Opinion
Argued June 8, 2001.
July 16, 2001.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Oshrin, J.), entered May 31, 2000, as, upon an order entered May 1, 2000, inter alia, granting those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action predicated upon Labor Law 241(6) and 240(1) and denying their cross motion for partial summary judgment under Labor Law 240(1), dismissed the causes of action pursuant to Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6).
Schwimmer Sweeney, New York, N.Y. (Peter P. Sweeney of counsel), for appellants.
Kral, Clerkin, Redmond, Ryan, Perry Girvan, Mineola, N Y (Elizabeth Gelfand Kastner and Robert D. Martin of counsel), for defendant third-party plaintiff-respondent.
Ahmuty, Demers McManus, Albertson, N.Y. (Frederick B. Simpson and Brendan T. Fitzpatrick of counsel), for third-party defendant-respondent.
Before: GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, THOMAS A. ADAMS, JJ.
ORDERED that the plaintiffs' notice of appeal from the order is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5520[c]); and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Immediately prior to demolishing a wall upon which numerous mirrored panels were affixed, the plaintiff Eyal Ofri (hereinafter the plaintiff) allegedly was injured by a falling piece of a broken mirror. The mirrors were mounted on the wall approximately five feet above the floor, and the plaintiff stood directly on the floor as he removed each panel from its mounting frame. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, as the Court of Appeals has now determined, this is not the kind of hazard contemplated by Labor Law 240(1), and thus the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the plaintiffs' cause of action predicated thereon (see, Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d 259, revg 270 A.D.2d 60).
The Supreme Court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs' cause of action predicated upon Labor Law 241(6) as the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by a hazard created by the demolition work, rendering the relied-upon regulation, 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(c), inapplicable (see, Monroe v. City of New York, 67 A.D.2d 89, 100).
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.
KRAUSMAN, J.P., S. MILLER, SCHMIDT and ADAMS, JJ., concur.