Opinion
18-CV-09041 (PMH)
12-23-2020
LORETTA AZUKA NWABUNDO OBI, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN KOEHLER, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER :
Plaintiff Loretta Aguke-Nwabundo Obi ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings claims of excessive force and false arrest against Sergeant Steven Koehler ("Sgt. Koehler"), Officer Edwin Ramirez ("Officer Ramirez"), and Officer Scott Forsythe ("Officer Forsythe" and collectively "Defendants") of the Westchester County Department of Public Safety. By motion dated May 18, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the claim of false arrest alleged in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 22; Doc. 24, "Defs. Br.").
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' partial motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a "sovereign" individual who identifies as "exempt from any and all identifications, treatments, and requirements as such pursuant to any process, law, code, or statute . . ." (Doc. 7, Second Am. Compl., "SAC" at 6, 14), commenced this action on October 2, 2018. Three days later, on October 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 3). By Order dated August 19, 2019, Chief Judge McMahon dismissed Plaintiff's claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Hon. Mark F. Farrell, Hon. John J. Donohue, Spencer C. Littman, and Gary R. Rick; and directed Plaintiff to amend her pleading to reallege her excessive force and false arrest claims against Sgt. Koehler, Officer Ramirez, and Officer Forsythe, and her conversion claim against Pratow Corporation. (Doc. 6, "Order to Amend").
Page numbers refer to those generated by the Court's electronic filing system.
On October 23, 2019, this action was reassigned to Judge Karas, and on April 16, 2020, it was reassigned to me.
On October 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint against Sgt. Koehler, Officer Ramirez, and Officer Forsythe. Plaintiff alleges that on August 3, 2018, her vehicle was parked in front of a nail salon. (SAC at 6). Plaintiff, who was inside the salon, noticed two police cars blocking her vehicle. (Id.). She went outside and "identified herself as the owner of the automobile without registration and registered plate number." (Id.). Defendants asked Plaintiff for her driver's license. (Id.). She attempted to explain that she "was NOT acting in a commercial capacity as a 'driver' of a 'motor vehicle' in 'trade,' 'traffic,' or 'transportation' as defined in 49 U.S.C. § 31301 and therefore 'motor vehicle codes' are not applicable if traveling by means of the day to get from one place to another." (Id. at 7).
When Plaintiff asked why she was being arrested, Officer Ramirez allegedly slapped her across the face, and with the assistance of Officer Forsythe, who held Plaintiff against a brick wall, Officer Ramirez repeatedly struck Plaintiff's head against the brick wall; Sgt. Koehler was also present. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff was then arrested by Defendants. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that the criminal proceedings are ongoing. (Id.). Plaintiff annexed to the Second Amended Complaint eight exhibits: a copy of an "Identification Card & Notice & Claim of Right of, To Travel w/o THE UNITED STATES, THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al." (id. at 13); an "Affidavit of Status" (id. at 14-16); a "Statement for Police" (id. at 17); medical records and photographs (id. at 19-24); an appearance ticket listing the charges against Plaintiff, which was signed by Officer Forsythe (id. at 18); portions of the Westchester County Police Department Case Report with partially legible copies of Officer Ramirez's narrative ("Ramirez Report") (id. at 25-26), and Officer Forsythe's narrative ("Forsythe Report") (id. at 28); a copy of the violation information (id. at 27); and a prisoner property receipt with a notation that Plaintiff refused to sign (id. at 29-30).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "the Court is entitled to consider facts alleged in the complaint and documents attached to it or incorporated in it by reference, [as well as] documents 'integral' to the complaint and relied upon in it, and facts of which judicial notice may properly be taken . . . ." Heckman v. Town of Hempstead, 568 F. App'x 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2014); Manley v. Utzinger, No. 10-CV-2210, 2011 WL 2947008, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2011) (explaining that a court may consider "statements or documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and documents possessed by or known to the plaintiff and upon which the plaintiff relied in bringing the suit"). Plaintiff referred to and attached to her Second Amended Complaint copies of both the Forsythe Report and Ramirez Report which are portions of the Case Report prepared by the Westchester County Department of Public Safety. (SAC at 8-9, 25-26, 28). Defendants filed fully legible copies of same. Plaintiff also submitted a copy of the appearance ticket signed by Officer Forsythe and the violation information issued by the Westchester County Department of Public Safety. The Court may and does consider the Case Report, appearance ticket, and violation information on this motion. See Fox v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-9661, 2019 WL 3003993, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2019); Awelewa v. New York City, No. 11-CV-778, 2012 WL 601119, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012). Citations to the Forsythe Report and Ramirez Report herein will be to page numbers generated by the Court's electronic filing system on the more legible copies proffered by Defendants as part of the Case Report.
On May 18, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the false arrest claim for relief alleged in the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They annexed four exhibits to the Declaration of Taryn A. Chapman-Langrin, which was filed in support of the motion (Doc. 23), including: the supporting deposition of Donna M. Atkinson, a Mount Kisco Parking Enforcement Officer ("Officer Atkinson") (Doc. 23-2, "Atkinson Statement"); the arrest report compiled by Officer Forsythe (Doc. 23-3); and a copy of the Case Report including legible copies of the Forsythe Report and Ramirez Report (Doc. 23-4, "Case Report"). In their memorandum of law in support of their motion, Defendants requested also that the Court direct Plaintiff to amend her pleading to comply with the short and plain statement pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and to set forth her allegations in separately numbered paragraphs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10.
Plaintiff pled that Officer Atkinson had "flagged down" Defendants when attempting to issue a ticket for Plaintiff's vehicle at an expired meter. (SAC at 6). Officer Atkinson's sworn statement may properly be considered at this stage. See Lee v. Town of Southampton, No. 18-CV-3167, 2020 WL 1237198, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2020) (concluding that the "Criminal File," including the written statement provided to police, was proper to consider on a motion to dismiss in a § 1983 action alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution), adopted by 2020 WL 1234200 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2020); see also Oblio v. City Univ. of City of New York, No. 01-CV-5118, 2003 WL 1809471, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2003).
On May 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 26; Doc. 27, "Pl. Br."). The motion was fully briefed as of June 18, 2020 with the filing of Defendants' reply in the form of an attorney affirmation. (Doc. 30). Subsequently, on June 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed what the Court will refer to as a sur-reply. (Doc. 31).
There is no entry in the docket showing that Plaintiff sought leave to file a sur-reply or that such leave was granted.. Local Civil Rule 6.1 does not contemplate the filing of a sur-reply. See Local Civil Rule 6.1(b). The Court need not consider a sur-reply where no permission to file was sought or given. Bisesto v. Uher, No. 19-CV-1678, 2019 WL 2537452, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2019) (collecting cases). "Although Plaintiff is proceeding in a pro se capacity, [s]he has an obligation, notwithstanding her pro se status, to be aware of and adhere to all applicable procedural rules." Sachs v. Matano, No. 15-CV-6049, 2016 WL 4179792, at *2, n.5 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016), adopted by 2016 WL 4186708 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016) (citing Jonas v. Citibank, N.A., 414 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)) ("[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel."); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) ("The right of self-representation is not a license . . . not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law."); Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (pro se status "does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law") (internal citation omitted); Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that pro se litigants "generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them") (internal quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court declines to consider Plaintiff's sur-reply. In any event, even if it were considered, the improperly filed sur-reply would not change the result herein.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion enables a court to consider dismissing a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face "when the ple[d] factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully." Id. The factual allegations pled "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
"When there are well-ple[d] factual allegations [in the complaint], a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the court must "take all well-ple[d] factual allegations as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). However, the presumption of truth does not extend to "legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of actions." Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662). Therefore, a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions" to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
A complaint submitted by a pro se plaintiff, "however inartfully ple[d], must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because pro se plaintiffs are often unfamiliar with the formalities of pleading requirements, courts must apply a more flexible standard in determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint than they would in reviewing the complaint of an individual represented by counsel. Smith v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 218 F. Supp. 2d 357 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). While "[p]ro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, even following Twombly and Iqbal . . . dismissal of a pro se complaint is nevertheless appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to meet minimum pleading requirements." Thomas v. Westchester Cty., No. 12-CV-6718, 2013 WL 3357171, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (internal citations omitted); see also Chavis v. Cappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Even in a pro se case, [ ] 'although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.'" (quoting Harris, 572 F.3d at 72)).
Therefore, while the Court is "obligated to draw the most favorable inferences that [a plaintiff's] complaint supports, [it] cannot invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has not pled." Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170. The Court also has a duty to interpret the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
ANALYSIS
I. False Arrest Claim
"A false arrest claim under Section 1983 'incorporates the elements of the state law where the arrest took place'—here, New York." Johnson v. City of New York, 18-CV-6256, 2020 WL 2732068, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2020) (quoting Youngblood v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-3541, 2019 WL 6216498, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2019)). As such, to state a claim for false arrest under § 1983, Plaintiff must plead "that (1) the defendant intended to confine [her], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement[,] and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged." Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[P]robable cause is an absolute defense" to a false arrest claim; in effect, eliminating the fourth element of the claim relative to the confinement not otherwise being privileged. Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Torraco v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 615 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original)); see also Kilburn v. Vill. of Saranac Lake, 413 F. App'x 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2011); McClenic v. Shmettan, No. 15-CV-705, 2016 WL 3920219, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016) (explaining that "probable cause is a complete defense to a false arrest claim, even where the plaintiff was ultimately acquitted of the criminal charges") (internal quotation marks omitted)). Defendants argue that probable cause to arrest existed. (See Defs. Br. at 9-13). Plaintiff argues that her parking violation is not a crime which can form a basis for probable cause to arrest, and that "probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion that a suspect committed a crime, but not enough information to prove that the person is guilty of a crime (beyond a reasonable doubt)." (Pl. Br. at 5 (emphasis omitted), 11-12).
Given the Court's determinations herein, it does not reach Defendants' arguments as to arguable probable cause or qualified immunity. (See Defs. Br. at 8-9).
"Probable cause to arrest . . . exists when the officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime." Wierzbic v. Howard, --- F. App'x ---, 2020 WL 7038597, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 1, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). "This standard is an objective one and evaluates 'the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest.'" Ventillo v. Falco, et al., No. 19-CV-03664, 2020 WL 7496294, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)). This standard requires that a court consider "the totality of the circumstances and . . . be aware that probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As probable cause is an objective question, the arresting officer's subjective belief as to its existence is immaterial; moreover, "[t]he arresting officer need not have had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for the specific offense invoked by the officer at the time of the arrest, or the offense with which the plaintiff was charged." Tompkins v. City of New York, 50 F. Supp. 3d 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Rather, probable cause "to arrest the suspect of any crime" will suffice. Coleman v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-4921, 2009 WL 705539, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009); see also Butler v. Brito, No. 15-CV-9718, 2017 WL 2116687, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2017). Hearsay can "establish probable cause." Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-4574, 2019 WL 1452013, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2019) (quoting United States v. Parcel of Prop., 337 F.3d 225, 236 (2d Cir. 2003)). "Probable cause can exist even where it is based on mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on that information." Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (1994); Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a police officer is "not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest."). "Put another way, police officers may have had probable cause to arrest if they have acted reasonably, even if they were mistaken." Yun v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-9267, 2019 WL 6918515, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2019).
Probable cause exists where officers are merely enforcing a statute that they directly observed a plaintiff violating. Heicklen v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 10-CV-2239, 2011 WL 3841543, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011) (citing Randle v. Rakiecki, No. 08-CV-579A, 2009 WL 4571822, at *2-3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2009) (probable cause defeating false arrest Bivens claim existed and motion to dismiss granted where defendant directly observed clear and undisputed violation of federal regulations; defendant had ample reason to detain men in question and issue violation notices)), adopted by 2011 WL 4442669 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011). Moreover, a plaintiff's refusal to provide her driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance provides probable cause for an arrest under New York law. Yun, 2019 WL 6918515, at *3 ("Under New York law, while it is preferable to issue a summons, an officer may arrest a driver if she is unwilling or unable to provide identification."); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (it is constitutionally permissible to take a defendant into custody after a traffic infraction); Butler, 2017 WL 2116687, at *4 (a violation of the New York Vehicle & Traffic Law is an offense for which an individual may be arrested).
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, obstructing governmental administration, and resisting arrest. (SAC at 7, 18). Plaintiff concedes that "a parking violation occurred" (Pl. Br. at 12), and that she "identified as the owner of the automobile without registration and registered plate number" (SAC at 6). Officer Atkinson "waved down [Defendants] . . . for a parking complaint" because she was unable to issue a ticket for the expired meter as the vehicle's "plates" read "'PRIVATE, NO DRIVER LICENSE OR INSURANCE REQUIRED, NOT FOR COMMERCE USE -- PRIVATE MODE OF TRAVEL' and the VIN on the dash was covered with a taped napkin." (Case Report at 3). Plaintiff then exited a nail salon, approached the vehicle, and attempted to put a quarter in the expired meter; Defendants inquired if that was her vehicle. (Case Report at 4). Although Plaintiff did not verbally respond, she walked back into the nail salon, returned with car keys, opened the passenger door, and produced a "small card that contained her rights as a 'Free Traveler.'" (Id.). Defendants requested Plaintiff's identification and registration for the vehicle, which she refused to produce. (Id.).
Plaintiff "continued to refuse to give [Defendants] the vehicle information" and "became irate." (Id.). Plaintiff "immediately began to yell and use abusive language." (Atkinson Statement at 2). Plaintiff "continued to yell and act belligerent . . . [and] began using profane language." (Case Report at 4). Defendants observed that "a crowd start[ed] to form . . . [and] a summer camp on a field trip [was] walking on the other side of the street as the chaperone hurried the alarmed looking children along (who were staring at the above scene)." (Id. at 3). Officer Forsythe attempted to arrest Plaintiff at that time for disorderly conduct and obstruction of governmental administration. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff then attempted to flee into the nail salon. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff was "flailing around and yelling." (Atkinson Statement at 2). While Defendants attempted to place Plaintiff into handcuffs, Plaintiff "mov[ed] her body in a violent, aggressive nature, and tens[ed] her arms aggressively so she would not be handcuffed." (Case Report at 5). Defendants were ultimately able to place Plaintiff in handcuffs and into the police vehicle. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that there is "no law-making [sic] obscenity, belligerence, cursing a crime" and that she was simply "[p]assionately expressing" herself. (Pl. Br. at 9).
That Plaintiff had "private" license plates on her car, coupled with her continued refusal to provide her license, registration, and proof of insurance constituted probable cause for her arrest. See Yun, 2019 WL 6918515, at *3; N.Y. Penal Law § 402(1)(a). Plaintiff's refusal to produce the required information in connection with her parking violation, her verbal confrontation with Defendants in public including the use of obscene language, and her actions of fleeing and resisting arrest, all support her arrest on the basis of probable cause for all three charges. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 195.05, 205.30, 240.20(3).
In the Order to Amend, Chief Judge McMahon determined with respect to an earlier version of Plaintiff's complaint that on these facts, probable cause to arrest Plaintiff existed, and urged Plaintiff to flesh out her claim, inter alia, for false arrest by "provid[ing] facts . . . suggesting that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest her. Plaintiff should also provide information regarding the status or outcome of the criminal proceedings." Order to Amend at 8.
Under these circumstances, Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and as such, her false arrest claim for relief is dismissed.
II. Request to Compel Plaintiff to Amend
Defendants also request, in their memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss, that Plaintiff be directed to amend her Second Amended Complaint. Defendants contend that they are prejudiced in framing adequate responses to the Second Amended Complaint due to Plaintiff's failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a pleading contain short and plain statements of the claim. (Defs. Br. at 13-14). They further contend that Plaintiff's failure to allege each fact in separately numbered paragraphs pursuant to Rule 10(b) is prejudicial to their ability to respond to the pleading, and a direction to amend would promote clarity and prevent confusion of the issues. (Defs. Br. at 14). Plaintiff opposes Defendants' request that she be directed to amend her pleading. (Pl. Br. at 12-13).
Local Civil Rule 7.1 provides that the "notice of motion . . . shall specify the applicable rules or statutes pursuant to which the motion is brought, and shall specify the relief sought by the motion." Local Civil Rule 7.1(a). "[I]t is improper to assert in a memorandum of law a legal basis for the motion that was not specified in the notice of motion." I.O.B. Realty, Inc. v. Patsy's Brand, Inc., No. 19-CV-2776, 2020 WL 5518230, at *2, n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2020). The Court addresses Defendants' request despite the failure to comply with Local Civil Rule 7.1. See, e.g., Fiedler v. Incandela, 222 F. Supp. 3d 141, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("[T]he court has discretion to overlook a failure to comply with Local Rule 7.1.").
The Second Amended Complaint is not a model of clarity. Indeed, some of the pleading consists of assertions against Defendants interspersed with citations and excerpts from often unrelated legal authorities. (See SAC at 7-10). However, "[i]nstead of focusing on whether a complaint's allegations are 'short and plain' or 'simple, concise, and direct,' the Court asks whether the complaint gives 'fair notice' to the defendants." Ong v. Park Manor (Middletown Park) Rehab. & Healthcare Ctr., 51 F. Supp. 3d 319, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 542 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that a complaint satisfied Rule 8 where the "allegations [were] sufficiently clear to have provided [the defendant] with a fair understanding of what the plaintiff [was] complaining about and to have allowed [the defendant] to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
However inartful the pleading here, it is only seven pages long, sets forth with sufficiently specific detail Plaintiff's claims for relief, and provides Defendants notice of what Plaintiff is complaining about. The Court simply cannot say that this pleading fails to put Defendants on fair notice of Plaintiff's claims. The Court finds that Defendants are thus not prejudiced in framing an answer to the remaining claim for relief in the Second Amended Complaint. Accordingly, Defendants' request that Plaintiff be directed to amend her pleading is denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED. The Court dismisses Plaintiff's false arrest claim for relief. Defendants are directed to file an answer to the Second Amended Complaint by January 15, 2021.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending motion (Doc. 22).
SO ORDERED: Dated: New York, New York
December 23, 2020
/s/_________
Philip M. Halpern
United States District Judge