Opinion
08 Civ. 1305 (DAB) 95 Cr. 942 (DAB)
05-08-2014
RONALD OCASIO, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On August 9, 2012, the Court denied Petitioner Ronald Ocasio ("Petitioner" or "Ocasio")'s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct His Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On January 25, 2013, the Court denied Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3 and dismissed his Petition for Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for lack of jurisdiction. Now before the Court is Petitioner's Motion for Relief from the Court's January 25, 2013 Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and 60(d).
"A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time--and for [motions under Rule 60(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3)] no more than a year after the entry of the . . . order" from which the party seeks relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). "A movant whose allegations properly fall under Rule 60(b)(3) but who inexcusably fails to file a timely claim for relief within Rule 60(b)(3)'s one year statute of limitations may not salvage the claim by filing under Rule 60(d)(3) instead." Rowe Entmt. v. William Morris Agency Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272, 2012 WL 5464611, at *2 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2012). Here, Petitioner does not make clear under which subsections of Rules 60(b) and 60(d) he brings his Motion. Because he filed his Motion more than one year after the January 25, 2013 entry of the Court's Order, any claims brought under Rule 60(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3) are time-barred. As Petitioner's delay in filing is inexcusable, his allegations of fraud, which properly fall under Rule 60(b)(3), may not be brought under Rule 60(d)(3). Rule 60(d)(2), which applies to a "defendant who was not personally notified of the action," is not relevant here. Accordingly, the Court will analyze Petitioner's Motion pursuant to the strictures of Rule 60(b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), and (d)(1).
The Court mailed its Order to Petitioner on January 25, 2013. According to the U.S. Postal Service's tracking system, the Order was delivered to Petitioner's address of record on January 30, 2013. Pursuant to the Prison Mailbox Rule, Petitioner filed his Rule 60 Motion on February 10, 2014, when he purchased postage for and prison authorities mailed the Motion to the Court. Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2001); (Ptr.'s Ltr. to S.D.N.Y. Clerk of Court, Apr. 22, 2014).
Petitioner cites to Bronx Assistant District Attorney Ravi Kantha's July 9, 2013 submission of Steven Kartagener's Affirmation as evidence that his Motion is timely. However, no later than August 2012, Petitioner was aware of all information in Kartagener's Affirmation relevant to the instant Motion. Accordingly, the July 2013 submission date does not provide an excuse for Petitioner's late filing of the Motion. --------
Rule 60(b)(4), (b)(5), and (b)(6) permit the Court to relieve a party from an order where, respectively and as relevant here, "the judgment is void"; "it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated[] or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable"; or for "any other reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4-6). "Under Rule 60(b)(4), a judgment is void 'only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.'" Lorenzana v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 6153, 2013 WL 4400526, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013) (citation omitted). "Rule 60(b)(5) may not be used to challenge the legal conclusions on which a prior judgment or order rests, but the Rule provides a means by which a party can ask a court to modify or vacate a judgment or order if 'a significant change either in factual conditions or in law' renders continued enforcement 'detrimental to the public interest.'" Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009) (citation omitted). Under Rule 60(b)(6), "an attack on the integrity of a previous habeas proceeding . . . is viable only in 'extraordinary circumstances,'" and to obtain relief based on the failures of habeas counsel, "a habeas petitioner must show that his lawyer abandoned the case and prevented the client from being heard, either through counsel or pro se." Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
Pursuant to Rule 60(d)(1), Rule 60(b) "does not limit a court's power to . . . entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a[n] . . . order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1). "To obtain equitable relief through an independent action, claimants must '(1) show that they have no other available or adequate remedy; (2) demonstrate that movants' own fault, neglect, or carelessness did not create the situation for which they seek equitable relief; and (3) establish a recognized ground--such as fraud, accident, or mistake--for the equitable relief.'" Marmolejas v. United States, No. 05 Civ. 10693, 2010 WL 3452386, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010) (quoting Campaniello Imports, Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia S.p.A., 117 F.3d 655, 661 (2d Cir. 1997)). "Independent actions under Rule 60(d)(1) are available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." Pena v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 2d 693, 698-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation and alteration omitted).
"[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is available with respect to a previous habeas proceeding only when the Rule 60(b) motion attacks the integrity of the habeas proceeding and not the underlying criminal conviction." Harris, 367 F.3d at 77. In contrast, "a Rule 60(b) motion that attacks the underlying conviction presents a district court with two procedural options: (i) the court may treat the Rule 60(b) motion as 'a second or successive' habeas petition, in which case it should be transferred to [the Second Circuit Court of Appeals] for possible certification, or (ii) the court may simply deny the portion of the motion attacking the underlying conviction 'as beyond the scope of Rule 60(b).'" Id. at 82 (citation omitted). "While it is not yet crystal clear whether the law governing Rule 60(b) motions made with respect to decisions in habeas proceedings applies also to Rule 60(d)," multiple courts within this district have found that it does. Salazar-Espinoza v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 247, 2012 WL 1788145, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012); see, e.g., Rivera v. United States, No. 94 Civ. 951, 2012 WL 1887133, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2012); Salazar-Espinoza, 2012 WL 1788145, at *1; Millan v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 8491, 2011 WL 5169443, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2011); Marmolejas, 2010 WL 3452386, at *4. This Court agrees.
Petitioner's arguments that the Government violated Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) and that the Court's jury instruction was improper directly attack his underlying conviction. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the portions of Petitioner's Motion devoted to these arguments as beyond the scope of Rule 60(b) and 60(d).
However, several other arguments in Ocasio's Motion "arguably attack[] the integrity of [his] habeas proceeding," and accordingly, the Court will consider those arguments on the merits. Harris, 367 F.3d at 80. Ocasio argues that Steven Kartagener, who served as Ocasio's counsel on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Petition between 2000 and 2012 (see Ptr.'s Rule 60 Mtn. A91-A92), provided ineffective assistance during the § 2255 proceedings. Here, Kartagener's failure to discover and bring to the Court's attention grand jury testimony in a case against Donald Saxon does not rise to the level of abandonment required by Rule 60(b)(6)'s treatment of ineffective assistance claims. See Harris, 367 F.3d at 82 (finding that attorney's "omissions as habeas counsel [and] sworn declaration to the Court confessing his ineffectiveness [did not] suggest that his performance approached a level of deficiency that could remotely be deemed 'abandonment' and therefore an 'extraordinary circumstance'"). Moreover, Kartagener's alleged ten-year abandonment of the case did not prevent Ocasio from being heard, because the Court tolled the limitations period and duly considered the Petition filed by Kartagener on February 8, 2008.
Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim also does not meet the requirements of Rule 60(b)(4), (b)(5), or (d)(1). Here, Ocasio does not argue that the Court lacked jurisdiction, and the Court's actions with regard to Ocasio's counsel and Petition were consistent with due process of law. No significant change in factual conditions or law renders the Court's enforcement of its Order detrimental to the public interest. Nor did Kartagener's behavior lead to a grave miscarriage of justice.
Next, Petitioner argues that the Court wrongfully issued the January 25, 2013 Order without conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, where a district court has "all the relevant facts to evaluate [Petitioner]'s petition," it may "deny[] his petition, as a matter of law, without holding an evidentiary hearing." Reilly v. Morton, 213 F.3d 626 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 ("A court . . . entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to [respond], unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.") (emphasis added).
Here, the Court had all relevant facts necessary to evaluate Petitioner's § 2241 and § 2255 Petitions, and none of the factual issues on which Petitioner seeks a hearing would have affected the Court's decisions. Primarily, Ocasio seeks a hearing on the extent to which the Government knew about and failed to disclose the existence of the Saxon grand jury testimony. However, the Court found that the testimony and Saxon's habeas petition could not "reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court" (Jan. 25, 2013 Order 5), and the Government's knowledge of or failure to disclose this evidence had absolutely no bearing on the outcome of Ocasio's Petitions. Ocasio also argues that an evidentiary hearing would be useful to determine the extent of Kartagener's failure to investigate the Saxon case and his abandonment of Ocasio's case. However, even assuming Kartagener failed to investigate the Saxon case and abandoned the case between 2001 and 2008 and after filing the Petition in 2008, the Court would not find that his actions prevented Ocasio from being heard. Accordingly, as a matter of law, the Court's decision not to order an evidentiary hearing does not make its Order void or inequitable. Nor is a hearing warranted due to extraordinary circumstances or for any other reason.
Petitioner also argues that it was unreasonable for the Court to find that he could have raised his allegations regarding the Saxon grand jury testimony at an earlier time. This finding, however, was only one of three reasons supporting the Court's holding that it had no jurisdiction over Ocasio's § 2241 Petition. (Jan. 25, 2013 Order 6-9.) Ocasio does not contest the Court's findings that his § 2241 Petition challenged the imposition of his sentence and that he could not prove actual innocence on the existing record, and nothing before the Court permits finding differently now. Accordingly, the Court's holding that it had no jurisdiction over Petitioner's § 2241 Petition must stand, and relief from this holding is not warranted.
Petitioner's Motion is also DENIED as to his remaining arguments, which merely relitigate arguments made in his prior Motions and Petitions. "A party 'may not use Rule 60(b) as a substitute for appeal or to relitigate matters already resolved by the court adversely to that party.'" Espinal v. United States, No. 91 Cr. 310, 2006 WL 163179, at *2 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2006) (alteration and citation omitted). Nor may Ocasio use Rule 60(d) to relitigate issues previously decided by the Court. See Mims v. United States, No. 3:08 Civ. 1400, 2010 WL 3025226, at *2 (D. Conn. July 30, 2010) (dismissing petitioner's Rule 60(d) motion where he "only seeks to relitigate issues that have already been decided").
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's Motion for Relief from the Court's January 25, 2013 Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and 60(d) is DENIED. As the Motion makes no substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Further, the Court finds, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith. SO ORDERED. Dated: May 8, 2014
New York, New York
/s/_________
Deborah A. Batts
United States District Judge