Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 03-4861
September 9, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs George O'Connell, Jim McBride, Ray Lederer, James Stangler, Timothy Roach, Ed Stean, Bob Dunphy, Milton Budd, Michael P. Garvey, Joe Crosley, Bob Breves, Matt Krier, James F. Snyder, and Louis Bensinger ("Plaintiffs") have sought relief under Title I of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 411. Plaintiffs are members of Local 30, a labor organization which is subordinate to Defendant United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers Allied Workers, AFL-CIO ("Defendant" or "the International"). Plaintiffs believe that under the LMRDA, they are entitled to nominate and elect delegates from Local 30 to the International Union Convention. They have asked this court to grant a preliminary injunction ordering Defendant to allow Local 30 to proceed with the nomination and election of delegates to the International Union Convention. Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim on the basis that this court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims and because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A hearing on this matter was held on Tuesday, September 2, 2002, in which we heard extensive argument and received stipulated evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we grant Defendant's motion to dismiss. However, if we had not dismissed this matter we would enter judgment for Defendant on the merits.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a court to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A complaint may only be dismissed under 12(b)(1) if the claim "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or . . . is wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Kehr Packages v. Fidelcor. Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-1409 (3d Cir. 1991), citing Bell v. Hood. 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). The burden of proving that this court has subject matter jurisdiction rests with Plaintiffs. Id. Unlike motions under 12(b)(6), the court is "free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case" when considering a 12(b)(1) motion. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n. 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim in whole or in part "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all the allegations set forth in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs. Fordv. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 1998). Dismissal is proper only if Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claims which would entitle them to relief. Id.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We briefly summarize the facts in this case. In March 21, 2003, Defendant placed Local 30 under trusteeship after an investigation of its affairs revealed numerous problems, including instances of physical violence, threats of violence, extortion at job sites, and financial malpractice. Local 30 remains under trusteeship at this time and is administered by the Trustee appointed by the International, Thomas Pedrick. This trusteeship was formalized with a preliminary injunction issued by this court on March 26, 2003, in case No. 03-1699. The injunction was upheld on appeal in case No. 03-1869.On May 5, 2003, Plaintiff Keith Lypka wrote a letter to Mr. Pedrick to confirm that Local 30 would be permitted to conduct delegate elections in preparation for the International Union convention to be held on October 12, 2003. When Mr. Pedrick did not respond, Mr. Lypka contacted John Martini, the International President, to inquire about the delegate elections. President Martini informed Mr. Lypka both by phone and in writing that delegate elections would not be conducted at Local 30 because "Local 30 remains delinquent in its obligations to the International Union." (Ex. P-5). Plaintiff Bob Dunphy appealed President Martini's decision in a letter to the International Executive Board ("IEB"), in which he asserted that as members in good standing who have paid their dues to the International, Plaintiffs could not be denied the right to participate in electoral activities. (Ex. P-6). Subsequent conversations between Plaintiffs and Defendant failed to resolve the issue.
This appeal was denied on August 26, 2003.
On August 25, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking an injunction to seat delegates at the convention and a Memorandum of Law in support thereof. Count I of the complaint alleges that Defendant violated Title I of the LMRDA when it refused to allow Plaintiffs to nominate and elect delegates from Local 30 to the International Union convention. Count II alleges that Defendant breached its contract with Plaintiffs by refusing to allow them to send delegates to the International Union convention. Defendant filed a response to this complaint on August 28, 2003 and a Memorandum of Law in support thereof.
Defendant now moves to dismiss Counts I and n on the basis that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant argues that both Counts are more properly characterized as Title IV claims, which must be filed with the Secretary of Labor, and not as Title I claims, which maybe filed in federal court. Second, Defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed because even if the facts alleged by Plaintiffs are accepted as true, they do not establish discrimination or a breach of contract which would entitle Plaintiffs to relief.
Before us is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), filed August 28, 2003, and Memorandum of Law in Support thereof and Plaintiffs' brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Preliminary Injunctive Relief, filed on August 29, 2003. For the reasons below, we grant Defendant's motion.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)
The LMRDA was enacted in 1959 to "eliminate or prevent improper practices on the part of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their officers and representatives which distort and defeat the policies of the Labor Management Relations Act" and the Railway Labor Act. 29 U.S.C. § 401(c). Titles I and IV of the LMRDA are at issue in this case. Title I, 29 U.S.C. § 411-415, establishes a "Bill of Rights" for members of labor organizations, while Title IV, 29 U.S.C. § 481-483, governs elections in labor organizations. Whether a complaint is brought under Title I or Title IV is significant because it determines the remedies available to the complainant. See Kraska v. United Mine Workers of America. 686 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1982). The "Bill of Rights" under Title I is enforceable at anytime in federal court by members of labor organizations. Id; 29 U.S.C. § 412. In contrast, the provisions governing elections in labor organizations are enforced first by exhausting the remedies available under the organization's constitution and bylaws and then filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. Kraska. 686 F.2d at 205; 29 U.S.C. § 482.
Although Titles I and IV provide distinct remedies, the scope of each Title is less clear. The provisions governing elections in Title IV also protect many of the rights granted in Title I. Local No. 82. Furniture Piano Movers. Furniture Store Drivers. Helpers. Warehousemen Pakcers. et al. v. Crowley et al., 467 U.S. 526, 539 (1984). Nonetheless, the Third Circuit has held, and the Supreme Court has agreed, that Title I concerns matters of discrimination, including equal rights of participation by union members in union affairs, freedom of speech and assembly and the right to sue. Crowlev. 467 U.S. at 536-537;Kraska. 686 F.2d at 205. Title IV, on the other hand, is largely confined to "union election procedures such as the frequency of elections, the distribution of campaign literature, the inspection of membership lists, the eligibility of candidates for office, campaign financing, and the removal of officers guilty of serious misconduct." Id.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that it is more properly characterized as a Title IV claim, over which this court would lack jurisdiction, and for failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons discussed below, we find that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims and that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Count I Alleging Violation of the "Bill of Rights" under the LMRDA
This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claim that Plaintiffs were discriminated against by Defendant when Defendant refused to allow the nomination and election of delegates to the International Union convention. Under Title I, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a):
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws.
By this language, Congress intended to "command that members and classes of members shall not be discriminated against in their right to nominate and vote." Calhoon v. Harvey. 379 U.S. 134, 139 (1964). Thus any claim brought under Title I must be supported by evidence that a labor organization is treating its members differently. That is not the case here. In the instant case, Plaintiffs argue that they have been discriminated against by Defendant because, unlike other members of the International who have paid their dues, they are not permitted to nominate and elect delegates to the International Union convention. PI. Mem. in Opposition to Def. Motion to Dismiss at 8. However, Article V(4) of the International's constitution states that
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article, a Local Union shall not be entitled to have its delegates accredited or permitted to exercise the rights of a delegate, unless all financial obligations due to the International Union from the Local Union shall have been paid in full for the period through the month of August of the year in which the convention is held.
Accordingly, local unions who are in debt to the International Union may not be allowed to send delegates to International Union conventions. Plaintiffs do not dispute Defendant's assertion that Local 30 is in fact in debt to the International. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not dispute that it is Defendant's longstanding policy not to allow local unions that have been put under trusteeship to send delegates to International Union conventions. It is on the basis of these provisions, Defendant maintains, that Plaintiffs were denied the right to nominate and elect delegates to the International Union convention. Since Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that they are being treated differently than other members of the International whose local unions are in debt to the International or under trusteeship, we can not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this claim.
Plaintiffs also argue that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over Count I because Title I guarantees them a fundamental right to vote and participate in union elections. However, the cases relied on by Plaintiffs do not support this proposition. Rather, they support the holdings discussed above, which conclude that Title I was designed to protect individual members of labor organizations from discrimination. InSickman v. Communications Workers of America. Local 13000. the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to force his union, Local 13000, to place him on the ballot for the election of secretary-treasurer. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17676 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff'd. mem. 230 F.3d 1344 (3d Cir. 2000). The election committee refused to put the plaintiff on the ballot because he had failed to comply with the committee's request to review the original signatures he had collected, some of which were identical to the opposition candidate. Id. at 4-5. Yet the election committee certified the candidacy of the opposing candidate despite the fact that she had failed to comply with the same request. Id. The court did not hold, as Plaintiffs suggest, that allowing one candidate to ignore the request, but not the other was a Title I violation on the grounds that those who had signed the petition were denied the right nominate and vote for a candidate. Rather, the court held that the complaint constituted a Title I violation because those who had signed plaintiffs candidacy petition were "deprived of their equal (emphasis added) right to nominate and vote, rights guaranteed by Title I." Id at 12.
Cupid v. Local 116 of Int'l Union of Electricians, cited by Plaintiffs, also fails to establish that Plaintiffs have a fundamental right to vote under Title I. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2007 (E.D. 1994), aff'd without op., 40 F.3d 1239, 147 LRRM [BNA] 2832 (3d Cir. 1995). The plaintiffs in Cupid argued that they had been denied a meaningful right to participate in a vote regarding a negotiated severance plan for laid off employees. Although the union placed notice of the scheduled vote on the employer's bulletin board, it failed to notify workers who were on sick leave or had already been laid off by the employer. Id. at 2-5. While the court did cite a case in a footnote which held that "members must be able to `mount effective support or opposition to the leadership's position,'" nowhere in its decision did it conclude that the union had violated plaintiffs' substantive right to vote under Title I. Id. at n. 3, citing Gilliam v. Independent Steelworkers Union. 572 F. Supp. 168, 171 (N.D.W.Va. 1983). The court merely denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether plaintiffs "enjoyed the right to participate in Local 116 affairs and whether Local 116 abrogated these rights in regard to the ratification of the Final Offer in violation of § 41 1(a)(1). This statement hardly constitutes authority for the proposition that Title I guarantees union members a fundamental right to vote. Upon further consideration, the court in Cupid might very well have concluded that plaintiffs rights under Title I were violated because they did not receive the same notice as members of the union who were still employed. The other cases cited by Plaintiffs, Denov v. Chicago Federation of Musicians. Local 10-208. 703 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1983), and Talley v. Feldman. 941 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Pa. 1996), are equally unpersuasive.
2. Count II Alleging Defendant's Breach of Contract with Plaintiffs
This court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count II, which alleges that Defendant breached its contract with Plaintiffs by refusing to allow them to nominate and elect delegates to the International Union convention. Plaintiffs correctly state that the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA") vests district courts with jurisdiction over violation of contracts between labor unions. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). This statute does not restrict itself to labor organizations, but entitles individual members of labor organizations to sue their unions for breach of contract. Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers. Local 71. 502 U.S. 93 (1991). Additionally, for purposes of this statute, the Supreme Court has held that a union's constitution and bylaws are deemed contracts. Id. at 501.
However, we still do not agree with Plaintiffs that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this claim because Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence of a breach of contract. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant breached its contract with Plaintiffs by refusing to comply with Article V of the International's constitution, which provides for the election of delegates. Pl.'s Motion for Injunctive Relief at 15. However, Plaintiffs again ignore Section 4 of Article V, which clearly states that "notwithstanding anything contained in this Article," local unions which are indebted to the International are not entitled to send delegates to International Union conventions. Since this qualification on the right to send delegates is clearly stated in the International's constitution and Defendant is acting consistently with it, we fail to see how Defendant's actions could be considered a breach of contract. Absent evidence of Defendant acting contrary to International's constitution and bylaws, we find that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim.
C. Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief can be Granted
1. Count I Alleging Violation of Plaintiffs Rights under Title I of the LMRDA
Plaintiffs allege in Count I that they are entitled to relief under Title I of the LMRDA for discriminatory treatment by Defendant. For purposes of this motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we will facially assume that we have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Accepting as true all allegations set forth by Plaintiffs, we find that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs argue that Article V of the International's constitution confers on members in good standing an unqualified right to elect delegates to the International Union convention. Article V(2) states that
Each Local Union shall be entitled to one delegate for fifty (50) members or less; two delegates for one hundred (100) members and one additional delegate for each additional one hundred (100) members or majority fraction thereof.
Since Plaintiffs have authorized their employer to withhold and remit earnings to Local 30 for the purpose of paying dues to the International, Plaintiffs contend they are members in good standing and are therefore entitled to send delegates to the convention. Plaintiffs argue that by allowing other members who have paid their dues to the International to vote, but not Plaintiffs, they are being discriminated against in violation of Title I. However, as Defendant points out, Article V(4) states that
a Local Union shall not be entitled to have its delegates accredited to the convention nor shall its delegates be accredited or permitted to exercise the rights of a delegate, unless all financial obligations due to the International Union from the Local Union shall have been paid in full for the period through the month of August of the year in which the convention is held.
Thus, the fact an individual member fulfills his or her individual financial obligation to the International by authorizing withholding of funds is immaterial, if the individual's local union is in debt to the International. Defendant asserts, and Plaintiffs' counsel does not dispute, that Local 30 continues to be in arrears to the International. Moreover, Article V(10) of the International's bylaws states:
Both parties have stipulated that Plaintiffs completed a "check-off authorization" card which authorized their employers to withhold money from their wages to be remitted to Local 30 for payment of dues to the International.
It is the duty of each member to see that his dues and obligations due to this International Union are promptly paid and no one else maybe held accountable for the payment or collection of such monies.
Thus unless Defendant is permitting some local union members who have authorized their employers to withhold dues, but whose local unions are in debt to the International, to send delegates, we cannot find that Defendant is discriminating against Plaintiffs. We are not unsympathetic to Plaintiffs' desire to participate in the convention, but as long as these provisions are being applied consistently to members of the International, and we have no reason to believe they are not, Plaintiffs have failed to establish facts which would entitle them to relief under this claim.
2. Count II Alleging Defendant Breached Its Contract with Plaintiffs
Count II of Plaintiffs complaint, alleging that Defendant breached its contract with Plaintiffs when it refused to allow them to send delegates to the International Union convention, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For purposes of this motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we will facially assume that we have subject matter jurisdiction over this Count. As stated above, Plaintiffs argue that Article V(2) of the International Constitution establishes Plaintiffs' right to send delegates to the International Union convention. Failure to comply with this provision, Plaintiffs assert, constitutes a breach contract with Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs again fail to acknowledge Article V(4) of the constitution, which states in relevant part
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article, a Local Union shall not be entitled to have its delegates accredited or permitted to exercise the rights of a delegate, unless all financial obligations due to the International Union from the Local Union shall have been paid in full for the period through the month of August of the year in which the convention is held.
This section of Article V states very clearly that the right to send delegates is a qualified right, one that may be restricted when a local union is in arrears to the International, as Local 30 is in this case. Defendant cannot be deemed to have committed a breach of contract for acting consistently with the provisions in the International's constitution. Since Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Defendant is acting inconsistently with the provisions of the International's constitution, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a claim upon which relief can be granted.
D. MERITS
We took stipulated evidence of Plaintiffs' entire case at the hearing. We did this under F.R.Civ.P. 43(e) for the purposes of the 12(b)(1) motion. Nevertheless, if we were to reach the merits, we would find for and enter judgment for Defendant because no discrimination has been proven and Defendant relies on valid provisions of the International's constitution and bylaws which expressly prevent Plaintiffs from electing delegates to the International Union convention.
It follows, then also, that Plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief. In order to grant injunctive relief, the moving party must establish (1) it has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury would be caused by denial of relief; (3) the absence of harm to other interested persons from the grant of injunctive relief; and (4) that the public interest would not be adversely affected. Morton v. Sever. 822 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1987). While all four factors are important, failure to show either the likelihood of success or irreparable harm "must necessarily result in the denial of a preliminary injunction." In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litigation. 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 1982). In other words, "unless both a `reasonable probability of eventual success' and `irreparable harm' are demonstrated, preliminary injunctive relief is not to be granted." Id.,citing Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz. 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982). Since Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate discrimination under Title I or a breach of contract by Defendant, they have failed to show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Thus, Plaintiffs are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief, even if they are able to demonstrate that irreparable harm would result from denial of the preliminary injunction.
IV. CONCLUSION
In granting Defendant's motion to dismiss, we find that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety and that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they were subjected to discriminatory treatment when Defendant refused to allow Local 30 to nominate and elect delegates to attend the International Union convention. Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a breach of contract by Defendant, since Defendant acted consistently with International's constitution in refusing to all Local 30 to send delegates to the International Union convention because Local 30 is in arrears to the International. Even accepting the facts in the most favorable light to Plaintiffs, we cannot find a complaint upon which relief can be granted.
An appropriate order follows.