Opinion
CV-22-00553-TUC-SHR-BGM
07-21-2023
Jennifer Obiol, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald, United States Magistrate Judge.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jennifer Obiol's appeal from the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's (SSA) denial of social security benefits. (Doc. 16-3). The appeal is fully briefed. (Doc. 17, Doc. 19). This matter was referred to the Court on February 14, 2023, for pretrial proceedings and a report and recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 and 72.2 of the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. (Doc. 15). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review, remand this matter for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Overview
Plaintiff was 22 years old on her alleged disability onset date of November 1, 2018. (Doc. 16-3 at 36, 50). She has a high school education and completed one year of college. (Id. At 50). Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (Id.) On March 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed applications for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). (Id. at 36). The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied these claims initially on December 8. 2020, and upon reconsideration on September 15, 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing, which occurred via telephone on February 17, 2022. (Id.) The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision on March 10, 2022, finding that from the alleged disability onset date to the date of the decision, Plaintiff was not disabled under Section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (Id. At 51). On November 16, 2022, the SSA Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision as final. (Doc. 14 at 2).
B. The SSA's Five-Step Evaluation Process
To qualify for social security disability insurance benefits, a claimant must show that she “is under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). To be “under a disability,” the claimant must be unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity” due to any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. Id. § 423(d)(1). The impairment must be of such severity that the claimant cannot do his previous work or any other substantial gainful work within the national economy. Id. § 423(d)(2). The SSA has created a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). The steps are followed in order, and each step is potentially dispositive. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4).
At Step One, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in “substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that is (1) “substantial,” i.e., doing “significant physical or mental activities;” and (2) “gainful,” i.e., usually done “for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a)-(b). If the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful work activity, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).
At Step Two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has “a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment” or severe “combination of impairments.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be “severe,” the claimant's impairment must “significantly limit” the claimant's “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable impairment (MDI) or combination of impairments, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).
At Step Three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant's impairment(s) “meets or equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant is disabled, but if not, the ALJ must assess the claimant's “residual functional capacity” (RFC) before proceeding to Step Four. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(e). The claimant's RFC is her ability to do physical and mental work activities “despite his limitations,” based on all relevant evidence in the case record. Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). To determine RFC, the ALJ must consider all the claimant's impairments, including those that are not “severe,” and any related symptoms that “affect what [the claimant] can do in a work setting.” Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(1)-(2).
At Step Four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform the physical and mental demands of “[her] past relevant work” given her RFC. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(e). “Past relevant work” is work the claimant has “done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant has the RFC to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the ALJ will proceed to Step Five in the sequential evaluation process.
At Step Five, the last in the sequence, the ALJ considers whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work,” considering her RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(v). If the claimant can make this adjustment, the ALJ will find the claimant not disabled; if the claimant cannot, the ALJ will find the opposite. Id.
Here, at Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 1, 2018, the alleged onset date. (Doc. 16-3 at 39).
At Step Two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the severe impairments of bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, personality disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. (Id.)
At Step Three, the ALJ ascertained that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Thus, Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: the claimant has the ability to occasionally adapt to changes in the workplace, but she cannot perform any high production rate jobs.” (Id. at 42).
At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work based on lack of substantial gainful activity within the last 15 years or 15 years prior to the alleged disability date. (Id. at 50).
At Step Five-the final step-the ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. (Doc. 16-3 at 39-51). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. (Id. at 51).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
This Court may not set aside a final denial of disability benefits unless the ALJ decision is “based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)). Substantial evidence refers to “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). The Court, in its review, must consider the record in its entirety, “weighing both the evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [ALJ's] conclusion.” Id. (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2007)).
The ALJ-not this Court-is responsible for resolving ambiguities, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and drawing logical inferences from the medical record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984)). Therefore, when the evidence of record could result in more than one rational interpretation, “the ALJ's decision should be upheld.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, this Court may only review the reasons the ALJ provides in the disability determination; it “may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff presents two issues in this appeal: (1) whether the ALJ committed error in determining the Plaintiff's RFC by underrating the severity of or ignoring impairments at Step Two and failing to seek an expert medical opinion, and (2) whether the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for her rejection of Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. (See Doc 17 at 2). The Court considers each issue in turn.
A. Step Two and RFC Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by neglecting to recognize Plaintiff's physiological MDIs and somatic symptom disorder at Step Two, leading to further error in failing to account for associated limitations when determining the RFC. (Doc. 17 at 89). The Commissioner contends that the ALJ provided sufficient consideration to all of Plaintiff's impairments and their related limitations, based her decisions on substantial evidence, and thus committed no error. (Doc. 19 at 6-9).
“Somatic symptom disorder” is formerly known as “somatoform disorder,” which is the term Plaintiff uses in her opening and reply briefs. Goodman, Brenda, Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders, WEBMD (Dec. 16, 2022), https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/somatoform-disorders-symptoms-types-treatment; (See generally Doc. 17; Doc. 22).
Step Two of the ALJ's analysis is a de minimis screening tool intended to eliminate groundless or weak claims; however, it is not meant to identify the MDIs the ALJ considers in assessing a claimant's RFC. John A. v. Saul, No. C18-5982-MAT, 2019 WL 2616594, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2019) (citing Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2017)). An ALJ is required to consider all MDI's, severe or not, when determining the RFC. (Id. at *3) (citing SSR 96-8p). The establishment of an MDI occurs through “anatomical, physiological or psychological abnormalities” which objective medical evidence supports. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921. Though neither a statement of symptoms nor a medical source's diagnosis are alone sufficient to establish an MDI, a single diagnosis can be enough to necessitate a discussion of impairment at Step Two. See Katie E. B. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-2354-MDD, 2022 WL 459062, at *3 (S.D. Cali. Sept. 30, 2022) (citing Dunn v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-0588 JRC, 2014 WL 1053273, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 2014) (determining that a single hypochondriasis disorder diagnosis compelled discussion at Step Two)).
When an ALJ decides Step Two in favor of a claimant while taking all severe and non-severe MDIs into account at Step Four, a claimant cannot demonstrate prejudice on the part of the ALJ. John A., 219 WL 2616594, at *3 (citing Buck, 869 F.3d at 1048-49; SSR 96-8p). Thus, even if an ALJ commits error by finding an impairment non-severe at Step Two, the error is harmless if the ALJ considers the limitations associated with the non-severe impairment at Step Four. Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007).
1) Physiological MDIs
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining there was no “severe medically determinable physical stomach impairment” at Step Two, resulting in the later error of failing to consider attendant limitations in the RFC determination. (Doc. 17 at 8-9). Plaintiff contends that this determination is “not based on substantial evidence.” (Doc. 17 at 8).
Here, at Step Two, the ALJ identifies multiple physical stomach-related diagnoses as non-severe impairments, including gastroparesis and irritable bowel syndrome; the ALJ also references abdominal migraines later in the Step Two analysis. The ALJ addressed gastroparesis and irritable bowel syndrome at Step Two and concluded these impairments were non-severe:
Regarding gastroparesis and irritable bowel syndrome, in 2014, the claimant was diagnosed with gastroparesis and lost a lot of weight. However, despite the weight loss, on January
5, 2017, she still weighed [193.5 pounds], and her Body Mass. Index (BMI) was 32.2 kg/m2, which indicated obesity. On November 21, 2018, the claimant told an examining physician that she treated her gastroparesis with anti-nausea medication, eating . . ., and standing under hot water. On May 22, 2020, the claimant went to Adobe Gastroenterology. The examining physician wrote that there was no evidence of ongoing gastroparesis and no obvious anatomical problem had been identified with endoscopy and imaging. On April 27, 2021, the claimant went to St. Joseph's Hospital where she reported nausea and vomiting. The claimant said she had been on medications for gastroparesis, but that two weeks earlier, she had stopped taking her medications. A small bowel barium examination with films, performed September 27, 2021, found a mildly delayed small bowel transit time of four hours and 50 minutes, but otherwise, a small bowel follow-through was negative. Spot compression views of the terminal ileum were unremarkable. The visualized portions of the duodenum, jejunum, and ileum showed no significant mucosal irregularity, filing defects, extrinsic compression, or masses.(Doc. 16-3 at 39) (internal citations omitted). Regarding abdominal migraines, the ALJ stated, “progress notes from treating physician Bradley Johnson, M.D., on December 13, 2019 state that the claimant was taking 25 milligrams of Topamax BID (bis in die, or twice daily) for abdominal migraines.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
To show the existence of a severe impairment, a claimant must establish that there is “more than a minimal effect on [her] ability to do basic work activities.” Jiminez v. Astrue, 641 F.Supp.2d 954, 960 (C.D. Cali. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). These activities include:
Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; [c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; [understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; [u]se of judgment; [Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and [d]ealing with changes in a routine
work setting.20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). The threshold for demonstrating a severe impairment is low and is intended “to screen out weak claims.” Buck, 869 F.3d at 1048.
Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ “overlooked that [Plaintiff's] stomach had been surgically corrected to treat gastroparesis, which could reasonably be expected to alter results of gastric emptying studies.” (Doc. 17 at 9). Further, Plaintiff argues that despite this surgery, Plaintiff “continued to have a motility disorder” revealed by the appearance of slowed small bowel motility on two gastric emptying studies completed six months apart. (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ incorrectly disregarded Plaintiff's abdominal migraines as a severe MDI because Plaintiff denied migraine headaches. (Id. at 8-9). Because of the foregoing, the Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not consider “limitations stemming from stomach pain or nausea in determining limitation,” affecting the RFC determination. (Id. at 8).
Here, at Step Two, the ALJ determined that physical stomach-related MDIs were non-severe for several reasons. First, the ALJ noted that after treatment for gastroparesis- including eating, anti-nausea medication, and standing under hot water- and for abdominal migraines-BID Topamax administration-a small bowel barium examination revealed one instance of “mildly delayed small bowel transit time,” but all other gastroenterological endoscopy and imaging revealed normal findings. (Doc. 16-3 at 4). Second, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's reports of nausea and vomiting during a hospital visit occurred after Plaintiff had stopped taking her medications for gastroparesis. (Id.) And third, although the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's gastrointestinal impairments were not severe, she still considered the impairments in the RFC determination. (Id.) (“The undersigned considered all of the claimant's medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe, when assessing the claimant's residual functional capacity.”) (Id. at 5).
The Court concludes that the ALJ gave legally sufficient reasons to conclude that Plaintiff's gastrointestinal, or physical stomach-related, impairments were not severe. Although alternative interpretation of the evidence could have resulted in the opposite conclusion, this Court must uphold the ALJ's decision when the evidence of record could result in more than one rational interpretation. Orn, 495 F.3d at 630.
2) Somatic Symptom Disorder
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in failing to identify somatic symptom disorder as an MDI at Step Two. (Doc. 17 at 8-9).
In the Commissioner's Listing of Impairments, “somatic symptom disorder, illness anxiety disorder, and conversion disorder” appear under the Mental Disorder category of “somatic symptom and related disorders.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00(B)(6)(a). The signs and symptoms of this category of disorders include “pain and other abnormalities of sensation, gastrointestinal symptoms, fatigue, a high level of anxiety about personal health issues, abnormal motor movement, pseudoseizures, and pseudoneurological symptoms, such as deafness or blindness.” Id. These signs and symptoms “cannot be fully explained by a general medical condition [or] another mental disorder,” nor are they “intentionally produced or feigned.” Id.
The Court's survey of the record revealed one definitive diagnosis of “somatic symptom disorder [,] moderate-severe [,] predominately pain” following a psychiatric evaluation by Nurse Practitioner Padilla in November 2018. (Doc. 16-8 at 95). Further, State Medical Consultant and psychologist Dr. Malone reported that Plaintiff “had a mood disturbance partly tied to somatic issues which seem chronic” in September 2021. (Doc. 16-3 at 48; Doc. 16-4 at 14). Review of Plaintiff's record reveals several signs and symptoms throughout that are consistent with somatic symptom disorder-i.e., “pain and other abnormalities of sensation,” “gastrointestinal symptoms,” “fatigue,” and “a high level of anxiety about personal health issues.” (See, e.g., Doc. 16-4 at 14, 29, 48, 49, 52, 73, 74; Doc. 16-8 at 13, 128, 134, 136). However, the ALJ does not mention somatic symptom disorder or discuss whether the disorder is an MDI at Step Two. (See Doc. 16-3 at 39). And although after Step Two the ALJ does provide a single mention each of NP Padilla's and Dr. Malone's above diagnoses in a review of objective medical evidence, ALJ provides no additional reference to or analysis of “somatic symptom disorder” or “mood disturbance partly tied to somatic issues.” (See id. at 44, 48; see generally id.). Notably, the ALJ does not demonstrate that she considered limitations related to somatic symptom disorder at Step Four; thus, its omission at Step Two cannot be considered harmless. See Lewis, 498 F.3d at 911.
At Step Four, the ALJ determined that the claimant has no past relevant work. (Doc. 163 at 50). Thus, no analysis of whether Plaintiff's RFC enabled her to perform the physical and mental demands of “[her] past relevant work” was necessary. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(e).
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ considered NP Padilla's somatic symptom diagnosis by finding State Medical Consultant Dr. Strause's opinion persuasive. (Doc. 19 at 9). As the Commissioner notes, the ALJ agreed with Dr. Strause's conclusion that Plaintiff had “no significant somatic MDI established that would impose any physical limitations for a period of 12 consecutive months.” (Id.; Doc. 16-4 at 12) (emphasis added). But Plaintiff remarks that the term “somatic MDI” is not synonymous with “somatic symptom disorder.” (Doc. 22 at 3). Indeed, in the same report, Dr. Strause refers to “gastroparesis and abdominal migraines” as “Somatic Allegations,” and nowhere in the report does Dr. Strause refer to Plaintiff's mental health diagnoses or symptoms. (Doc. 16-4 at 12) (emphasis added). This indicates that Dr. Strause's use of the term “ somatic ” in his report is not in reference to a somatic symptom disorder diagnosis; rather, it is tantamount to the terms “physical” or “physiological.” As the Court “cannot affirm the ALJ on a ground on which [she] did not rely,” the Commissioner's argument is unpersuasive. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010.
Accordingly, it is evident to this Court that Plaintiff's record merited a Step Two discussion regarding whether Somatic Symptom Disorder is an MDI. At Step Two, the ALJ was responsible for explaining whether Plaintiff's somatic symptom disorder was an MDI-if so, the ALJ should then have determined its severity. See, e.g., Katie E. B., 2022 WL 459062, at *4; John A., 2019 WL 2616594, at *3; Adila B. v. Kijakazi, No. 4:20-CV-5171-EFS, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33607, at *18-19 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 2022). The ALJ erred in failing to do so.
Additionally, the Court cannot conclude the ALJ's error in failing to acknowledge somatic symptom disorder at Step Two was harmless, because this error was not “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Katie E. B., 2022 WL 459062, at *4 (citing Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 2015)). For instance, somatic symptom disorder can provide credibility to purported symptoms otherwise subject to rejection as feigned or unsubstantiated. Id. (citing Adila B., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33607, at *18-19). Moreover, if at Step Two an ALJ disregards a legitimate case of somatic symptom disorder as a potential MDI, then it is doubtful that she will account for corresponding symptoms at any of the remaining stages of the disability analysis. Id. (citing Adila B., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33607, at *18-19; John A., 2019 WL 2616594, at *3 (the court determined ALJ's failure to recognize or discuss somatic symptom disorder at Step Two was not harmless as it “impacted the subsequent consideration of the medical evidence, plaintiff's symptom testimony, the RFC assessment, and the ultimate decision of non-disability”)).
Consequently, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in failing to discuss whether Plaintiff has an MDI of somatic symptom disorder at Step Two. Further, this error was not harmless and requires remand.
3) Medical Opinion Regarding Somatic Symptom Disorder
Plaintiff argues that, when determining the RFC, the ALJ also committed error by failing to seek an expert opinion regarding the existence of an MDI “that could reasonably account for the symptoms that [Plaintiff] found most impairing,” i.e., gastrointestinal pain and nausea. (Doc. 17 at 8, 11). The Commissioner counters that “the ALJ was able to rely on the conclusions of doctors who interpreted [raw medical data] when determining that Plaintiff did not have a severe physical impairment.” (Doc. 19 at 8). However, here, the Court finds the Plaintiff's argument persuasive-because the Court has concluded that the ALJ must discuss somatic symptom disorder at Step Two, it is possible that additional development of medical opinion evidence is required to determine whether any changes to Plaintiff's RFC are justified.
In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must fully develop the record in order to resolve any ambiguities within. E.g., Tonapteyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). Specifically, in cases of inconsistent evidence or when the ALJ needs “highly technical or specialized medical evidence” that is not available in the record, it may be appropriate obtain an expert opinion. Katie E.B., 2022 WL 459062, at *9 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519a(b); 416.919a(b)) (additional citation omitted).
Diagnoses of somatic symptom disorder can be associated with inconsistent evidence in the record. Id. at *9 (citation omitted). Because the Court is unaware of any medical source opinions in the record that that directly address any functional limitations stemming from somatic symptom disorder, it may be necessary to obtain an additional medical opinion addressing this disorder. See Id. at *9 (citing Jacob M. v. Comm'r, SSA, N. 6:17-CV-02000-MC, 2019 WL 2267303, at *5 (“[T]he ALJ erred by failing to ... obtain a medical source opinion addressing Plaintiff's conversion disorder.”); see also Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 543, 460 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is the ALJ's duty to develop the medical record where “there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.”)). Hence, if the ALJ determines on remand that somatic symptom disorder is among Plaintiff's MDIs at Step Two, the ALJ must obtain an additional medical source opinion or examination to address this disorder-or alternatively, explain why no such opinion is required.
B. Plaintiff's Symptom Testimony
As discussed above, the ALJ's errors implicate the assessment of Plaintiff's symptom testimony. See also Katie E. B., 2022 WL 459062, at *5 (“Had the ALJ considered somatic symptom disorder at step two and found it to be an MDI, he would have been required to consider Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony in the context of her somatic symptom disorder.”). Thus, the Court declines to individually address all of Plaintiff's arguments challenging that assessment. However, because the ALJ did not discuss somatic symptom disorder as an alternative explanation for contradictions between Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony and the objective medical evidence, the Court agrees with Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ did not wholly provide clear and convincing reasons for her rejection of Plaintiff's symptom testimony. (Doc. 17 at 12); Katie E. B., 2022 WL 459062, at *3-6 (finding that the ALJ did not provide “clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony as inconsistent with the objective medical evidence” because the ALJ failed to discuss somatic symptom disorder in his decision); see also Elliot G. v. Kijakazi, No 1:20-CV-1701-SI, 2022 WL 910055, at *9 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2022) (“The ALJ erred in failing to address Plaintiff's somatic symptom disorder in considering his subjective symptom testimony.”). Subsequently, the ALJ should reconsider Plaintiff's symptom testimony in aggregate on remand and address the material possibility that inconsistencies between Plaintiff's symptom testimony and the objective medical evidence of record are attributable to somatic symptom disorder.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that the District Court REMAND this matter to the Commissioner for further administrative action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party may file and serve written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District Judge. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-22-00553-TUC-SHR.
Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review.