Opinion
(December Term, 1802.)
1. If a latter statute be inconsistent with a former one, it repeals the former; if it be reconcilable with the former, but legislates upon the same subjects as the former does, and repeals all other laws within its purview, the former is repealed.
2. The Legislature, by an act passed in 1799, declared that a law passed in 1715 has continued and shall continue in force. It was a question, at the time of the passage of the act of 1799, whether the act of 1715 was not repealed by a law passed in 1789: Held, that the determination of this question belonged to the judiciary and not to the Legislature; and that, therefore, the act of 1799, so far as it regards this question, contravenes the 4th section of the Bill of Rights, and is void.
3. The act of 1715, limiting the time for the demand of claims against the estates of deceased persons, was repealed by the act of 1789 on the same subject.
Defendant pleaded the act of 1715, ch. 48, sec. 9: "Creditors of any person deceased shall make their claim within seven years after the death of such debtor; otherwise, such creditor shall be forever barred." Divers other actions were in court pending upon the same pleadings, and the Court appointed a day for the argument respecting the validity and effect of the plea. On the day appointed an argument was had, and the Court took time to advise; and some days afterwards delivered their opinions, in substance as follows:
The act of 1789 is consistent with that of 1715, for it establishes a shorter limitation than the act of 1715, and upon different terms. The act of 1789, ch. 23, sec. 4 enacts: "That the creditors of any person or persons deceased, if he or they reside within this State, shall within two years, and if they reside without the limits of this State, shall within three years from the qualification of the executors or administrators exhibit and make demand of their respective accounts, debts and claims, of every kind whatever, to such executors or administrators; and if any creditor or creditors shall hereafter fail to demand and bring suit for the recovery of his, her, or their debt as above specified, within the aforesaid time limited, he, she, or they shall forver [forever] be barred from the recovery of his, her, or their debt in any court of law or equity, or before any justice of the peace within this State." Section 5 directs: "advertisements within two months after qualification," etc. The act of 1715, however, was in force till the act of 1789; but clearly its operation was suspended by section 101 of the act of 1777, ch. 2, commonly called the court law, and by other acts passed after the beginning of the war, disabling British subjects to sue in our courts. These disabilities continued till the treaty of peace was enforced in this State by the act of 1787, which declares it to be a part of the law of the land. The act of 1799, declaring the act of 1715 not to have been repealed, and to have continued in force, has not the effect of making that act to have been in force after it was repealed, till reenacted.
In the act of 1789 there is this clause: "That all laws and parts of law that come within the meaning and purview of this act are hereby declared void and of no effect." There are two (228) rules for determining what act shall be deemed to be repealed by a later one. If the latter be inconsistent with the former, it repeals the former. If it be reconcilable with the former, but legislates upon the same subjects as the former does, and repeals all other laws within its purview, the former is repealed. Then, what is the subject of section 9 of the act of 1715? The estates of all dead men, and all creditors upon them, and a limitation of the time for the exhibition of such claims. What is the subject of the latter act? Precisely the same estates and persons, and a limitation of the time for bringing forward their claims. There is a legislation in both acts upon the same cases. The repealing clause, then, extends to the section in question. The act of 1715 prescribes a limitation, without an exception of persons; the act of 1789 excepts persons under disabilities, such a femes covert and the like. If the act of 1715 be in force, persons under disabilities will be excepted until the expiration of seven years, and not afterwards; for at that period all persons will be barred by the act of 1715, if it stand with the act of 1789. But why should the Legislature design a permission for persons under disabilities to sue after the time prescribed in the act of 1789 for other persons, and until the completion of the seven years fixed by the act of 1715, and not afterwards? The same reason which continued the exception till the expiration of seven years will still operate to continue it longer. If the exceptions are to last, as mentioned by the act of 1789, until the disabilities be removed, then the act of 1715 must be repealed. The act of 1799 declares that the act of 1715 hath continued, and shall continue, to be in force. I will not say at this time that a retrospective law may not be made; but if its retrospective view be not clearly expressed, construction ought not to aid it. That, however, is not the objection to this act. The Bill of Rights of this State, which is declared to be a part of the Constitution, says in section 4: "That the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other." The separation in these powers has been deemed by the people of almost all the states as essential to liberty. And the question here is, Does it belong to the judiciary to decide upon laws when made, and the extent and operation of them, or to the Legislature? If it belongs to the judiciary, then the matter decided by this act, namely, whether the act of 1789 be a repeal of section 9 of 1715, is a judicial matter and not a legislative one. The determination is made by a branch of government not authorized by the Constitution to make it, and is, therefore, in my judgment, void. It seems, also, to be void for another reason: Section 10 of the first article of the Federal Constitution prohibits the states to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Now, will it not impair this obligation if a contract which, at the time of passing the act of 1789, might be recovered on by the creditor, shall by the operation of the act (229) of 1799 be entirely deprived of his remedy?
Upon the point of suspension of the act of 1715, prior to its repeal by the act of 1789, I am of opinion with my brother judge, and for the reasons by him given, that it was suspended, and continued so till the act of 1787 declaring the treaty of 1783 to be a part of the law of the land, for it was not settled till the making of the Federal Constitution that treaties should ipso facto become a part of the laws of every state, without any act of the State Legislature to make them so. It has been argued that by an act passed in 1791 all acts and parts of acts retained in the compilation of Mr. Iredell, and not by him declared to be repealed or obsolete or not in force, shall be held to be in force; and that section 9 of the act of 1715 being retained therein, and having no such declaration attached to it, is therefore in force. The whole of 1789 is also retained, and the repealing clause, as well as the other parts of the act; and if the repealing clause be in force, as no doubt it is, it had the same effect in 1791 as in 1788 and 1789, and continued to keep section 9 of the act of 1715 repealed until the passing of the act of 1799.
This cause was removed to the Supreme Court by a writ of error, where it was also decided that the act of 1715 had not been repealed by the act of 1789.
NOTE. — The reporter was of the same opinion in 1799, when he published the manual, and placed the act of 1715, as taking effect in 1799; but TAYLOR, J., and some of the other judges of the Court of Conference, were of a different opinion, and held the act of 1715 not to have been repealed by that of 1789.
NOTE. — See Young, Miller Co. v. Farrel, ante, 219, and the note thereto.