurse Ficks failed to give him his Motrin. (Id., ¶ 51). This is the sole factual averment made by Oke relating to Defendant Ficks.
Oke filed several grievances about his lack of treatment, claiming that Dental had been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because he had been in pain for six weeks before he was seen by Dr. Italia. On April 20, Defendant Williams responded to the plaintiff's first grievance that he had filed on April 3 and informed him that security had been unable to escort him to his appointment with Dental in March, and because he had ultimately been seen by Dental and received treatment, his grievance was denied. (Id., ¶ 61). The response to this grievance also stated that Oke's initial request for dental care was not deemed an emergency. (Id.) Ultimately, all of the plaintiff's grievances about his dental care were denied at final review.
Oke then filed this action on February 5, 2018. (Doc. 1). In his complaint, he brings thirty-three claims against fifteen different defendants. With respect to Nurse Ficks, Oke brings an Eighth Amendment claim, as well as claims for professional negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Oke claims that Ficks' denial of his Motrin on the day after his surgery constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Nurse Ficks filed the instant motion to dismiss the complaint on July 6, 2018 (Doc. 23), arguing that the single allegation against her does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Additionally, she claims that the plaintiff has failed to state viable state law claims against her. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for resolution. (Docs. 24, 26). For the reasons that follow, we will recommend that Nurse Ficks' motion to dismiss be granted, but that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice to giving Oke an opportunity to remedy the deficiencies in his pleading.
The other named defendants in this case ("the DOC defendants") are represented separately and have filed a separate motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against them. (Doc. 19).
In the absence of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility, a court should grant a plaintiff leave to file a curative amended pleading. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (even where a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must permit amendment, unless to do so would be inequitable or futile). In this case, we do not find that it would be inequitable or futile to permit the plaintiff opportunity to amend.
II. Discussion
A. Rule 12(b)(6) - The Legal Standard
The defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)]and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal -U.S.-, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not "assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.' In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. (1955)). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, [ ] "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement of relief.'"Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1950. Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a
demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
B. The Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Constitutional Claim against Nurse Ficks.
Oke asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against Ficks, alleging that she was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when she withheld his pain medication the day after he received surgery on his tooth. Oke faces an exacting burden in advancing this Eighth Amendment claim against Nurse Ficks in her individual capacity. To sustain such a claim, he must plead facts that:
[M]eet two requirements: (1) "the deprivation alleged must be objectively, sufficiently serious;" and (2) the "prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quotations marks and citations omitted). In prison condition cases, "that state of mind is one of 'deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Id. "Deliberate indifference" is a subjective standard under Farmer—the prison official-defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
These principles apply with particular force to Eighth Amendment claims premised upon inadequate medical care. In the medical context, a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment occurs only when officials are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). To establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care in accordance with this standard, an inmate is required to point to evidence that demonstrates (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Such indifference may be evidenced by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed provision of medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or "persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury." White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
However, it is also clear that the mere misdiagnosis of a condition or medical need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. "Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners." Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (citations omitted). Furthermore, in a prison medical context, deliberate indifference is generally not found when some significant level of medical care has been offered to the inmate. Thus, such complaints fail as constitutional claims under § 1983 since "the exercise by a doctor of his professional judgment is never deliberate indifference. See e.g., Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) ('[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights')." Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F.Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1997). "The key question . . . is whether defendants have provided plaintiff with some type of treatment, regardless of whether it is what plaintiff desires." Little v. Lycoming Cnty., 912 F.Supp. 809, 816 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In this case, Oke asserts only one allegation against Ficks—that she failed to provide him with his pain medication on the day after he received surgery on his tooth. On this score, courts in this circuit have found that a single denial of medication does not rise to the level of "deliberate indifference" that constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation. See Ayala v. Terhune, 195 F. App'x 87, 91 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[S]poradic delays (not exceeding four days at any one time) in providing prescription medication . . . do not amount to deliberate indifference"); Boyce v. DeRose, 2011 WL 1304728, at *4 (M.D. Pa. March 31, 2011) (finding that "the denial of a single dose of medication on one occasion" did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation); Wesley v. Murphy, 2010 WL 2736943, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2010) (finding that a one-week delay in prescription eyedrops did not constitute deliberate indifference). Because Ficks is only alleged to have denied Oke his Motrin on one single occasion, in our view this single denial of medication does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference, and Oke has failed to state a constitutional claim against Nurse Ficks. Accordingly, we recommend that this claim be dismissed.
C. This Court Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the Plaintiff's State Law Claims Against Nurse Ficks.
In addition to the Eighth Amendment claim brought against Nurse Ficks, Oke also alleges state law claims of professional negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. This court has the discretion to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims that "form part of the same case or controversy" as the federal constitutional claims before it. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." § 1367(c); see Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 625, 639-40 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)) ("A district court's decision whether to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary"). In a case such as this, where the jurisdiction of the federal court was premised on alleged federal claims which are found to be subject to dismissal, the proper course generally is for "the court [to] decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ('The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if-... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.'); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (holding that when federal causes of action are dismissed, federal courts should not separately entertain pendent state claims)." Bronson v. White No. 05-2150, 2007 WL 3033865, *13 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 15, 2007)(Caputo, J.)(adopting report and recommendation dismissing ancillary malpractice claim against dentist); see Ham v. Greer, 269 F. App'x 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2008)("Because the District Court appropriately dismissed [the inmate's] Bivens claims, no independent basis for federal jurisdiction remains. In addition, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to address the state law negligence claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Tully v. Mott Supermkts., Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir.1976).") In this case, because we have found that Oke's complaint has failed to state a viable constitutional claim against Nurse Ficks, in our view this court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims. Accordingly, we will recommend that these claims be dismissed with respect to Nurse Ficks.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 23) be GRANTED, and that the plaintiff's claims against Ficks be dismissed without prejudice to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to remedy the pleading deficiencies that we have identified.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 22nd day of February 2019.
S/ Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge