Opinion
Civil No. 02CV2502 JAH (POR).
February 22, 2006
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DOC. NO. 41]
INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 2005, Defendant Sherry Davidson ("Defendant") filed a motion for summary judgment in this case. Oral arguments were heard on October 27, 2005, with appearances by Ray Vecchio for Plaintiff Michael O'Bryan (hereinafter "Plaintiff") and Susan Coleman for Defendant. This Court, after hearing the oral argument of counsel, took the matter under submission. Now, after a careful consideration of the pleadings, relevant exhibits, the oral argument of counsel at the hearing, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Michael William O'Bryan ("Plaintiff"), a resident of the state of Florida, filed a complaint on December 18, 2002, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as rights under the California Constitution by the California Department of Corrections and an unnamed California Parole Agent. He filed an amended complaint on March 7, 2003, adding claims of Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. See Doc. No. 5. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested in the State of Florida "at the behest, direction, and based upon false and misleading documentation provided by Defendant." Id. at 2.
On April 7, 2003, Defendants California Department of Corrections and California Parole Agent filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. Doc. No. 7. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, see Doc. No. 9, and Defendants filed a reply. Doc. No. 10. The Honorable Judith N. Keep took the matter under submission on May 12, 2003. Doc. No. 11. On June 5, 2003, Judge Keep granted Defendants California Department of Corrections and California Parole Agent's motion to dismiss the first amended complaint based on Eleventh Amendment Immunity, and granted Plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint. Doc. No. 12.
Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on July 7, 2003, in which he added James W. Nielsen, Sherry Davidson and Janet Williams as defendants. See Doc. No. 13. This case was transferred to this Court on November 18, 2003. See Doc. No. 14.
On September 24, 2004, Defendants Nielsen and Davidson filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Doc. No. 27. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion and Defendants Nielsen and Davidson subsequently filed a reply. Doc. Nos. 29 and 30. The Court took the motion under submission without oral argument on November 1, 2004. On February 16, 2005, the court granted Defendant Nielsen's motion based on absolute immunity, and denied Defendant Davidson's motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Doc. No. 36.
On July 26, 2005, Defendant Davidson ("Defendant") filed the instant motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity and governmental immunity. Doc. No. 41. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion on September 14, 2005. See Doc. No. 49. Defendant filed a reply on September 22, 2005. Doc. No. 50. Oral arguments were heard on October 27, 2005, and the matter subsequently taken under submission by this Court.
DISCUSSION
1. Legal StandardA. Summary Judgment Motion
Summary judgment is properly granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Entry of summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Where the party moving for summary judgment does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it may show that no genuine issue of material fact exists by demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. The moving party is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, nor is it required to offer evidence negating the moving party's claim. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); United Steelworkers v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989). "Rather, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the District Court demonstrates that the standard for entry of judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Lujan, 497 U.S. at 885 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).
Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion, who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Without specific facts to support the conclusion, a bald assertion of the "ultimate fact" is insufficient. See Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1991). A material fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and the existence of which might affect the outcome of the suit. The materiality of a fact is thus determined by the substantive law governing the claim or defense. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. T.W. Electrical Service, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). "Qualified immunity is `an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001), quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526; Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that because qualified immunity is "`an entitlement not to stand trial' . . . courts, not juries, [must] settle the ultimate questions of qualified immunity."). Thus, the Supreme Court has "stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
"[Q]uite aside from the special concerns regarding the need for early resolution of matters concerning immunity, litigants are ordinarily entitled to resolution of their summary judgment motions through a determination whether there are material facts in dispute regarding the elements necessary to establish liability." Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
In Katz, the Court set forth a threshold question when analyzing qualified immunity eligibility in a suit: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry."Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Id.
Even if a constitutional violation were found, plaintiffs must still meet the additional hurdle of finding "whether the right was clearly established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The Supreme Court found that this second inquiry "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id. Thus, "the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been `clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id., citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) ("[A]s explained in Anderson, the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established"). "If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate." Id. at 195; see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law")).
2. Analysis
Defendant seeks summary judgment based on qualified immunity, as well as governmental immunity against Plaintiff's state law claims.
A. Qualified Immunity
Defendant argues that she is shielded from liability under qualified immunity because Plaintiff, at the time the arrest warrant was issued, "was a parolee at large who had left the jurisdiction and was no longer being supervised, in violation of the terms of his parole." See Doc. No. 42 at 5. As support, Defendant points to evidence that Plaintiff knew prior written authorization was necessary for transfer to another state, that Plaintiff previously applied for, and received, prior written authorization for transfer from California to Louisiana, and that Plaintiff previously had applied for, and received, prior written transfer for temporary visits to Mississippi. Id. at 5-6. Defendant also contends that Plaintiff was not under any form of parole supervision in Mississippi, and therefore, had absconded from parole and was lawfully subject to arrest. Id.
Plaintiff argues that although he never received written authorization, he did receive verbal authorization by Defendant before he moved to Mississippi with his spouse. Doc. No. 49 at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant "authorized his move to Mississippi, and assured Plaintiff that she would `take care of everything,' meaning the necessary paperwork required for his official transfer to Mississippi." Id. Based on her alleged statement, Plaintiff moved to Mississippi believing necessary arrangements would be made by Defendant. Plaintiff provides undisputed evidence from his Louisiana parole agent's field notes that document his intent to relocate to Mississippi, and a conversation with Plaintiff where Plaintiff stated that he "has spoken to Calif. agent for O.K. to stay in Miss." Doc. No. 49 at Exh. 2.
Defendant objects to Exhibits 1 and 3 proffered by Plaintiff as containing hearsay correspondence, but does not object to Exhibit 2, a copy of the Louisiana Parole Agent's field notes. See Doc. No. 51. The Court does not address Defendant's evidentiary objections here because Exhibits 1 and 3 were not considered in the formation of this Order.
1. First Inquiry: Establishment of a Constitutional Right
The first inquiry for the Court under Saucier, is "whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged." 533 U.S. at 200. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations, in particular Plaintiff's "clearly established right to be secure in his person from unreasonable seizures . . . and/or his substantive due process rights not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law." See Cplt. at 5. Plaintiff alleges Defendant caused him "to be unlawfully arrested and incarcerated against his will for an unreasonable period of time depriving him of his constitutional rights of liberty." Id.
Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals generally have the right not to be seized or arrested absent probable cause. Plaintiff, however, was a parolee at the time the arrest warrant was issued. The Supreme Court has made clear that parolees have a more limited liberty interest than ordinary citizens. See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) ("Revocation [of parole] deprive an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions."). In United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), the Supreme Court interpreted this lesser standard to require only reasonable suspicion to justify a search of a probationer's home. Id. at 119-21. The Court cited a limited privacy interest of the probationer and increased governmental interest in closely monitoring an individual who is "more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law." Id. Therefore, in deciding whether a constitutional violation occurred in the instant matter, Defendant need only show reasonable suspicion for issuing the arrest warrant and revoking Plaintiff's parole status in order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment standard.
Defendant frames this issue as "whether Defendant Davidson violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights by recommending Plaintiff's parole be suspended and an arrest warrant issued." Doc. No. 42 at 5. Plaintiff, in contrast, contends the first inquiry should be "whether Defendant Davidson violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights by issuing a miscellaneous decision . . . while knowing she did not have jurisdiction to issue such an affidavit, and being the only agent in California in possession of information regarding Plaintiff's whereabouts and reporting details." Doc. No. 49 at 7.
a. Jurisdiction
Plaintiff claims his constitutional rights were violated in part because, although Defendant had no jurisdiction over Plaintiff, she submitted a miscellaneous decision in support of revoking Plaintiff's parole. Doc. No. 49 at 6. Defendant Davidson points out that it was her duty to make the recommendation to suspend Plaintiff's parole, because he was a parolee at large who had left the jurisdiction and was no longer being supervised by both California and Louisiana. Defendant points to California Department of Corrections Regulations, which states:
A California Interstate parole (California parolee supervised in another state) absconds when the parolee becomes unavailable for supervision. A suspension action and warrant are necessary to arrest and detain any California Interstate Parolee who is not in California or the authorized receiving state. California Interstate absconders will be reported to the BPT.
DOM § 81060.13. Doc. No. 42, Ex. D. Plaintiff argues that although California had jurisdiction to issue the warrant, Defendant personally did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 6. Plaintiff submits as support Defendant's deposition testimony stating that upon notice of acceptance from the Louisiana parole agency, Defendant should have transferred Plaintiff's file to the Interstate Unit in Sacramento, which would have terminated Defendant's involvement in the case. Id. at 4. Instead, Defendant allegedly retained the file and continued correspondence with Plaintiff. Id.
In a summary judgment motion, the materiality of a fact is determined by the substantive law governing the claim or defense.T.W. Electrical, 809 F.2d at 630. Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's act of not closing his file and transferring it to the proper authorities is a material fact. However, Defendant's actions in not transferring the file to Sacramento was not a cause of any violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Accordingly, no constitutional violation of Plaintiff's rights occurred based on an alleged lack of jurisdiction by Defendant.
b. Verbal Authorizations
Plaintiff next argues that he relied on Defendant's continued communications and verbal authorizations when he moved to Mississippi without prior written authorization, which caused him to be arrested in violation of his constitutional rights. Doc. No. 49 at 6. Defendant argues that any communication or verbal authorization is irrelevant to this inquiry. Doc. No. 42 at 6. Instead, Defendant points out that Plaintiff did not receive the required written authorization to move to Mississippi that was required under both California and Louisiana law. Id. This parole violation, therefore, gave Defendant reasonable suspicion to apply for revocation of Plaintiff's parole and issue an arrest warrant.
Defendant is correct that, in hindsight, Plaintiff should have known he was violating parole. However, the essential inquiry by Defendant is misplaced regarding Plaintiff's alleged verbal authorization by Defendant to relocate to Mississippi. Instead, the relevant inquiry should be whether Defendant, allegedly knowing that verbal authorization was given to Plaintiff for his requested move, and allegedly knowing of Plaintiff's whereabouts in Mississippi, falsely reported Plaintiff's violation of his parole condition in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful arrest and seizure. A parolee's rights under the Fourth Amendment may be violated if an "officer knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, makes false statements in requesting" and receiving a warrant for a parolee's arrest. See Knox v. Smith, 342 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 1997).
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court finds that Plaintiff provides sufficient support to demonstrate his constitutional rights were violated by Defendant's actions. First, notes from Plaintiff's parole officer in Louisiana, Ms. Janet Williams, corroborates Plaintiff's statement that he received verbal authorization from Defendant. See Doc. No. 44, Decl. of Jason Hooge, Exh. B. When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court finds that Plaintiff may have received verbal instructions from Defendant to move to Mississippi, as he has alleged in his complaint.
Second, Defendant presents conflicting information regarding Plaintiff's whereabouts on or before December 12, 1997, and therefore calls into question the veracity of the miscellaneous decision that she provided in support of revoking Plaintiff's parole. In her declaration, Defendant stated that "[o]n, or before December 12, 1997, I learned in response to an inquiry that Louisiana had closed its file on O'Bryan because he had moved to Mississippi." Doc. No. 46, Decl. S. Davidson at ¶ 9. That Defendant knew or should have known Plaintiff's location was corroborated by the Louisiana parole office's files on Plaintiff with Plaintiff's address and employment, as well as the notes compiled by Ms. Williams, Plaintiff's parole officer. See, e.g., Doc. No. 46, Decl. S. Davidson, Exh. C.
Defendant, however, listed Plaintiff's current location as "unknown" in her miscellaneous decision to the Board of Prison Terms ("BPT"), despite the information provided to her by the Louisiana parole board, and her knowledge during the relevant period as evidenced in her declaration. See Doc. No. 46, Decl. S. Davidson, Exh. E. When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court concludes that although Defendant did know of Plaintiff's whereabouts, and his efforts to inform the California parole authorities of his whereabouts, she falsely reported to the BPT of Plaintiff's absconding from parole, and withheld information that could have explained Plaintiff's actions.
Therefore, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court finds the complaint sufficiently alleges that the officer's conduct violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights in connection with Plaintiff's arrest and parole revocation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
2. Second Inquiry: Reasonableness of Defendant's Actions
Even if this Court finds that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated by Defendant, the Court in applying qualified immunity must still determine whether "the contours of the right was sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.Defendant argues that qualified immunity should attach because she "believed her actions were lawful" in light of the information she had before her. Doc. No. 42 at 7. Defendant contends that the proper inquiry should be "whether a reasonable parole officer could have reasonably believed it was lawful to recommend the suspension of parole and arrest of a California Interstate parolee who left the authorized receiving state without prior written authorization." Id. at 8. In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's experience with the parole system, his prior written authorizations for travel to Louisiana, and his prior written authorizations for travel to Mississippi gave Plaintiff sufficient notice that he was in violation of his parole when he decided to move to Mississippi without prior written authorization. Id.
Plaintiff rebuts that Defendant cannot avoid liability if the affidavit she submitted in support of obtaining the arrest warrant was false. Plaintiff, thus, frames his inquiry as "whether a reasonably well-trained officer [in the same position] would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant." Doc. No. 49 at 7.
Although the Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue of parole officers and falsification of arrest warrants, the Ninth Circuit has previously addressed the role of parole officers when performing a law enforcement function, such as obtaining an arrest warrant, as "`more akin to that of a police officer.'" See Swift, 384 F.3d at 1190 n. 4. Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), it is clearly established law that police officers violate the Fourth Amendment if a "defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause." Id. at 155-156. Thus, reasonable parole officers would know that they violate the Fourth Amendment if they "knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, make false statements in requesting the warrant and the false statements were necessary to the determination that a warrant should issue." Knox, 342 F.3d at 658; see also Zupan v. Brown, 5 F.Supp.2d 792, 800-801 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (clearly established law when parole officers issue arrest warrants in the absence of reasonable suspicion). At the time of this incident, the law was defined at the appropriate level of specificity to put the officer on notice that her conduct would be clearly unlawful. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615.
A reasonable parole officer in Defendant's position would know that giving verbal authorization for Plaintiff's move, and subsequently filing for an arrest warrant knowing that permission was given and knowing Plaintiff's whereabouts, would have violated clearly established law against falsification or omission of material statements to obtain an arrest warrant. The BPT, relying on Defendant's statements, would have found material the information allegedly omitted from Defendant's affidavit that Plaintiff moved to Mississippi after receiving verbal permission from Defendant.
This Court finds that the law is sufficiently clear to put a reasonable parole officer on notice that the conduct exhibited by Defendant "was unlawful in the situation [s]he confronted." See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. As such, summary judgment based upon qualified immunity is inappropriate. Accordingly, this Court DENIES Defendant's summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
B. Governmental Immunity
Defendant additionally claims that she is entitled to governmental immunity against Plaintiff's state constitutional claims. California Government Code § 845.8 states in relevant part:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: (a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release or from determining whether to revoke his parole or release.
Defendant contends that the statute grants parole agents immunity "for actions related to the determination of whether to revoke parole and any actions taken during the revocation process." Doc. No. 42 at 10, citing Swift v. Dep't of Corrections, 116 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371-72 (2004). Plaintiff presents no arguments against Defendant's claims.
In Swift, the California Appellate court interpreted section 845.8 as "provid[ing] immunity to a parole officer for making discretionary decisions and for taking action as a parole officer which ultimately leads to the revocation of a person's parole." 116 Cal.App.4th at 1370. The appeals court noted that such immunity extends even to the negligent supervision of parolees by parole agents. Id. at 1371. Thus, the court found immunity for parole agents of the California Department of Corrections even where parole agents issued a report recommending arrest and revocation of parole based on false information. Id. at 1373; see also Kim v. Walker, 208 Cal.App.3d 375, 382 (1989) (parole officer immunity "for any injury resulting from the performance of his duties as a parole officer in revoking . . . parole.").
This Court finds Defendant's arguments persuasive. Section 845.8 provides "absolute immun[ity] for the supervision of [Plaintiff] and revocation of his parole," even where a parole agent negligently supervises a parolee by producing a falsified report in support of revoking his parole. Kim, 208 Cal.App.3d at 382. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's state law claims are GRANTED.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff's federal law claims.
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's state law claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.