Opinion
No. 96-CV-4202-DRH.
February 13, 2001.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Introduction and Procedural Background
This matter comes before the Court on Hospice of Southern Illinois, Inc.'s renewed Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding disparate treatment after entry of judgment (Doc.111) and renewed motion for new trial after entry of judgment (Doc. 113). Based on the reasons states herein, the Court grants Hospice's renewed Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and denies as moot the renewed motion for new trial.
In July 1996, William Dale Odom sued his former employer, Hospice of Southern Illinois, Inc. ("Hospice"), pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Odom's complaint contained four counts: (a) Count I — quid pro quo discrimination; (b) Count II — hostile work environment; (c) Count II — disparate treatment sexual discrimination and (d) Count IV — retaliation. Specifically, Odom's complaint alleged that while he was employed as a nurse at Hospice (from November 1994 through January 1996) he was sexually harassed, treated differently and terminated from his employment because of his gender.
On April 1, 1998, then Chief Judge J. Philip Gilbert denied Hospice's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 48). Afterward, the case was reassigned to the undersigned District Judge to preside over the jury trial (Doc. 60). Trial commenced on May 3, 1999 and lasted until May 13, 1999. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Hospice and against Odom on Counts I, II, and IV and returned a verdict in favor of Odom and against Hospice on Count III (the disparate treatment claim). In addition to the verdicts, the jury answered "YES" to the following special interrogatory question:
"We, the jury, unanimously enter the following finding on the question of whether the defendant has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same employment decision concerning plaintiff even in the absence of any discriminatory intent."
Further, the jury found that Odom was entitled to the following damages: (1) $18,000 in past lost wages; (2) $4,000 in past pain suffering and emotional distress; and (3) $20,000 in punitive damages. In agreement with the parties, the Court did not enter judgment on the jury's verdicts, and instead, allowed the parties to file post trial motions.
On September 22, 1999, the Court entered an Order granting in part and denying in part Odom's motion to enter judgment (Doc. 89) and denying the remaining pending motions: (a) Odom's motion for attorney fees and costs (Doc. No. 90); (b) Hospice's motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding disparate treatment (Doc. No. 91); (c) Hospice's motion for judgment as a matter of law relating to punitive damages or in the alternative remittitur (Doc. No. 93); and (d) Hospice's motion for new trial (Doc. No. 95) (Doc. 106). On September 24, 1999, the Court entered judgment in favor of Odom and against Hospice on Count III of the complaint and entered judgment in favor of Hospice and against Odom on Counts I, II, and IV of the complaint (Doc. 107). On October 6, 1999, Odom filed a notice of appeal (Doc. 110). Meanwhile, Hospice filed a renewed Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding disparate treatment filed after entry of judgment (Doc. 111) and a renewed motion for new trial filed after entry of judgment (Doc. 113). Subsequently, the Court denied Hospice's motions (Doc. 115). Shortly thereafter, Hospice filed a separate notice of appeal (Doc. 116).
On March 23, 2000, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied without prejudice to renewal Hospice's motion for stay of appeal and remand. The Seventh Circuit directed Hospice to comply with CIRCUIT RULE 57 by requesting the District Court to indicate whether it is inclined to grant its two post trial motions filed on October 5, 1999. On May 8, 2000, the undersigned District Judge received a letter from Mr. Kenneth Bean, counsel for Hospice, requesting the Court to indicate whether it is willing to substantively consider and grant the October 5, 1999 post trial motions. On May 18, 2000, the Court entered an order finding that it is inclined to grant Hospice's post trial motions (Doc. 118). On June 9, 2000, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted Hospice's renewed motion for remand of appeal and remanded the case to this Court to rule on Hospice's renewed motions filed after entry of judgment. Having reviewed the pleadings and the applicable case law, the Court grants Hospice's renewed Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding disparate treatment after entry of judgment (Doc. 111) and denies as moot Hospice's renewed motion for new trial filed after entry of judgment (Doc. 113).
II. Facts
Odom was employed by Hospice as a staff nurse from November 1994 to January 2, 1996. As a staff nurse at Hospice, Odom was required to personally visit the homes of terminally ill patients. Generally, Odom's work schedule provided that he report to the Fairfield, Illinois office to receive his daily assignments and special instructions for the day and to complete paperwork. Typically, nurses employed at Hospice would spend about an hour each day in the office and the remainder of the day visiting patients.
As early as four months prior to his termination, Juli Wilkin Piper, Odom's immediate supervisor, verbally warned Odom of the problems concerning the inaccuracies with his time sheets and time records. This verbal warning was also followed by several handwritten letters from Ms. Wilken Piper to Odom alerting him of additional time sheet recording problems and by a formal written warning which was presented to, read to and signed by Odom. The warning cautioned Odom that any more problems with his time sheets would result in termination. In late December 1995, Odom again over charged his time sheet.
The Director of Nursing of Hospice (Diane Lanter) and the CEO of Hospice (Merle Aukamp) had the authority to terminate Odom. Aukamp and Lanter jointly decided to terminate Odom based on his inaccurate time sheet submitted in late December 1995. Thereafter, Lanter met with Odom and terminated him on January 2, 1996. During trial, Odom testified to the following regarding one of his time charts during his employment with Hospice:
Q. And from 8:15 when you have walked in the door to 12:30, which was the DAR when you saw your last patient, is four hours and fifteen minutes, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had charged a total of seven hours that day, so according to at least the 8:15 to 12:30 you need to account for another two hours and forty-five minutes, right, to get to seven?
A. Yeah.
Q. And the way you account for it is that you say that you left Wally, and would that be the last patient?
A. Yes.
Q. And you drove to Huck's. What is Huck's?
A. It's a convenience store.
Q. And that took you five minutes, and then you had fifteen minutes, is that at Huck's?
A. Yes.
Q. Where you got gas and had a, I think it says "BM" for bowel movement and diarrhea?
A. Yes.
Q. So that was another fifteen. Then you drove from the Huck's to the curve in the road for a roadside stop and that took you nine minutes.
A. Yes.
Q. And you stopped on the side of the road for five minutes while you violently coughed?
A. Yes.
Q. And then it took you 23 minutes from this stop with violent coughing to get to Carmi railroad tracks?
A. Yes.
A. And then three minutes to get from the railroad tracks to the Wal-Mart?
Q. Yes.
Q. And then you went into the Wal-Mart for sixteen minutes?
A. Yes.
Q. And then it took you eleven minutes to get from Wal-Mart over to Carmi?
A. Yes.
Q. And then another twelve minutes from Carmi to Crossville, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And then a second step[sic] at the Huck's, this time for eggs, milk and cheese and another bowel movement for twelve minutes?
A. Yes.
Q. And then finally seven minutes to get home?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's a hundred eighteen minutes. So how many miles is it from Wally's house to your home? And if it's not easy to find, don't worry about it.
A. Roughly 32 miles.
Q. So that day to drive 32 miles it took you a hundred and eighteen minutes which is two minutes shy of two hours, right?
A. I didn't drive straight from there to home.
Q. I understand that. And even with this hundred and eighteen minute drive you still billed too much on your time sheet, haven't you? We are still not up to seven hours yet, are we, right?
A. Right.
Q. So to get to seven hours you then have to say I'm going to take five more, a half hour more for lunch, and you add that in at the end, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you add, you're still short so, you have to add another twenty-five, point two five, which is almost thirty minutes, for moving a file cabinet and being given deer salami and hugs and kisses and good-byes, right?
A. Diane wanted to know what I did that day.
Q. Well, I guess I need to quibble with you a bit. Diane wanted to know how you had arrived at a legitimate seven hours of billed time on your sheet, didn't she?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you consider as you sit here today that this is billable time to the Hospice under what you were told was proper and allowed?
A. No, it's not.
Q. That's all I have.
III. Judgment as a Matter of Law
In determining whether to grant a judgment as a matter of law after a jury trial, the court must determine "whether the evidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences permissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed." McNabola v. Chicago Transit Authority, 10 F.3d 501, 515 (7th Cir. 1993). District Courts should only grant judgment as a matter of law "when there can be but one conclusion from the evidence." Id. The standards generally applicable to other motions for judgment as a matter of law apply in discrimination cases. Tincher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 118 F.3d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir. 1997).
The Court finds that there can be but one conclusion from the evidence — that Hospice had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Odom which Odom failed to demonstrate was pre-textual. "Once a trial in a disparate treatment case is over, the question is whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on account of race or another characteristic covered by the statute. The employee bears the burden on this subject, and the rules governing prima facie cases, order of proof, responses, and so on no longer matter." Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co. Inc., 824 F.2d 557, 558 (7th Cir.) (bench trial), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987). Here, Odom proffers the following categories of evidence in support of his claim that Hospice discriminated against him: his claim that other female employees were given preferential treatment and his challenges to the reasonableness of Hospice's decision to terminate him. Each of these attempts to support his discrimination claim fails.
Odom's allegations that female employees were treated more favorably fail. First, Odom claims that Delores Compton received mental health days off but that he did not receive mental health days off work. However, Ms. Compton testified that she was not given mental health days off, but that she was given personal days off as was Odom. In addition, Odom admitted that he did not ask for mental health days off work. Further, Odom claims that Compton was given better days off work on the holidays. Ms. Compton and Odom both testified that they were scheduled to be on call for holidays throughout the year. Ms. Compton agreed to be on call Christmas day to allow employees with small children to be at home uninterrupted in exchange for her being off work on New Year's Eve. Moreover, Compton had been employed at Hospice longer than Odom, therefore, she had seniority over Odom. Odom also asserts that his supervisor monitored his records more closely than the other female employees. However, Odom has not presented evidence that any female employee ever conducted herself in the manner that Odom had. Thus, the Court concludes that Odom has not established that he was treated differently because of his gender.
Lastly, Odom's challenges to the reasons behind his termination fail. Odom's evidence and argumentation regarding the decision to terminate boil down to a challenge to the correctness of the decision to terminate. Such a challenge ignores the fact that Hospice need not prove that it was correct to believe that Odom was not keeping accurate time sheets and that conduct merited termination — all it needs to prove to merit judgment as a matter of law is that Hospice was sincere in its belief that Odom was not keeping accurate time sheets and that conduct merited termination. See Sirvidas v. Common Wealth Edison Co., 60 F.3d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The questions is not whether Sirvidas was or was not performing satisfactorily but whether ComEd honestly believed that Sirvidas was the weakest member of the department."); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., Inc., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987) (reversing bench trial verdict in favor of plaintiff; holding that lower court had incorrectly found pretext where it found that the defendant "did not have good cause to fire" the plaintiff; "If you honestly explain the reasons behind your decision, but the decision was ill-informed or ill-considered, your explanation is not a `pretext.'").
The Court need not go through each of the steps of the McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting test because such an exercise is unnecessary after a full trial; rather "we need ask only whether the plaintiff was a victim of international discrimination." Diettrich v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 168 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 1999).
Here, Odom admitted on cross-examination that his billable time to Hospice was too much and was neither proper nor allowed by Hospice. Further, the jury found that Hospice would have terminated Odom even in the absence of discriminatory evidence. With no evidence to show that Lanter or Aukamp or any of the other decision makers at Hospice was insecure in their belief that Odom was not keeping accurate time sheets and that conduct merited termination, the jury verdict cannot stand. Russell v. Acme-Evens, Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995) ("If `pretext' meant simply mistake, a plaintiff's testimony could go far to create a genuine issue of fact in these cases. But neither ordinary language nor in law does it mean a mistake.").
Odom argues that special interrogatory # 2 and its answer should be vacated. Specifically, Odom claims that the special interrogatory was confusing because it failed to define the terms "legitimate reason" or "adverse action." Further, Odom claims that a new trial is warranted because the verdict is inconsistent. The Court rejects both of these arguments. First, the special interrogatory does not contain either of these terms, therefore, there was no need to define these terms. Second, the Court finds that Odom did not establish that he was treated disparately, therefore, a new trial is not warranted.
Even if challenging the correctness of Hospice's decision was sufficient to refute Hospice's nondiscriminatory purpose, Odom's challenge is lacking. The fact that Odom's work had been praised in the past is insufficient to show that Hospice was unreasonable to criticize and to monitor Odom about his time sheets. See Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Systems, Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1998) ([P]ast raises and bonuses do not prove that Cengr was meeting Fusibond's legitimate expectations at the time of his "discharge."). This makes sense, given that the caliber of work from a given employee may change over time and given that the recording of time sheets may not have been taken into account during the past praises. The Court finds that Odom could not demonstrate that a similarly situated employee outside of his protected class was treated more favorably because Odom has no evidence to indicate that Compton (or any other female employee) had the same time sheet record keeping problems as Odom.
In short, Odom has demonstrated neither that Lanter and Aukamp were insincere in their belief that Odom's time sheets were not accurate and that conduct merited termination nor that Lanter or Aukamp, in the absence of Odom's gender, would have decided not to terminate Odom. In light of this failure, judgment as a matter of law in favor of Hospice is appropriate.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Hospice's renewed Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding disparate treatment after entry of judgment (Doc. 111) and DENIES as moot Hospice's renewed motion for new trial filed after entry of judgment (Doc. 113). Further, the Court VACATES the September 22, 1999 Judgment and the September 22, 1999 Memorandum and Order (Docs. 107 106, respectively). The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment in favor of Hospice of Southern Illinois, Inc. and against William Dale Odom on Counts I, II, III and IV of Odom's complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.