Summary
Reversing district court's dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 judicial deception claim premised on detective's alleged giving of false information to support arrest warrant
Summary of this case from Pollack v. Boulder Cnty.Opinion
No. 11-1461.
Submitted: April 11, 2011.
Filed: May 26, 2011.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota.
Charles Bradford Odom, Jamestown, ND, pro se.
Before BYE, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
[UNPUBLISHED]
North Dakota inmate Charles Odom appeals the district court's preservice dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Following our de novo review, we conclude that Odom's allegations — that Bismarck Police Detective Kenan Kaizer knowingly gave false information while testifying in support of issuance of an arrest warrant — were sufficient to state a claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. See Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 978-79 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review; in reviewing district court's dismissal for failure to state claim, appellate court accepts as true all factual allegations contained in complaint and affords all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations); Bagby v. Brondhaver, 98 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996) (warrant based on affidavit containing deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth violates Fourth Amendment; official who causes such deprivation is subject to § 1983 liability).
The claim is not barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because Odom's success on the claim would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions or sentences, see id. at 486-87; and Kaizer is not entitled to absolute immunity, see Medley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-44, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (denying absolute immunity to police officers who applied for arrest warrants; complaining witnesses were not shielded by absolute immunity at common law, and police officer applying for arrest warrant was not analogous to prosecutor seeking indictment).
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.